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 3 
Abstract	
	
This	project	explores	the	issue	of	selectivity	within	contemporary	
international	politics,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	implementation	of	the	
United	Nations’	Responsibility	to	Protect	principle,	from	a	postcolonial	
perspective.	It	argues	that	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	selective	
implementation	of	policy	in	contemporary	contexts,	it	is	necessary	to	
examine	the	historical	origins	of	the	United	Nations	and	to	highlight	the	
institutionalisation	of	postcolonial	privilege	in	international	political	
organisations.	Through	the	use	of	archival	data,	it	shows	that	the	United	
Nations	is	an	institution	that	has	been	committed	to	the	perpetuation	of	
colonial	power	structures	through	the	development	of	new	forms	of	
government	and	structures	of	control,	relying	on	problematic	discourses	of	
civilisation	and	progress	that	legitimate	a	global	power	structure	that	has	
its	roots	in	colonialism.	It	begins	with	the	provision	of	an	alternative	
historical	narrative	that	highlights	the	significance	of	colonialism	in	the	
founding	of	the	United	Nations	and	that	seeks	to	undermine	the	discourse	
of	equality	that	is	frequently	attributed	to	the	organisation.	It	then	moves	
on	to	explore	more	concrete	examples	of	the	structures	of	the	United	
Nations	that	have	allowed	for	the	continuation	of	colonial	power	relations	
before	examining	these	ideas	in	relation	to	the	contemporary	politics	of	
intervention,	particularly	focusing	on	the	role	of	the	Security	Council	as	the	
locus	of	postcolonial	and	neocolonial	power.				
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Introduction	
	
‘If	we	believe	that	all	human	beings	are	equally	entitled	to	be	protected	
from	acts	that	shock	the	conscience	of	us	all,	then	we	must	match	rhetoric	
with	reality,	principle	with	practice.	We	cannot	be	content	with	reports	and	
declarations.	We	must	be	prepared	to	act.	We	won’t	be	able	to	live	with	
ourselves	if	we	do	not’	(International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	
State	Sovereignty,	2001:	75).		
	
	
Selective	Responsibility:	The	United	Nations	and	Contemporary	Conflicts	
	
The	early	months	of	2011	saw	the	beginning	of	a	wave	of	revolutionary	
protests	that	had	started	in	Tunisia	in	December	of	2010	and	quickly	
spread	across	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	that	have	come	to	be	
known	more	commonly	as	the	‘Arab	Spring’	(Bellamy	and	Williams,	2011:	
838).	These	protests	saw	huge	numbers	of	pro-democracy	campaigners	
take	to	the	streets	in	uprisings	against	long-standing	dictatorial	
governments	(Henderson,	2014:	176).	Each	situation	encouraged	and	
bolstered	by	the	revolutionary	nature	of	surrounding	protests,	civilians	
objected	to	the	harsh	conditions	imposed	by	governments	under	which	
they	had	been	living	in	some	cases	for	decades.	The	protests	had	differing	
outcomes	throughout	the	region,	but	in	the	cases	of	Libya	and	Syria,	these	
protests	quickly	descended	into	civil	war	(Wilson,	2014:	158).		
	
As	I	watched	these	civil	wars	and	the	inevitable	humanitarian	crises	that	
followed	unfold	in	the	newspapers	and	on	television,	I	was	acutely	aware	
of	the	international	response	in	each	case	and	began	to	do	some	research	
into	the	policies	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	organisation	that	was	designed	
to	deal	with	international	peace	and	security.	It	seemed	clear	to	me	that	
 5 
the	large-scale	loss	of	life	in	these	contexts	required	a	response	from	the	
international	community	that	amounted	to	more	than	charity	donations	
and	sympathy	and	that	there	would	be	a	policy	in	place	for	how	to	deal	
with	such	a	situation.	Surely	the	purpose	of	international	organisations	
such	as	the	United	Nations	is	to	act	in	cases	where	civilian	lives	are	in	
danger?	Within	this	particular	time	frame	and	geographical	context,	what	
interested	and	alarmed	me	most	was	the	stark	difference	between	the	
response	to	Libya	and	the	(non-)	response	to	Syria.		
	
My	research	began	by	looking	at	the	particular	policies	of	the	United	
Nations	in	dealing	with	international	humanitarian	emergencies,	which	the	
situation	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	undoubtedly	was.	In	2001,	the	
International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	Sovereignty	(ICISS)	
produced	a	report	detailing	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	a	new	principle	in	
guiding	United	Nations	approaches	to	intervention	within	the	international	
community.	Following	the	publication	of	the	report	in	2001,	this	principle	
was	agreed	upon	by	the	member	states	of	the	United	Nations	at	the	World	
Summit	in	2005	and	it	remains	the	leading	principle	in	debates	around	
intervention.	The	report	stated	that	in	the	case	of	large-scale	loss	of	life	
such	as	that	which	has	been	seen	during	these	two	civil	wars,	the	
Responsibility	to	Protect	would	be	the	policy	that	guided	any	intervention	
led	by	the	United	Nations	(ICISS,	2001:	xii).		
	
In	the	two	specific	cases	of	Libya	and	Syria	however,	the	Responsibility	to	
protect	was	not	applied	equally.	On	March	17th	2011,	the	Security	Council	
adopted	Resolution	1973,	which	authorised	the	use	of	‘all	necessary	
measures’	in	dealing	with	the	escalating	conflict	in	Libya	(United	Nations,	
2011:	3).	This	amounts	to	an	agreement	that	member	states	could	organise	
a	military	intervention	in	order	to	protect	civilians	in	Libya	from	the	
violence	of	the	Gaddafi	regime	under	the	principle	of	Responsibility	to	
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Protect.	The	response	was	clear	and	rapid;	the	international	community	
would	not	stand	by	and	allow	a	dictatorship	to	continue	in	the	face	of	a	
huge	pro-democracy	revolution.	The	United	Nations	quickly	acted	to	
enforce	a	no	fly	zone	and	an	arms	embargo	in	Libya,	followed	by	NATO-led	
air	strikes	(Averre	and	Davies,	2015:	818).	The	United	Nations	sent	a	clear	
message	that	the	responsibility	of	the	international	community	was	to	
protect	civilians	in	danger	and	to	support	the	development	of	democratic	
governments.		
	
However,	in	spite	of	similar	circumstances	in	Syria	the	following	year	and	
the	large-scale	loss	of	life	at	the	hands	of	the	Assad	government,	the	
response	was	much	less	clear.	To	many	it	seemed	obvious	that	the	
situation	in	Syria	demanded	the	same	international	action	that	had	been	
seen	in	the	case	of	Libya.	However,	this	was	not	the	case	and	military	
intervention	was	not	authorised	due	to	the	continuous	vetoes	of	the	
Russian	and	Chinese	governments	(Weiss,	2014:	13).	These	vetoes	have	
effectively	paralysed	the	Security	Council	and	prevented	the	United	
Nations	from	taking	military	action	in	Syria.		
	
As	they	played	out	in	international	news	coverage,	the	cases	of	Libya	and	
Syria	prompted	me	to	think	about	the	underlying	structures	that	would	
allow	for	the	obvious	selective	enforcement	of	policy	in	this	way.	How	is	it	
possible	that	two	remarkably	similar	contexts	could	be	dealt	with	in	such	
different	ways	by	an	institution	committed	to	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security?	It	is	this	question	of	selectivity	that	
prompted	this	thesis	and	that	provided	the	basis	for	an	investigation	into	
the	historical	development	of	the	United	Nations.	Where	the	policy	states	
that	the	United	Nations	has	a	responsibility	to	protect	civilians	in	danger	as	
the	result	of	conflict,	how	is	it	possible	that	one	situation	results	in	a	full-
scale	military	intervention	and	the	other	does	not?		
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Here,	the	focus	is	on	history.	The	following	pages	provide	a	historical	
analysis	of	the	development	of	the	United	Nations	that	aims	to	critique	the	
notions	of	responsibility	that	underpin	this	policy	and	argue	that	
responsibility	in	this	context	functions	to	obscure	the	role	of	the	major	
powers	within	the	United	Nations.	The	argument	that	follows	shows	that	
the	ability	for	this	responsibility	to	be	applied	selectively	is	the	result	of	a	
deliberate	structuring	of	the	United	Nations	and	particularly	of	the	Security	
Council	that	institutionalises	the	privilege	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	
nations,	supported	by	problematic	discourses	of	development	and	
civilisation	that	were	born	out	of	the	colonial	encounter	(Anghie,	2005).	
The	primary	objective	here	is	to	disrupt	the	dominant	discourses	of	
equality	that	surround	the	United	Nations	and	frame	it	as	a	universal,	equal	
and	representative	body,	instead	arguing	that	the	power	differentials	
characteristic	of	formal	colonialism	are	reproduced	through	the	structure	
of	the	United	Nations	as	an	international	organisation.		
	
This	thesis	is	grounded	in	a	political	belief	that	the	current	global	system	is	
unjust	and	that	international	institutions	such	as	the	United	Nations	play	a	
key	role	in	the	reproduction	of	inequality,	partly	through	the	ability	of	the	
powerful	to	write	history.	It	is	based	on	a	normative	belief	in	equality,	
redistribution	and	justice,	specifically	in	this	context	for	formerly	colonised	
nations.	The	research	that	has	been	undertaken	and	the	arguments	that	
follow	contribute	to	postcolonial	theories	of	international	relations	that	
wish	to	address	the	current	formation	of	the	world	by	taking	into	account	
its	colonial	past	and	insisting	on	the	redistribution	of	global	wealth	and	
power.	The	purpose	of	this	project	is	to	contribute	to	a	broader	
questioning	of	political	power	and	a	commitment	to	citizens	holding	states	
accountable	for	their	behaviour.		Any	claims	that	are	made	in	terms	of	
legitimacy,	validity	and	accuracy	of	historical	accounts	are	made	from	this	
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normative	position	and	reflect	a	moral	and	political	commitment	to	
addressing	the	inequality	established	through	the	colonial	encounter	and	
to	disrupting	hegemonies.	This	begins	with	a	commitment	to	an	
understanding	of	the	past	that	illuminates	that	which	has	been	silenced	as	
part	of	the	violence	of	colonialism.			
	
Key	Themes	and	Grounding	Frameworks	
	
In	discussing	the	specific	issue	of	the	application	of	Responsibility	to	
Protect	within	global	politics,	this	thesis	relies	on	theoretical	frameworks	to	
ground	the	discussions	and	involves	a	number	of	key	themes	that	are	
recurring	throughout.	Postcolonial	theory	provides	the	lens	through	which	
the	social	world	is	viewed,	whilst	methodologically,	the	project	focuses	on	
reading	the	contemporary	world	through	the	historical.	The	thesis	hopes	to	
contribute	to	a	sociology	of	international	relations	and	stress	the	value	of	
sociological	research	in	an	arena	frequently	dominated	by	legal	and	
political	scholars.	These	key	frameworks	will	be	introduced	briefly	here.		
	
Postcolonial	Theory	
Postcolonial	approaches	to	understanding	the	social	world	are	an	attempt	
to	redistribute	the	power	that	comes	from	dominant	knowledge.	As	
prominent	postcolonial	theorist	Homi	K.	Bhabha	argues:	
	
‘They	intervene	in	those	ideological	discourses	of	
modernity	that	attempt	to	give	a	hegemonic	“normality”	to	
the	uneven	development	and	the	differential,	often	
disadvantaged,	histories	of	nations,	races,	communities,	
peoples.	They	formulate	their	critical	revisions	around	
issues	of	cultural	difference,	social	authority,	and	political	
discrimination	in	order	to	reveal	the	antagonistic	and	
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ambivalent	moments	within	the	“rationalizations”	of	
modernity’	(1994:	246).		
	
The	intention	of	postcolonial	theory	is	always	to	disrupt	those	dominant	
discourses	that	naturalise	the	uneven	development	of	the	globe	that	
occurred	as	a	result	of	the	colonial	encounter.	This	thesis	is	grounded	in	
postcolonial	theory	as	an	approach	to	understanding	the	world.	It	works	on	
the	basis	that	the	impact	of	colonialism	did	not	end	with	the	granting	of	
independence	to	former	colonial	territories	and	that	dominant	discourses	
that	were	allowed	to	thrive	as	a	result	of	colonialism	should	be	challenged.		
As	with	other	postcolonial	projects,	the	arguments	developed	throughout	
the	following	chapters	provide	a	resistance	to	the	desire	to	assume	that	
colonialism	ended	with	the	formal	process	of	decolonisation	(Gandhi,	
1998:	4).	The	belief	that	motivates	this	project	is	that	colonialism	shaped	
the	world	to	such	a	degree	that	its	aftermath	cannot	be	undone	through	
the	granting	of	formal	independence	to	former	colonies.		
	
In	line	with	this	belief,	this	project	focuses	on	the	role	played	by	
international	institutions	in	the	framing	of	colonialism	as	a	distinct,	self-
contained	period	in	history	that	takes	no	responsibility	for	the	current	state	
of	the	international	community	–	what	Gandhi	terms	‘mystifying	amnesia’	
(1998:	4).		In	addressing	this	ability	of	colonialism	to	disguise	its	history,	
this	thesis	seeks	to	illustrate	the	ways	in	which	the	colonial	history	of	the	
United	Nations	as	an	international	organisation	has	affected	its	very	
foundations,	its	structures	and	its	ways	of	framing	the	world.	This	is	done	
on	the	basis	that	the	United	Nations	plays	a	key	role	in	the	maintenance	of	
global	hierarchies	and	that	it	has	significant	influence	in	the	contemporary	
desire	to	regard	colonialism	only	as	an	event	in	history.		
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Whilst	postcolonial	theory	provides	the	lens	through	which	the	problem	is	
viewed,	throughout	the	following	chapters,	distinctions	will	be	made	
between	postcolonial	power	and	neocolonial	technologies	of	power.	
References	to	‘postcolonial	power’	signify	an	acknowledgment	that	
colonialism	affected	the	structure	of	global	society	to	the	extent	that	we	
cannot	understand	the	current	global	positioning	of	states	without	
understanding	their	role	in	colonialism.	The	use	of	this	term	represents	an	
acknowledgement	that	the	majority	of	the	world	has	undergone	a	process	
of	formal	decolonisation,	but	that	the	effects	of	colonialism	are	so	
significant	that	we	must	continue	to	recognise	its	impact	when	discussing	
the	contemporary	global	context	(Seth,	2013:	1).	This	term	will	therefore	
be	used	when	discussing	colonial	power	structures	that	continue	to	
structure	contemporary	global	relationships.		
	
The	arguments	throughout	this	thesis	will	also	discuss	neocolonialism	and	
neocolonial	technologies,	which	refer	to	something	slightly	different.	
Kwame	Nkrumah,	the	first	prime	minister	of	Ghana,	discusses	this	
terminology	at	length	in	his	book	Neo-Colonialism:	The	Last	Stage	of	
Imperialism	(1965).	Writing	in	the	years	following	the	decolonisation	of	
large	parts	of	Africa,	Nkrumah	argues	that	neocolonialism	developed	as	the	
main	instrument	of	imperialism	following	the	granting	of	independence	to	
the	colonies,	operating	through	economic	or	financial	control	(1965:	ix).	
Neocolonialism	therefore	refers	to	the	practices	of	former	imperial	powers	
that	result	in	the	economic	control	of	colonies	that	have	been	granted	
independence.	These	practices	are	often	developed	as	part	of	the	process	
of	decolonisation	via	international	law	and	international	institutions	
(Anghie,	2005:	192).		
	
Within	the	context	of	this	project	then,	the	terms	‘neocolonialism’	or	
‘neocolonial	technologies’	will	be	used	in	order	to	refer	to	the	mechanisms	
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developed	through	the	process	of	decolonisation	that	allow	imperial	
powers	to	maintain	control	over	colonial	territories	in	spite	of	granting	
them	formal	independence.	These	practices	cannot	be	referred	to	as	
colonial	as	they	do	not	form	part	of	a	relationship	of	direct	rule	by	one	
state	over	another,	rather	they	are	neocolonial	as	they	were	developed	as	
new	ways	of	maintaining	control	following	independence.	As	Nkrumah	
argues:	‘the	question	is	one	of	power.	A	State	in	the	grips	of	neocolonialism	
is	not	master	of	its	own	destiny’	(1965:	x).		
	
The	underlying	belief	of	this	project	is	based	upon	this	body	of	work	that	
seeks	to	emphasise	the	extent	to	which	the	contemporary	world	is	still	
feeling	the	effects	of	the	colonial	encounter,	through	the	postcolonial	
structures	of	power	that	continue	to	determine	both	the	relationships	
between	states	and	the	positioning	of	states	in	a	global	political	hierarchy,	
and	through	the	neocolonial	technologies	of	power	that	have	been	
developed	via	international	institutions	in	order	to	ensure	that	former	
colonies	will	never	be	truly	independent.			
	
The	Importance	of	History	
Whilst	postcolonialism	provides	the	overarching	theoretical	impetus	for	
the	thesis,	it	is	also	grounded	in	an	associated	methodological	belief	that	
an	accurate	understanding	of	history	is	essential	to	an	adequate	
understanding	of	the	contemporary	world	(Bhambra,	2007:	2).	It	is	
insufficient	to	approach	contemporary	issues	through	an	examination	of	
just	their	immediate	context.	In	order	to	fully	understand	any	social	issue,	
it	is	necessary	to	explore	the	historical	processes	that	enabled	these	issues	
to	occur.	Following	the	methodological	approach	of	historical	sociology,	
this	thesis	signifies	a	commitment	to	‘taking	history	seriously’	(Steinmo,	
2008:	128).	Within	the	context	of	this	particular	project,	the	aim	is	to	
highlight	the	significance	of	colonialism	in	the	establishment	of	the	United	
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Nations	and	to	examine	the	ways	in	which	colonial	relationships	feed	into	
the	discourses	that	continue	to	frame	contemporary	debates	through	the	
provision	of	a	historical	analysis.		
	
This	project	is	also	heavily	influenced	by	the	work	of	Michel-Rolf	Trouillot	
and	his	book	Silencing	the	Past:	Power	and	the	Production	of	History	
(1995).	It	focuses	on	the	problem	of	silences	in	understanding	history,	
following	Trouillot’s	argument	that	history	is	simultaneously	the	facts	of	
what	happened	in	the	past	and	the	narrative	of	those	facts	that	is	
continued	in	the	present	(1995:	2).	The	chapters	that	follow	will	examine	
contemporary	debates	through	the	lens	of	history,	but	will	also	highlight	
the	silences	in	the	dominant	historical	narratives	on	the	understanding	that	
history	is	always	the	product	of	dominant	knowledge.	It	is	important	
therefore	to	establish	the	particular	aspects	of	history	that	have	been	
silenced	in	conventional	narratives	in	order	to	understand	how	
contemporary	issues	have	been	enabled.		
	
	
Taking	a	Sociological	Approach	
It	may	seem	unusual	for	United	Nations’	policies	on	military	intervention	to	
be	the	focus	of	a	sociological	research	project.	Topics	such	as	this	are	more	
often	dealt	with	in	law	or	politics	and	are	largely	neglected	in	the	field	of	
sociology.	This	thesis	is	both	an	attempt	to	address	this	gap	and	to	
demonstrate	the	contribution	of	sociology	to	a	more	rounded	
understanding	of	these	debates.	This	thesis	takes	a	sociological	approach	
to	issues	around	intervention	and	international	relations,	allowing	for	an	
understanding	of	power	in	relation	to	the	institutionalisation	of	particular	
social	meanings,	with	a	focus	on	the	empirical	conditions	within	which	
power	is	exercised	(Nash,	2010:	193).		
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Borrowing	from	the	conceptual	frameworks	of	historical	sociology	and	the	
theoretical	frameworks	of	postcolonialism,	the	aim	here	is	not	to	recount	
history	but	to	question	the	standard	histories	that	we	take	for	granted	and	
the	structures	that	enable	these	histories	to	be	accepted.	The	aim	is	to	
provide	an	approach	that	resists	narratives	that	construct	our	experiences	
as	necessary	and	natural	(Dean,	2003:	180).		
	
In	terms	of	locating	this	project	within	existing	debates	and	in	relation	to	
existing	literature,	there	is	a	significant	engagement	with	Critical	
International	Relations	scholarship	and	Critical	Legal	Studies	throughout.	
The	subject	matter	and	its	absence	in	sociological	scholarship	make	this	
inevitable.	Particularly	in	relation	to	discussions	around	the	
implementation	of	Responsibility	to	Protect,	the	thesis	engages	with	
Critical	International	Relations	scholarship	that	has	argued	for	an	
understanding	of	this	principle	as	a	process	of	legitimation	for	the	United	
Nations	(see	for	example	Chandler,	2010)	and	work	that	has	been	critical	of	
the	language	of	humanitarianism	that	obscures	the	fact	that	national	
interests	always	outplay	humanitarian	need	within	the	international	
community	(see	Hehir,	2014;	Barnett,	2011).		
	
The	project	should	also	be	read	in	relation	to	Critical	Legal	Studies,	
particularly	with	regard	to	the	discussions	around	sovereignty	that	have	
been	useful	for	the	argument	being	developed	throughout.	Critical	legal	
theory	has	been	particularly	useful	in	terms	of	thinking	through	the	
relationship	between	colonialism	and	international	law	and	sovereignty	as	
a	principle	emerging	from	this	through	the	idea	of	a	civilising	mission	(see	
Anghie,	2005;	Koskenniemi,	2005).	Critical	legal	theorists	have	also	been	
sceptical	of	the	language	of	human	rights,	arguing	that	their	moral	
character	obscures	the	ways	in	which	they	are	used	for	political	ends	(see	
Douzinas,	2007).		
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Both	Critical	International	Relations	Studies	and	Critical	Legal	Studies	have	
provided	useful	points	of	engagement	for	the	thesis	that	follows	in	terms	
of	thinking	through	the	power	relations	involved	in	both	the	political	and	
legal	construction	and	implementation	of	international	law.	Whilst	aspects	
of	this	thesis	are	situated	within	these	debates,	as	a	whole,	the	project	
aims	to	develop	these	arguments	in	terms	of	an	understanding	of	silencing	
as	a	historical	process.	The	aim	here	is	to	engage	with	these	literatures,	but	
add	something	from	the	perspective	of	Sociology	in	terms	of	including	the	
silenced	anti-colonial	resistance	that	occurred	alongside	the	development	
of	international	law	and	international	political	institutions.		
	
In	spite	of	the	sociological	literature	on	this	particular	topic	being	minimal,	
the	project	should	be	viewed	within	a	broader	sociological	critique	of	
neoliberalism	as	a	global	project.	It	fits	within	a	critique	of	the	
contemporary	world	that	exposes	the	contradictions	between	
neoliberalism’s	claims	to	freedom,	liberty,	choice,	rights	and	democracy	
and	its	political	and	economic	policies	that	ensure	the	maintenance	of	
unequal	global	wealth	and	power	(see	Harvey,	2010;	Brown,	2015).				
	
The	thesis	is	innovative	in	its	approach	to	the	topic.	It	takes	a	postcolonial	
theoretical	perspective,	engaging	with	literature	from	other	critical	
disciplines	that	are	more	commonly	aligned	with	the	study	of	international	
institutions	and	reads	them	in	conjunction	with	archive	data	that	has	
previously	been	silenced.	Applying	postcolonial	theory	to	this	particular	
topic	within	the	disciplinary	context	of	sociology	expands	the	reach	of	
postcolonial	theory	in	our	understanding	of	all	aspects	of	global	society	and	
creates	a	greater	engagement	between	postcolonial	theory	as	a	way	of	
understanding	our	contemporary	world,	and	the	disciplines	of	law,	politics	
and	international	relations.	The	thesis	therefore	contributes	to	postcolonial	
theory	through	the	innovative	application	of	its	concepts.			
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Thesis	Structure	
	
Having	provided	a	brief	introduction	to	the	motivations	for	the	project	and	
the	core	theoretical	frameworks	that	will	be	utilised	throughout	the	
following	chapters,	I	will	now	outline	the	structure	of	the	thesis	and	the	
core	arguments	of	each	chapter.	The	thesis	is	split	into	two	parts:	Part	One:	
Challenging	History;	and	Part	Two:	Postcolonialism	in	Practise.	Part	One	
seeks	to	provide	the	theoretical	framework	for	the	thesis,	detailing	the	
approach	to	history	that	will	guide	the	project,	as	well	as	providing	an	
alternative	narrative	to	the	particular	history	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	
institution.	Part	Two	is	made	up	of	three	chapters	that	illustrate	this	theory	
by	working	through	examples	of	how	postcolonial	power	structures	within	
the	United	Nations	play	out	in	reality.	Together,	the	two	parts	form	a	
postcolonial	historical	analysis	of	contemporary	debates	around	
intervention	within	the	United	Nations,	focusing	particularly	on	the	issue	of	
selectivity	and	the	historical	processes	that	have	enabled	it.		
	
Chapter	1	begins	with	a	reconsideration	of	the	documented	history	of	the	
United	Nations.	It	summarises	the	basic	structure	of	the	United	Nations	
and	looks	at	its	core	principles	as	stated	in	the	1945	Charter	of	the	United	
Nations.	It	then	goes	on	to	provide	the	standard	historical	narrative	of	the	
organisation	as	told	by	the	organisation	itself	and	by	a	number	of	historians	
since	its	establishment,	before	offering	an	alternative	approach	to	
understanding	this	history.	This	alternative	approach	is	largely	based	on	
the	work	of	Mark	Mazower	in	his	book	No	Enchanted	Palace:	The	End	of	
Empire	and	the	Ideological	Origins	of	the	United	Nations,	where	he	argues	
that	the	United	Nations	ought	to	be	understood	not	as	a	distinct	
organisation	separate	from	its	historical	predecessors,	but	as	having	
evolved	out	of	prior	failed	institutions,	namely	the	League	of	Nations	
(2009:	17).	Where	standard	narratives	document	the	birth	of	the	United	
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Nations	as	a	distinct	moment	in	time,	this	approach	argues	that	viewing	
the	organisation	as	part	of	a	historical	process	provides	a	more	accurate	
understanding.		
	
Chapter	1	therefore	argues	that	in	order	to	understand	the	role	of	the	
United	Nations	in	the	contemporary	world,	it	is	necessary	to	view	it	as	an	
extension	of	earlier	institutions.	In	doing	so,	it	is	possible	to	see	the	ways	in	
which	the	United	Nations	is	built	upon	power	relations	established	through	
the	process	of	colonialism.	This	chapter	is	an	introduction	to	these	ideas	
that	underpin	the	rest	of	the	thesis,	that	ultimately	the	United	Nations	
signifies	the	institutionalisation	of	colonial	power	relations.	It	also	ends	
with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	contemporary	contexts	mentioned	in	the	
introductory	section	of	this	chapter	that	prompted	this	project	and	by	
asking	questions	about	the	role	of	the	United	Nations	in	the	contemporary	
world.		
	
Chapter	2	builds	upon	the	ideas	introduced	in	Chapter	1	with	an	
introduction	to	postcolonial	critiques	of	the	United	Nations.	This	chapter	
looks	at	the	issues	raised	by	studying	the	United	Nations	from	a	
postcolonial	perspective	and	details	the	approach	that	will	be	taken	
throughout	the	rest	of	the	thesis.	It	argues	that	colonialism	was	significant	
in	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	and	that	colonialism	informed	
the	discourses	of	development	and	civilisation	that	were	the	basis	for	the	
structuring	of	the	organisation.	These	discourses	will	be	challenged	
throughout	the	thesis	on	the	understanding	that	they	continue	to	have	
influence	in	terms	of	the	problematic	framing	of	particular	parts	of	the	
world	as	‘civilised’	and	‘uncivilised’.		
	
Chapter	2	also	introduces	debates	around	the	relationship	between	
sovereignty,	international	law	and	colonialism.	Drawing	closely	on	the	work	
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of	Antony	Anghie,	the	argument	here	is	that	the	United	Nations	and	
international	law	more	broadly	are	reliant	on	the	concept	of	sovereignty	as	
a	way	of	ordering	the	world,	but	that	sovereignty	is	a	concept	that	was	
born	out	of	the	colonial	encounter	in	terms	of	providing	a	way	to	
differentiate	between	European	and	non-European	states	and	in	to	create	
a	system	that	was	able	deal	with	the	relationship	between	them	(Anghie,	
2005:	3).	Following	Anghie’s	line	of	argument,	Chapter	2	contends	that	the	
United	Nations’	reliance	on	sovereignty	as	a	fundamental	principle	of	the	
organisation	is	in	conflict	with	the	organisation’s	claims	to	equality	as	a	
result	of	the	colonial	origins	of	sovereignty	as	a	concept.		
	
Having	explored	the	postcolonial	framework	within	which	the	rest	of	the	
thesis	should	be	understood,	Chapter	3	moves	on	to	provide	a	more	
methodological	framework,	expanding	on	the	ideas	that	have	already	been	
introduced	here.	It	argues	for	the	importance	of	reading	contemporary	
contexts	through	history	and	makes	use	of	Trouillot’s	(1995)	work	on	
silences	in	approaching	the	historical	narratives	of	the	United	Nations.	The	
purpose	of	providing	this	methodological	framework	is	to	make	clear	the	
overall	aim	of	the	project,	which	is	to	disrupt	the	dominant	narratives	of	
equality	and	progress	that	form	the	accepted	history	of	the	United	Nations	
through	the	provision	of	an	alternative	narrative	that	emphasises	the	
significance	of	colonial	domination	and	postcolonial	power	structures	
within	its	establishment.	This	methodological	approach	of	reading	through	
history	is	applied	in	this	context	on	the	basis	that	in	order	to	understand	
contemporary	debates	around	intervention	within	the	United	Nations,	it	is	
essential	to	understand	the	organisation’s	colonial	origins.		
	
Chapter	3	also	outlines	the	practicalities	of	using	archival	data	in	
supporting	the	re-narration	of	the	history	of	an	institution,	firstly	looking	
broadly	at	concerns	around	the	use	of	archives	in	social	research,	before	
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focusing	more	specifically	on	the	practicalities	of	collecting	data	from	the	
United	Nations	Archives.		
	
Chapter	4	is	the	final	chapter	of	Part	One	and	seeks	to	provide	an	
alternative	discourse	in	the	narration	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations.	
It	begins	with	an	examination	of	forms	of	resistance	to	imperialism	in	the	
years	of	the	League	of	Nations	and	traces	this	history	of	resistance	
throughout	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations,	which	eventually	
forced	the	beginning	of	the	process	of	decolonisation.	This	chapter	argues	
that	this	history	of	resistance	to	colonialism	has	been	silenced	in	the	
standard	narratives	of	the	United	Nations	and	that	including	this	history	of	
resistance	removes	the	possibility	of	viewing	the	United	Nations	as	an	
institution	committed	to	equality.	In	providing	this	alternative	history,	
Chapter	4	seeks	not	only	to	challenge	these	dominant	narratives,	but	also	
to	challenge	the	silencing	of	the	resistance	of	particular	nations	that	allows	
for	the	continued	domination	of	others.		
	
Part	Two:	Postcolonialism	in	Practise	is	made	up	of	three	chapters,	each	
exploring	a	key	issue	within	the	United	Nations	from	a	postcolonial	
perspective.	This	begins	in	Chapter	5	with	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	
debates	around	sovereignty	that	are	introduced	in	Part	One.	Following	on	
from	the	position	that	the	United	Nations	represented	evolution	from	the	
League	of	Nations,	the	chapter	starts	with	an	examination	of	the	role	
played	by	the	concept	of	sovereignty	in	the	League,	before	moving	on	to	
discuss	the	development	of	notions	of	sovereign	equality	within	the	United	
Nations.		
	
Chapter	5	argues	that	the	United	Nations	used	the	rhetoric	of	sovereign	
equality	as	a	way	of	distancing	itself	from	the	perceived	imperialism	of	the	
League.	However,	as	the	chapter	goes	on	to	detail,	once	we	examine	the	
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actual	structures	and	systems	of	control	established	by	the	United	Nations,	
it	becomes	difficult	to	understand	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	
committed	to	equality.	The	chapter	illustrates	this	through	an	examination	
of	the	trusteeship	system	that	was	written	into	the	Charter,	arguing	that	
this	system	amounted	to	a	re-branding	of	the	mandate	system	of	the	
League	of	Nations	and	as	such,	was	essentially	loosely	supervised	
colonialism.	Chapter	5	again	draws	heavily	on	the	work	of	Antony	Anghie	in	
understanding	the	relationship	between	sovereignty	and	colonialism,	as	
well	as	using	archival	data	from	the	1945	United	Nations	Conference	on	
International	Organisation	at	San	Francisco.			
	
Advancing	more	concretely	to	the	issue	of	intervention	within	the	United	
Nations,	Chapter	6	examines	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council	and	how	
it	came	to	be	established.	Again	making	use	of	archival	data	from	the	
United	Nations	Archives,	Chapter	6	looks	at	how	the	major	powers	
designed	the	organisation	around	the	institutionalisation	of	their	power.	As	
the	Security	Council	is	both	a	key	body	within	the	United	Nations	and	the	
primary	decision	making	body	with	regards	to	intervention,	the	status	of	
the	five	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	safeguards	their	
ability	to	authorise	and/or	prevent	action	in	line	with	their	own	political	
interests.	This	chapter	argues	that	the	powers	afforded	to	the	permanent	
members	of	the	Security	Council	are	upheld	by	ideologies	of	development	
and	responsibility	that	have	their	roots	in	colonialism,	and	that	the	ability	
of	the	Security	Council	to	act	selectively	with	regards	to	intervention	was	
deliberately	built	into	its	structure	from	the	very	beginning	of	the	United	
Nations.		
	
Whilst	focusing	primarily	on	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council	and	how	
this	was	established	at	the	San	Francisco	conference	and	at	the	Dumbarton	
Oaks	conference	that	preceded	it,	Chapter	6	also	returns	to	the	issue	of	
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sovereignty,	arguing	that	the	role	of	the	Security	Council	in	the	overall	
structure	of	the	United	Nations	and	the	powers	afforded	to	its	permanent	
members	signify	a	privileging	of	the	sovereignty	of	particular	nations	over	
others	that	replicates	the	colonial	relationship.	The	major	powers	are	the	
ultimate	sovereigns,	given	the	ability	to	intervene	on	the	basis	of	
international	peace	and	security,	whilst	territories	that	fought	for	their	
independence	as	sovereign	nations	can	have	their	right	to	non-intervention	
revoked	on	this	same	basis.		
	
Chapter	7	is	in	some	ways	the	culmination	of	the	arguments	that	have	
been	developed	throughout	the	previous	chapters.	Concentrating	on	the	
issue	of	intervention,	it	examines	various	stages	in	the	historical	
development	from	an	initial	commitment	to	non-intervention	made	in	the	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations	to	the	current	policy	of	Responsibility	to	
Protect,	which	amounts	to	a	responsibility	to	intervene.	The	argument	here	
is	that	the	current	policy	perpetuates	the	existing	global	order	by	
reproducing	a	problematic	historical	understanding	of	progress	and	
development	that	frames	particular	nations	as	paternalistic	educators	with	
a	responsibility	to	civilise	the	uncivilised,	whilst	ultimately	allowing	for	the	
continuation	of	selectivity	with	regards	to	intervention	and	obscuring	the	
political	power	that	underlies	decision	making	in	this	context.			
	
The	two	parts	are	intended	to	complement	each	other,	with	Part	One	
providing	a	theoretical	approach	to	understanding	global	relationships	
within	the	United	Nations	and	Part	Two	providing	a	more	concrete	
application	of	this	theory	through	examples.	Ultimately,	the	thesis	aims	to	
re-narrate	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	in	order	that	we	might	
understand	its	role	in	the	maintenance	of	an	unequal	global	order	that	was	
established	through	colonialism.		
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Chapter	1:	The	United	Nations:	A	History	Reconsidered	
	
‘The	past	is	emphatically	not	destiny	and	the	UN’s	origins	need	not	shape	
its	future.	But	without	some	knowledge	of	the	context	from	which	it	
emerged,	we	are	likely	to	simply	continue	rehearsing	the	arguments	of	the	
past	rather	than	to	move	successfully	beyond	them’	(Mazower,	2009:	203).	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	United	Nations	was	founded	in	1945,	celebrating	its	70th	birthday	in	
2015.	It	is	an	international	institution	that	has	193	member	states	at	
present	and	plays	a	key	role	in	global	politics.	It	is	made	up	of	a	number	of	
different	organs,	each	with	a	range	of	committees	of	representatives	from	
governments	around	the	world,	and	seeks	to	‘take	action	on	the	issues	
confronting	humanity	in	the	21st	century’,	including	peace	and	security,	
climate	change,	terrorism	and	gender	equality	amongst	others	(United	
Nations,	2016).	The	United	Nations’	main	headquarters	are	in	the	Turtle	
Bay	area	on	the	east	side	of	New	York	City,	but	it	also	has	major	regional	
bases	in	Geneva,	Nairobi	and	Vienna.	Established	at	the	end	of	the	Second	
World	War,	the	United	Nations	was	an	attempt	to	generate	an	
international	agreement	to	prevent	wars	on	such	a	scale	from	happening	in	
the	future.	The	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	signed	by	the	51	original	
member	states	in	1945	establishes	its	organisational	structure,	detailing	
the	specific	roles	of	the	various	organs,	as	well	as	outlining	the	purposes	
and	core	principles	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	international	body.	Each	of	
these	will	be	briefly	outlined	in	the	section	that	follows	in	order	to	provide	
an	overview	of	what	exactly	the	United	Nations	is,	why	it	was	established	
and	how	it	functions.		
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Following	this,	an	overview	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations’	
development	will	be	explored.	Standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations,	
told	both	by	the	United	Nations	itself	and	by	academics,	often	date	its	birth	
as	an	institution	as	the	signing	of	the	Charter	at	the	San	Francisco	
conference	in	October	of	1945.	Although	some	of	these	histories	provide	a	
brief	discussion	of	the	meetings	that	led	to	the	San	Francisco	conference,	it	
is	generally	accepted	that	the	United	Nations	came	into	existence	as	a	new	
form	of	international	organisation	at	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War.	We	
see	this	history	replicated	and	reproduced,	particularly	within	historical	
and	political	accounts	of	the	development	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	
institution.	Although	this	history	is	not	always	presented	in	a	positive	light,	
it	is	nonetheless	replicated	and	despite	some	level	of	diversity,	standard	
histories	are	united	in	two	key	aspects.	They	are	united	firstly	in	
understanding	the	United	Nations	as	a	novel	institution,	and	secondly	in	
seeing	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	that	is	universal	in	its	
membership.		
	
Towards	the	end	of	this	chapter	and	in	the	chapters	that	follow,	it	will	be	
argued	that	these	standard	accounts	of	the	United	Nations’	development	
often	underplay	its	relationship	to	its	predecessor,	the	League	of	Nations,	
and	gloss	over	the	issues	of	complex	power	politics	involved	in	its	
construction	(Mazower,	2009).	More	broadly	than	this	though,	these	
standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations	exclude	a	consideration	of	
colonialism	and	how	this	allowed	particular	countries	to	dominate	in	the	
construction	of	a	new	international	organisation.	These	standard	histories	
fail	to	acknowledge	that	colonialism	has	overwhelmingly	shaped	the	
character	and	structure	of	international	institutions	in	their	earliest	stages,	
and	the	United	Nations	is	one	such	example	of	this	(Anghie,	2005:	117).	
This	chapter	will	detail	these	standard	histories,	in	order	to	provide	a	basis	
for	the	argument	that	in	spite	of	their	diversity	and	their	sometimes	critical	
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approach	to	the	United	Nations,	these	histories	are	united	in	certain	
aspects	and	most	importantly	in	their	neglect	of	particular	aspects	of	
history.	It	will	then	move	on	to	disrupt	the	dominant	discourses	
constructed	through	these	standard	accounts	by	arguing	that	the	United	
Nations	was	in	fact	a	development	of	earlier	forms	of	international	
organisation,	rather	than	a	revolutionary	turn	in	global	politics.		
	
Finally,	this	chapter	will	explore	the	role	of	the	United	Nations	in	the	
contemporary	global	context,	examining	some	of	the	key	challenges	facing	
the	United	Nations	and	the	international	community	more	generally	at	
present.	It	will	look	at	the	aims	of	the	United	Nations	in	the	past	16	years	
and	particularly	how	the	organisation	responded	to	the	political	challenges	
of	a	‘war	on	terror’	after	September	11th	2001,	specifically	in	relation	to	the	
enforcement	of	policies	of	intervention	and	the	role	of	the	Security	
Council,	which	will	be	significant	for	later	chapters.	This	final	section	of	this	
chapter	will	conclude	with	a	discussion	of	the	contemporary	issues	facing	
the	United	Nations	in	terms	of	a	political	struggle	within	the	context	of	
intervention	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	questioning	the	
contemporary	relevance	of	an	institution	established	over	70	years	ago	and	
asking	some	initial	questions	around	how	it	might	adapt	in	order	to	face	
the	international	concerns	of	the	world	as	it	is	today.		
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The	United	Nations:	Purpose	and	Structure	
	
‘WE	THE	PEOPLES	OF	THE	UNITED	NATIONS	DETERMINED	
to	save	succeeding	generations	from	the	scourge	of	war,	which	twice	in	our	
life-	time	has	brought	untold	sorrow	to	mankind,	and	
to	reaffirm	faith	in	fundamental	human	rights,	in	the	dignity	and	worth	of	
the	human	person,	in	the	equal	rights	of	men	and	women	and	of	nations	
large	and	small,	and	
to	establish	conditions	under	which	justice	and	respect	for	the	obligations	
arising	from	treaties	and	other	sources	of	international	law	can	be	
maintained,	and	
to	promote	social	progress	and	better	standards	of	life	in	larger	freedom,	
AND	FOR	THESE	ENDS	
to	practice	tolerance	and	live	together	in	peace	with	one	another	as	good	
neighbors,	and	
to	unite	our	strength	to	maintain	international	peace	and	security,	and	
to	ensure,	by	the	acceptance	of	principles	and	the	institution	of	methods,	
that	
armed	force	shall	not	be	used,	save	in	the	common	interest,	and	
to	employ	international	machinery	for	the	promotion	of	the	economic	and	
social	advancement	of	all	peoples,	
HAVE	RESOLVED	TO	COMBINE	OUR	EFFORTS	TO	ACCOMPLISH	THESE	AIMS.	
Accordingly,	our	respective	Governments,	through	representatives	
assembled	in	the	city	of	San	Francisco,	who	have	exhibited	their	full	
powers	found	to	be	in	good	and	due	form,	have	agreed	to	the	present	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	do	hereby	establish	an	international	
organization	to	be	known	as	the	United	Nations’	(United	Nations,	1945).	
	
The	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	begins	with	this	ambitious	declaration,	
and	it	is	the	Charter	that	forms	the	fundamental	basis	of	the	work	of	the	
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United	Nations,	providing	guidelines	on	the	structure	of	the	organisation	
and	the	core	governing	principles.	This	preamble	clearly	states	that	the	
core	aims	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	international	organisation	are	to	
promote	human	rights,	justice	and	social	progress,	to	practice	tolerance	
and	to	maintain	international	peace	and	security.	It	emphasises	the	need	
to	limit	the	use	of	armed	force	and	makes	a	commitment	to	economic	and	
social	advancement	for	all	people	in	the	world.	Ultimately,	the	United	
Nations	was	designed	as	an	international	agreement	to	prevent	war	on	the	
scale	that	had	been	seen	just	prior	to	its	establishment.	Its	success	and	
growth	was	reflective	of	the	general	mood	following	the	Second	World	
War:	that	something	had	to	be	done	in	order	to	prevent	the	conflict	and	
loss	of	life	on	this	scale	from	ever	happening	again.	In	signing	the	Charter,	
the	original	51	member	states	declared	an	intention	to	act	collectively	to	
prevent	war	and	to	promote	international	peace	and	security,	as	well	as	
promoting	human	rights	and	global	advancement	on	all	levels	in	order	that	
the	world	would	never	again	suffer	as	it	had	between	1939	and	1945.		
	
Following	this	preamble,	Chapter	1	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	
goes	on	to	outline	its	‘Purposes	and	Principles’.	The	four	fundamental	
principles	are	stated	as	follows:	
	
‘1.	To	maintain	international	peace	and	security,	and	to	that	end:	to	take	
effective	collective	measures	for	the	prevention	and	removal	of	threats	to	
the	peace,	and	for	the	suppression	of	acts	of	aggression	or	other	breaches	
of	the	peace,	and	to	bring	about	by	peaceful	means,	and	in	conformity	with	
the	principles	of	justice	and	international	law,	adjustment	or	settlement	of	
international	disputes	or	situations	which	might	lead	to	a	breach	of	the	
peace;		
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2.	To	develop	friendly	relations	among	nations	based	on	respect	for	the	
principle	of	equal	rights	and	self-determination	of	peoples,	and	to	take	
other	appropriate	measures	to	strengthen	universal	peace;		
	
3.	To	achieve	international	cooperation	in	solving	international	problems	of	
an	economic,	social,	cultural,	or	humanitarian	character,	and	in	promoting	
and	encouraging	respect	for	human	rights	and	for	fundamental	freedoms	
for	all	without	distinction	as	to	race,	sex,	language,	or	religion;	and		
	
4.	To	be	a	center	for	harmonizing	the	actions	of	nations	in	the	attainment	
of	these	common	ends’	(United	Nations,	1945:2).		
	
The	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	is	and	has	always	
been	therefore	an	essential	priority	for	the	United	Nations,	and	these	four	
primary	purposes	of	the	organisation	state	that	this	is	to	be	delivered	
through	cooperation,	respect	for	human	rights	and	dealing	with	acts	of	
aggression	through	peaceful	means.	In	addition,	there	is	a	focus	here	on	
equality,	respect	and	non-discrimination,	reflecting	upon	the	horrors	of	the	
events	of	the	Second	World	War.	It	is	argued	that	the	absolute	disregard	
for	human	rights	shown	by	the	Nazi	regime	strengthened	an	international	
will	for	the	development	of	a	‘common	law	of	mankind’	that	would	allow	
for	the	protection	of	individuals	from	genocide	(Goodwin,	1971:	29).	The	
United	Nations	was,	in	theory,	to	be	based	upon	the	fundamental	human	
rights	of	all	of	the	worlds’	peoples	and	was	designed	to	develop	
international	standards	of	treatment	as	well	as	signifying	an	agreement	
between	states	to	prevent	human	rights	abuse.	This	was	consolidated	in	
the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	in	1948,	three	years	after	the	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations	was	signed,	which	stated	that	‘recognition	of	
the	inherent	dignity	of	the	equal	and	inalienable	rights	of	all	members	of	
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the	human	family	is	the	foundation	of	freedom,	justice	and	peace	in	the	
world’	(United	Nations,	1948).		
	
These	principles	that	are	detailed	at	the	beginning	of	the	Charter	also	
highlight	a	commitment	to	dealing	with	international	disputes	without	
aggression	and	in	line	with	the	values	of	international	law,	again	reflecting	
a	response	to	the	military	conflicts	of	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	
century.	Through	these	fundamental	principles	and	the	declaration	of	the	
preamble,	the	founders	of	the	United	Nations	vowed	to	act	collectively	to	
make	the	world	a	safer	place,	designing	what	they	argued	was	a	structure	
that	would	address	the	perceived	threats	to	international	peace	and	
security	(Hanhimäki,	2008:	2).		
	
Structurally,	the	United	Nations	is	made	up	of	six	distinct	organs:	the	
General	Assembly,	the	Security	Council,	the	Economic	and	Social	Council,	
the	Trusteeship	Council,	the	International	Court	of	Justice	and	the	
Secretariat.	Each	of	these	organs	fulfils	a	particular	function	in	relation	to	
the	broader	aims	of	the	organisation	and	they	vary	in	terms	of	size	and	
membership.	These	six	organs	will	be	detailed	in	turn	now	in	order	to	give	
an	overview	of	how	the	United	Nations	is	organised	and	how	these	various	
organs	work	together	with	each	performing	a	particular	function.		
	
The	General	Assembly	
The	General	Assembly	consists	of	all	member	states	of	the	United	Nations.	
It	has	the	capacity	to	discuss	anything	within	the	scope	of	the	Charter	and	
is	able	to	make	recommendations	for	action	to	individual	member	states	or	
to	the	Security	Council	where	appropriate	(United	Nations,	1945:	4).	The	
General	Assembly	is	the	only	space	where	all	individual	member	states	are	
always	represented	and	have	the	opportunity	to	have	their	say	on	issues	of	
international	concern	or	relevance.	Here,	each	and	every	member	state	
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has	one	equal	vote	and	as	such	it	has	often	been	conceptualised	as	a	
‘proto-world	parliament’	(Peterson,	2006:	3).	It	allows	all	member	states	to	
be	involved	in	deciding	upon	action	that	should	be	taken	in	relation	to	
issues	within	the	remit	of	the	Charter,	with	recommendations	being	taken	
forward	for	action	by	the	relevant	relating	committee.	Decisions	made	
within	the	General	Assembly	about	important	issues	such	as	peace	and	
security	or	the	admission	of	new	member	states	need	a	two-thirds	majority	
to	pass,	whilst	all	other	decisions	simply	require	a	majority	(United	Nations,	
2016).	The	General	Assembly	is	a	representative	body,	where	decisions	are	
made	through	democratic	processes	of	one	vote	per	member	and	passed	
by	a	majority.	However,	in	terms	of	making	decisions	on	issues	of	peace	
and	security,	its	powers	for	action	are	fairly	limited.	Whilst	the	General	
Assembly	can	hold	a	vote	to	make	recommendations	for	action	on	peace	
and	security	issues,	it	does	not	have	the	power	to	authorise	such	action.	
This	power	is	held	exclusively	by	the	Security	Council.	
	
The	Security	Council	
The	Security	Council	has	primary	responsibility	for	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security	and	its	structure	will	be	examined	in	much	
more	detail	in	later	chapters	as	it	holds	significance	for	the	arguments	
around	power	and	privilege	that	are	being	developed	throughout	the	
thesis.	However,	a	brief	overview	is	relevant	here	in	the	context	of	
discussing	the	main	organs	of	the	United	Nations	and	providing	an	
introduction	to	the	United	Nations	as	an	organisation.	The	Security	Council	
consists	of	fifteen	members	–	five	permanent	and	ten	non-permanent	–	
each	with	one	vote.	The	non-permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	
are	elected	by	the	General	Assembly,	each	for	a	term	of	two	years.	
According	to	the	Charter,	member	states	of	the	United	Nations	defer	the	
responsibility	for	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	to	
the	Security	Council	‘in	order	to	ensure	prompt	and	effective	action	by	the	
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United	Nations’	(United	Nations,	1945:	7).	The	Security	Council	acts	on	
behalf	of	all	member	states	in	making	decisions	that	can	result	in	action	in	
relation	to	international	peace	and	security	in	order	to	avoid	the	
inefficiency	and	disagreement	that	may	occur	as	the	result	of	debate	
amongst	all	193	member	states	within	the	General	Assembly.	Limiting	
discussions	around	action	to	fifteen	member	states	in	theory	allows	for	
decisions	to	be	made	much	more	quickly,	which	is	important	when	dealing	
with	major	breaches	of	peace	and	security	that	may	require	an	urgent	
response	or	immediate	action.	Although	the	General	Assembly	can	discuss	
such	issues	and	make	recommendations,	their	authorisation	or	support	is	
not	required	in	order	for	the	Security	Council	to	take	action.		
	
Crucially	for	the	arguments	to	be	developed	over	the	following	chapters,	
voting	within	the	Security	Council	is	not	as	straightforward	as	one	vote	per	
member	state	as	in	the	General	Assembly.	Whilst	all	fifteen	members	of	
the	Security	Council	have	one	vote	each	on	matters	discussed,	the	five	
permanent	members	of	the	Council	–	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	
States,	France,	Russia	and	China	–	also	have	the	power	of	veto,	meaning	
that	decisions	are	made	‘by	an	affirmative	vote	of	seven	members	
including	the	concurring	votes	of	the	permanent	members’	(United	
Nations,	1945:	7).	So,	in	order	for	a	resolution	for	action	to	be	passed,	all	
five	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	must	agree	on	the	
course	of	action.	Any	permanent	member	who	does	not	agree	with	the	
course	of	action	suggested	in	a	proposed	resolution	therefore	has	the	
power	to	prevent	it	by	invoking	their	right	to	veto.	As	the	Security	Council	
is	the	chief	authorising	body	for	action,	this	voting	procedure	clearly	leaves	
the	United	Nations	open	to	being	controlled	by	the	interests	of	the	major	
powers	who	have	the	right	to	veto.	Due	to	the	rights	afforded	to	the	five	
permanent	members,	this	pattern	of	voting	within	the	Security	Council	and	
the	controversy	around	it	will	be	looked	at	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	6.	
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The	Economic	and	Social	Council			
The	Economic	and	Social	Council’s	remit	focuses	on	policy	
recommendations	for	economic,	social	and	environmental	issues	and	it	is	
responsible	for	the	implementation	of	policy	in	relation	to	the	United	
Nations’	development	goals	(United	Nations,	2016).	Its	work	includes	
promoting	sustainable	development	across	the	world,	raising	awareness	of	
global	issues	and	coordinating	humanitarian	action,	working	alongside	a	
number	of	non-governmental	organisations	(NGOs).	It	currently	consists	of	
54	members,	elected	by	the	General	Assembly	and	serving	overlapping	
terms	of	three	years.		
	
Seats	on	the	Economic	and	Social	Council	are	assigned	in	order	to	allow	for	
weighted	geographical	representation	with	fourteen	allocated	to	African	
States,	eleven	to	Asian	States,	six	to	Eastern	European	States,	ten	to	Latin	
American	and	Caribbean	States,	and	thirteen	to	Western	European	and	
other	States	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	Economic	and	Social	Council	was	
also	established	through	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	is	able	to	
make	recommendations	to	the	General	Assembly	‘for	the	purpose	of	
promoting	respect	for,	and	observance	of,	human	rights	and	fundamental	
freedoms	for	all’	(United	Nations,	1945:	12).	The	focus	of	the	Economic	and	
Social	Council	is	therefore	less	upon	maintaining	peace	and	security	and	
more	on	ensuring	a	cooperative	approach	to	global	development	and	
sustainability,	whilst	also	ensuring	the	United	Nations	fulfills	its	duties	with	
regards	to	human	rights	and	the	advancement	of	all	peoples.	
	
The	Trusteeship	Council		
The	fourth	major	organ	of	the	United	Nations	is	the	Trusteeship	Council.	
Again,	this	body	has	particular	significance	for	the	arguments	being	
developed	throughout	the	following	chapters	and	as	such	it	will	be	dealt	
with	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	5.	It	is	particularly	significant	in	
 32 
understanding	the	various	ways	in	which	the	United	Nations	created	
neocolonial	mechanisms	for	maintaining	control	over	colonial	territories	
following	the	process	of	decolonisation.	However,	it	is	necessary	here	to	
provide	a	brief	overview	and	introduction	in	the	context	of	the	structure	of	
the	United	Nations.	The	Charter	established	the	Trusteeship	Council	in	
1945	in	order	to	deal	with	the	management	of	the	remaining	League	of	
Nations	Mandate	Territories	–	that	is	the	former	colonies	of	the	states	
defeated	in	the	First	World	War.	Article	76	of	the	Charter	states	that	the	
primary	aim	of	the	Trusteeship	system	is	to	‘promote	the	political,	
economic,	social,	and	educational	advancement	of	the	inhabitants	of	the	
trust	territories,	and	their	progressive	development	towards	self-
government	or	independence	as	may	be	appropriate’	(United	Nations,	
1945).	It	was	therefore	established	as	a	supervisory	body,	with	the	aim	of	
supporting	former	colonies	to	achieve	independence,	in	line	with	the	
principles	of	advancement	outlined	in	the	preamble	to	the	Charter.		
	
The	Charter	emphasised	progress	and	advancement	as	the	fundamental	
principles	of	the	Trusteeship	system,	although	it	remained	vague	in	relation	
to	the	ultimate	outcome	of	the	supervisory	arrangement,	which	would	be	
independence	or	self-government	‘as	may	be	appropriate’	(United	Nations,	
1945:	15).	The	Trusteeship	Council	formally	suspended	operation	in	
November	of	1994,	following	the	eventual	self-government	and	
independence	of	all	remaining	Trust	Territories	(United	Nations,	2016).	
Once	the	territories	being	supervised	under	this	system	achieved	they	
system’s	aim	of	independence	or	self-government,	it	was	no	longer	seen	as	
necessary	to	maintain	an	official	Council	with	regular	meetings.		
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The	International	Court	of	Justice	
The	International	Court	of	Justice	is	the	principal	judicial	organ	of	the	
United	Nations	and	is	based	at	the	Hague	in	the	Netherlands.	It	functions	
to	settle	legal	disputes	submitted	by	states	and	to	provide	legal	advice	to	
United	Nations	organs	and	committees	in	accordance	with	international	
law	(United	Nations,	2016).	Its	establishment	is	in	line	with	the	governing	
principles	of	the	United	Nations,	providing	the	space	and	support	for	
member	states	to	settle	disagreements	in	line	with	international	law	rather	
than	resorting	to	military	violence	or	other	forms	of	unauthorised	
aggression.	The	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice	forms	part	of	
the	Charter	and	sets	out	its	composition	and	functioning.	The	Court	is	
composed	of	fifteen	independent	judges	‘elected	regardless	of	their	
nationality	from	among	persons	of	high	moral	character’	(United	Nations,	
1945:	21).	The	Court	is	not	bound	by	rules	of	representativeness	and	the	
need	to	elect	judges	giving	adequate	weighted	representation	to	different	
states	or	members.	The	current	fifteen	judges	are	from	France,	Somalia,	
Japan,	Slovakia,	Morocco,	Brazil,	the	United	Kingdom,	China,	the	United	
States,	Italy,	Uganda,	India,	Jamaica,	Australia	and	Russia,	showing	the	
diverse	membership	of	the	Court	(International	Court	of	Justice,	2016).	If	
the	General	Assembly	is	understood	as	a	world	parliament,	the	
International	Court	of	Justice	acts	as	the	accompanying	formal	space	within	
which	disputes	can	be	settled	in	accordance	with	international	law.		
	
The	Secretariat	
Finally,	the	sixth	primary	organ	of	the	United	Nations	is	the	Secretariat.	The	
Secretariat	is	the	chief	administrative	body	of	the	United	Nations,	
responsible	for	the	daily	running	of	the	organisation.	It	is	made	up	of	a	
large	number	of	departments	including	but	not	limited	to:	the	Department	
of	Political	Affairs,	the	Office	for	Disarmament	Affairs,	the	Department	of	
Peacekeeping	Operations	and	the	Office	for	the	Coordination	of	
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Humanitarian	Affairs.	The	Secretary-General	is	the	chief	administrative	
officer	of	the	Secretariat	and	is	appointed	by	the	General	Assembly	
following	a	recommendation	by	the	Security	Council	(United	Nations,	1945:	
18).	It	is	worth	nothing	therefore	that	although	the	Secretary-General	is	
formally	appointed	by	the	General	Assembly,	the	recommendation	for	this	
appointment	is	subject	to	the	veto	power	of	the	five	permanent	members	
of	the	Security	Council	in	the	same	way	as	any	other	decision	made	within	
that	arena.	Since	2007,	the	Secretary-General	has	been	Ban	Ki-moon	of	the	
Republic	of	Korea,	who	is	the	eighth	person	to	fulfil	this	role	since	the	
signing	of	the	Charter	in	1945	(United	Nations,	2016).	Each	Secretary-
General	is	elected	for	a	term	of	five	years,	however	there	is	no	limit	to	the	
number	of	terms	they	may	serve.		
	
The	six	primary	organs	outlined	here	combine	to	collectively	make	up	the	
United	Nations	as	an	organisation	and	they	work	together	in	order	to	
deliver	the	aims	established	in	the	preamble	to	the	Charter.	They	allow	the	
United	Nations	‘to	be	an	active	participant	in	world	affairs	in	its	key	areas:	
military	security,	economic	and	social	development,	and	the	upholding	of	
human	rights	and	international	justice’	(Hanhimäki,	2008:	17).	As	the	
membership	of	the	United	Nations	is	ever	increasing,	its	potential	role	in	
international	politics	as	a	hub	for	debate	and	discussion	between	the	
world’s	nations	has	become	ever	more	significant.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	
it	is	necessary	to	explore	in	more	depth	its	structure,	its	history	and	its	
power,	both	in	terms	of	its	organisational	power	and	the	particular	powers	
afforded	to	some	states	within	it.			
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Standard	Histories	of	the	United	Nations	
	
As	an	international	institution	with	a	key	role	in	global	politics,	the	United	
Nations	has	seen	numerous	accounts	of	its	history	written	and	replicated	
over	time.	The	chapters	that	follow	in	the	first	half	of	this	thesis	will	seek	to	
provide	an	alternative	historical	account	of	the	development	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	institution	that	challenges	the	history	it	tells	of	itself	and	
emphasises	its	relationship	to	colonialism	and	colonial	power	relations.	As	
the	United	Nations	is	made	up	of	an	ever-increasing	number	of	
independent	states,	that	all	have	some	sort	of	role	to	play	to	varying	
degrees	and	that	all	participate	in	the	General	Assembly,	its	decisions	are	
commonly	seen	to	be	the	outcome	of	an	international	process	of	debate,	
negotiation	and	compromise.	This	process	of	debate,	negotiation	and	
cooperation	that	seemingly	forms	of	the	basis	of	the	United	Nations	results	
in	it	being	imbued	with	an	authority	to	deal	with	international	issues	above	
that	of	individual	states,	and	this	authority	results	in	a	sense	of	legitimacy	
(Thakur,	2006:	8).	Decisions	made	by	the	United	Nations	are	seen	to	be	
decisions	made	by	the	international	community	and	this	process	of	mutual	
discussion	that	the	United	Nations	is	seen	to	take	part	in	leads	to	these	
decisions	being	understood	as	valid.		
	
The	theoretically	inclusive	structure	of	the	United	Nations	and	its	role	as	a	
cooperative	organisation,	as	the	culmination	of	competing	interests,	
provides	it	with	a	sense	of	legitimacy	that	suggests	that	the	things	it	says	
and	does	are	accurate	and	are	in	the	general	interest,	rather	than	in	the	
interests	of	individual	states.	It	is	for	this	reason	that	in	providing	an	
alternative	historical	narrative	for	the	United	Nations,	the	main	focus	here	
will	be	upon	the	history	the	United	Nations	tells	of	itself,	as	the	sense	of	
legitimacy	afforded	to	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	allows	for	its	
own	narration	of	its	history	to	be	understood	as	factual	and	accurate.	The	
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history	the	United	Nations	tells	of	its	own	development	has	been	
replicated	and	reproduced	throughout	numerous	accounts	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	institution,	for	example	Leland	Goodrich’s	The	United	
Nations	(1959),	Evan	Luard’s	A	History	of	the	United	Nations:	Volume	1	
(1982)	or	the	collection	of	essays	edited	by	Kenneth	Twitchett	in	The	
Evolving	United	Nations:	A	Prospect	for	Peace	(1971)	amongst	others.	In	
spite	of	their	diversity	and	their	sometimes	critical	approach	to	the	United	
Nations,	these	histories	are	united	in	certain	aspects	and	most	importantly	
in	their	neglect	of	particular	aspects	of	history.	As	such,	the	aspects	that	
unite	these	accounts	that	are	collectively	viewed	as	‘standard	histories’	will	
also	be	discussed	here.		
	
The	United	Nations	website	(www.un.org)	has	a	section	dedicated	to	
detailing	the	history	of	the	institution	that	will	be	used	here	in	order	to	
outline	the	standard	historical	narrative	of	its	development,	before	this	
section	moves	on	to	look	at	how	this	narrative	has	been	replicated	in	the	
histories	such	as	those	mentioned	above.	The	history	told	by	the	United	
Nations	of	its	own	development	argues	that	former	president	of	the	United	
States	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	first	used	the	name	‘United	Nations’	in	1942,	
when	representatives	from	26	different	nations	pledged	their	allegiance	
and	willingness	to	fight	against	the	Axis	powers	of	World	War	Two	(United	
Nations,	2016).	However,	the	initial	ideas	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	
institution	are	dated	back	to	the	signing	of	the	Atlantic	Charter	by	British	
Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	and	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	1941.	The	
two	world	leaders	issued	a	joint	statement	of	eight	points	following	their	
meeting	at	sea,	with	the	final	point	stating	that:	
	
‘They	believe	all	of	the	nations	of	the	world,	for	realistic	as	well	spiritual	
reasons,	must	come	to	the	abandonment	of	the	use	of	force.	Since	no	
future	peace	can	be	maintained	if	land,	sea,	or	air	armaments	continue	to	
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be	employed	by	nations	which	threaten,	or	may	threaten	aggression	
outside	of	their	frontiers,	they	believe,	pending	the	establishment	of	a	
wider	and	permanent	system	of	general	security,	that	the	disarmament	of	
such	nations	is	essential.	They	will	likewise	aid	and	encourage	all	other	
practicable	measures	which	will	lighten	for	peace-loving	peoples	the	
crushing	burden	of	armament’	(Churchill	and	Roosevelt,	1941).		
	
The	Atlantic	Charter	therefore	signified	a	commitment	and	desire	by	
Britain	and	the	United	States	to	develop	a	widespread	international	system	
of	security	in	order	to	deal	with	potential	acts	of	aggression.	The	historical	
account	provided	by	the	United	Nations	argues	that	the	Atlantic	Charter	
encapsulated	a	novel	agreement	by	these	two	leaders	on	common	
principles,	a	sincere	‘…affirmation	of	common	faith	between	peace-loving	
nations’	(United	Nations,	2016).	This	pledge	was	followed	on	New	Year’s	
Day	of	1942	by	the	signing	of	the	‘Declaration	by	United	Nations’,	initially	
by	Roosevelt,	Churchill,	Maxim	Litvinov	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	T.V.	Soong	
of	China,	and	on	the	2nd	of	January	by	a	further	22	nations	committed	to	
the	principles	outlined	in	the	Atlantic	Charter	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	
Atlantic	Charter	and	the	Declaration	by	United	Nations	are	therefore	posed	
as	the	historical	beginnings	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	as	we	
know	it	today,	signifying	an	unprecedented	dedication	to	principles	of	
international	peace	and	security.		
	
The	1943	Moscow	Conference	is	viewed	as	an	attempt	to	ground	this	
commitment	to	a	peaceful	world	organisation	in	some	sort	of	concrete	
structure,	with	the	primary	responsibility	for	its	design	falling	to	the	leaders	
of	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	(United	
Nations,	2016).	This	meeting	was	followed	by	a	declaration	at	the	Tehran	
Conference	in	the	same	year,	which	stated	that:		
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‘And	as	to	peace-we	are	sure	that	our	concord	will	win	an	enduring	Peace.	
We	recognize	fully	the	supreme	responsibility	resting	upon	us	and	all	the	
United	Nations	to	make	a	peace	which	will	command	the	goodwill	of	the	
overwhelming	mass	of	the	peoples	of	the	world	and	banish	the	scourge	
and	terror	of	war	for	many	generations’	(Churchill,	Roosevelt	and	Stalin,	
1943).	
	
Thus,	the	United	Nations’	own	narrative	of	its	history	places	these	events	
and	their	commitment	to	a	common	goal	of	peace	as	pre-cursors	to	the	
development	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	before	its	official	birth	
in	1945	in	San	Francisco.	These	events	are	framed	in	terms	of	a	collective	
agreement	to	develop	a	system	based	on	international	cooperation	and,	
importantly	for	the	focus	of	this	thesis,	an	emphasis	on	the	responsibility	of	
particular	nations	to	oversee	this	system’s	development.		
	
The	next	page	in	the	United	Nations	history	storybook	concerns	the	
Dumbarton	Oaks	conference	in	October	of	1944,	at	which	a	‘blueprint’	for	
the	structure	of	the	envisaged	new	world	organisation	was	to	be	
developed	in	order	to	be	accepted	by	all	nations	of	the	world	that	were	
united	in	their	aims	for	peace	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	Dumbarton	Oaks	
conference	saw	representatives	from	the	United	States,	the	United	
Kingdom,	China	and	the	Soviet	Union	meet	to	discuss	proposals	for	the	
structure	of	the	United	Nations.	The	Dumbarton	Oaks	proposals,	formally	
known	as	‘The	Washington	Conversations	on	International	Peace	and	
Security	Organization’,	contained	points	on	broad	aspects	of	the	United	
Nations	such	as	its	purposes	and	principles,	membership	and	the	principal	
organs,	as	well	as	going	into	more	specific	detail	about	how	these	organs	
should	function	(Dumbarton	Oaks,	1944).	Crucially,	this	involved	a	
discussion	of	the	role	of	the	Security	Council	as	it	was	envisaged	by	those	
four	powerful	nations	in	attendance.	According	to	the	United	Nations	
 39 
history	books,	the	essence	of	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	proposals	was	that	the	
responsibility	for	the	prevention	of	war	should	fall	to	the	Security	Council	
rather	than	the	General	Assembly,	which	was	to	be	made	up	of	five	
permanent	members	(the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom,	China,	the	
Soviet	Union	and	France)	and	six	non-permanent	members	who	would	
each	serve	a	term	of	two	years	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	issue	of	voting	
within	the	Security	Council	was	left	open	to	be	discussed	at	a	later	date,	
but	otherwise	these	proposals	were	put	forward	and	‘…fully	discussed	
throughout	the	Allied	countries,’	with	extensive	media	coverage	allowing	
people	living	in	the	Allied	countries	to	assess	the	worth	of	the	plans	for	
ensuring	international	peace	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	final	pre-San	
Francisco	meeting	to	discuss	the	plans	for	the	United	Nations	was	at	Yalta	
in	February	of	1945.	Churchill,	Roosevelt	and	Stalin	met	to	resolve	the	all-
important	question	of	voting	within	the	Security	Council,	and	upon	doing	
so	sent	out	invitations	to	the	San	Francisco	conference,	which	was	to	begin	
on	March	5th	1945	(United	Nations,	2016).		
	
With	discussions	and	preparations	for	the	United	Nations	having	occurred	
in	Moscow,	Tehran,	Washington	and	Yalta	throughout	the	early	1940s	
following	the	Atlantic	Charter,	forty-five	nations	were	invited	to	attend	the	
conference	in	San	Francisco,	which	signified	the	official	birth	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	institution.	In	attendance	were	‘…representatives	of	over	
eighty	per	cent	of	the	world’s	population,	people	of	every	race,	religion	
and	continent;	all	determined	to	set	up	an	organization	which	would	
preserve	peace	and	help	build	a	better	world’	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	
conference	was	organised	around	four	commissions,	representing	the	four	
key	sections	of	the	planned	United	Nations	Charter,	each	to	discuss	the	
proposals	that	were	made	at	Dumbarton	Oaks;	general	purposes,	the	
General	Assembly,	the	Security	Council	and	the	International	Court	of	
Justice	(United	Nations,	2016).		
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Unsurprisingly,	one	of	the	most	contentious	points	in	developing	the	
Charter	was	the	issue	of	veto	power	within	the	Security	Council.	The	
United	Nations	describes	the	resolving	of	this	issue	as	follows:		
	
‘The	smaller	powers	feared	that	when	one	of	the	"Big	Five"	menaced	the	
peace,	the	Security	Council	would	be	powerless	to	act,	while	in	the	event	
of	a	clash	between	two	powers	not	permanent	members	of	the	Security	
Council,	the	"Big	Five"	could	act	arbitrarily.	They	strove	therefore	to	have	
the	power	of	the	"veto"	reduced.	But	the	great	powers	unanimously	
insisted	on	this	provision	as	vital,	and	emphasized	that	the	main	
responsibility	for	maintaining	world	peace	would	fall	most	heavily	on	them.	
Eventually	the	smaller	powers	conceded	the	point	in	the	interest	of	setting	
up	the	world	organization.	This	and	other	vital	issues	were	resolved	only	
because	every	nation	was	determined	to	set	up,	if	not	the	perfect	
international	organization,	at	least	the	best	that	could	possibly	be	made’	
(United	Nations,	2016).		
	
Thus,	by	its	own	admission,	the	United	Nations	was	plagued	from	the	
outset	by	power	struggles	between	the	world’s	most	powerful	nations	and	
those	smaller	nations	struggling	to	make	their	voices	count,	if	they	were	to	
be	heard	at	all.	However,	these	issues	were	seemingly	resolved	in	the	vein	
of	working	towards	a	greater	good,	the	Charter	was	signed	by	all	nations	in	
attendance	and	the	United	Nations	as	we	now	know	it	officially	came	into	
existence	on	October	24th	1945,	following	the	ratification	of	the	Charter	by	
the	governments	of	China,	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States,	the	
Soviet	Union	and	France	(United	Nations,	2016).		
	
The	United	Nations	history	of	its	own	existence	therefore	tells	us	a	very	
particular	story.	Starting	with	a	meeting	between	Winston	Churchill	and	
Franklin	D.	Roosevelt,	it	constructs	a	narrative	of	democratic	progression	
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from	an	initial	commitment	to	common	principles	of	peace	to	a	formal	
pledge	of	global	cooperation	by	eighty	percent	of	the	world’s	population.	
This	narrative	focuses	on	the	United	Nations	as	a	novel	approach	to	
international	relations	following	the	horrors	of	the	Second	World	War,	and	
as	the	result	of	free	and	open	debate	between	all	nations,	signifying	a	
united	promise	to	prevent	conflict.	Whilst	it	acknowledges	that	there	were	
instances	of	tension	and	disagreement	throughout	the	initial	stages,	it	
argues	that	these	were	dissolved	through	a	process	of	negotiation	and	
compromise	in	order	to	succeed	in	creating	the	organisation	as	it	was	
envisaged.		
	
This	narrative,	to	varying	degrees,	has	been	replicated	and	reinforced	
within	historical	and	political	accounts	of	the	development	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	institution.	These	accounts	show	a	particular	focus	on	the	
United	Nations	as	distinct	from	its	chronological	predecessor,	the	League	
of	Nations,	supporting	the	idea	of	the	United	Nations	as	a	novel	institution	
that	we	see	in	its	history	of	itself.	Leland	Goodrich’s	account	of	the	history	
of	the	United	Nations,	named	simply	The	United	Nations	(1959),	argues	
that	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War	indicated	the	failure	on	the	
behalf	of	the	League	of	Nations	as	an	international	organisation	and	that	
no	attempt	was	made	to	strengthen	the	League	in	order	to	make	it	more	
effective,	but	that	it	was	to	be	abandoned	and	replaced	with	a	new	
structure	of	global	cooperation	(Goodrich,	1959:	20).	Accounts	such	as	
Goodrich’s	emphasise	the	novelty	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	in	
the	same	way	as	the	United	Nations’	history	of	itself.	Whereas	the	aim	of	
the	League	of	Nations	was	perceived	as	an	agreement	between	states	to	
abstain	from	conflict,	the	accounts	of	history	we	see	from	Goodrich	and	
others	argue	that	the	events	of	the	Second	World	War	‘…strengthened	the	
search	for	a	"common	law	of	mankind"	under	which	the	rights	of	the	
human	person,	whether	individual	or	in	association	with	his	fellows,	could	
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be	more	effectively	protected’	(Goodwin,	1971:	29).	This	argument	follows	
the	line	that	the	uniqueness	of	the	shocking	events	of	the	Second	World	
War	highlighted	the	fact	that	the	League	of	Nations	was	not	equipped	to	
deal	with	international	relations	and	as	such,	a	new	organisation	capable	of	
preventing	these	atrocities	needed	to	be	developed.	Within	these	
accounts,	the	Second	World	War	is	viewed	as	the	catalyst	for	the	
development	of	a	new	organisation	to	deal	with	international	peace	and	
security	(Nicholas,	1975:1).	This	new	organisation	represented	a	fresh	start	
from	the	League	of	Nations,	allowing	the	leading	governments	to	distance	
themselves	from	its	reputation	as	a	failure	(Baehr	and	Gordenker,	2005:	7).	
The	events	of	the	Second	World	War	were	seen	as	a	clear	sign	that	the	
existing	agreement	between	particular	states	in	the	form	of	the	League	of	
Nations	was	no	longer	relevant	and	a	clean	break	was	required	in	order	to	
move	forward	and	to	prevent	future	wars	on	this	scale.	The	new	
organisation	had	to	ensure	that	the	failures	of	the	League	of	Nations	would	
not	be	repeated	(Hanhimäki,	2008:	12).		
	
The	United	Nations	Conference	on	International	Organization	(UNCIO)	at	
San	Francisco	is	often	the	focus	of	these	standard	accounts	of	the	history	
of	the	United	Nations.	Once	they	have	established	the	United	Nations	as	a	
unique	organisation,	embodying	the	lessons	taught	by	the	perceived	failure	
of	the	League	of	Nations,	these	histories	turn	to	San	Francisco	as	its	
birthplace.	The	negotiations	around	what	would	become	the	Charter	of	the	
United	Nations	are	seen	to	have	taken	place	in	two	stages:	firstly	through	
an	agreement	by	the	major	powers	over	what	were	considered	to	be	the	
main	questions,	and	secondly	through	a	universal	conference	of	potential	
member	states	at	San	Francisco	(Hurd,	2007:	85).	The	conference	at	San	
Francisco	therefore	becomes	evidence	of	the	universalism	of	the	United	
Nations	in	contrast	to	the	League	of	Nations.	In	his	two	volume	book,	A	
History	of	the	United	Nations	(1982),	Evan	Luard	frames	San	Francisco	as	a	
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space	where	for	the	first	time,	smaller	nations	were	able	to	have	their	say	
in	how	this	new	world	organisation	would	work	(Luard,	1982:	36).	Where	
the	League	of	Nations	was	selective	in	its	membership,	the	aim	of	the	
United	Nations	was	universal	membership	and	as	such,	the	conference	at	
San	Francisco	was	designed	to	facilitate	discussion	between	smaller	states	
and	the	great	powers,	giving	smaller	states	the	opportunity	to	express	their	
opinions	on	the	draft	proposals	from	Dumbarton	Oaks	and	to	influence	the	
content	of	the	Charter	(Hurd,	2007:	88).	This	process	of	negotiation	
between	smaller	states	and	the	global	elite	is	reproduced	in	these	accounts	
as	an	example	of	the	way	in	which	the	United	Nations	dealt	with	the	
decline	of	empire	and	attempted	to	create	a	universal	international	
organisation.	These	accounts	of	the	United	Nations’	history	claim	that	the	
League	of	Nations	was	never	truly	a	global	organisation	due	to	the	lack	of	
representation	for	the	colonies	and	that	contrary	to	this,	the	United	
Nations	embodied	a	‘new	world	order’	to	ensure	representation	for	all	
(Kennedy,	2006:	45).	However,	these	accounts	do	also	recognise	that	in	
order	for	the	United	Nations	to	succeed,	it	was	necessary	for	the	world’s	
major	powers	to	take	the	lead.		
	
The	dominance	of	the	sponsoring	nations	at	San	Francisco	is	frequently	
viewed	as	a	simple	reflection	of	reality	as	it	was	the	British,	American	and	
Soviet	forces	that	had	together	defeated	the	Axis	powers	and	won	the	
Second	World	War	(Archer,	1992:	24).	Although	this	dominance	is	
recognised	therefore,	it	is	rarely	problematised,	due	to	the	perceived	
universalism	of	the	United	Nations.	As	we	saw	in	the	United	Nations’	own	
narrative	of	its	development,	dominance	in	the	form	of	the	role	of	the	
Security	Council	and	the	permanent	five	members	was	a	contentious	issue	
at	San	Francisco.	However,	these	standard	histories	argue	that	the	process	
of	discussion	and	negotiation	that	took	place	at	San	Francisco	legitimates	
this	structure,	as	ultimately	the	Charter	was	ratified	by	all	states	present	
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(Hurd,	2007:	108).	The	consensus	appears	to	be	that	the	agreement	of	all	
states	to	participate	in	the	United	Nations,	represented	by	the	signing	of	
the	Charter,	is	sufficient	to	prove	that	the	dominance	of	the	permanent	
five	members	of	the	Security	Council	was	no	longer	a	problem.	
Furthermore,	the	permanent	five	members	are	viewed	as	‘…a	directorate	
for	governance	with	narrowly	defined	emergency	powers…’	(Baehr	and	
Gordenker,	2005:	5).	The	dominance	of	the	major	powers	is	therefore	not	
seen	as	an	issue	within	these	histories,	as	their	power	was	to	be	limited	by	
the	universalism	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	and	their	
leadership	was	supported	by	all	those	who	signed	the	Charter	at	San	
Francisco.		
	
However,	not	all	of	these	standard	histories	are	entirely	uncritical	of	the	
United	Nations	and	its	development	as	an	international	institution,	
particularly	with	regards	to	the	role	of	the	great	powers.	Whilst	the	
majority	of	these	accounts	argue	that	the	leadership	of	the	sponsoring	
nations	was	necessary	in	order	to	achieve	international	cooperation	on	
matters	of	peace	and	security,	there	is	also	some	level	of	scepticism	within	
these	accounts.	Hilderbrand	argues	that	the	United	Nations	was	never	
thought	of	as	majoritarian	in	character	and	that	it	was	understood	from	
the	outset	that	the	major	powers	would	have	the	ultimate	authority	
despite	the	universalism	of	United	Nations	membership	(1990:15).	For	the	
United	States,	the	United	Nations	provided	not	only	an	opportunity	to	take	
centre	stage	in	an	international	organisation,	but	President	Roosevelt	also	
used	the	development	of	the	United	Nations	as	a	justification	for	United	
States	involvement	in	the	Second	World	War,	framing	it	as	a	longer	term	
project	of	global	security	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	5).	The	critiques	within	these	
standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations	are	therefore	usually	
representative	of	a	feeling	of	scepticism	around	the	intentions	of	the	great	
powers.	
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Nonetheless,	these	commonly	accepted	accounts	of	the	development	of	
the	United	Nations	as	an	institution,	both	within	the	United	Nations’	own	
narration	of	its	history	and	within	academic	accounts,	are	united	in	certain	
aspects.	These	histories,	told	by	academics	such	as	Goodrich	(1959)	and	
Goodwin	(1971)	frame	the	United	Nations	as	an	original	response	to	the	
horrors	of	modern	existence,	and	as	a	democratically	evolved	structure,	
embodying	principles	of	global	cooperation	and	international	peace.	Even	
where	accounts	are	critical	about	the	dominance	of	the	major	powers,	they	
are	united	with	the	arguments	of	Luard	(1982)	in	their	acceptance	of	the	
United	Nations	as	providing	a	space	for	smaller	powers	to	play	a	role	in	
international	peace	and	security.	The	universalism	of	the	United	Nations	as	
an	organisation	is	legitimised	through	the	framing	of	the	United	Nations	
Conference	on	International	Organisation	at	San	Francisco	as	a	negotiation	
exercise	and	the	inclusion	of	smaller	powers	is	seen	as	an	appropriate	
response	to	the	decline	of	empire.		
	
What	is	missing	from	these	histories	of	the	United	Nations	and	what	will	
form	the	basis	of	the	alternative	narrative	to	be	explored	throughout	the	
following	chapters,	is	an	account	of	colonialism	and	how	this	allowed	
particular	countries	to	dominate	the	United	Nations	in	the	first	place.	
Whilst	a	number	of	these	accounts	recognise	colonialism	as	a	historical	
phenomenon,	this	is	only	ever	acknowledged	as	something	that	has	been	
overcome	by	the	development	of	the	United	Nations.	Within	these	
accounts,	the	problem	of	colonialism	is	solved	by	the	inclusion	of	former	
colonies	as	member	states	(Baehr	and	Gordenker,	2005:	114).	They	suggest	
that	once	former	colonies	have	been	granted	sovereign	status	and	formal	
independence,	colonialism	ceases	to	be	a	problem.	This	fails	to	
acknowledge	and	in	fact	obscures	the	fact	that	the	sovereignty	granted	to	
former	colonies	is	not	on	par	with	the	sovereignty	held	by	European	states.	
Non-European	sovereignty	is	distinct	and	inherently	vulnerable	due	to	its	
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reliance	on	the	system	of	international	law	(Anghie,	2005:	6).	This	
approach	to	colonial	power	relations	that	we	see	within	the	context	of	
standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations	is	therefore	insufficient	and	fails	
to	acknowledge	the	process	by	which	particular	countries	came	to	be	great	
powers	whilst	others	had	to	have	independence	granted	to	them.	
Furthermore,	former	colonies	have	only	succeeded	in	being	granted	formal	
independence	through	adherence	to	Western	ideas	of	progress	and	their	
independence	was	contingent	upon	their	cooperation	with	newly	
generated	systems	of	control	(Rajagopal,	2003:	72).	These	will	be	referred	
to	throughout	the	following	chapters	as	neocolonial	technologies	of	power,	
and	it	will	be	argued	that	these	continue	to	operate	in	contemporary	
international	politics.	Whilst	these	nations	may	have	been	granted	
independence	in	a	formal	sense,	the	fact	that	this	had	to	be	granted	to	
them	at	all	highlights	the	continuing	significance	of	the	colonial	encounter	
and	points	towards	problematic	hierarchies	of	power.	These	arguments	
will	be	developed	further	in	the	chapters	that	follow.	For	the	purposes	of	
this	chapter,	this	standard	history	will	now	be	challenged	through	a	
process	of	disrupting	the	dominant	discourses	that	have	been	examined	in	
this	section,	arguing	that	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	continuation	of	
colonial	power	relations	today,	it	is	necessary	to	see	the	United	Nations	
not	as	a	revolutionary	approach	to	international	relations	but	as	an	
extension	of	its	predecessor,	the	League	of	Nations.		
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‘Evolution	Not	Revolution’:	From	the	League	of	Nations	to	the	United	
Nations	
	
To	be	explicit,	the	argument	of	this	section	is	that	in	contrast	to	the	
standard	histories	that	present	it	as	a	novel	institution,	the	United	Nations	
was	in	fact	‘the	product	of	evolution,	not	revolution’	(Mazower,	2009:	17).	
Where	the	birth	of	the	United	Nations	is	usually	presented	as	a	particular	
moment	in	history	and	as	the	dawn	of	a	new	era	in	international	
organisation,	this	section	will	suggest	that	the	United	Nations	has	a	much	
stronger	basis	in	the	League	of	Nations	than	is	usually	acknowledged.	In	
order	to	understand	the	impact	of	colonial	power	relations	on	the	
contemporary	relationships	between	the	most	and	least	powerful	nations	
of	the	world,	it	is	necessary	to	reconsider	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	
and	to	disturb	the	dominant	discourses	of	equality	upon	which	the	
organisation	is	based	through	taking	into	account	the	relationship	between	
the	two	institutions.	The	League	of	Nations	is	often	cited	as	the	
predecessor	to	the	United	Nations	chronologically,	but	as	we	have	seen	in	
the	examination	of	the	standard	historical	narrative,	there	is	a	strong	
desire	to	view	the	United	Nations	as	a	clean	break	and	as	a	new,	more	
inclusive	organisation.	There	is	an	attempt	to	view	the	Second	World	War	
as	a	rupture	in	international	politics	that	signaled	the	need	for	an	entirely	
new	approach	to	governing	the	relationships	between	states	and	a	new	
form	of	international	organisation	that	would	prevent	war	and	maintain	
security.		
	
However,	if	we	reject	this	narrative	of	rupture	and	see	the	United	Nations	
not	as	a	unique	institution	but	as	a	rebranding	and	continuation	of	the	
League	of	Nations,	the	colonial	history	it	wished	to	forget	becomes	much	
more	apparent.	What	follows	here	is	the	initial	presentation	of	an	
alternative	historical	narrative	that	will	be	developed	throughout	the	
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following	chapters.	This	section	will	continue	to	disrupt	the	dominant	
discourses	of	equality	and	universality	that	surround	the	United	Nations	by	
highlighting	its	colonial	origins	through	an	examination	of	its	relationship	
to	the	League	of	Nations.	If	we	understand	the	ways	in	which	the	League	of	
Nations	was	inherently	colonial	and	reject	the	understanding	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	original	institution,	we	are	able	to	understand	more	fully	the	
perpetuation	of	colonial	power	structures	in	the	contemporary	
international	context.			
	
‘The	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations’	was	signed	on	June	28th	1919	and	
signified	a	commitment	by	the	largely	European	founding	members	of	the	
League	of	Nations	to	attempt	to	put	an	end	to	the	‘international	anarchy’	
that	had	been	the	result	of	traditional	approaches	to	peacekeeping	(Birn,	
1981:	6).	The	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War	in	1914	had	suggested	that	
previously	existing	diplomatic	strategies	were	ineffective	for	dealing	with	
global	relations	and	that	an	international	union	of	nations	would	be	
necessary	in	order	to	deal	with	and,	where	possible,	to	prevent	future	
conflicts.	The	founding	members	of	the	League	of	Nations	clearly	hoped	
that	this	permanent	coalition	of	states	would	bring	about	the	abolition	of	
war	on	a	global	scale	and	that	international	relations	as	a	result	of	this	
permanent	cooperation	would	be	significantly	less	hostile.		
	
With	this	objective	in	mind,	the	Covenant	itself	states	that	signing	parties	
agree	to:		
	
‘Obligations	not	to	resort	to	war…open,	just	and	honourable	relations	
between	nations…the	firm	establishment	of	the	understandings	of	
international	law	as	the	actual	rule	of	conduct	among	
Governments…respect	for	all	treaty	obligations	in	the	dealings	of	organised	
peoples	with	one	another…’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	
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These	foundational	principles	upon	which	the	League	was	based	were	
designed	‘in	order	to	promote	international	co-operation	and	to	achieve	
international	peace	and	security…’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	Thus,	the	
language	used	in	the	first	section	of	this	governing	document	clearly	sets	
out	ideals	of	international	cooperation	in	promoting	peaceful	relations,	but	
with	a	solid	foundation	in	international	law	as	the	basis	for	relationships	
between	states.	It	also	frames	peaceful	relations	between	nations	as	an	
‘obligation’,	that	is,	as	a	duty	or	responsibility	of	‘organised	peoples’,	rather	
than	as	a	choice	for	states	in	their	dealings	with	others.		
	
The	Covenant	goes	on	to	detail	specific	strategies	for	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security.	Article	8	of	the	Covenant	states	that	
‘…the	maintenance	of	peace	requires	the	reduction	of	national	armaments	
to	the	lowest	point	consistent	with	national	safety…’	and	that	members	of	
the	League	agree	to	‘…interchange	full	and	frank	information	as	to	the	
scale	of	their	armaments,	their	military,	naval	and	air	programmes	and	the	
condition	of	such	of	their	industries	are	adaptable	to	war-like	purposes’	
(League	of	Nations,	1919).		This	suggests	the	idea	that	in	order	for	states	to	
be	able	to	interact	peacefully	with	one	another,	there	must	be	little	
possibility	for	military	aggression.	The	Covenant	therefore	symbolised	a	
commitment	to	a	universal	alliance	of	states,	particularly	with	regard	to	
issues	around	international	peace	and	security,	in	place	of	the	numerous	
and	evidently	unsuccessful	pre-World	War	One	alliances	between	
individual	states.		
	
Where	previous	alliances	had	been	between	individual	states	or	small	
groups	of	states,	the	League	of	Nations	represented	a	somewhat	broader	
cooperation	between	nations	with	regards	to	the	prevention	of	global	
conflict.	In	creating	an	international	organisation	of	states	in	this	way,	the	
League	of	Nations	had	hoped	that	the	most	powerful	nations	would	be	
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able	to	work	together	to	provide	collective	security	on	a	larger	scale	than	
previously	possible	(MacQueen,	2011:	6).	Nonetheless,	as	with	any	
international	institution,	the	reality	and	the	ideal	were	poles	apart.	
Although	in	theory	the	League	of	Nations	was	to	be	a	universal	coalition	of	
states,	the	reality	was	that	membership	was	limited	and	eurocentric,	giving	
no	voice	to	those	countries	under	colonial	rule	and	providing	a	great	deal	
of	protection	to	the	idea	of	national	sovereignty	(Schlesinger,	2003:	17).	
The	League	of	Nations	in	reality	was	an	agreement	between	the	world’s	
major	powers	of	that	time	to	prevent	conflict	on	a	similar	scale	to	the	First	
World	War,	failing	to	address	the	inequalities	inherent	in	the	colonial	
system.	Universality	in	this	case	was	only	in	terms	of	the	inclusion	of	
imperial	states.	
	
Indeed,	certain	aspects	of	the	League	of	Nations	encouraged	the	
continuation	of	colonial	rule	and	this	is	particularly	apparent	in	an	
examination	of	the	Mandate	System.	Following	the	end	of	the	First	World	
War,	Article	22	of	the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations	established	a	
system	for	dealing	with	territories	that	had	previously	been	colonies	of	the	
defeated	empires.	Article	22	states	the	following:	
	
‘To	those	colonies	and	territories	which	as	a	consequence	of	the	late	war	
have	ceased	to	be	under	the	sovereignty	of	the	States	which	formerly	
governed	them	and	which	are	inhabited	by	peoples	not	yet	able	to	stand	
by	themselves	under	the	strenuous	conditions	of	the	modern	world,	there	
should	be	applied	the	principle	that	the	well-being	and	development	of	
such	peoples	form	a	sacred	trust	of	civilisation	and	that	securities	for	the	
performance	of	this	trust	should	be	embodied	in	this	Covenant’	(League	of	
Nations,	1919).		
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Rather	than	seeking	independence	for	the	colonies	that	had	ceased	to	be	
under	to	control	of	their	colonisers,	the	League	of	Nations	developed	a	
system	which	stated	that	‘…the	tutelage	of	such	peoples	should	be	
entrusted	to	advanced	nations	who	by	reason	of	their	resources,	their	
experience	or	their	geographical	position	can	best	undertake	the	
responsibility,	and	who	are	willing	to	accept	it…’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	
These	former	colonial	territories	were	split	into	three	categories:	A,	B	and	
C	mandates.	A	Mandates	consisted	of	the	former	colonies	of	the	Ottoman	
Empire	such	as	Iraq,	Palestine	and	Syria,	and	under	Article	22	of	the	
Covenant,	these	territories	were	considered	to	have	‘…reached	a	stage	of	
development	where	their	existence	as	independent	nations	can	be	
provisionally	recognized	subject	to	the	rendering	of	administrative	advice	
and	assistance	by	a	Mandatory	until	such	time	as	they	are	able	to	stand	
alone’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	These	territories	were	considered	
‘developed’	to	the	degree	that	they	no	longer	required	direct	supervision	
from	an	imperial	centre	and	could	be	recognised	as	independent	states.	
Category	B	mandates	included	Cameroon	and	Togo,	German	East	Africa	
and	Rwanda-Burundi	and	were	subject	to	full	administrative	control	of	the	
mandatory	power	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	Category	B	territories	were	
considered	to	be	at	such	an	early	stage	in	the	development	process	that	
they	required	administrative	supervision	from	an	imperial	power.	Finally,	
Category	C	mandates	included	territories	such	as	South-West	Africa	and	
the	South	Pacific	Islands.	These	territories	were	to	become	‘integral	
portions’	of	the	mandatory	power’s	territory,	due	to	‘…the	sparseness	of	
their	population,	or	their	small	size,	or	their	remoteness	from	the	centres	
of	civilization…’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	These	territories	were	either	too	
small	or	too	remote	to	be	considered	for	independence	by	the	League	of	
Nations	and	as	such,	were	to	be	integrated	into	existing	empires.			
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This	system	of	control	developed	by	the	League	of	Nations	to	deal	with	
colonial	territories	reinforces	ideologies	of	civilisation	and	progress,	whilst	
attempting	to	disguise	the	relationship	between	these	ideas	and	the	
violence	of	colonial	rule.	Rather,	the	mandate	system	is	the	beginning	of	
the	move	from	an	arrangement	of	direct	colonial	rule	to	a	system	of	
indirect	colonial	rule	through	the	idea	of	development	(Rajagopal,	2003:	
50).	The	distinction	between	category	A,	B	and	C	mandates	reiterates	the	
notion	of	civilisation	as	a	linear	progression,	with	those	countries	who	are	
furthest	away	from	European	cultural	values	being	subject	to	the	strictest	
level	of	supervision,	with	remote	or	sparse	territories	being	fully	integrated	
into	empires	due	to	the	fear	that	they	may	never	adhere	to	European	
values	without	such	intense	supervision.	The	very	idea	of	'tutelage'	as	
outlined	in	Article	22	of	the	Covenant	again	reinforces	this	problematic	
notion	of	European	culture	as	the	height	of	civilisation	and	the	idea	that	in	
order	for	these	territories	to	be	granted	sovereignty,	they	must	adopt	
European	cultural	values.	The	significance	of	the	mandate	system	will	
become	more	apparent	once	we	begin	an	examination	of	the	development	
of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	and	its	desire	to	distance	itself	from	
the	League	of	Nations	and	from	the	question	of	colonialism.		
	
Despite	the	League’s	written	intention	to	develop	a	system	capable	of	
maintaining	international	peace	and	security,	it	proved	to	be	relatively	
ineffective,	as	1939	saw	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War	and	calls	
for	the	need	for	a	more	effective	way	of	dealing	with	international	conflict,	
which	is	where	discussions	around	the	United	Nations	pick	up.	In	reality,	
the	failure	of	the	League	of	Nations	was	partly	the	result	of	an	absence	of	
involvement	on	the	part	of	two	key	governments	–	the	United	States	and	
the	Soviet	Union	–	and	the	success	of	any	following	international	
institutions	would	be	reliant	upon	their	involvement,	which	required	some	
degree	of	re-branding	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	92).		
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The	concurrent	timing	of	the	development	of	the	United	Nations	with	the	
United	States	involvement	in	World	War	Two	meant	that	President	
Roosevelt	was	able	to	use	the	United	Nations	to	justify	American	
involvement	in	the	war	by	constructing	its	ultimate	purpose	as	something	
longer-term	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	5).	If	the	United	States	could	be	seen	as	
participating	in	a	global	organisation	to	prevent	breaches	to	the	peace,	
their	involvement	in	the	Second	World	War	as	part	of	this	process	could	be	
justified.	Thus,	the	disassociation	between	the	League	of	Nations	and	the	
United	Nations	was	less	a	case	of	difference	in	objectives;	after	all,	both	
organisations	had	international	peace	and	security	as	their	primary	
purpose,	and	more	a	case	of	political	PR.	The	aim	was	to	create	an	
organisation	capable	of	dealing	with	international	relations	on	a	global	
scale,	but	this	time,	with	the	support	of	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	
Union.	Leaders	were	able	to	disconnect	the	United	Nations	from	its	
predecessor	by	framing	its	development	as	a	response	to	the	Second	
World	War,	supporting	enlightenment	ideas	of	universalism	and	progress,	
as	signifying	a	new	world	order,	rather	than	as	a	continuation	of	existing	
global	power	relations.	The	rising	power	and	influence	of	the	United	States	
at	this	time	therefore	made	their	involvement	essential.		
	
This	approach	to	understanding	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	highlights	
the	relationship	between	the	United	Nations	and	the	League	of	Nations,	
indicating	the	inaccuracies	of	the	standard	narrative	of	rupture	between	
the	two	organisations	that	allows	for	a	dominant	discourse	of	equality	to	
be	associated	with	the	United	Nations.	If	instead,	we	understand	the	
United	Nations	as	the	product	of	a	PR	campaign	to	protect	the	
relationships	between	the	major	powers	of	the	League,	but	also	to	create	
an	organisation	that	included	the	rising	powers	of	the	time,	we	are	able	to	
disturb	these	dominant	discourses.	This	reconsideration	of	the	history	of	
the	United	Nations	provides	a	base	from	which	we	can	understand	the	
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relationship	between	the	United	Nations	and	colonialism,	showing	the	
extent	to	which	colonial	power	structures	were	built	into	the	organisation	
from	the	very	beginning.	In	re-narrating	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	
and	highlighting	the	significance	of	colonialism	within	this,	this	thesis	will	
emphasise	the	continuation	of	these	power	structures	in	contemporary	
contexts,	even	following	formal	decolonisation.			
	
	
The	United	Nations	in	the	Contemporary	World	
	
Having	explored	the	founding	of	the	United	Nations,	its	aims	and	its	
structure,	it	is	worth	briefly	reflecting	upon	the	differences	in	the	world	
that	the	United	Nations	is	trying	to	protect	70	years	on	from	the	signing	of	
the	Charter.	At	its	birth	in	1945,	the	United	Nations	was	dealing	with	the	
recovery	from	two	world	wars	in	historically	short	succession.	The	
purposes	and	ideals	behind	the	role	of	the	United	Nations	were	made	fairly	
clear	and	reasonable	through	a	commitment	to	‘save	succeeding	
generations	from	the	scourge	of	war,	which	twice	in	our	life-	time	has	
brought	untold	sorrow	to	mankind’	(United	Nations,	1945).	In	2016,	the	
issues	the	United	Nations	faces	are	somewhat	different.	Chapter	7	will	
explore	some	of	the	developments	in	United	Nations	policies	on	
intervention	over	the	course	of	the	70	years	of	the	organisation’s	existence	
and	how	this	was	influenced	at	particular	periods	in	time	by	what	was	
happening	in	the	world,	in	order	to	give	an	example	of	the	different	focus	
of	the	United	Nations	now	in	comparison	to	its	early	years.	Here	however,	
it	is	useful	to	examine	more	broadly	the	role	the	United	Nations	plays	and	
has	played	in	recent	years.	This	section	will	outline	some	of	the	key	
developments	in	the	rhetoric	of	the	United	Nations	since	the	turn	of	the	
twenty	first	century.		
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The	Millennium	Declaration	in	2000	put	forward	the	following	six	values	as	
‘essential	to	international	relations	in	the	twenty-first	century’:	freedom,	
equality,	solidarity,	tolerance,	respect	for	nature	and	shared	responsibility	
(United	Nations,	2000).	These	six	fundamental	values	were	then	translated	
into	key	objectives	for	the	United	Nations	in	the	twenty	first	century,	
falling	into	the	categories	of	peace,	security	and	disarmament;	
development	and	poverty	eradication;	protecting	our	common	
environment;	human	rights,	democracy	and	good	governance;	protecting	
the	vulnerable;	meeting	the	special	needs	of	Africa;	and	strengthening	the	
United	Nations	(United	Nations,	2000).	In	contrast	to	the	Charter	then,	the	
focus	in	the	twenty	first	century	shifted	to	not	only	deal	with	issues	of	
international	conflict	and	disagreement	between	states,	but	to	
understanding	the	United	Nations	fundamentally	as	a	responsible	agent	in	
the	development	of	all	of	the	world’s	nations	and	as	a	collective	protector	
of	the	environment	and	the	world’s	most	vulnerable	people.	The	focus	on	
the	‘special	needs	of	Africa’	suggests	some	level	of	acknowledgement	that	
the	world	is	not	equal	and	that	particular	geographical	regions	are	in	need	
of	a	greater	level	of	support,	whilst	also	neglecting	to	take	responsibility	for	
the	history	behind	Africa’s	‘special	needs’.	Similarly,	the	identification	of	
poverty	eradication	as	a	key	goal	for	the	United	Nations	implies	a	
recognition	of	inequality	both	within	and	between	countries.	Where	the	
original	declaration	of	the	Charter	had	focused	on	maintaining	
international	peace	and	security	through	an	agreement	between	states	to	
prevent	war,	the	Millennium	Declaration	frames	the	United	Nations	as	
much	more	of	an	active	agent	in	dealing	with	a	wide	range	of	issues	around	
the	globe.		
	
This	declaration	was	followed	in	2005	by	the	Outcome	Document	of	that	
year’s	World	Summit,	which	saw	the	reaffirmation	of	the	values	of	the	
Millennium	Declaration	as	well	as	an	increased	focus	on	terrorism	as	a	
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fundamental	and	immediate	threat	to	international	peace	and	security	
(United	Nations,	2005).	The	events	of	September	11th	2001	in	the	United	
States	and	the	conflict	that	followed	had	clearly	been	a	catalyst	in	this	push	
towards	developing	strategies	to	deal	with	terrorism,	but	also	in	reiterating	
the	fundamental	principles	of	the	United	Nations	and	attempting	to	
restrain	unauthorised	action.	This	is	implicitly	suggested	when	the	
Outcome	Document	states:		
	
‘We	therefore	reaffirm	our	commitment	to	work	towards	a	security	
consensus	based	on	the	recognition	that	many	threats	are	interlinked,	that	
development,	peace,	security	and	human	rights	are	mutually	reinforcing,	
that	no	State	can	best	protect	itself	by	acting	entirely	alone	and	that	all	
States	need	an	effective	and	efficient	collective	security	system	pursuant	to	
the	purposes	and	principles	of	the	Charter’	(United	Nations,	2005:	21).			
	
The	focus	here	was	arguably	on	proving	the	continued	relevance	of	the	
United	Nations	in	a	contemporary	context	where	individual	states	both	
have	the	power	and	the	desire	to	act	alone	without	the	support	of	an	
international	organisation.	The	concerns	in	recent	years	then	have	been	
around	threats	that	go	beyond	national	boundaries	and	are	not	concerning	
conflict	between	particular	states,	but	are	about	international	threats	that	
affect	the	entire	global	population,	whether	these	are	issues	of	
development,	environmental	concerns	or	participating	in	the	‘war	on	
terror’.		
	
The	period	between	the	Millennium	Declaration	and	the	2005	World	
Summit	saw	some	key	developments	in	United	Nations	policy,	that	are	
particularly	significant	for	the	arguments	being	developed	here,	around	
intervention	and	the	use	of	force	and	these	will	be	discussed	in	much	more	
detail	in	Chapter	7.	It	is	clear	however	that	the	United	Nations	recognised	
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the	ability	of	states	to	act	alone	and	the	conflicting	perspectives	between	
states	in	dealing	with	such	global	issues.	These	documents	contain	an	
implicit	plea	to	the	world’s	major	powers	to	continue	to	support	an	
international	organisation	that	has	become	increasingly	trapped	by	inter-
state	conflict.		
	
At	present,	the	United	Nations	displays	itself	as	working	towards	five	key	
goals:	maintaining	international	peace	and	security,	promoting	sustainable	
development,	protecting	human	rights,	upholding	international	law	and	
delivering	humanitarian	aid	(United	Nations,	2016).	In	line	with	the	
Charter,	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	is	highlighted	
as	the	fundamental	purpose	of	the	organisation.	It	argues	that	peace	and	
security	is	maintained	through	the	complementary	strategies	of	
preventative	diplomacy	and	mediation,	peacekeeping,	peace	building,	
countering	terrorism	and	disarmament	(United	Nations,	2016).	The	‘war	on	
terror’	therefore	still	features	as	a	key	aspect	of	the	United	Nations’	work	
since	2001,	as	well	as	continuing	work	to	prevent	conflict	before	it	arises	
through	diplomatic	approaches.	Strategies	for	dealing	with	breaches	of	
international	peace	and	threats	to	international	security	have	been	
contentious	issues	within	the	United	Nations	in	recent	years	and	it	is	the	
role	of	the	Security	Council	in	dealing	with	such	issues	that	will	become	the	
focus	of	the	critique	provided	throughout	the	following	chapters.		
	
To	move	this	discussion	into	the	context	of	the	most	recent	debates,	a	key	
issue	for	the	United	Nations	in	the	contemporary	world	has	been	
developing	within	the	geographical	context	of	the	Middle	East	and	North	
Africa.	The	past	five	years	have	seen	continuing	conflict	in	this	region	as	a	
result	of	the	revolutionary	protests	that	began	in	2011	that	have	come	to	
be	known	as	the	‘Arab	Spring’.		The	self-immolation	of	Mohamed	Bouazizi	
in	Tunisia	on	December	17th	2010	signified	the	start	of	a	wave	of	anti-
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governmental	uprisings	across	the	Arab	world	(Dickinson,	2013:	105).	The	
period	between	then	and	now	has	seen	the	development	of	a	number	of	
conflicts	between	governments	and	pro-democracy	protestors	across	the	
region,	some	of	which	have	seen	more	United	Nations	involvement	than	
others.	Most	significant	within	the	United	Nations	context	have	been	the	
revolutionary	uprisings	in	Libya	and	Syria,	as	these	two	conflicts	have	seen	
extensive	debate	within	the	international	community	and	particularly	
within	the	Security	Council.	The	role	of	the	United	Nations	within	this	
context	has	been	heavily	criticised	in	the	media	due	to	its	selective	
response	to	the	conflicts	and	the	prevention	of	meaningful	action	by	the	
Security	Council	(Weiss,	2014:	13).			
	
In	March	2011,	Resolution	1973,	adopted	by	a	meeting	of	the	United	
Nations	Security	Council	authorised	the	use	of	‘all	necessary	measures’	
under	the	principle	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	in	order	to	protect	civilians	
in	Libya	from	the	violence	of	the	Gaddafi	government	(Crook,	2011:	571).	
The	escalating	tension	and	aggression	between	rebel	groups	and	the	
Libyan	government	was	such	that	an	international	response	was	deemed	
necessary	in	order	to	maintain	international	peace	and	security.	This	
Security	Council	Resolution	was	the	first	instance	of	the	authorised	use	of	
force	against	the	wishes	of	a	functioning	state	(Bellamy	and	Williams,	2011:	
825).	Never	before	had	the	Security	Council	authorised	the	use	of	force	
without	the	consent	of	a	government	that	was	still	in	power.	In	this	sense,	
the	intervention	in	Libya	was	a	significant	decision	on	the	part	of	the	
Security	Council	and	appeared	to	represent	a	commitment	to	a	
responsibility	to	protect	civilians,	rather	than	a	responsibility	to	respect	the	
authority	of	governments.	However,	as	the	intervention	in	Libya	unfolded,	
concerns	were	raised	around	the	relationship	between	the	implementation	
of	policy	by	the	Security	Council	and	the	unequal	power	relations	within	
the	United	Nations	(Mahdavi,	2012:	267).	Whilst	the	United	Nations	
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claimed	publically	to	be	acting	in	the	interests	of	international	peace	and	
the	protection	of	Libyan	civilians,	the	intervention	was	heavily	criticised	on	
the	basis	that	the	Security	Council	may	in	fact	be	acting	in	the	interests	of	
the	major	powers	and	in	order	to	promote	regime	change	(Bellamy	and	
Williams,	2011:	846).	The	protection	of	innocent	civilians	in	such	conflicts	is	
undoubtedly	a	responsibility	that	the	international	community	should	take	
seriously.	However,	this	conflict	raised	serious	questions	about	the	
relationship	between	protecting	civilians	and	promoting	a	change	in	
regime	in	Libya	that	would	better	suit	the	interests	of	the	world’s	major	
powers.	These	concerns	were	reiterated	even	more	strongly	once	the	
uprising	in	Syria	began	and	the	Security	Council	failed	to	agree	upon	a	
response	in	spite	of	similar	conditions.		
	
Despite	the	violence	of	Syria’s	government,	led	by	President	Assad,	and	the	
death	of	large	numbers	of	civilians	as	well	as	huge	numbers	of	displaced	
people,	the	Security	Council	has	been	unable	to	intervene	due	to	the	
continued	use	of	veto	power	by	the	Russian	and	Chinese	governments	
(Weiss,	2014:	13).	The	Russian	government,	backed	by	the	Chinese	
government,	has	consistently	blocked	Security	Council	proposals	for	a	full	
intervention	in	Syria,	bringing	the	Security	Council	to	a	standstill	on	the	
issue.	The	situation	in	Syria	has	therefore	highlighted	the	ability	of	the	
Security	Council	to	act	selectively	in	dealing	with	conflicts,	particularly	
when	the	interests	of	the	permanent	five	members	are	not	being	met.	The	
fact	that	the	Security	Council	can	authorise	the	United	Nations	to	intervene	
in	Libya	and	not	in	Syria	emphasises	the	real	and	significant	power	that	the	
permanent	five	members	of	the	Security	Council	have	in	terms	of	dealing	
with	conflict.	The	selective	response	to	conflict	that	has	been	seen	in	the	
past	five	years	has	also	led	to	a	questioning	of	the	contemporary	relevance	
of	the	United	Nations.	If	it	can	be	prevented	from	taking	action	within	the	
context	of	a	civil	war	that	has	resulted	in	an	enormous	number	of	refugees,	
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the	conflicts	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	have	highlighted	the	real	
extent	to	which	the	United	Nations	is	run	by	its	most	powerful	members.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	provided	a	broad	overview	of	the	United	Nations,	whilst	
also	introducing	some	of	the	underlying	critical	themes	of	the	thesis.	
Beginning	with	an	examination	of	the	purposes	and	the	structure	of	the	
organisation,	it	has	outlined	what	the	United	Nations	is	and	what	it	claims	
to	set	out	to	do	in	terms	of	regulating	international	relations.	Here,	the	
power	differentials	between	the	different	factions	of	the	organisation	have	
been	introduced	and	this	will	continue	to	be	a	theme	throughout	the	
following	chapters.		
	
The	second	section	of	the	chapter	introduced	the	standard	historical	
narrative	of	the	United	Nations	at	which	the	critique	that	follows	in	the	
rest	of	the	chapters	will	be	aimed.	Some	of	the	particular	critiques	of	this	
history	have	been	initiated	here,	such	as	the	absence	of	colonialism	and	its	
fundamental	significance	for	the	founding	of	the	United	Nations,	but	these	
will	be	explored	in	much	more	detail	throughout	the	remaining	chapters.		
	
This	standard	narrative	was	followed	by	a	reconsideration	of	the	history	of	
the	United	Nations	that	emphasised	its	relationship	to	the	League	of	
Nations.	Arguing	against	the	standard	narrative	of	rupture	between	the	
two	organisations	that	allows	for	the	United	Nations	to	be	understood	as	
an	institution	committed	to	equality,	this	chapter	has	followed	Mark	
Mazower’s	proposal	that	the	United	Nations	is	in	fact	the	product	of	
‘evolution	not	revolution’	(2009:	17).	If	we	understand	the	United	Nations	
to	be	a	continuation	of	the	League	of	Nations,	but	with	the	addition	of	the	
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newer	major	global	powers,	we	are	able	to	see	the	ways	in	which	the	
colonial	power	relationships	that	formed	the	basis	of	the	League	of	Nations	
have	been	developed	into	new	systems	of	control,	masked	by	the	
dominant	discourses	of	equality,	notions	of	rupture	and	a	rhetoric	of	
originality	or	novelty	that	surround	the	formation	of	the	United	Nations.		
	
Finally,	this	chapter	has	provided	a	context	for	the	thesis	overall	in	terms	of	
questioning	the	ability	of	the	United	Nations	to	handle	the	global	issues	of	
contemporary	international	politics.	The	ability	to	act	selectively	in	dealing	
with	conflicts	such	as	those	continuing	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	
prompts	a	question	about	what	the	role	of	the	United	Nations	is	in	the	
contemporary	world	and	the	extent	to	which	it	is	able	to	fulfil	this	role	
within	the	current	structure	of	the	organisation.	The	world	and	
international	politics	have	clearly	changed	in	a	number	of	ways	since	the	
Charter	was	written	in	1945	and	the	extent	to	which	it	is	reasonable	or	
sensible	to	have	an	international	organisation	dominated	by	five	major	
powers	is	questionable.	What	the	following	chapters	of	this	thesis	aim	to	
do	is	to	develop	an	understanding	of	the	historical	development	of	the	
United	Nations	as	an	institution,	in	order	to	understand	how	it	is	possible	
for	an	organisation	claiming	to	act	in	the	interests	of	international	peace	
and	security	to	be	so	hugely	dominated	by	such	a	small	number	of	states.	
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Chapter	2:	Postcolonialism,	the	United	Nations	and	
Sovereignty	
	
‘Colonialism	becomes	the	past	property	of	individual	nation	states	to	be	
displaced	by	a	new	narrative	of	European	integration	free	from	the	strain	
of	colonialism.	By	erasing	the	colonial	past,	the	postcolonial	present	of	
Europe	and	European	states	is	also	disavowed’	(Bhambra,	2014:	155).		
	
	
Introduction	
	 	
This	chapter	will	ground	the	theoretical	claims	of	Chapter	1	in	postcolonial	
theory	and	provide	the	theoretical	basis	for	the	thesis	as	a	whole,	drawing	
upon	literature	from	prominent	postcolonial	theorists.	It	will	begin	by	
providing	a	postcolonial	critique	of	the	United	Nations,	exploring	the	
significance	of	colonialism	within	the	founding	stages	of	the	institution	and	
arguing	that	the	United	Nations	is	a	fundamentally	postcolonial	
organisation,	perpetuating	unequal	power	relations	through	neocolonial	
technologies	of	power	and	justifying	this	through	problematic	discourses	of	
development	that	centre	around	characterisations	of	different	parts	of	the	
world	as	‘civilised’	and	‘uncivilised’.		
	
This	chapter	will	also	introduce	some	significant	debates	relating	to	the	
concept	of	sovereignty	within	the	United	Nations,	which	will	be	explored	in	
more	detail	in	Chapter	5.	It	will	argue	that	the	basis	of	the	United	Nations	
in	the	concept	of	sovereignty	and	the	framing	of	the	organisation	as	an	
interaction	between	sovereign	states	overlooks	the	history	of	sovereignty	
as	a	concept	and	its	relationship	to	colonialism.	Indeed,	it	is	rarely	
acknowledged	that	the	emergence	of	international	law	as	we	understand	it	
today	was	concurrent	with	the	height	of	colonial	domination	(Megret,	
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2006:	269).	The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	emphasise	the	relationship	
between	the	two	that	has	been	lost	in	the	majority	of	the	accounts	of	the	
modern	world.		Once	we	understand	that	sovereignty	has	a	colonial	
history,	international	institutions	with	sovereignty	as	their	foundational	
principle	become	more	problematic	and	claims	to	equality	are	exposed	as	
somewhat	misleading.	Add	to	this	the	unwillingness	of	the	sponsoring	
nations	of	the	organisation	to	include	decolonisation	on	the	agenda	in	
discussing	the	structure	of	the	United	Nations	and	the	power	relations	
inherent	in	its	development	become	much	more	apparent.		
	
So,	if	we	understand	the	United	Nations	as	both	underpinned	by	principles	
and	concepts	–	such	as	sovereignty	-	that	are	inherently	colonial,	and	
illuminate	the	silencing	of	colonial	issues	in	its	development,	it	is	easier	to	
see	how	colonial	power	relations	are	inextricably	built	into	the	United	
Nations	as	an	institution.	In	understanding	how	colonialism	influenced	
international	institutions	at	their	formative	stage,	it	is	possible	to	highlight	
issues	of	colonial	power	that	continue	in	these	institutions	now	(Anghie,	
2005:	117).	In	their	neglect	of	colonialism	as	an	issue	at	the	founding	of	the	
United	Nations,	the	standard	histories	detailed	in	the	previous	chapter	
contribute	towards	the	perpetuation	of	discourses	of	development	and	
civilisation	that	legitimate	the	dominance	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	
nations	within	international	institutions.		
	
The	attempt	here	to	highlight	the	silencing	of	the	United	Nations’	colonial	
past	follows	Bhambra’s	line	of	argument	that	‘…if	our	understandings	of	
the	past	are	inadequate	it	follows	that	our	grasp	of	the	present	will	also	be	
inadequate’	(2007:	2).	If	we	accept	the	standard	accounts	of	the	history	of	
the	United	Nations	and	fail	to	recognise	the	intricate	ways	in	which	
colonialism	was	inherent	in	this,	our	understanding	of	contemporary	issues	
will	also	be	flawed.	Where	the	previous	chapter	followed	this	line	of	
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argument	in	providing	a	re-narration	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations,	
the	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	locate	this	alternative	historical	narrative	
within	the	context	of	postcolonial	theory	and	postcolonial	literature,	in	
order	to	provide	a	framework	for	understanding	the	chapters	that	follow.	It	
will	provide	a	brief	introduction	to	postcolonial	theory	more	broadly,	
before	moving	on	to	look	at	some	of	the	specific	critiques	of	the	United	
Nations	developed	by	postcolonial	theorists,	and	finally	providing	a	critique	
of	international	law	and	the	concept	of	sovereignty	from	a	postcolonial	
perspective.		
	
	
A	Postcolonial	Critique	of	the	United	Nations	
	
Postcolonial	theory	has	been	described	by	Leela	Gandhi	as	‘…a	theoretical	
resistance	to	the	mystifying	amnesia	of	the	colonial	aftermath’	(1998:	4).	
Where	it	is	commonly	understood	that	colonialism	ended	with	the	formal	
process	of	decolonisation	and	the	granting	of	independence	to	colonial	
states,	postcolonial	theory	represents	a	challenge	to	the	desire	to	
understand	colonialism	as	a	distinct	period	in	history	and	instead	wishes	to	
uncover	the	many	ways	in	which	colonial	power	relations	have	structured	
the	contemporary	world.	It	represents	a	desire	to	oppose	the	ability	for	
particular	nations	to	frame	uneven	global	development	as	natural	(Bhabha,	
1994:	246).	Postcolonial	theory	opposes	the	ability	of	the	West	to	frame	its	
development	as	a	natural	phenomenon,	obscuring	the	violence	and	
exploitation	of	colonialism.	Furthermore,	for	postcolonial	theorists,	the	
power	relations	inherent	in	the	colonial	encounter	have	contributed	to	the	
structuring	of	the	contemporary	world	in	a	way	that	cannot	be	undone	
simply	through	the	process	of	decolonisation	and	independence.	As	such,	
the	primary	aim	of	postcolonial	theory	is	to	identify	and	draw	attention	to	
the	ways	in	which	colonial	power	relations	continue	to	be	significant.		
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The	‘post’	of	postcolonialism	is	not	a	signal	therefore	that	we	exist	in	a	
time	after	colonialism,	but	forms	an	understanding	that	the	world	we	live	
in	has	been	definitively	shaped	by	the	existence	of	colonial	power	relations	
and	that	in	order	to	understand	the	contemporary	world,	this	fact	needs	to	
be	acknowledged	and	must	form	a	key	part	of	our	analysis	of	the	present	
situation	(Seth,	2013:	1).	For	postcolonial	theorists,	it	is	not	enough	to	
analyse	contemporary	problems	in	terms	of	their	immediate	context.	
Rather,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	varied	and	numerous	ways	in	
which	colonialism	as	a	process	constructed	the	modern	world.	In	order	to	
fully	understand	contemporary	issues,	we	must	always	explore	them	
within	the	historical	context	of	colonialism.	In	this	way,	postcolonial	theory	
represents	a	direct	challenge	to	the	conceptualisation	of	the	world	as	no	
longer	colonial.	Instead,	it	argues	that	the	continued	existence	of	the	
inequalities	inherent	in	colonialism	make	this	conceptualisation	inaccurate	
(Loomba,	1998:	7).	Whilst	we	continue	to	live	in	a	world	where	some	are	
rich	whilst	others	are	poor	and	where	power	is	not	equally	distributed,	it	is	
impossible	to	argue	that	we	are	beyond	colonialism	and	its	effects.		
Throughout	the	following	chapters,	this	way	of	thinking	will	be	used	in	
order	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	the	United	Nations	has	been	able	to	
construct	itself	as	an	institution	based	on	equality	and	democratic	
representation,	despite	its	intense	relationship	with	colonialism.	The	
chapters	that	follow	will	explore	the	implications	of	this	obscuring	of	
colonial	power	for	contemporary	issues	in	international	politics,	
particularly	focusing	on	the	issue	of	intervention	in	Chapter	7.	The	topics	
discussed	here	are	an	attempt	to	disturb	the	dominant	narratives	of	
equality	that	surround	the	United	Nations	and	problematise	some	its	core	
principles	of	progress	and	development	from	a	postcolonial	perspective,	in	
order	to	emphasise	the	ways	in	which	the	United	Nations	is	involved	in	the	
perpetuation	of	unequal	global	power	relations	that	have	their	basis	in	the	
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colonial	encounter.	The	arguments	that	will	be	developed	here	are	done	so	
in	the	spirit	of	postcolonial	theory,	which	seeks	to	disrupt	the	ideologies	of	
modernity	that	allow	for	the	uneven	development	of	the	world	and	the	
severe	disadvantage	of	particular	nations	to	be	viewed	as	natural	(Bhabha,	
1994:	pp.	245	–	246).	The	purpose	of	disrupting	the	dominant	discourses	
that	surround	the	United	Nations	and	its	development	is	to	disturb	the	
established	understandings	of	the	contemporary	world	order	as	legitimate	
and	in	any	way	natural.	Rather,	one	of	the	key	claims	being	made	
throughout	the	course	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	existing	world	order	is	the	
result	of	colonial	violence	and	domination	that	is	in	no	way	justifiable.	In	
focusing	on	the	role	of	international	institutions	in	maintaining	this	global	
hierarchy,	a	number	of	postcolonial	critiques	of	the	United	Nations	will	
now	be	outlined	with	the	aim	of	disrupting	the	dominant	discourses	that	
will	be	challenged	throughout	this	thesis.	
	
As	previously	noted,	the	United	Nations’	core	governing	document,	the	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	constructs	it	as	an	institution	committed	to	
the	equality	of	all	nations	and	frames	the	United	Nations	as	a	innovative	
response	to	the	Second	World	War	with	reference	to	saving	‘…succeeding	
generations	from	the	scourge	of	war,	which	twice	in	our	life-	time	has	
brought	untold	sorrow	to	mankind’	(United	Nations,	1945).	However,	this	
narrative	is	largely	inaccurate	and	rather,	we	should	see	the	United	Nations	
not	as	an	original	organisation	which	was	developed	in	response	to	the	
horrific	events	of	the	Second	World	War,	but	as	a	product	and	continuation	
of	the	institutions	that	preceded	it,	namely	the	League	of	Nations	
(Mazower,	2009:	17).	As	was	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter,	if	we	see	the	
United	Nations	not	as	an	original	response	to	the	Second	World	War	but	as	
a	continuation	of	its	chronological	predecessor,	the	relationship	between	
the	United	Nations	and	the	colonial	powers	becomes	much	more	apparent.	
Following	this	analysis,	the	United	Nations	becomes	simply	the	next	
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chapter	in	the	history	of	international	political	organisations	that	started	
with	the	League	of	Nations.	As	such,	the	United	Nations	is	linked	to	the	
issues	of	colonialism	and	its	associated	understandings	of	global	order	that	
accompanied	the	League	of	Nations	(Mazower,	2009:	14).	As	the	League	of	
Nations	was	so	heavily	dominated	by	colonial	powers,	including	this	as	part	
of	the	historical	narrative	of	the	United	Nations	and	challenging	the	idea	of	
a	distinct	temporal	and	ideological	break	separating	the	two	organisations	
makes	the	ways	in	which	the	United	Nations	dealt	with,	or	more	accurately	
failed	to	deal	with,	questions	around	colonial	domination	all	the	more	
significant.		
	
In	addition	to	the	idea	that	the	United	Nations	was	developed	in	response	
to	the	Second	World	War,	another	common	mystifying	factor	in	the	
relationship	between	the	United	Nations	and	colonialism	is	the	process	of	
decolonisation.	The	conventional	narrative	is	that	the	United	Nations	
supported	colonies	in	achieving	independence	through	the	system	of	
trusteeship	which	reached	its	endpoint	in	the	Declaration	on	the	Granting	
of	Independence	to	Colonial	Countries	and	Peoples	(1960)	that	signified	
the	end	of	colonialism,	with	colonialism	ceasing	to	exist	or	have	any	
influence	on	the	world	once	all	former	colonies	were	granted	
independence.	This	narrative	is	exactly	what	is	being	challenged	here:	the	
idea	that	the	formal	process	of	decolonisation	and	the	granting	of	
independence	to	former	colonies	ended	colonial	influence	and	power	
structures.	As	the	influential	postcolonial	theorist	Frantz	Fanon	clearly	
states:	‘colonialism	and	imperialism	have	not	paid	their	score	when	they	
withdraw	their	flags	and	their	police	forces	from	our	territories’	(1967	
[1961]:	pp.79	–	80).		
	
This	turn	towards	anti-colonialism	and	independence	within	the	rhetoric	of	
the	United	Nations	obscures	the	fact	that	the	United	Nations	is	in	itself	a	
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product	of	empire	(Mazower,	2009:	17).	The	United	Nations	ultimately	
developed	out	of	the	dissolution	of	the	League	of	Nations	following	its	
failure	to	prevent	the	Second	World	War,	and	the	need	to	include	the	
emerging	global	powers	of	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union.	The	
colonial	power	relations	inherent	in	the	League	of	Nations	were	carried	
through	to	the	United	Nations	from	its	very	beginnings,	through	the	power	
structures	that	are	integral	to	its	organisation.	To	assume	that	colonialism	
ceased	to	have	an	impact	upon	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	once	
the	colonies	were	granted	formal	independence	therefore	disguises	the	
various	ways	in	which	colonialism	was	foundational	to	the	United	Nations’	
construction.	Rather,	as	will	be	seen	in	more	detail	in	later	chapters,	the	
process	of	formal	decolonisation	was	bound	up	in	the	development	of	new	
structures	that	would	allow	for	the	continuation	of	forms	of	imperial	
control.	These	neocolonial	technologies	have	been	developed	in	the	place	
of	colonial	mechanisms	of	power	in	order	to	exercise	control,	primarily	
through	economic	or	financial	means	(Nkrumah,	1965:	ix).	The	
maintenance	of	colonial	power	structures	was	key	to	the	expansion	of	the	
United	Nations	as	an	international	institution	during	the	period	of	
decolonisation.		
	
The	significance	of	colonial	power	relationships	in	the	construction	of	the	
United	Nations	is	further	emphasised	by	its	central	importance	for	the	
major	powers	within	initial	discussions	to	develop	a	new	international	
organisation	towards	the	final	years	of	the	Second	World	War.	The	Atlantic	
Charter	signed	by	the	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	and	United	
States	President	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	in	1941	is	a	prime	example	of	this.	
The	Atlantic	Charter	reflected	a	conflict	between	the	United	States’	desires	
for	decolonisation	and	the	development	of	colonies	into	independent	
states	that	could	participate	in	a	world	system	of	free	trade,	and	the	British	
desire	that	colonies	would	become	self-governing	dominions	with	a	close	
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connection	to	their	imperial	centres	(Simpson,	2001:	235).	Whereas	
Roosevelt	saw	decolonisation	as	an	opportunity	to	expand	the	
international	system	of	free	trade	by	including	a	larger	number	of	
countries,	for	Churchill,	and	for	the	other	existing	colonial	powers,	
independence	was	not	viewed	as	a	logical	outcome	of	colonial	status	
(Gilchrist,	1945:	987).	The	idea	that	the	colonies	could	function	as	
independent	states	that	were	capable	of	participating	in	the	international	
trade	system	was	at	odds	with	imperial	understandings	of	colonisers	acting	
as	educators	to	the	less	civilised.	If	the	colonies	were	granted	
independence	and	deemed	able	to	participate	in	global	systems	at	the	
same	level	as	existing	independent	states,	the	entire	historical	system	of	
colonialism	would	become	unjustifiable	and	could	only	be	understood	as	a	
simple	act	of	violence	and	domination	by	imperial	powers.	As	such,	
representatives	of	the	United	Kingdom	had	to	argue	for	the	continued	
relevance	and	importance	of	colonialism	as	a	system	of	international	
organisation	in	order	to	justify	previous	years	of	domination.		
	
For	imperial	states	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	it	was	important	to	
maintain	an	understanding	of	people	in	the	colonies	as	unable	to	
participate	on	their	own	in	the	global	trade	system.	Decolonisation	was	
therefore	a	contentious	issue	between	the	major	powers	involved	in	the	
formation	of	the	United	Nations,	and	Churchill	insisted	at	the	final	meeting	
before	the	San	Francisco	conference	of	1945	at	Yalta	on	an	assurance	that	
no	part	of	the	British	Empire	would	be	put	under	United	Nations’	control	
without	British	consent	(Baehr	and	Gordenker,	2005:	16).	It	seemed	that	
for	Churchill,	the	preservation	of	the	British	Empire	was	of	greater	
importance	than	the	establishment	of	a	global	political	organisation.	To	
write	colonialism	out	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	
is	therefore	to	construct	an	inaccurate	representation	of	the	United	
Nations’	founding,	as	colonialism	was	a	definite	point	of	contention	
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between	two	of	the	major	powers.	However,	despite	the	unwillingness	of	
the	colonial	powers	to	discuss	decolonisation,	mounting	public	and	
international	pressure	at	that	time	meant	that	something	had	to	be	done	
about	the	question	of	colonialism	within	the	context	of	the	United	Nations.	
It	became	necessary	for	the	founding	members	of	the	United	Nations	to	
justify	the	colonial	relationship	in	the	face	of	demands	for	decolonisation.		
	
What	resulted	was	a	substantial	focus	on	the	idea	of	development,	which	
had	been	established	as	a	framework	for	understanding	global	relations	
within	international	political	institutions	during	the	League’s	years.	Prior	to	
the	League	of	Nations’	existence,	19th	century	Europe	had	seen	a	heavy	
focus	on	ideas	of	social	progress,	and	closely	linked	to	this,	the	idea	of	
civilisation.	A	theory	emerged	that	nations	advanced	through	different	
stages	of	development,	with	Europeans	believing	that	‘…they	were	
endowed	with	an	advanced	level	of	social	complexity	in	opposition	to	
“barbarous”	nations,	who	could	possibly	acquire	civilization	if	they	
conformed	to	certain	values,	or	“savages”,	who	were	condemned	to	never	
access	it’	(Tarazona,	2012:	917).		
	
Colonialism	was	the	process	by	which	Europeans	came	to	understand	
themselves	as	superior,	through	their	engagement	with	non-Europeans.	As	
Said	argues,	colonialism	was	not	just	about	the	discovery	of	other	cultures	
or	‘the	Orient’	as	is	his	focus,	but	it	also	allowed	Europe	to	define	itself	as	
‘us’	in	contrast	to	‘them’	(1995:	7).	The	process	of	colonialism	allowed	
Europe	to	position	itself	as	superior	through	the	construction	of	East	and	
West	as	inherently	oppositional.	Colonialism	allowed	the	discovery	of	the	
‘backwards’	East	in	relation	to	the	superior	West	and	given	the	context	of	
European	enlightenment,	the	East	was	constructed	not	simply	as	East	but	
as	‘the	Orient’	or	‘non-Europe’	(Said,	1995:	7).	Such	is	the	power	of	this	
ideology	that	Europe	has	come	to	be	understood	as	the	only	source	of	
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innovation	and	progress.	As	Bhambra	argues,	‘the	rest	of	the	world	is	
simply	the	rest	of	the	world	with	a	negative	designation;	it	is	the	non-West,	
the	non-European,	the	Third	World	in	contrast	to	the	First,	the	
underdeveloped	in	relation	to	the	developed’	(2007:	146).	The	process	of	
colonialism	was	therefore	not	just	a	process	of	exploitation	and	violence,	
but	it	was	also	a	process	of	identity	construction.	It	was	the	process	by	
which	Europe	became	Europe	with	all	the	characteristics	that	entails,	in	
direct	opposition	to	non-Europe,	and	the	construction	of	this	identity	
inevitably	involved	the	interaction	between	power	and	powerlessness	
(Said,	1995:	332).		
	
Through	colonialism	and	the	construction	of	oppositional	European	and	
non-European	identities,	a	global	cultural	hierarchy	was	established	with	
Europeans	at	its	peak,	viewing	themselves	as	naturally	more	socially	
advanced	than	other	cultures,	an	idea	consolidated	by	the	development	of	
Enlightenment	thought	throughout	Europe.	Although	the	end	result	would	
never	be	comparable	to	that	of	European	society,	there	was	an	acceptance	
of	the	notion	that	some	non-European	nations	could	progress	their	way	
through	the	stages	of	development	towards	civilisation	if	they	adopted	
certain	cultural	characteristics,	which	were	those	of	European	nations	
(Tarazona,	2012:	917).	These	Enlightenment	ideas	of	progress	and	social	
advancement	were	applied	to	the	colonial	relationship,	and	rather	than	
being	understood	as	a	system	of	direct	control,	exploitation	or	oppression,	
the	colonial	encounter	was	framed	as	a	‘civilising	mission’	–	a	way	for	
civilised	nations	to	encourage	uncivilised	nations	on	the	path	to	
development	(Anghie,	2005:	3).	Rather	than	being	understood	as	a	system	
of	direct	domination,	the	19th	century	saw	colonialism	presented	as	a	way	
in	which	the	uncivilised	nations	of	the	world	could	become	civilised	via	the	
tutelage	of	the	most	advanced	nations.		
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This	civilising	mission	of	colonialism	and	the	ideologies	of	development	and	
progress	that	accompanied	it	were	significant	for	the	policies	developed	by	
international	institutions	in	mediating	the	relationships	between	different	
parts	of	the	world.	Following	the	First	World	War,	colonies	of	defeated	
Germany	and	the	Ottoman	Empire	became	mandates	under	Article	22	of	
the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations,	as	detailed	in	Chapter	1.	Rather	
than	be	granted	independence,	these	colonies	were	put	under	
international	supervision	on	the	understanding	that	they	were	
insufficiently	prepared	for	self-government,	as	people	in	the	colonies	were	
widely	characterised	as	lazy	and	lacking	the	entrepreneurship	necessary	to	
transform	their	traditional	societies	into	modern	ones	capable	of	engaging	
in	the	global	capitalist	system	(Rajagopal,	2003:	39).	However,	as	the	anti-
colonial	movement	was	beginning	to	expand,	rather	than	being	perceived	
as	expanding	their	own	empires	or	as	discouraging	independence	for	the	
colonies,	the	victors	of	the	First	World	War	framed	this	colonial	system	of	
supervision	in	terms	of	development.	There	was	a	move	from	colonies	
being	directly	controlled	by	individual	empires	to	an	understanding	of	
colonising	countries	acting	as	educators,	teaching	people	in	the	colonies	
how	to	be	civilised,	and	the	Mandate	system	of	the	League	of	Nations	was	
the	key	institutional	connection	in	this	move	from	traditional	colonialism	to	
a	discourse	of	development	(Rajagopal,	2003:	50).	These	ideas	of	
development	and	progress	that	emerged	as	ideologies	in	the	League	of	
Nations	following	the	construction	of	European	and	non-European	
identities	through	the	process	of	colonialism	were	key	in	continuing	to	
legitimise	the	colonial	relationship	and	the	dominance	of	imperial	powers,	
and	these	discourses	continued	after	the	Second	World	War	and	into	the	
construction	of	the	United	Nations.	Indeed	in	the	chapters	that	follow,	it	
will	be	argued	that	these	postcolonial	discourses	of	development	and	
progress	continue	today	as	justification	for	the	neocolonial	mechanisms	of	
control	that	we	see	in	the	United	Nations.		
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The	decolonisation	movement	had	gained	momentum	in	the	years	prior	to	
the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations,	and	anti-colonial	groups	had	
attempted	to	get	the	issue	of	colonialism	onto	the	agenda	for	discussion	at	
the	United	Nations	Conference	on	International	Organisation	(UNCIO)	in	
San	Francisco	in	1945.	This	anti-colonial	resistance	to	the	United	Nations	
will	be	detailed	in	Chapter	4,	but	it	is	important	here	to	note	the	responses	
to	it	and	the	techniques	used	by	the	major	powers	in	order	to	transform	
understandings	of	colonialism	from	a	relationship	of	domination	to	a	
relationship	of	tutelage,	with	imperial	powers	acting	in	order	to	encourage	
development.	Despite	this	anti-colonial	movement	including	the	Soviets	by	
the	last	meeting	of	the	San	Francisco	conference,	Western	powers	
managed	to	avoid	any	concrete	discussion	of	the	core	concerns	of	the	anti-
colonial	movement	-	issues	such	as	race,	sovereignty,	justice	and	
decolonisation	(Patil,	2008:	42).	Conversations	of	this	kind	were	limited	to	
the	transition	from	the	mandate	system	of	the	League	of	Nations	to	the	
trusteeship	system	of	the	United	Nations.	These	conversations	will	form	
part	of	the	argument	in	Chapter	4,	but	what	is	significant	for	discussion	
here	is	the	way	in	which	the	responses	of	the	major	powers	to	the	
concerns	raised	by	the	anti-colonial	movement	functioned	in	order	to	
establish	new	systems	of	control	and	how	this	was	enabled	through	
existing	discourses	of	development,	civilisation	and	progress,	continuing	
the	work	done	by	the	mandate	system	in	the	League.		
	
What	we	see	in	the	United	Nations	is	the	growth	of	what	Patil	terms	
‘kinship	politics’,	whereby	two	distinct	categories	of	social	identity	exist	in	
opposition	to	each	other,		
	
‘…the	disembodied	or	rational/paternal/masculine	on	the	one	hand	versus	
the	embodied	or	irrational/childlike/feminine	on	the	other;	a	hierarchical	
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set	of	social	relationships	between	the	two,	whereby	the	first	category	can	
and	indeed	must	“rule	over”	or	“guide”	the	second;	and	the	system	of	
knowledge	inherent	in	these	constructions,	namely	the	notion	that	
dependent	territories	require	rule/tutelage	from	sovereign	states’	(2008:	
95).	
	
Patil’s	characterisation	emphasises	the	way	in	which	this	relationship	as	
was	framed	as	one	of	paternalism,	suggesting	a	level	of	care	as	opposed	to	
a	straightforward	relationship	of	domination.	The	European	powers	
claimed	not	to	want	to	control	non-European	peoples,	but	to	help	them	to	
achieve	their	full	potential	through	the	provision	of	guidance	and	support.	
What	we	see	in	the	United	Nations	then,	despite	a	formal	commitment	to	
equality	and	rights	in	the	preamble	to	the	Charter,	is	a	system	that	
continues	the	colonial	relationship	but	which	is	justified	through	ideas	of	
development	and	civilisation.	This	discourse	of	development	allowed	the	
institutionalisation	of	colonial	power	in	the	very	structure	of	the	United	
Nations,	with	the	world’s	most	powerful	nations	acting	as	paternalistic	
educators,	leading	less	civilised	nations	on	a	singular	path	to	progress.	
Despite	colonies	using	various	bodies	of	the	United	Nations	to	put	an	end	
to	formal	colonialism	in	later	years,	the	independence	granted	to	them	was	
as	a	result	of	imperial	powers	controlling	their	development	(Rajagopal,	
2003:	72).	The	colonies	could	not	be	independent	on	their	own	terms,	but	
had	to	be	granted	independence	once	they	had	shown	an	adherence	to	
particular	cultural	values	as	set	out	by	the	colonisers	and	major	powers	of	
the	United	Nations.	This	granting	of	independence,	as	well	as	the	giving	of	
aid	for	development,	is	a	key	strategy	in	the	operation	of	neocolonial	
power.	It	allows	former	imperial	masters	to	control	the	development	of	
their	former	colonies	under	the	guise	of	generosity,	achieving	the	aims	
formerly	achieved	by	blatant	colonialism	(Nkrumah,	1965:	239).	
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What	has	been	institutionalised	in	the	United	Nations	then	is	a	particular	
view	of	the	world	and	what	it	means	to	be	civilised.	The	most	powerful	
nations	have	encouraged	former	colonies	through	a	system	of	
development	with	its	end	point	as	their	own	Western	liberalism,	which	is	
complicated	and	rendered	contradictory	by	its	colonial	past	(Mazower,	
2009:	201).	Civilisation	as	it	is	understood	in	the	West	is	institutionalised	
through	the	United	Nations	as	a	universal	aspiration	and	this	discourse	of	
development	encourages	an	understanding	of	progress	as	conformity	with	
this.	This	development	discourse	and	ideas	of	‘civilised’	and	‘uncivilised’	
nations	continue	to	frame	contemporary	debates	within	the	United	
Nations,	such	as	decisions	around	military	intervention	under	the	current	
guiding	principle	of	Responsibility	to	Protect,	as	will	be	examined	in	
Chapter	7.	Within	this	framework,	international	law	is	seen	as	the	
‘…ultimate	product	of	civilization,	making	it	into	an	utopian	ideal	of	a	
transnational	organized	legal	system	that	would	bring	progress	and	peace	
to	the	world’	(Tarazona,	2012:	918).	International	law	became	the	
universal	system	by	which	all	countries	should	be	judged	and	which	all	
countries	should	adhere	to	in	order	to	be	understood	as	modern	states	of	
the	world,	and	the	United	Nations	plays	a	key	role	in	the	enforcement	of	
international	law.	
	
This	section	has	provided	an	introduction	to	postcolonial	theory	and	the	
postcolonial	critiques	that	provide	the	overarching	theoretical	framework	
within	which	this	project	is	situated.	The	argument	throughout	the	thesis	is	
that	the	United	Nations	is	ultimately	an	institution	designed	to	legitimate	
and	reinforce	postcolonial	power	structures,	through	the	implementation	
of	neocolonial	policies,	practices	and	mechanisms.	This	has	been	done	
largely	through	the	reiteration	of	discourses	of	development	that	ensure	
the	inequality	between	states	is	understood	as	natural	and	part	of	a	system	
of	progress	that	sees	the	United	Nations	playing	a	key	role.	One	of	the	key	
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ways	in	which	the	United	Nations	seeks	to	naturalise	these	postcolonial	
power	structures	is	through	a	commitment	to	international	law	and	the	
concept	of	sovereignty.	Sovereignty	however,	is	a	concept	that	is	in	itself	
bound	up	in	the	colonial	encounter.		
	
	
Sovereignty,	International	Law	and	Colonialism	
	
	The	United	Nations	gains	a	great	deal	of	its	legitimacy	through	a	
commitment	to	adhering	to	international	law	and	as	such,	it	is	important	to	
explore	some	of	the	significant	critiques	of	international	law,	particularly	
with	regards	to	its	intricate	historical	relationship	to	colonialism.	Within	
this,	an	exploration	of	the	notion	of	sovereignty	is	key.	The	concept	of	
sovereignty	will	be	discussed	at	length	in	Chapter	5,	where	the	focus	of	the	
discussion	will	be	around	how	international	organisations	have	used	the	
concept	of	sovereignty	in	order	to	justify	and	legitimate	the	unequal	global	
order.	This	section	however	will	outline	a	postcolonial	critique	of	
international	law	more	broadly	and	the	concept	of	sovereignty,	largely	
borrowing	from	the	work	of	Antony	Anghie,	in	order	to	ground	this	later	
discussion	of	sovereignty	within	a	theoretical	framework.	Anghie’s	2005	
book	Imperialism,	Sovereignty	and	the	Making	of	International	Law	
examines	the	relationship	between	colonialism	and	international	law,	
focusing	on	the	use	of	sovereignty	as	a	means	of	justifying	and	rationalising	
the	relationship	between	the	colonisers	and	the	colonised.	This	approach	is	
particularly	significant	for	the	arguments	being	developed	throughout	this	
thesis	as	the	principle	of	sovereignty	features	heavily	within	the	United	
Nations	debates	around	intervention	that	will	form	the	broad	focus	of	the	
second	part	of	the	thesis.		
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International	law	is	understood	to	be	a	universal	system	of	government,	as	
applying	equally	to	all	individuals	and	all	states	within	the	international	
community	and	as	being	outside	of	the	hierarchy	established	between	
states	(Orford,	2006:	1).	However	Anghie	argues	that	the	history	of	
international	law	shows	it	to	be	explicitly	European	in	origin,	and	as	such,	
there	is	a	question	to	be	addressed	as	to	how	a	system	that	originated	in	
Europe	came	to	be	understood	as	universally	applicable	to	all	societies	in	
spite	of	different	cultures,	beliefs	and	political	institutions	(2001:	516).	
Throughout	the	course	of	the	following	chapters,	this	acceptance	of	the	
universalism	of	international	law	will	be	attributed	to	the	process	of	
colonialism.	It	will	be	argued	that	colonialism	was	the	process	by	which	a	
European	system	of	governance	came	to	be	a	universal	system	of	
governance	that	we	now	call	international	law,	in	spite	of	these	
differences.	The	argument	follows	therefore	that	institutions	that	have	
their	basis	in	international	law	also	have	their	basis	in	colonial	power	
relations.		
	
Based	on	the	principle	of	the	sovereign	equality	of	its	members,	the	United	
Nations	claims	a	commitment	to	the	values	of	international	law	and	settles	
disputes	in	the	International	Court	of	Justice	in	accordance	with	
international	law	(United	Nations,	1945).	In	the	preamble,	the	Charter	
states	that	one	of	the	primary	aims	of	the	United	Nations	is	‘to	establish	
conditions	under	which	justice	and	respect	for	the	obligations	arising	from	
treaties	and	other	sources	of	international	law	can	be	maintained’	(United	
Nations,	1945).	International	law	and	the	concept	of	sovereignty	are	
evidently	of	central	importance	to	the	functioning	of	the	United	Nations.	
However,	sovereignty	as	it	is	understood	in	international	law	is	intricately	
connected	to	colonialism	and	so	the	fact	that	the	United	Nations	places	a	
high	value	on	these	concepts	is	significant	and	contributes	to	the	ways	in	
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which	the	United	Nations	perpetuates	the	inequalities	characteristic	of	
colonialism	in	contemporary	international	society.		
	
The	principle	of	sovereignty	is	foundational	to	international	law,	but	it	was	
also	paradoxically	a	creation	of	international	law.	The	concept	of	
sovereignty	did	not	precede	the	development	of	international	law	as	a	
system	of	governing	the	behaviour	of	states	towards	one	another;	it	is	a	
creation	of	that	very	system	(Roth,	2011:	55).	What	is	significant	for	the	
argument	being	developed	throughout	the	following	chapters	is	the	way	in	
which	sovereignty	developed	out	of	the	system	of	international	law,	and	
how	this	came	to	be	understood	as	a	universal	category.	The	United	
Nations	is	by	its	own	admission	an	exercise	in	cooperation	between	
sovereign	states,	but	this	suggests	that	sovereignty	is	an	objective	status	
and	neglects	the	history	of	sovereignty	as	a	concept.	It	suggests	that	
sovereignty	is	equally	available	to	all	nations	and	that	it	means	the	same	
when	attributed	to	any	individual	state.	However,	once	we	understand	that	
sovereignty	has	a	colonial	history,	international	institutions	with	
sovereignty	as	their	foundational	principle	become	more	problematic.		
As	Anghie	argues,	the	‘sovereignty	doctrine’	which	forms	the	basis	of	
international	law	results	from	an	attempt	to	create	a	legal	framework	
which	could	deal	with	the	colonial	encounter	and	the	relationship	between	
Europeans	and	non-Europeans	(2005:	3).	Within	the	colonial	context,	there	
was	a	need	to	justify	the	dominance	of	one	nation	over	another,	and	
sovereignty	was	the	way	to	do	this.	European	colonising	empires	were	
deemed	sovereign,	whilst	the	colonial	territories	were	not.	International	
law	therefore	became	part	of	the	civilising	mission	of	colonialism,	justifying	
domination	as	a	means	of	teaching	the	uncivilised	world	how	to	be	
civilised,	at	which	point	they	would	be	granted	sovereignty	(Anghie,	2001:	
617).	International	law	and	its	potential	universality,	justified	through	the	
concept	of	sovereignty,	was	therefore	used	by	Europeans	from	their	
 79 
position	of	overwhelming	colonial	power	to	feed	into	the	civilizing	mission	
that	justified	colonialism	(Koskenniemi,	2005:	117).	European	domination	
and	power	was	justified	through	the	idea	that	sovereignty	was	a	universal	
category	that	formed	the	basis	of	international	law,	which	would	be	a	
universal	system	of	governance	for	all	the	world’s	people	to	live	in	
harmony	and	that	colonialism	was	the	way	in	which	all	nations	would	
become	sovereign	and	hence	able	to	participate	in	the	international	legal	
system.		
	
This	understanding	of	sovereignty	within	international	law	was	based	on	
what	Anghie	terms	the	‘dynamic	of	difference’,	whereby	one	culture	is	
framed	as	universal	(and	civilised)	and	the	other	is	particular	(and	
uncivilised),	with	international	law	seeking	to	develop	systems	to	make	the	
particular	universal	(2005:	4).	This	process	emphasised	the	difference	
between	two	cultures	as	a	difference	in	terms	the	level	of	civilisation	and	
therefore	sought	to	eradicate	difference	through	the	establishment	of	a	
universal	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	be	civilised.	By	granting	
sovereignty	to	one	culture	automatically	whilst	making	alternative	cultures	
have	to	earn	their	sovereignty,	the	universalisation	of	international	law	
was	not	simply	an	impartial	inclusion	of	all	the	world’s	people	into	an	
objective	system	of	governance,	but	rather	made	it	necessary	for	all	
nations	to	conform	to	a	particular	form	of	social	and	political	organisation	
in	order	to	participate	in	the	international	community	(Pahuja,	2011:	46).	
As	international	law	was	historically,	conceptually	and	inherently	
European,	non-European	nations	had	to	conform	to	European	forms	of	
organisation	in	order	to	participate	and	to	be	understood	as	civilised.		
	
Through	making	sovereignty	foundational	to	international	law	and	framing	
international	law	as	universally	applicable,	but	only	allowing	European	
states	to	be	deemed	sovereign	in	the	first	instance,	it	was	possible	to	
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create	a	system	in	which	states	outside	of	Europe	were	regarded	as	
existing	in	an	earlier	stage	of	development.	The	cultural	characteristics	of	
sovereignty	then	become	the	cultural	characteristics	of	Europe	and	thus	
Europe	is	equated	with	civilisation	(Anghie,	2005:	100).	The	significance	of	
this	within	the	context	of	international	institutions,	firstly	in	the	League	of	
Nations	and	later	in	the	United	Nations	is	that	European	dominance,	
particularly	through	schemes	such	as	the	mandate	system	or	the	
trusteeship	system,	was	legitimised	through	linear	understandings	of	
progress	and	civilisation.	Colonies	were	not	simply	being	encouraged	to	be	
European,	they	were	being	encouraged	to	be	civilised	in	order	to	
participate	in	global	interactions.	These	systems	were	justified	as	assisting	
colonised	peoples	to	attain	sovereign	status	within	the	framework	of	
international	law,	legitimating	colonial	rule	through	the	concept	of	
development	(Rajagopal,	2003:50).	Within	this	framework,	colonialism	can	
only	be	viewed	as	a	positive	attempt	to	assist	less	developed	nations	in	
becoming	civilised	and	able	to	participate	in	a	global	network.	Colonial	
violence,	domination	and	the	eradication	of	cultural	difference	are	framed	
as	a	generous	act	of	support.		
However,	even	in	attaining	sovereign	status,	the	sovereignty	granted	to	
non-Europeans	was	distinct.	Whereas	European	nations	were	sovereign	
from	the	start	within	the	system	of	international	law	due	to	their	ability	to	
participate	in	such	systems	as	a	result	of	their	advanced	level	of	social	
complexity,	non-European	nations	had	to	be	granted	sovereignty.	Thus,	in	
developing	the	concept	of	sovereignty,	international	law	and	its	associated	
institutions	created	two	different	models:	European	sovereignty,	which	
was	automatic	due	to	the	advanced	civilisation	of	European	societies,	and	
non-European	sovereignty,	which	could	be	granted	once	these	societies	
had	followed	European	paths	of	development	(Anghie,	2001:	520).	The	
discourse	of	development	that	had	been	created	in	order	to	justify	
colonialism	fed	into	the	establishment	of	a	system	of	international	law.	
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This	notion	of	development	meant	that	whilst	international	law	and	the	
international	community	more	broadly	was	considered	universal,	Europe	
would	always	remain	the	prime	example	of	what	it	meant	to	be	civilised	
and	as	a	result,	substantive	equality	between	sovereigns	could	be	
prevented	(Pahuja,	2011:	46).	The	colonies	then,	could	participate	in	
international	law	as	sovereign	states	once	those	states	that	already	held	
sovereign	status	deemed	them	ready,	but	the	sovereignty	granted	to	them	
would	never	be	equivalent.	This	meant	that	prior	to	the	Second	World	War	
international	law	was	only	applicable	to	sovereign	(i.e.	European)	states,	
and	as	a	result,	virtually	no	conduct	towards	Asian	and	African	states	could	
be	questioned	(Anand,	2010:	6).		
	
As	with	most	aspects	of	social	organisation	that	we	consider	constitutive	of	
modernity,	the	conventional	narrative	of	international	law	is	that	it	
developed	in	Europe	and	was	spread	out	to	the	rest	of	the	world	until	it	
was	universal.	This	universalism	suggests	a	level	of	inclusivity,	allowing	
international	law	to	disguise	its	colonial	origins	and	actually	appear	anti-
colonial	(Pahuja,	2011:	256).	Where	colonialism	is	associated	with	
dominance	and	inequality,	the	perceived	universality	of	international	law	
implies	equality	between	all	nations	under	one	single	system	of	
governance,	concealing	its	intricate	relationship	with	colonialism.	This	
established	eurocentric	narrative	of	international	law	hides	the	way	in	
which	Western	culture	was	forcefully	encouraged	through	the	process	of	
colonialism	(Fassbender	and	Peters,	2012:	2).	Even	where	colonialism	is	
recognised	as	significant	in	the	development	of	international	law	within	
conventional	narratives,	the	assumption	is	that	colonial	domination	ended	
with	formal	decolonisation.	However,	this	disguises	the	way	in	which	
sovereignty	developed	as	a	concept	within	international	law	and	how	it	
was	designed	to	ensure	the	dominance	of	European	culture	(Anghie,	2014:	
134).	The	argument	that	will	be	developed	throughout	the	following	
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chapters	is	that	colonialism	did	not	end	with	decolonisation,	and	that	
international	law	and	the	concept	of	sovereignty	play	a	key	role	in	
perpetuating	the	inequalities	that	characterised	formal	colonialism.	Ideas	
of	civilisation	and	difference	still	feature	heavily	in	debates	around	
sovereignty	despite	an	understanding	that	we	now	live	in	a	post-imperial	
world.	Due	to	its	history,	the	concept	of	sovereignty	continues	to	enable	
certain	political	structures	such	as	those	based	on	fixed	territory,	and	
disables	others	such	as	those	based	on	solidarities	across	territorial	borders	
(Jones,	2013:	1151).	The	notion	of	sovereignty	therefore	plays	a	key	role	in	
maintaining	the	existing	hierarchical	order	in	world	politics,	and	does	so	
through	its	ability	to	disguise	its	colonial	origins	and	present	itself	as	
universal	and	objective.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	provided	the	theoretical	framework	for	the	chapters	that	
follow	and	for	the	thesis	overall.	The	first	section	provided	an	introduction	
to	postcolonial	theory	as	a	way	of	understanding	contemporary	issues,	
following	the	work	of	scholars	such	as	Homi	K.	Bhabha,	Frantz	Fanon	and	
Leela	Gandhi.	It	argued	that	in	order	to	fully	understand	the	world,	it	is	
necessary	to	reconsider	the	histories	that	we	are	told	in	order	to	
acknowledge	the	significance	of	the	colonial	encounter	in	its	structuring.	
This	section	also	briefly	touched	upon	the	influential	work	of	Edward	Said	
(1995),	discussing	the	way	in	which	colonialism	was	essential	to	the	
development	of	the	identities	of	Europe	and	non-Europe	as	oppositional	to	
each	other	and	to	the	construction	of	non-Europe	as	‘backwards’,	both	
creating	and	establishing	the	superiority	of	the	West.	
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The	purpose	of	discussing	postcolonial	theory	here	is	to	locate	the	thesis	
within	a	body	of	literature	that	aims	to	challenge	the	standard	narratives	of	
the	development	of	the	modern	world.	Within	the	context	of	sociological	
research,	this	thesis	hopes	also	to	contribute	towards	a	postcolonial	social	
theory	that	not	only	explores	colonialism	as	a	historical	process,	but	that	
challenges	established	social	theories	that	privilege	the	West	without	any	
reflection	upon	the	histories	of	imperialism	that	enabled	the	West	to	
achieve	its	dominance	(Bhambra,	2007:	146).	It	is	not	sufficient	to	study	
colonialism	in	order	that	it	might	add	to	the	established	concepts	we	use	in	
order	to	understand	the	modern	world,	rather	we	must	acknowledge	these	
histories	of	imperial	domination	in	order	to	re-think	the	core	concepts	of	
modernity.	In	the	case	of	this	chapter,	the	focus	has	been	particularly	on	
the	role	of	international	law	and	its	basic	concepts	as	an	aspect	of	the	
modern	world	that	we	must	re-think	in	light	of	its	colonial	history,	however	
this	forms	part	of	a	wider	argument	around	the	need	for	sociology	and	
social	theory	to	understand	the	historical	processes	by	which	Europe	came	
to	represent	the	world	(Bhambra,	2007:	146).				
	
This	chapter	has	begun	to	unpick	some	of	the	discourses	that	have	been	
used	in	order	to	mask	the	institutionalisation	of	inequality	in	terms	of	
global	power	within	the	United	Nations.	These	discourses	will	be	of	
particular	significance	within	the	second	part	of	the	thesis	when	these	
theoretical	approaches	are	explored	in	relation	to	the	development	of	
policy	within	the	United	Nations.	Firstly,	the	discourse	of	development	that	
has	allowed	for	what	Patil	(2008)	terms	‘kinship	politics’	within	the	United	
Nations,	whereby	the	major	powers	are	framed	as	educators,	teaching	the	
uncivilised	nations	of	the	world	how	to	be	civilised.	This	discourse	frames	
all	nations	as	existing	within	a	system	of	development	with	European	ideals	
and	values	representing	the	peak	of	civilisation.	This	chapter	has	argued	
that	this	discourse	of	development	was	used	in	order	to	justify	the	process	
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of	colonialism	and	so	its	continuation	in	contemporary	global	politics	
represents	a	continuation	of	the	colonial	power	dynamic.		
	
Secondly,	the	discourse	of	sovereignty,	which	has	legitimised	the	
universalisation	of	a	system	of	international	law	that	is	European	in	origin	
and	is	grounded	in	the	colonial	encounter.	This	chapter	has	showed	that	
sovereignty	as	a	concept	was	born	out	of	colonialism	as	a	way	of	
understanding	the	relationship	between	the	colonised	and	the	colonisers,	
linked	into	the	discourse	of	development	and	ideas	of	civilisation,	in	order	
to	ensure	that	the	world	would	be	governed	by	a	system	of	international	
law	that	was	based	upon	European	culture	and	values.		These	two	key	
discourses	continue	to	play	a	key	role	in	contemporary	United	Nations	
politics,	underpinning	the	neocolonial	technologies	of	control	that	will	be	
discussed	in	the	second	part	of	this	thesis,	and	so	this	chapter	has	
emphasised	their	colonial	origins	as	a	means	of	disturbing	the	conventional	
narrative	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	committed	to	the	equality	
of	all	nations.	The	theoretical	approach	of	postcolonialism	forms	the	basis	
of	the	thesis	and	these	understandings	of	the	key	discourses	within	the	
United	Nations	will	be	applied	in	the	second	part	of	the	thesis	to	more	
empirical	examples	of	how	the	United	Nations	works.		
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Chapter	3:	Researching	History	
	
‘History	is	the	fruit	of	power,	but	power	itself	is	never	so	transparent	that	
its	analysis	becomes	superfluous.	The	ultimate	mark	of	power	may	be	its	
invisibility;	the	ultimate	challenge,	the	exposition	of	its	roots’	(Trouillot,	
1995:	xix).		
	
	
Introduction	
	
Having	provided	the	overarching	theoretical	framework	for	the	thesis	in	
the	previous	chapter,	this	chapter	will	explore	a	more	methodological	
framework	for	the	project.	Ultimately,	this	is	a	theoretical	project	and	so	
the	use	of	a	straightforward	methodology	consistent	with	traditional	forms	
of	sociological	research	is	neither	appropriate	nor	useful.	Nonetheless,	
there	is	an	approach	to	dealing	with	history	that	will	be	used	throughout	
the	thesis,	as	well	as	the	use	of	archival	material	in	the	later	chapters,	and	
so	it	is	useful	to	detail	these	here.		
	
This	chapter	will	begin	with	a	discussion	of	reading	through	history	as	a	
tool	for	understanding	contemporary	issues	and	argue	that	within	the	
context	of	the	United	Nations,	an	accurate	understanding	of	its	colonial	
origins	is	essential	both	in	terms	of	having	an	accurate	understanding	of	
contemporary	debates	and	in	terms	of	challenging	unequal	global	power	
relations.	This	section	will	detail	the	body	of	literature	that	has	provided	
the	overall	methodological	approach	of	the	thesis	and	which	focuses	
particularly	on	the	relationship	between	power	and	the	construction	of	
history	through	silencing.	This	section	will	particularly	make	use	of	Michel-
Rolf	Trouillot’s	(1995)	book	Silencing	the	Past:	Power	and	the	Production	of	
History	and	Jeanne	Morefield’s	(2014)	book	Empires	Without	Imperialism:	
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Anglo-American	Decline	and	the	Politics	of	Deflection.	These	two	texts	
when	read	together	form	an	important	argument	about	the	politics	of	
memory	and	the	importance	of	addressing	silences	when	dealing	with	
history.		
	
The	chapter	will	then	move	on	to	a	more	concrete	discussion	of	some	of	
the	issues	associated	with	using	archival	data	in	research,	as	well	as	the	
potential	of	the	archive	as	a	site	of	historical	information.	It	will	argue	that	
although	the	archive	undoubtedly	has	the	potential	to	be	selective	and	
incomplete,	it	provides	access	to	information	that	may	otherwise	be	
difficult	to	attain	and	often	provides	the	resources	to	challenge	dominant	
accounts	of	history	with	documentary	evidence.	Finally,	this	chapter	will	
conclude	by	providing	an	overview	of	the	United	Nations	archives	and	the	
use	of	these	throughout	the	research.	This	final	section	will	detail	the	
process	of	collecting	data	from	the	archives	at	the	United	Nations’	
headquarters	in	New	York	and	discuss	the	methodological	issues	previously	
identified	in	relation	to	this	specific	context.	The	data	collected	during	the	
research	visit	to	the	United	Nations	archives	will	be	used	throughout	the	
following	chapters,	particularly	in	Chapters	4,	5	and	6.	
	
	
Reading	Through	History	
	
As	has	already	been	summarised	in	the	introduction,	the	central	premise	of	
this	thesis	is	to	provide	a	historical	examination	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	
institution,	looking	at	the	ways	in	which	colonial	power	relationships	have	
been	written	out	of	dominant	narratives.	The	aim	is	to	disturb	the	
conventional	narratives	of	equality	and	progress	that	frequently	constitute	
understandings	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	and	instead	emphasise	
the	significance	of	colonial	domination	and	postcolonial	power	structures	
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within	the	founding	of	the	organisation.	The	argument	that	will	be	
developed	throughout	the	thesis	will	challenge	these	notions	of	equality,	
cooperation	and	democracy	that	are	so	often	attributed	to	the	founding	of	
the	organisation	through	providing	an	alternative	discourse	of	power	and	
resistance.		
	
As	such,	this	project	is	not	a	straightforward	piece	of	empirical	sociological	
research	with	a	clear	methodological	approach	such	as	an	argument	based	
on	quantitative	statistical	analysis	or	the	qualitative	analysis	of	interview	
data.	Rather,	its	focus	is	more	theoretical	or	conceptual.	It	will	examine	
contemporary	debates	around	the	United	Nations’	use	of	military	
intervention	in	cases	of	conflict	under	the	principle	of	Responsibility	to	
Protect	by	reading	these	debates	through	history.	Rather	than	simply	
focusing	on	the	contemporary	political	context,	it	will	argue	for	a	re-
narration	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations,	taking	into	account	its	
imperial	origins.	This	is	done	on	the	basis	that	in	order	to	understand	the	
power	structures	that	underpin	United	Nations	debates	around	
intervention,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	the	ways	in	which	postcolonial	
privilege	was	written	into	the	institution	from	its	very	beginnings.		
	
The	methodological	approach	being	employed	here	then	has	two	key	
features.	Firstly,	it	will	provide	an	alternative	or	counter-discourse	that	
takes	into	account	both	the	power	structures	inherent	in	a	system	born	out	
of	the	legacy	of	colonialism,	but	that	also	narrates	the	colonial	history	of	
international	institutions	as	one	of	resistance.	In	this	sense,	it	is	attempting	
to	explore	the	relationship	between	history	and	power	through	the	
provision	of	an	alternative	narrative.	In	doing	so,	I	hope	to	emphasise	not	
only	the	colonial	domination	that	has	been	perpetuated	by	this	particular	
system	of	international	organisation,	but	also	to	acknowledge	that	this	is	a	
domination	that	has	been	resisted	in	a	number	of	ways	throughout	history,	
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as	I	believe	it	is	important	to	recognise	resistance	to	power	and	give	voice	
to	the	stories	that	have	been	silenced	throughout	history.	Secondly,	it	will	
examine	a	contemporary	issue	by	reading	through	history,	arguing	that	in	
order	to	understand	the	contemporary	conditions	within	which	debates	
around	intervention	exist	it	is	necessary	to	have	a	clear	understanding	of	
the	history	that	allowed	for	them.	It	is	not	sufficient	to	discuss	issues	only	
within	their	immediate	context.	The	historical	conditions	that	have	allowed	
for	the	emergence	of	the	policy	that	is	being	debated	are	profoundly	
significant	if	we	wish	to	have	a	real	understanding	of	the	issue.		
	
This	approach	of	reading	through	history	is	framed	by	a	belief	that	how	we	
understand	the	past	is	crucial	for	how	we	understand	the	world	today,	and	
that	if	our	understanding	of	the	past	is	inaccurate,	our	understanding	of	
the	present	will	necessarily	be	inadequate	(Bhambra,	2007:	2).	The	key	
idea	underlying	all	of	the	chapters	that	follow	and	the	argument	that	is	
being	built	throughout	the	thesis	is	that	it	is	inadequate	to	simply	explore	
contemporary	issues	by	examining	their	contemporary	circumstances.	In	
the	context	of	this	particular	topic,	to	do	so	fails	to	acknowledge	the	
history	of	Western	dominance	that	has	legitimated	power	structures	that	
allow	for	selective	decision	making	around	intervention	within	the	United	
Nations.	Therefore	in	order	to	more	accurately	understand	the	power	
structures	affecting	decisions	being	made	around	intervention,	it	is	
necessary	to	look	at	these	contemporary	decisions	within	the	historical	
context	of	colonialism	and	postcolonial	power	structures.	This	approach	
amounts	to	‘taking	history	seriously’	and	arguing	against	the	idea	that	
historical	events	are	independent	of	one	another	(Steinmo,	2008:	128).	It	is	
impossible	to	view	history	as	a	series	of	disconnected	and	self-contained	
events.	Rather,	we	must	understand	the	present	as	always	being	shaped	by	
the	past.	The	relationship	between	the	past	and	the	present	is	therefore	of	
paramount	importance	for	this	argument.	
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What	is	also	being	challenged	here	is	the	idea	of	history	as	an	objective	
fact.	The	following	chapters	emphasise	the	ways	in	which	history	is	not	
simply	‘what	happened’	or	the	facts	of	events,	but	also	‘what	is	said	to	
have	happened’	(Trouillot,	1995:	2).	To	approach	history	in	this	way	is	an	
acknowledgement	of	the	place	of	power	in	narrating	history.	Not	all	stories	
are	told,	not	all	people	have	the	power	to	tell	stories,	and	only	the	stories	
of	some	come	to	be	understood	as	historical	fact.	Within	the	context	of	
global	history,	it	is	the	history	of	the	West	that	is	relentlessly	reinforced	as	
the	universal	history	of	all	(Bhambra,	2007:	2).	This	project,	alongside	
others,	provides	a	challenge	to	the	history	that	is	taken	for	granted,	that	is	
the	history	of	the	West.		
	
This	approach	has	already	been	highlighted	in	the	first	two	chapters	of	this	
thesis,	where	it	has	been	argued	that	there	is	a	dominant	narrative	of	the	
history	of	the	United	Nations	as	told	by	the	United	Nations	itself	and	by	
academics	and	historians.	This	history	underplays	the	relationship	between	
the	League	of	Nations	and	the	United	Nations,	presenting	the	United	
Nations	as	an	original	response	to	the	Second	World	War.	However,	
Chapter	1	has	argued,	following	the	work	of	Mark	Mazower,	that	the	
United	Nations	was	the	product	of	‘evolution	not	revolution’	(2009:	17).	
This	is	a	prime	example	therefore	of	the	ways	in	which	history	is	affected	
by	the	ability	of	particular	stories	to	be	told	and	taken	as	truth.		
	
This	leads	us	to	a	recognition	of	silences	and	history	as	a	process	of	
silencing.	If	we	accept	that	history	is	not	simply	a	record	of	factual	
occurrences,	of	‘what	happened’,	but	rather	that	it	is	a	record	of	what	is	
said	to	have	happened,	it	becomes	clear	that	history	will	necessarily	consist	
of	silences	(Bhambra,	2007:	10).	For	one	particular	narrative	of	history	that	
is	accepted	as	fact,	there	are	always	other	narratives	that	tell	a	different	
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story.	In	the	case	of	international	political	institutions,	these	alternative	
narratives	may	be	rather	significant	and	the	silencing	of	them	may	be	
deliberate.		
	
Trouillot	argues	that	the	creation	of	silences	is	a	key	aspect	of	the	
production	of	history	and	historical	narratives:	
		
‘Silences	enter	the	process	of	historical	production	at	four	crucial	
moments:	the	moment	of	fact	creation	(the	making	of	sources);	the	
moment	of	fact	assembly	(the	making	of	archives);	the	moment	of	fact	
retrieval	(the	making	of	narratives);	and	the	moment	of	retrospective	
significance	(the	making	of	history	in	the	final	instance)’	(1995:	26).		
	
At	each	of	these	points,	decisions	are	made	about	the	authenticity	of	
particular	‘facts’	over	others.	History	is	therefore	produced	through	the	
continual	privileging	of	certain	accounts	and	the	silencing	of	others,	in	the	
creation	of	facts,	the	making	of	archives,	the	making	of	narratives	and	in	
the	acknowledgement	of	retrospective	significance.	At	each	of	these	
points,	the	dominance	of	particular	narratives	gains	more	strength	and	the	
silencing	of	alternative	narratives	intensifies.	Throughout	this	thesis,	this	
approach	to	the	construction	of	history	will	be	used	in	order	to	address	the	
production	of	silences	throughout	the	history	of	the	United	Nations,	
particularly	in	relation	to	colonialism,	postcolonial	power	structures,	and	
neocolonial	technologies	of	power.		
	
The	production	of	facts	and	silences	that	ultimately	constitute	history	
contributes	to	a	process	of	‘forgetting’,	which	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	way	
historians	construct	the	past,	despite	the	general	assumption	that	history	is	
a	process	of	remembering	or	preservation	(Morefield,	2014:	14).	History	is	
 91 
understood	to	be	a	process	of	remembering	the	past	and	historians	are	
often	characterised	as	those	who	are	responsible	for	preserving	it.	What	is		
being	argued	here	however	is	that	history	is	not	only	a	process	of	
remembering	but	also	a	process	of	forgetting.	History	involves	selection	
and	the	preservation	of	particular	aspects	of	the	past,	with	the	
simultaneous	forgetting	or	silencing	of	other	aspects.	The	narratives	that	
are	preserved	come	to	be	known	as	‘facts’	and	the	narratives	that	are	
silenced	are	forgotten,	no	longer	existing	in	our	collective	memory	of	the	
past.			
	 	
In	arguing	that	history	produces	silences,	the	objective	here	is	to	contest	
the	dominance	of	particular	narratives	and	the	privileging	of	the	narratives	
of	particular	groups	in	our	understandings	of	history.	Hodgkin	and	
Radstone	argue	that	the	role	of	social	researchers	in	approaching	history	is	
not	simply	to	dispute	a	course	of	events,	but	to	provide	alternative	
narratives	belonging	to	those	groups	whose	knowledge	has	been	forgotten	
in	order	that	these	dominant	narratives	may	be	contested	(2003:	1).	It	is	
not	enough	to	simply	disagree	with	a	particular	picture	of	history	without	
providing	an	alternative	picture.	This	is	particularly	important	in	relation	to	
the	telling	of	stories	by	groups	who	are	frequently	silenced.	Chapter	1	has	
already	begun	to	provide	an	alternative	narrative	to	the	standard	histories	
of	the	United	Nations	and	this	will	be	further	developed	in	Chapter	4,	
which	provides	an	alternative	historical	discourse	of	resistance	in	the	
founding	of	the	United	Nations.	This	history	of	resistance	to	colonial	and	
postcolonial	power	is	frequently	overlooked	in	the	narratives	of	
international	institutions	and	so	Chapter	4	signifies	an	attempt	to	give	
voice	to	this	silenced	history.			
	
The	process	of	forgetting	is	particularly	significant	in	relation	to	the	
dominance	of	imperial	narratives	of	history.	In	Jeanne	Morefield’s	2014	
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book	Empires	Without	Imperialism:	Anglo-American	Decline	and	the	Politics	
of	Deflection,	she	challenges	‘the	sustained	historical	and	contemporary	
narratives	that	enable	these	[Western]	powers	to	deflect	responsibility	for	
imperial	violence	away	from	themselves	in	an	ongoing,	systematic	way’	
(2014:	1).	The	purpose	of	presenting	an	alternative	narrative	of	resistance	
in	Chapter	4	is	an	attempt	to	do	just	this.	The	aim	is	to	provide	a	history	of	
resistance	that	was	ultimately	accompanied	by	a	history	of	domination,	in	
order	to	challenge	the	dominant	narratives	of	equality	and	progress	that	
allow	the	major	powers	to	disguise	the	perpetuation	of	imperial	power.	In	
doing	so,	it	provides	an	example	of	the	importance	of	listening	to	‘counter-
discourses’	that	are	often	obscured	by	the	eurocentric	claims	of	Western	
history	to	be	representing	universal	history	(Morefield,	2014:	242).	By	
exploring	the	histories	of	those	dominated	by	the	world’s	major	powers,	it	
is	possible	to	illuminate	the	extent	to	which	postcolonial	privilege	has	
allowed	for	the	universalisation	of	European	values	and	the	way	that	
histories	of	the	powerful	have	come	to	represent	the	history	of	the	world.	
Furthermore,	this	is	done	on	the	basis	that	to	contest	the	past	is	to	also	
question	the	present	and	the	relationship	between	the	two	(Hodgkin	and	
Radstone,	2003:	1).		
	
The	approach	of	reading	through	history	is	being	used	here	then	to	argue	
that	an	accurate	understanding	of	the	past	is	essential	for	an	accurate	
understanding	of	the	present.	This	approach	requires	a	recognition	of	the	
silences	that	have	accompanied	the	establishment	of	dominant	narratives,	
as	well	as	the	provision	of	an	alternative	discourse	that	allows	for	those	
silenced	stories	to	be	heard.	This	approach	to	history	forms	the	basis	of	the	
arguments	that	will	be	developed	throughout.		
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Using	Archival	Material	
	
Although	the	core	focus	of	this	project	is	theoretical,	in	providing	a	
deconstruction	of	dominant	narratives	and	the	provision	of	an	alternative	
discourse	that	may	affect	the	way	in	which	we	understand	contemporary	
debates	within	the	United	Nations	it	will	also	make	use	of	archival	material	
as	a	core	aspect	of	the	alternative	discourse	being	presented.	The	use	of	
archival	material	here	will	not	form	a	standard	secondary	analysis	of	
documentary	evidence	of	the	kind	we	often	see	in	sociological	research	as	
this	is	not	necessarily	beneficial	to	the	argument	being	developed	or	the	
approach	being	taken,	but	historical	documents	from	the	archive	of	the	
United	Nations	will	feature	as	part	of	the	process	of	de-silencing	the	
narratives	of	resistance	that	have	been	silenced	throughout	history	and	as	
part	of	the	process	of	reconstructing	a	history	of	the	United	Nations	that	
takes	this	colonial	and	anti-colonial	history	into	account.	These	archival	
documents	are	central	to	doing	the	work	of	de-silencing	and	
deconstructing	the	dominant	narrative	that	is	both	inaccurate	and	
insufficient.	These	range	from	official	documents	such	as	the	Charter,	to	
minutes	of	meetings	and	letters	between	representatives	from	the	United	
Nations	and	interested	parties.	These	documents	are	not	intended	to	form	
a	data	set	for	an	in-depth	documentary	analysis,	but	rather	to	give	
evidence	and	bring	life	to	the	arguments	being	made	throughout	the	
following	chapters,	grounding	them	in	the	reality	of	the	historical	context	
and	giving	voice	to	silenced	narratives.	
		
Whilst	it	has	been	established	in	the	previous	section	that	history	is	not	
objective	but	constructed	and	produced	through	the	silencing	and	
privileging	of	particular	facts,	that	is	not	to	say	that	all	narratives	are	equal	
in	validity.	In	the	face	of	well-established	power	and	privilege,	what	gives	
counter-discourses	their	authenticity	is	substantiation	through	evidence.	
 94 
As	such,	the	alternative	narrative	that	is	to	be	presented	in	Chapters	4,	5	
and	6	makes	use	of	archival	material	in	order	to	support	the	claims	being	
made	and	to	provide	examples	of	the	ways	in	which	imperial	power	
functioned	throughout	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations.	It	is	
necessary	therefore	to	discuss	here	some	of	the	debates	around	the	use	of	
archival	material	and	the	problems	associated	with	doing	research	
involving	documentary	evidence	contained	in	archives.		
	
The	definition	of	what	constitutes	an	archive	is	reasonably	broad,	ranging	
from	an	organised	collection	with	curators	to	a	disorganised	collection	of	
personal	papers	(McKee	and	Porter,	2012:	60).	The	difficulties	in	
conducting	research	involving	the	use	of	archival	materials	therefore	vary	
depending	on	the	kind	of	archive.	In	the	context	of	this	research,	the	focus	
will	largely	be	on	the	archives	of	official	documents	as	collected	by	
government	agencies,	or	in	this	case,	by	international	institutions.	Archives	
have	been	used	increasingly	frequently	in	researching	these	kinds	of	public	
bodies,	as	they	generate	huge	amounts	of	material	that	seem	to	provide	a	
direct	insight	into	both	how	they	function	and	into	past	events	(Scott,	
1990:	10).	Where	gaining	access	to	individuals	within	an	organisation	for	
interviews	or	observation	can	be	difficult,	the	use	of	archives	enables	a	
reasonably	easy	way	in	which	research	can	be	done	and	large	amounts	of	
information	can	be	found.	Furthermore,	the	use	of	archives	allows	
research	into	historical	events	that	is	somewhat	more	reliable	than	
individual	memory.		
	
However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	archives	are	spaces	within	which	all	
knowledge	is	possible	or	where	a	researcher	can	reveal	the	truth	about	a	
particular	topic.	Just	as	history	is	constructed	and	selective,	the	archive	is	
constructed	and	selective.	As	Jimerson	argues,	‘archives	at	once	protect	
and	preserve	records;	legitimize	and	sanctify	certain	documents	while	
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negating	and	destroying	others;	and	provide	access	to	selected	sources	
while	controlling	the	researchers	and	conditions	under	which	they	may	
examine	the	archival	record’	(2006:	20).	Archives	are	not	a	collection	of	
every	single	item	of	relevant	information	or	documentation.	They	are	
selected	based	on	the	perceived	significance	of	particular	pieces	of	
information	that	exist	in	certain	forms.	Furthermore,	archives	as	physical	
spaces	within	which	a	researcher	conducts	their	research	are	set	up	in	such	
a	way	that	they	control	the	way	that	research	can	be	done.	The	way	in	
which	materials	are	organised	and	categorised	will	affect	the	ability	of	the	
researcher	to	access	information.	The	information	a	researcher	seeks	may	
not	always	be	in	the	most	obvious	place,	as	individuals	with	different	
agendas	or	interests	will	inevitably	categorise	information	differently,	
meaning	the	researcher	must	always	begin	with	a	fairly	broad	approach	to	
the	topic	in	order	to	find	the	most	relevant	or	interesting	material.	
	
Whilst	archives	exist	as	preservations	of	records,	they	are	never	complete.	
Archivists	play	a	key	role	in	deciding	what	counts	as	significant	enough	to	
be	catalogued,	stored	and	made	available	for	viewing	by	those	who	may	be	
interested	(Featherstone,	2006:	593).	They	are	key	to	the	process	of	
selection	and	preservation	that	occurs	within	the	archive.	However,	even	
though	archives	are	constructed	through	a	process	of	selection,	they	can	
just	as	easily	be	made	up	of	things	that	were	not	intended	to	be	preserved	
or	that	have	no	obvious	significance	-	what	Steedman	terms	‘mad	
fragmentations’	(2001:	68).	What	this	shows	is	that	archives	cannot	be	
considered	whole	by	any	means.	Individuals	who	are	responsible	for	the	
making	and	maintaining	of	archives	play	a	role	in	both	the	organisation	of	
the	archive	and	the	process	of	deciding	what	it	is	that	is	worth	preserving.	
Researchers	must	therefore	learn	to	be	flexible	when	conducting	archival	
research,	accepting	the	absence	of	things	they	expected	to	find	and	
remaining	alert	to	material	that	may	not	be	categorised	in	the	most	
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obvious	way	(McCulloch,	2004:	47).	The	categorising	of	archives	is	often	
the	result	of	the	idiosyncrasies	of	particular	individuals.	In	spite	of	this,	
archives	can	be	an	incredibly	useful	resource	for	researchers,	allowing	
access	to	material	that	may	otherwise	be	unavailable	and	by	providing	
documented	evidence	of	words	and	events.	In	using	archives	however,	
researchers	must	always	keep	in	mind	that	they	do	not	represent	a	
complete	picture.		
	
Issues	of	subjectivity	on	a	number	of	levels	therefore	affect	the	process	of	
conducting	research	within	an	archive.	Firstly,	the	sources	available	to	a	
researcher	may	be	the	result	of	bias	on	the	part	of	the	archivist,	as	
previously	suggested.	Once	the	archives	exist	as	researchable	entities	
however,	the	biases	of	the	researcher	will	also	come	into	play.	Documents	
do	not	‘speak	for	themselves’,	but	rather	they	are	materials	that	
researchers	use	in	order	to	make	meaning	(Howell	and	Prevenier,	2001:	
19).	As	such,	they	are	susceptible	to	the	biases	of	the	researcher	in	the	
same	way	as	any	other	other	form	of	data.	In	this	sense,	use	of	the	archive	
is	no	more	able	to	provide	a	path	to	the	‘truth’	than	any	other	
methodological	approach	(Hazareesingh	and	Nabulsi,	2008:	168).	However,	
if	we	accept	that	the	researcher	and	their	prior	knowledge	and	experiences	
inevitably	influence	all	forms	of	research,	this	seems	to	be	less	of	a	
problem.	Archival	research	can	be	an	effective	way	to	investigate	issues	
that	are	inaccessible	by	other	means,	and	particularly	in	researching	
history	and	historical	events	or	people.	
	
Using	archives	in	sociological	research	is	therefore	part	of	the	argument	
that	history	is	constructed.	As	relics	of	the	past,	archives	are	selected,	
incomplete	and	the	result	of	the	power-laden	process	of	remembering	
(Steedman,	2001:	66).	In	spite	of	this,	they	can	provide	access	to	the	past	in	
a	way	that	other	methods	cannot.	Archival	research	allows	access	to	data	
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produced	at	particular	moments	in	time	and	may	therefore	be	the	most	
reliable	form	of	data	we	have	in	studying	the	past.	Although	issues	of	
subjectivity	are	present	in	the	process	of	conducting	archival	research,	this	
is	no	more	than	the	subjectivity	seen	in	any	other	form	of	social	research.		
	
The	United	Nations	Archives	
	
Having	outlined	the	approach	to	history	that	forms	the	position	of	the	
thesis	and	having	identified	some	of	the	issues	associated	with	conducting	
research	using	archives	and	documentary	evidence,	this	section	will	move	
on	to	describe	the	process	of	conducting	research	in	the	United	Nations	
archives.		
	
The	United	Nations	Archives	and	Records	Management	Section	(ARMS)	is	
responsible	for	the	preservation	of	United	Nations	documents,	providing	
access	to	information	for	both	staff	of	the	United	Nations	as	well	as	for	
external	researchers.	Documents	in	this	sense	can	be	anything	from	
correspondence	between	staff	at	the	United	Nations	headquarters	to	
Security	Council	resolutions	or	major	declarations	such	as	the	Millennium	
Declaration	of	2000.	ARMS	is	located	on	a	street	very	near	to	the	United	
Nations	main	headquarters	in	New	York	and	researchers	are	able	to	book	
an	appointment	to	visit	and	examine	United	Nations	documents	that	are	
relevant	to	their	research	in	physical	form.	Documents	collected	by	ARMS	
are	increasingly	existing	in	digital	form	and	as	such,	a	large	number	of	
documents	are	available	online	for	researchers	on	the	ARMS	website:	
https://archives.un.org.	Researchers	are	able	to	access	documents	that	
were	not	subject	to	restrictions	at	the	time	they	were	created,	documents	
less	than	20	years	old	that	are	not	subject	to	restrictions	as	decided	by	the	
Secretary-General,	and	documents	that	are	more	than	20	years	old	(United	
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Nations,	2012).	The	majority	of	documents	over	20	years	old	are	
automatically	declassified	and	available	for	researchers	to	use.		
	
ARMS	is	responsible	for	ensuring	accurate	record	keeping	by	United	
Nations	officials	and	for	the	preservation	of	documents	that	may	be	
valuable	and	of	interest	to	the	public	through	the	archives	(United	Nations,	
2012).	ARMS	began	with	an	archives	unit	that	was	set	up	in	order	to	
document	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	International	Organisation	at	
San	Francisco,	preserving	copies	of	official	documents	generated	by	the	
conference	as	well	as	the	original	drafts	(Claus,	1948:	195).	It	is	these	
documents	from	the	San	Francisco	conference	in	1945	that	form	the	
majority	of	the	data	that	will	be	used	throughout	the	following	chapters.	
Once	the	Charter	had	been	signed	and	the	Secretariat	was	formed	in	1946,	
the	archives	unit	that	had	worked	at	San	Francisco	became	an	official	
department	within	the	United	Nations	and	moved	to	an	office	in	New	York	
(Claus,	1948:	196).	Since	its	establishment	then,	the	United	Nations	has	
maintained	records	that	have	become	part	of	an	official	archive	available	
to	the	public.		
		
The	arguments	being	made	here	will	be	supported	by	archival	data	from	
the	United	Nations	archives,	especially	those	arguments	developed	in	the	
following	three	chapters.	The	data	largely	consists	of	correspondence	
between	the	organisers	of	the	San	Francisco	conference	in	1945	and	
interested	parties,	such	as	potential	member	states	and	groups	
representing	particular	sections	of	national	populations,	as	well	as	minutes	
taken	at	meetings	during	the	conference.	This	data	will	be	used	in	order	to	
support	claims	being	made,	particularly	relating	to	the	failure	to	address	
issues	around	colonialism	during	the	founding	stages	of	the	United	
Nations.	The	data	is	also	central	to	both	the	deconstruction	of	the	
dominant	narrative	and	the	construction	of	an	alternative	narrative,	which	
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emphasises	the	colonial	history	of	the	United	Nations	and	the	anti-colonial	
resistance	present	both	prior	to	and	throughout	its	establishment.	The	
data	does	the	work	of	de-silencing	those	uncomfortable	and	disturbing	
histories	relating	to	the	United	Nations	and	its	development.	It	was	
collected	during	a	short	research	visit	to	ARMS	in	New	York	in	December	of	
2014.		
	
This	research	visit	began	with	an	initial	correspondence	with	ARMS	staff	in	
order	to	establish	the	availability	of	the	kind	of	documents	being	sought.	
Having	found	that	there	were	no	documents	relating	to	the	San	Francisco	
conference	held	in	the	online	archive,	I	contacted	ARMS	to	ask	where	
these	documents	could	be	found	or	if	they	had	been	preserved	at	all.	The	
archivist	responded	and	provided	an	extensive	list	of	files	held	at	ARMS	
relating	to	the	San	Francisco	conference	prior	to	the	research	visit.	This	list	
was	examined,	with	files	that	appeared	to	be	relevant	to	the	questions	
being	asked	being	selected	for	further	examination.	This	selection	took	
place	bearing	in	mind	the	need	to	look	broadly	in	order	to	find	potentially	
interesting	information.		
	
Having	identified	archival	material	that	may	be	relevant,	I	booked	a	desk	in	
the	research	room	at	ARMS	for	3	days,	where	I	was	required	to	fill	out	a	
registration	form	with	personal	details	as	well	as	an	explanation	of	the	
research	I	wanted	to	conduct	and	how/where	this	research	would	appear.	I	
was	also	issued	with	a	list	of	‘Rules	and	Procedures’	for	the	reading	room.	
These	included	familiar	general	policies	for	using	archives	such	as	only	
using	pencils,	maintaining	the	order	of	documents	within	files	and	keeping	
noise	to	a	minimum	(United	Nations,	2012).	Upon	arrival	at	the	reading	
room,	I	provided	a	list	of	the	files	I	had	identified	to	the	research	room	
staff.	These	included	(but	were	not	limited	to):	
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• ‘Correspondence	Files	–	Outgoing	Letters	–	Negroes’	
• ‘Correspondence	Files	–	Outgoing	Letters	–	Minorities’	
• ‘Organisation	of	Conferences	–	United	Nations	Conference	on	
International	Organisation’	
• ‘Files	By	Country	–	United	Kingdom’	
• ‘Files	By	Country	–	United	States’	
• ‘Files	By	Country	–	France’	
• ‘Files	By	Country	–	USSR’	
• ‘Files	By	Country	–	China’	
	
As	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	the	files	I	selected	to	look	at	were	
rather	broad	in	their	scope	but	this	was	necessary	in	order	to	provide	the	
best	chance	of	accessing	relevant,	important	and	interesting	information.	I	
selected	the	‘Files	By	Country’	of	the	sponsoring	nations,	as	well	as	files	for	
a	number	of	ex-colonial	states,	and	correspondence	files	that	appeared	to	
relate	to	issues	of	race	and	colonialism.	These	files	were	retrieved	from	the	
stores	and	given	to	me	at	my	desk	three	files	at	a	time	in	order	to	ensure	
minimum	disruption	to	their	ordering.	Each	file,	some	larger	than	others,	
was	then	sifted	through	and	any	documents	that	discussed	relevant	issues	
such	as	colonialism,	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council	or	the	
representation	of	minorities	at	San	Francisco	were	photographed	in	order	
to	be	examined	in	more	detail	at	a	later	date.	Doing	so	allowed	me	to	look	
through	a	large	number	of	documents	in	the	relatively	brief	time	I	was	
visiting	the	archives	and	also	meant	that	I	had	copies	of	the	documents	to	
explore	in	more	detail	at	a	later	date.	As	such,	the	research	visit	was	purely	
a	data	collection	exercise,	which	allowed	me	to	collect	a	large	amount	of	
data	and	worry	about	its	relevance	at	a	later	point	in	time.		
	
The	process	of	collecting	data	was	therefore	typical	of	archival	research.	
Visiting	the	United	Nations	archives	allowed	access	to	information	that	I	
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would	have	been	otherwise	unable	to	access.	The	documents	of	the	
conference	were	created	before	the	age	of	digitisation	and	the	sheer	
volume	of	material	generated	by	the	United	Nations	on	a	daily	basis	means	
it	is	unlikely	that	these	documents	will	be	made	available	electronically	in	
the	near	future.	Access	to	the	archives	therefore	provided	an	insight	into	
the	silences	of	the	standard	narrative	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	
that	it	would	have	been	difficult	to	gain	elsewhere.	The	data	collected	
provided	documentary	evidence	of	the	kinds	of	conversations	around	
colonialism	that	were	happening	both	prior	to	and	during	the	conference	
that	have	been	written	out	of	these	standard	accounts.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	began	with	a	consideration	of	the	strategy	of	reading	through	
history,	and	has	argued	that	in	order	to	understand	contemporary	issues	
within	the	United	Nations,	it	is	necessary	to	locate	them	within	their	
historical	context.	It	is	not	sufficient	to	look	only	at	the	immediate	
surrounding	circumstances	of	such	debates,	but	rather	we	need	to	look	at	
the	underlying	structures	that	facilitate	these	debates.	The	core	question	
is:	what	has	happened	historically	that	has	enabled	these	debates	to	
occur?	The	aim	of	the	following	three	chapters	is	to	re-narrate	the	history	
of	the	United	Nations	in	order	to	provide	a	more	accurate	understanding	of	
its	history	that	will	ultimately	highlight	the	continued	significance	of	
colonialism	in	the	power	structures	of	the	United	Nations	today.	The	thesis	
will	explore	the	primary	structures	of	the	United	Nations	through	an	
examination	of	their	historical	development.		
	
In	doing	so,	the	hope	is	that	this	thesis	will	not	only	add	something	to	the	
existing	literature	that	deals	with	the	relationship	between	colonialism	and	
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international	institutions,	but	that	it	will	also	contribute	to	broader	
conversations	about	the	relationship	between	history	and	power,	
particularly	focusing	on	the	need	to	address	silences	in	the	historical	
narratives	of	political	institutions	in	order	to	address	existing	inequalities	in	
power	and	more	accurately	understand	their	origins.	The	purpose	of	using	
the	approach	to	history	that	has	been	outlined	here	is	to	provide	a	
challenge	to	dominant	discourses	and	ultimately	to	advocate	the	
development	of	international	political	institutions	that	are	committed	to	
the	pursuit	of	global	equality.	It	represents	a	desire	not	simply	to	eradicate	
international	institutions,	but	to	re-design	the	ways	in	which	these	
institutions	function	in	order	to	address	their	colonial	past	and	their	role	in	
perpetuating	an	unequal	global	order.	This	chapter	has	argued	that	the	key	
to	challenging	dominance	is	to	illuminate	silences	and	to	provide	counter-
narratives	that	allow	for	these	silences	to	be	heard.	In	terms	of	this	
particular	context,	the	following	chapter	will	provide	such	a	counter-
narrative	through	an	examination	of	the	histories	of	resistance	that	have	
played	a	role	in	challenging	the	relationships	between	the	powerful	and	
the	rest	of	the	world.				
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Chapter	4:	The	United	Nations	and	Colonialism:	An	Alternative	
Discourse	
	
‘Let	us	remember	that	the	stature	of	all	mankind	is	diminished	so	long	as	
nations	or	parts	of	nations	are	still	unfree.	Let	us	remember	that	the	
highest	purpose	of	man	is	the	liberation	of	man	from	his	bonds	of	fear,	his	
bonds	of	human	degradation,	his	bonds	of	poverty	-	the	liberation	of	man	
from	the	physical,	spiritual	and	intellectual	bonds	which	have	for	too	long	
stunted	the	development	of	humanity's	majority.	And	let	us	remember,	
Sisters	and	Brothers,	that	for	the	sake	of	all	that,	we	Asians	and	Africans	
must	be	united’	(Sukarno,	1955).		
	
Introduction	
	
Since	there	has	been	colonialism,	there	has	been	resistance	to	colonialism.	
This	resistance	is	frequently	overlooked	in	the	dominant	histories	of	
international	institutions	and	in	national	histories	more	generally.	This	
chapter	will	outline	some	of	the	key	stages	in	the	anti-colonial	movement	
and	will	focus	on	the	anti-colonial	opposition	present	at	the	San	Francisco	
conference	as	a	particular	moment	in	this	history	of	resistance,	due	to	its	
relationship	to	the	construction	of	the	United	Nations.	It	will	argue	that	
this	history	of	resistance	has	been	strategically	written	out	of	standard	
accounts	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	and	that	to	provide	this	
history	as	an	alternative	discourse	provides	a	different	understanding	of	
the	United	Nations	as	an	institution.		
	
When	we	look	at	the	ways	in	which	colonialism	has	been	resisted	
historically	as	well	as	the	ways	in	which	this	resistance	has	been	silenced,	it	
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emphasises	the	power	of	particular	nations	to	dominate	the	histories	that	
are	told	and	also	their	ability	to	construct	institutions	that	primarily	serve	
their	own	interests	in	spite	of	resistance.	What	is	presented	here	is	by	no	
means	an	exhaustive	history	of	resistance	to	colonial	power.	Instead,	this	
chapter	will	highlight	a	number	of	key	moments	in	the	anti-colonial	
struggle	in	order	to	assert	that	the	absence	of	this	resistance	in	historical	
accounts	is	not	due	to	an	absence	of	resistance	per	se,	but	due	to	an	
unwillingness	to	recognise	the	imperial	nature	of	global	institutions.		
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	this	historical	narrative	of	resistance	will	
begin	with	the	end	of	the	First	World	War.	As	Chakrabarty	(2010)	has	
argued,	‘the	urge	to	decolonize,	to	be	rid	of	the	colonizer	in	every	possible	
way,	was	central	to	the	anticolonial	criticism	after	the	end	of	World	War	1’,	
and	so	this	chapter	will	focus	on	the	key	developments	in	anti-colonial	
criticism	from	1918	onwards	and	the	push	towards	decolonisation,	
finishing	with	the	Declaration	on	the	Granting	of	Independence	to	Colonial	
Countries	and	Peoples	of	1960.	As	with	the	alternative	history	already	
presented	in	terms	of	the	formation	of	the	United	Nations	in	Chapter	1,	
this	chapter	will	begin	with	the	League	of	Nations	and	look	at	the	ways	in	
which	the	League	prompted	an	anti-colonial	movement	following	the	
unfulfilled	promise	of	the	United	States	President	Woodrow	Wilson’s	
commitment	to	self-determination.	As	has	already	been	argued,	the	United	
Nations	should	not	be	considered	entirely	distinct	from	the	League	of	
Nations,	and	as	such,	the	opposition	to	these	institutions	is	inherently	
connected.	Indeed,	the	very	fact	that	the	anti-colonial	criticism	aimed	at	
the	League	of	Nations	was	not	dealt	with	in	the	development	of	the	United	
Nations	is	of	great	importance.		
	
The	chapter	will	then	move	on	to	discuss	the	San	Francisco	conference	as	a	
particular	moment	in	the	history	of	anti-colonial	resistance	and	as	a	
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deliberately	missed	opportunity	on	the	part	of	the	sponsoring	nations	to	
create	an	institution	in	line	with	the	demands	for	decolonisation	and	
independence	for	colonial	states.	The	next	section	explores	the	rise	of	the	
organisation	of	states	that	described	itself	as	Asia-Africa	and	the	
significance	of	the	Cold	War	for	mounting	pressure	on	the	issue	of	
independence.	This	is	followed	by	a	brief	discussion	of	the	more	formal	
commitment	to	decolonisation	within	the	United	Nations	in	1960	and	a	
look	at	some	of	the	more	recent	organisations	of	non-European	states	such	
as	the	Non-Aligned	Movement	and	the	Group	of	77.	
	
The	point	of	detailing	this	history	of	anti-colonial	resistance	is	to	provide	an	
alternative	discourse	to	those	commonly	seen	in	histories	of	the	United	
Nations,	whereby	the	United	Nations	is	framed	as	an	institution	
fundamentally	based	on	equality	and	respect	for	all.	This	standard	
narrative	constructs	the	United	Nations	as	the	space	within	which	states	
were	able	to	gain	independence	and	attributes	this	to	the	vision	of	the	
major	powers	as	outlined	in	the	Charter.	In	contrast,	this	chapter	will	show	
the	United	Nations	to	be	a	site	of	constant	struggle	and	instead	attribute	
independence	and	decolonisation	to	the	unrelenting	anti-colonial	
resistance	provided	by	existing	and	former	colonies	in	the	face	of	imperial	
power.	The	purpose	is	to	challenge	the	conception	of	the	United	Nations	as	
a	progressive	institution	and	to	highlight	the	contradictions	inherent	in	its	
structure,	whilst	also	demonstrating	a	history	of	resistance	that	has	been	
written	out	of	standard	narratives.	In	addressing	the	silencing	of	this	
history	of	anti-colonial	resistance,	the	aim	here	is	to	disturb	the	dominant	
discourses	of	equality	and	progressiveness	that	surround	the	United	
Nations.		
	
The	chapter	does	the	work	of	de-silencing	these	anti-colonial	histories,	
through	allowing	the	archival	documents	representative	of	the	voices	of	
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these	anti-colonial	movements	to	speak.	Where	these	voices	have	not	
been	heard	in	standard	accounts	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations,	this	
chapter	reveals	the	extent	to	which	anti-colonial	activists	were	silenced	
within	the	context	of	the	San	Francisco	Conference	in	spite	of	their	
persistence.	The	chapter	will	also	address	the	development	of	this	anti-
colonial	movement	after	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	and	de-
silence	this	continued	anti-colonial	history	in	terms	of	the	commitments	
and	proposals	made	at	the	Bandung	Conference.	The	use	of	archival	data	
in	this	chapter	is	not	simply	illustrative	of	the	arguments	being	made,	but	is	
done	in	the	spirit	of	giving	voice	to	those	who	have	been	silenced	by	
history.							
	
	
Imperial	Resistance	and	the	League	of	Nations	
	
As	previously	stated,	the	history	of	resistance	against	colonialism	has	been	
in	existence	as	long	as	the	practice	of	colonialism	itself.	However,	for	the	
purposes	of	this	chapter,	it	is	neither	possible	nor	useful	to	detail	this	
history	in	its	entirety.	Instead,	a	number	of	key	moments	have	been	
selected	in	order	to	highlight	some	of	the	ways	in	which	imperialism	has	
been	resisted	by	the	anti-colonial	movement,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	
construction	of	international	institutions,	namely	the	League	of	Nations	
and	the	United	Nations.	This	begins	here	with	a	look	at	the	events	of	the	
early	20th	century.	The	Paris	Peace	Conference	began	on	January	18th	1919	
and	resulted	in	the	well-known	Treaty	of	Versailles	as	well	as	being	the	site	
at	which	the	League	of	Nations	was	founded	(Williams,	2014:	80).	
Following	the	end	of	the	First	World	War,	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	was	
established	in	order	for	the	allied	powers	to	develop	a	system	for	
maintaining	international	peace,	as	the	war	had	highlighted	the	
unambiguous	failure	of	traditional	methods	of	peacekeeping	and	the	need	
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for	an	alternative	(Birn,	1981:	6).	For	a	number	of	hopeful	former	and	
existing	colonies	this	seemed	to	be	an	opportunity	for	democracy	and	
freedom	to	prevail,	particularly	in	light	of	statements	made	by	the	United	
States	government.		
	
During	the	years	of	the	First	World	War,	United	States	President	Woodrow	
Wilson	had	become	an	advocate	for	the	principles	of	democracy,	collective	
security	and	self-determination	(Steel,	1998:	21).	Speaking	about	this	in	
public	on	a	number	of	occasions,	President	Wilson	had	become	a	sponsor	
for	the	values	of	democracy	and	self-determination	that	those	who	had	
been	or	were	still	colonies	sought	for	themselves.	In	his	discussions	of	this,	
President	Wilson	had	frequently	projected	a	clear	vision	for	an	
international	institution	that	would	ensure	peace,	and	in	1918	he	put	
forward	a	fourteen-point	proposal	that	reflected	his	vision	(Wilson,	1918).	
The	points	of	Wilson’s	proposal	were	largely	relating	to	diplomacy,	national	
self-determination	and	the	formation	of	a	‘general	assembly	of	nations’	
(Schlesinger,	2003:	20).	For	former	and	existing	colonies,	the	significance	of	
Wilson’s	plan	was	the	commitment	to	self-determination	and	particularly	
point	five,	which	stated	the	need	for		
	
‘a	free,	open-minded,	and	absolutely	impartial	adjustment	of	all	colonial	
claims,	based	upon	a	strict	observance	of	the	principle	that	in	determining	
all	such	questions	of	sovereignty	the	interests	of	the	populations	
concerned	must	have	equal	weight	with	the	equitable	claims	of	the	
government	whose	title	is	to	be	determined’		
(Wilson,	1918).		
	
In	outlining	his	plans	for	an	international	assembly	of	nations,	Wilson	had	
come	to	be	seen	as	a	champion	for	the	principles	of	sovereignty,	
democracy	and	self-government,	reflecting	a	consideration	of	the	interests	
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of	colonial	populations	in	comparison	to	a	distinct	lack	of	such	
consideration	on	the	part	of	the	imperial	powers.	Those	who	had	been	
working	tirelessly	to	promote	independence	for	the	colonies	had	hoped	
Wilson’s	vision	would	provide	the	catalyst	for	decolonisation	and	the	dawn	
of	a	more	equal	distribution	of	power	internationally.		
	
By	the	time	it	came	to	the	Peace	Conference	of	1919	however,	it	had	
become	clear	that	Wilson	had	neither	the	power	nor	the	desire	to	be	a	
representative	for	colonial	interests.	Despite	pleas	from	India	for	Wilson	to	
push	for	decolonisation	as	a	key	feature	in	the	design	of	a	new	
international	institution,	he	was	evidently	unwilling	to	represent	demands	
that	conflicted	with	the	interests	of	the	major	powers,	particularly	France	
and	Britain	(Manela,	2006:	1348).	For	Wilson	it	seemed,	the	Paris	
conference	was	not	the	correct	forum	within	which	to	challenge	the	
imperial	domination	of	the	Allied	powers,	with	Wilson	believing	instead	
that	these	issues	would	inevitably	be	resolved	by	the	establishment	of	the	
League	of	Nations	(Manela,	2006:	1348).	This	proved	to	be	disappointing	
for	those	pushing	for	decolonisation	and	for	them,	represented	a	missed	
opportunity	on	the	part	of	the	United	States,	fuelling	an	even	more	intense	
desire	to	continue	to	challenge	imperial	power.		
	
The	need	to	be	free	of	colonial	domination	in	any	and	every	way	possible	
therefore	became	a	key	feature	of	anti-colonial	resistance	at	the	end	of	
First	World	War	(Chakrabarty,	2010).	The	unfulfilled	promise	of	Wilson’s	
plan	had	proved	that	it	was	not	possible	to	negotiate	with	imperial	powers	
and	their	militarily	powerful	allies.	However,	as	will	become	a	theme	
throughout	this	chapter	and	throughout	this	thesis,	this	relationship	
between	Wilson’s	Fourteen	Points,	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	and	the	
anti-colonial	movement	is	often	neglected	within	historical	accounts	of	the	
development	of	international	institutions.	In	narrating	the	agreements	
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made	at	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	and	the	development	of	the	League	of	
Nations,	the	anti-colonial	movement	is	rarely	acknowledged	and	the	
potential	significance	of	Wilson’s	plans	for	the	issue	of	decolonisation	is	
rarely	discussed.	As	Manela	argues,	historians	of	international	relations	
have	been	inclined	to	ignore	the	very	issues	that	were	ignored	by	the	allied	
powers	at	the	conference,	namely	the	demands	for	decolonisation	from	
peoples	outside	of	Europe	that	were	contrary	to	the	interests	of	the	major	
powers	(2006:	1328).	To	neglect	this	tension	in	historical	accounts	of	the	
Paris	Peace	Conference	or	accounts	of	the	signing	of	the	Treaty	of	
Versailles	suggests	an	unwillingness	to	deal	with	the	role	of	colonialism	in	
the	building	of	the	League	of	Nations	as	an	institution	and	neglects	a	
history	of	resistance	that	was	very	much	present.			
	
At	the	same	time	that	the	Paris	Peace	Conference	was	taking	place	and	for	
the	years	between	the	First	and	Second	World	Wars,	Paris	became	a	
significant	meeting	point	for	anti-colonial	activists.	International	anti-
colonial	groups	used	Paris	as	a	significant	geographical	location	that	
allowed	space	for	the	discussion	of	both	issues	of	international	politics	and	
issues	regarding	their	own	homelands	(Goebel,	2015:	173).	Anti-colonial	
movements	saw	a	need	to	establish	a	presence	within	Europe	in	order	to	
respond	to	the	international	politics	that	so	often	took	place	on	European	
soil.	Although	their	primary	focus	was	on	decolonisation	outside	of	Europe,	
Paris	became	a	hub	for	anti-colonial	resistance	in	order	to	maintain	a	direct	
connection	to	those	European	countries	that	were	responsible	for	colonial	
oppression.		
	
In	spite	of	the	claims	being	made	around	internationalism	and	universalism	
at	the	end	of	the	First	World	War,	President	Wilson’s	inaction	at	the	Peace	
Conference	had	resulted	in	a	pessimistic	response	to	the	discourse	of	
universalism	among	colonial	peoples	and	anti-colonial	activists	(Goebel,	
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2015:	173).	It	quickly	became	clear	that	the	universalism	the	major	powers	
discussed	in	their	plans	for	the	League	of	Nations	was	not	designed	to	
include	the	colonies.	Whilst	the	major	powers	discussed	a	need	for	
international	relations	based	on	a	‘universal	brotherhood’	and	Western	
understandings	of	universalism,	it	quickly	became	clear	that	this	
brotherhood	would	not	extend	beyond	European	borders	(Goebel,	2015:	
173).	The	understandably	cynical	response	to	the	inherent	contradictions	
of	imperialist	states	championing	universalism	from	proponents	of	anti-
colonialism	was	particularly	present	in	the	League	Against	Imperialism,	
which	was	established	in	1927	during	the	League	of	Nations’	international	
reign.		
	
The	League	Against	Imperialism	was	established	at	the	first	International	
Congress	against	Colonial	Oppression	and	Imperialism,	which	opened	on	
February	10th	1927	and	saw	174	delegates	representing	organisations	from	
34	countries	gather	together	in	Brussels	(Petersson,	2014:	50).	Following	
anti-colonial	sentiment	that	had	been	fuelled	by	the	Peace	Conference	in	
Paris,	the	League	Against	Imperialism	was	one	of	the	earliest	attempts	to	
unify	this	anti-colonial	anger	into	a	formal	organisation.	The	chosen	name	
of	this	organisation	was	a	direct	attack	on	the	League	of	Nations	and	the	
‘preservation	of	imperialism’	that	was	represented	by	the	mandate	system	
(Prashad,	2007:	21).	The	mandate	system	of	the	League	of	Nations	will	be	
examined	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	5	through	a	discussion	of	the	concept	
of	sovereignty,	but	for	the	purposes	of	this	discussion	it	is	needless	to	say	
that	the	mandate	system	did	not	represent	the	decolonisation	or	
independence	that	the	colonies	had	been	hopeful	for	prior	to	the	Paris	
Peace	Conference.	Hence	the	League	Against	Imperialism	was	a	direct	
reaction	to	the	continued	colonial	domination	being	legitimised	by	the	
League	of	Nations.	The	League	Against	Imperialism	was	the	first	real	
attempt	to	create	an	anti-colonial	body	that	brought	together	key	
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individuals,	organisations	and	associations	in	spite	of	their	differences	
(Petersson,	2014:	69).	This	again	emphasises	the	international	forms	of	
resistance	to	continued	colonial	domination	by	and	through	global	
institutions,	which	not	only	existed	but	which	have	been	neglected	in	the	
standard	accounts	of	history.		
	
This	organised	resistance	that	started	with	the	League	Against	Imperialism	
continued	in	various	forms	throughout	the	interwar	years	and	intensified	
around	the	founding	of	the	United	Nations	in	1945	following	the	
dissolution	of	the	League.	The	significance	of	the	anti-colonial	resistance	
surrounding	the	San	Francisco	conference	for	the	arguments	being	
developed	throughout	this	thesis	is	such	that	it	demands	a	more	detailed	
examination.		
	
	
The	Colonial	Question	at	San	Francisco	
	
In	the	later	years	of	the	League	of	Nations	and	prior	to	the	United	Nations	
Conference	on	International	Organisation	at	San	Francisco	there	had	been	
a	shift	in	public	attitudes	away	from	support	for	colonialism.	The	European	
colonial	powers	faced	the	rising	strength	of	independence	movements	
within	colonial	territories	as	well	as	this	shift	in	public	attitudes	both	within	
and	outside	of	Europe,	making	the	maintenance	of	colonial	rule	difficult	to	
uphold	(Matz,	2005:	88).	Despite	this,	the	founding	members	of	the	United	
Nations	managed	to	keep	questions	around	colonialism	and	decolonisation	
to	a	minimum	during	the	conference	in	1945.	As	previous	chapters	have	
shown,	this	silencing	of	the	issue	of	colonialism	is	something	that	has	been	
replicated	throughout	standard	accounts	of	the	history	of	the	United	
Nations	and	the	standard	historical	narrative	suggests	that	the	issue	of	
colonialism	was	dealt	with	at	the	San	Francisco	conference,	with	the	
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universalism	of	United	Nations	membership	signifying	an	end	to	empire	
and	colonialism	as	we	knew	it.		
	
Within	the	majority	of	the	accounts	of	the	United	Nations,	the	apparent	
aim	of	universal	membership	signalled	the	first	step	on	the	road	to	
independence	for	colonial	territories.	Not	only	does	this	narrative	fail	to	
acknowledge	how	certain	countries	came	to	be	the	major	powers	and	the	
key	players	in	the	United	Nations	in	the	first	instance,	it	is	also	highly	
deceptive	in	terms	of	concealing	the	ways	in	which	colonial	questions	were	
(not)	dealt	with	at	San	Francisco.	Marika	Sherwood	puts	this	plainly	when	
she	states	that		
	
'not	one	of	the	innumerable	books	on	the	founding	of	the	United	Nations	
at	San	Francisco	fifty	years	ago	mentions	the	efforts	made	by	colonized	
peoples	and	black	Americans	to	have	their	voices	heard	and	to	have	the	
freeing	of	the	colonies	put	on	the	UN's	agenda'	(1996:	71).			
	
These	standard	histories,	such	as	those	detailed	in	Chapter	1,	highlight	the	
problem	of	selective	membership	as	one	of	the	main	failures	of	the	League	
of	Nations,	and	even	recognise	the	fact	that	the	four	sponsoring	countries	
present	at	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	conference	(United	Kingdom,	United	
States	of	America,	China	and	the	Soviet	Union)	claimed	that	they	were	‘not	
ready’	to	discuss	the	issue	of	colonialism	and	moves	towards	
decolonisation	(Gilchrist,	1945:	983).	However,	they	do	not	address	the	
anti-colonial	resistance	that	coincided	with	the	establishment	of	the	United	
Nations.	This	narrative	suggests	that	the	discussion	of	colonialism	was	
down	to	the	sponsoring	countries,	which	were	unwilling	to	engage	in	any	
sort	of	meaningful	debate.	As	such,	this	narrative	fails	to	acknowledge	the	
intense	anti-colonial	resistance	that	was	being	outright	ignored	by	the	
sponsoring	governments	in	their	decision	to	not	discuss	decolonisation.	
 113 
Although	the	sponsors	wished	to	frame	the	United	Nations	as	a	new	
organisation	that	would	succeed	where	the	League	of	Nations	had	failed,	
the	issue	of	colonialism	and	colonial	independence	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	did	
not	appear	to	feature	as	a	high	priority,	or	proved	to	be	such	a	contentious	
issue	that	the	colonial	powers	wished	to	avoid	it	altogether	in	order	to	
protect	their	own	political	interests.	The	question	of	colonial	territories	
was	to	be	dealt	with	at	San	Francisco	and	the	agreements	made	here	were	
embodied	in	the	Charter	(Nicholas,	1975:	10).	However,	in	reality,	
discussions	on	working	papers	at	San	Francisco	did	not	allow	for	any	radical	
amendments	by	smaller	states	(Hurd,	2007:	88).	Thus,	the	discussion	of	
how	to	manage	the	colonial	territories	was	limited	to	a	discussion	between	
colonial	powers,	rather	than	a	discussion	involving	the	subjects	of	empire	
or	representatives	of	ex-colonial	territories.	In	the	standard	historical	
narratives,	the	absence	of	colonialism	in	the	discussions	at	Dumbarton	
Oaks	and	at	San	Francisco	are	frequently	put	down	to	disagreements	
between	the	major	powers	or	the	fact	that	the	focus	was	on	creating	an	
international	institution,	rather	than	dealing	with	colonialism.		
	
The	significant	absence	of	discussions	of	colonialism	at	San	Francisco	is	
therefore	rarely	put	into	the	context	of	the	anti-colonial	movement	that	
existed	concurrently.	The	colonial	question	was	absent	from	the	agenda	at	
San	Francisco,	but	this	is	not	to	say	that	attempts	were	not	made	to	raise	
the	issues	of	colonialism	and	decolonisation.	A	number	of	anti-colonial	
groups	at	San	Francisco	expressed	a	desire	to	address	the	issues	of	
decolonisation	and	sovereign	equality	for	all	territories	involved	in	the	
organisation,	but	the	Western	powers	showed	no	desire	to	discuss	these	
issues,	instead	wishing	to	protect	their	own	sovereignty	and	the	rights	of	
their	own	states	above	all	else	(Patil,	2008:	42).	Within	this	context,	this	
meant	their	right	to	rule	over	colonial	territories	and	to	govern	over	these	
territories	without	the	interference	of	international	bodies.	Despite	the	
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reluctance	of	the	major	powers	to	address	the	issue	of	colonialism,	prior	to	
the	conference	at	San	Francisco,	attempts	were	made	by	individuals	and	
groups	external	to	the	planning	of	the	conference	to	ensure	equal	
representation	at	San	Francisco	and	to	get	decolonisation	put	on	the	
agenda.	These	attempts	however	have	been	written	out	of	the	standard	
histories	of	the	United	Nations	and	these	standard	histories	therefore	
signify	a	failure	to	deal	with	the	colonial	history	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	
institution	and	a	neglect	of	significant	debates	around	its	founding.	Here,	
the	aim	is	to	de-silence	these	anti-colonial	narratives	through	the	
examination	of	archival	documents.		
	
The	African	Academy	of	Arts	and	Research	is	one	such	example	of	a	group	
that	attempted	to	get	decolonisation	put	onto	the	agenda	at	the	San	
Francisco	conference.	It	was	established	in	1943	by	three	African	students	
studying	in	America	-	Kingsley	Mbadiwe,	Mbonu	Ojike	and	A.A.	Nwafor	
Orizu	-	with	the	aim	of	promoting	African	independence.	During	the	San	
Francisco	conference	in	1945,	Ojike	lobbied	for	target	dates	to	be	set	on	
African	independence,	but	was	unable	to	secure	a	meeting	with	either	
British	or	American	representatives	(Diamond,	2005).	A	joint	letter	from	
the	African	Academy	of	Arts	and	Research	and	the	African	Students	
Association	which	enclosed	a	‘Memorandum	of	Recommendations	on	
Independence	of	British	West	African	Colonies’	was	met	with	the	response	
from	United	Nations	information	officer	T.T.	McCrosky	that		
	
‘…the	Conference	is	devoting	its	energies	and	its	labors	exclusively	to	the	
single	problem	of	setting	up	an	international	organization	to	maintain	
peace	and	security	and	therefore	it	is	not	anticipated	that	the	specific	
problems	mentioned	in	the	memorandums	will	be	the	subject	of	action’	
(Letter	from	T.T.	McCrosky	to	Mr	Ojike,	30th	May	1945).	
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This	response	suggests	that	colonialism	was	in	no	way	related	to	the	issue	
of	international	peace	and	security	and	highlights	the	overwhelming	desire	
of	the	European	empires	to	keep	the	issue	of	colonialism	out	of	discussions	
at	San	Francisco	despite	mounting	public	pressure.	However,	it	is	
interesting	in	itself	that	as	Sherwood	(1996)	points	out,	attempts	such	as	
this	to	put	decolonisation	on	the	agenda	at	San	Francisco	are	rarely	
included	in	the	standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations.	Of	the	numerous	
books	detailing	the	history	of	the	United	Nations,	mentions	of	groups	that	
were	campaigning	for	decolonisation,	such	as	the	African	Academy	of	Arts	
and	Research,	are	few	and	far	between.		
	
Similarly,	the	President	of	the	West	Indies	National	Council	Dr	Charles	A.	
Petioni	and	Vice	President	Richard	B.	Moore	lobbied	the	San	Francisco	
conference	on	behalf	of	Caribbean	interests,	arguing	that	British	colonial	
rule	in	the	West	Indies	was	not	acting	in	the	interests	of	encouraging	self-
government	and	that	the	resources	of	the	West	Indies	were	being	used	to	
produce	profit	for	the	European	powers	controlling	them	(Turner	and	
Turner,	1988:	79).	The	response	to	Moore's	'Appeal	on	Behalf	of	the	
Caribbean	Peoples',	which	was	circulated	to	government	officials	at	San	
Francisco	states	that		
	
‘You	are	of	course	aware	that	the	purpose	of	the	San	Francisco	Conference	
is	to	formulate	the	best	possible	charter	for	an	international	organization	
to	maintain	peace	and	security	for	all	people	of	the	world	regardless	of	
race,	color,	religion	or	sex.	It	will	devote	its	energies	and	its	labors	
exclusively	to	this	task,	and	it	is	not	intended	that	the	matter	you	mention	
will	be	the	subject	of	action	here’	(Letter	from	Alger	Hiss	to	Mr	Moore,	1st	
June	1945).	
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Again,	this	response	is	astoundingly	contradictory.	In	raising	questions	
around	the	exploitation	of	people	and	resources	in	colonial	territories,	
representatives	of	the	West	Indies	National	Council	are	told	that	these	
questions	are	not	appropriate	questions	to	be	raised	in	the	context	of	
developing	an	international	organisation	for	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	
security.	This	standard	response	is	seen	repeatedly	in	reply	to	letters	from	
organisations	such	as	the	National	Committee	for	India’s	Freedom	(Letter	
from	Alger	Hiss	to	Mrs	Pandit,	May	11th	1945),	the	Lithuanian	League	of	
Canada	(Letter	from	T.T.	McCrosky	to	Mr	Batkus,	May	6th	1945)	and	the	
movement	for	Indonesian	independence	(Letter	from	T.T.	McCrosky	to	Mr	
Patty,	May	23rd	1945),	among	others.	In	the	same	vein,	letters	from	
individuals	arguing	for	the	importance	of	black	representation	at	San	
Francisco	are	met	with	the	response	that		
	
‘No	special	group	interest	as	such	has	a	delegation	to	the	Conference.	Their	
interests	are	represented	by	their	respective	national	delegations.	The	
Delegation	of	the	United	States,	for	example,	has	a	number	of	unofficial	
consultants	from	special	groups	that	were	invited	to	send	representatives	
to	San	Francisco,	among	them	the	Association	for	the	Advancement	of	
Colored	People.	There	is	also	a	prominent	Negro	on	the	staff	of	that	
Delegation.	You	are	also	aware	no	doubt	that	the	Delegates	of	certain	
other	countries	are	of	the	Negro	race’	(Letter	from	T.T.	McCrosky	to	Mrs	
Black,	21st	May	1945).		
	
As	referenced	in	the	text	above,	the	National	Association	for	the	
Advancement	of	Colored	People	(NAACP)	did	send	Walter	White,	Mary	
McLeod	Bethune	and	W.E.B	Du	Bois	as	representatives	in	the	American	
delegation	at	San	Francisco	to	raise	issues	of	representation	and	
independence	for	the	colonies,	as	well	as	racial	equality	more	generally.	
Out	of	the	42	organisations	invited	to	act	as	consultants	to	the	United	
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States	delegation	at	the	conference,	the	NAACP	was	the	only	group	
selected	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	African	American	population	
(Sherwood,	1996:	76).	Ultimately,	the	goals	they	had	set	themselves	in	
attending	the	conference	were	unfulfilled	by	the	time	the	conference	came	
to	a	close	and	in	fact,	despite	including	them	in	the	conference	to	
represent	the	interests	of	so	called	‘special	interest	groups’,	the	colonial	
powers	and	the	American	delegation	made	it	clear	to	the	representatives	
of	the	NAACP	that	the	language	of	sovereignty	and	self-determination	was	
not	applicable	to	people	of	the	colonial	territories	(Tillery,	2011:	104).		
	
However,	this	is	not	to	say	that	the	NAACP	did	not	organise	and	attempt	to	
make	their	voices	heard.	Prior	to	the	conference,	Du	Bois	made	contact	
with	a	number	of	Black	activists	including	Nwafor	Orizu	of	the	African	
Academy	of	Arts	and	Research	in	order	to	organise	a	separate	conference	
before	the	actual	San	Francisco	conference	to	prepare	the	NAACP	
representatives	(Sherwood,	1996:	76).	This	pre-conference	conference	
concluded	with	the	following	four	key	points	that	were	taken	forward	by	
the	NAACP	representatives	to	San	Francisco:		
	
1. Colonialism	must	go;	
2. The	transition	from	colonial	status	to	autonomy	should	be	overseen	
by	an	international	body;	
3. Colonials	should	be	represented	on	this	international	body	
4. The	primary	objective	should	be	to	improve	the	social	and	
economic	conditions	of	colonial	peoples	(Sherwood,	1996:	77).		
	
In	spite	of	Du	Bois’	efforts	and	his	preparation	for	the	San	Francisco	
conference,	his	interventions	were	ultimately	unproductive.	The	Charter	
that	came	out	of	the	conference	and	that	still	guides	the	actions	of	the	
United	Nations	today	failed	to	address	decolonisation	in	any	concrete	
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manner.	In	fact,	even	proposals	by	China	and	the	Soviet	Union	to	include	
independence	for	the	colonies	in	the	Charter	were	blocked	by	the	United	
States	and	the	United	Kingdom	(Sherwood,	1996:	90).	The	inclusion	of	the	
NAACP	in	the	United	States	consultant	organisations	appeared	to	be	
decorative	rather	than	actually	allowing	for	any	form	of	debate	or	impact.		
	
Despite	the	issues	of	empire	and	decolonisation	being	raised	by	these	
various	organisations	both	prior	to	and	during	the	conference	at	San	
Francisco,	their	attempts	and	the	unsatisfactory	responses	from	the	
conference	organisers	are	seldom	mentioned	in	the	standard	histories	of	
the	United	Nations.	To	exclude	these	significant	exchanges	and	debates	
from	the	historical	understanding	of	the	development	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	institution	is	clearly	problematic.	The	history	told	by	the	
United	Nations	itself	and	reproduced	by	academics	in	the	seventy	years	
since	its	establishment	fails	to	acknowledge	the	ways	in	which	the	basic	
structure	of	the	organisation,	and	even	the	structure	and	content	of	the	
conference	understood	to	be	its	birthplace,	ignores	particular	aspects	of	
history	and	particular	power	relationships.	Processes	such	as	this	allow	for	
the	legitimation	of	the	institutionalisation	of	Great	Power	privilege,	which	
is	exceptional	in	the	case	of	the	United	Nations	as	compared	with	other	
international	institutions	(Krisch,	2008:	135).	To	accept	these	standard	
histories	as	accurate	representations	of	the	development	of	the	United	
Nations	fails	to	understand	that	history	is	a	construction,	not	just	a	factual	
record	of	events	(Bhambra,	2007:	10).		
	
	
The	Rise	of	Asia-Africa	
	
Following	the	failure	to	get	decolonisation	on	the	agenda	at	San	Francisco,	
the	early	years	of	the	United	Nations	saw	an	increased	focus	on	the	anti-
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colonial	identity	of	Asia-Africa	that	had	developed	from	earlier	forms	of	
anti-imperial	solidarity.	This	identity	was	born	out	of	an	understanding	that	
in	spite	of	their	religious	or	cultural	differences,	these	nations	were	united	
in	their	suffering	through	shared	experiences	of	imperial	domination	and	
exploitation	(Patil,	2008:	50).	Whatever	their	differences,	they	were	unified	
through	an	experience	of	colonialism	and	Western	power	that	it	was	
necessary	to	challenge.	As	such,	the	identity	of	Asia-Africa	was	forged	
through	a	solidarity	framed	in	terms	of	brotherhood	and	morality,	in	
opposition	to	the	West’s	identification	of	Asia-Africa	as	infantile	and	in	
need	of	guidance	(Patil,	2008:	41).	As	has	been	discussed	in	earlier	
chapters,	the	relationship	between	the	West	and	the	rest	of	the	world	had	
historically	been	characterised	as	one	of	paternalism,	whereas	the	unity	of	
Asia-Africa	was	based	on	a	rejection	of	this	characterisation	and	solidarity	
through	equality	and	brotherhood.	
	
The	Bandung	Conference	in	April	of	1955	was	central	to	the	development	
of	this	Asia-Africa	identity,	signifying	a	culmination	of	anti-colonial	pressure	
that	had	begun	in	1927	with	the	League	against	Imperialism	(Prashad,	
2007:	32).	It	brought	together	29	Asian	and	African	states	and	colonies	at	
the	invitation	of	the	Indonesian	President	Sukarno	and	the	Indian	Prime	
Minister	Jawaharlal	Nehru	in	order	to	consolidate	the	demands	being	
made	of	the	United	Nations	by	anti-colonial	forces	in	terms	of	
decolonisation	and	independence	(Mazower,	2012:	259).	The	organisers,	
whilst	acknowledging	the	differences	and	aspects	of	division	between	the	
countries	taking	part,	hoped	to	generate	a	sense	of	solidarity	emanating	
from	a	shared	history	of	Western	imperialism	(Lee,	2010).	In	spite	of	their	
differences,	those	present	at	the	conference	agreed	on	issues	of	economic	
and	cultural	co-operation	and	what	the	Bandung	Conference	ultimately	
represented	was	both	a	diplomatic	and	symbolic	commitment,	where	
Asian	and	African	countries	met	to	‘discuss	the	possible	futures	of	the	
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postcolonial	world’	(Lee,	2010).	What	the	conference	ultimately	achieved	
was	a	sense	of	solidarity	between	Asian	and	African	States.	It	signified	a	
refusal	by	colonial	and	ex-colonial	states	to	continue	to	take	orders	from	
colonisers	and	an	acknowledgement	that	they	were	able	to	discuss	
international	problems	and	provide	a	unified	viewpoint	(Prashad,	2007:	
41).		
	
President	Sukarno’s	opening	speech	at	Bandung	is	filled	with	references	to	
the	responsibility	of	those	present	following	their	independence	from	
colonial	powers	and	their	duty	to	find	solutions	to	the	problems	facing	
humanity:	
	
‘For	many	generations	our	people	have	been	the	voiceless	ones	in	the	
world.	We	have	been	the	unregarded,	the	peoples	for	whom	decisions	
were	made	by	others	whose	interests	were	paramount,	the	peoples	who	
lived	in	poverty	and	humiliation.	Then	are	nations	demanded,	nay	fought	
for	independence,	and	achieved	independence,	and	with	that	
independence	came	responsibility.	We	have	heavy	responsibilities	to	
ourselves,	and	to	the	world,	and	to	the	yet	unborn	generations.	But	we	do	
not	regret	them’	(Sukarno,	1955).		
	
There	was	a	strong	sense	of	overcoming	domination	at	Bandung.	The	
majority	of	those	nations	present	had	been	subject	to	the	colonial	
domination	of	Western	Europe	for	time	periods	spanning	decades	to	
hundreds	of	years	(Wright,	1956).	These	were	the	nations	that	had	
suffered	the	violence	of	colonialism	and	had	fought	relentlessly	for	their	
freedom	in	order	that	they	would	be	able	to	shoulder	the	responsibility	of	
providing	solutions	for	the	problems	of	humanity.	As	Wright	describes	it,	
Bandung	represented	a	meeting	of	‘the	despised,	the	insulted,	the	hurt,	
the	dispossessed	–	in	short,	the	underdogs’	(1956:	12).		
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Sukarno’s	speech	goes	on	to	describe	the	new	guises	of	colonialism	that	
the	recently	independent	African	and	Asian	nations	need	to	be	wary	of:	
	
‘Colonialism	has	also	its	modern	dress,	in	the	form	of	economic	control,	
intellectual	control,	actual	physical	control	by	a	small	but	alien	community	
within	a	nation.	It	is	a	skilful	and	determined	enemy,	and	it	appears	in	
many	guises.	It	does	not	give	up	its	loot	easily.	Wherever,	whenever	and	
however	it	appears,	colonialism	is	an	evil	thing,	and	one	which	must	be	
eradicated	from	the	earth’	(Sukarno,	1955).		
	
The	Bandung	Conference	represented	not	only	a	collective	of	formerly	
colonised	nations,	but	a	collective	of	formerly	colonised	nations	that	
sought	to	challenge	the	neocolonial	forms	of	power	being	established	by	
the	major	imperial	powers.	Their	unity	came	not	from	cultural	or	racial	
likenesses,	but	from	a	political	opposition	to	colonialism	in	any	and	every	
form	(Prashad,	2007:	34).	This	position	was	frequently	articulated	
throughout	the	conference,	particularly	in	regards	to	aspects	of	military	
defence.	Whilst	it	was	accepted	that	these	countries	had	the	right	to	self-
defence	in	response	to	military	aggression,	there	was	an	agreement	to	
refrain	from	collective	defence	that	served	the	interests	of	the	major	
powers	(Acharya	and	Tan,	2008:	8).	These	nations	would	no	longer	play	the	
role	of	protection	for	their	imperial	masters.	Their	identity	would	now	be	
defined	by	their	role	in	an	Asia-Africa	alliance,	no	longer	by	the	colonised-
coloniser	relationship.		
		
As	well	as	being	a	space	for	the	creation	of	a	unified	Asia-Africa	identity	
outside	of	the	United	Nations,	the	conference	aimed	to	establish	a	
cohesive	set	of	proposals	for	anti-colonial	resistance	within	the	United	
Nations.	In	returning	to	the	United	Nations	with	a	set	of	demands	for	
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independence,	those	present	at	the	Bandung	Conference	needed	to	be	
clear	and	united	in	their	approach.	The	conference	succeeded	in	
generating	a	well-defined	set	of	proposals,	with	the	Final	Communiqué	
stating	the	following	agreements:		
	
‘The	Conference	is	agreed:		
(a)	in	declaring	that	colonialism	in	all	its	manifestations	is	an	evil	which	
should	speedily	be	brought	to	an	end;		
(b)	in	affirming	that	the	subjection	of	peoples	to	alien	subjugation,	
domination	and	exploitation	constitutes	a	denial	of	fundamental	human	
rights,	is	contrary	to	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	is	an	
impediment	to	the	promotion	of	world	peace	and	co-operation;		
(c)	in	declaring	its	support	of	the	cause	of	freedom	and	independence	for	
all	such	peoples,	and		
(d)	in	calling	upon	the	powers	concerned	to	grant	freedom	and	
independence	to	such	peoples’	(Asian-African	Conference,	1955).	
	
What	we	see	in	the	outcome	of	the	Bandung	Conference	then	is	a	clear,	
unified	demand	for	decolonisation	in	every	sense	and	a	growing	scepticism	
with	the	United	Nations	and	the	institutionalised	privilege	of	the	world’s	
major	powers.	The	Final	Communiqué	shows	an	acknowledgement	of	the	
contradictions	inherent	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	which	
enshrines	the	principle	of	human	rights	whilst	allowing	the	continuation	of	
imperial	domination.	The	Bandung	Conference		
	
‘declared	its	full	support	to	the	principle	of	self-determination	of	peoples	
and	nations	as	set	forth	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	took	note	
of	the	United	Nations	resolutions	on	the	rights	of	peoples	and	nations	to	
self-determination,	which	is	a	pre-requisite	of	the	full	enjoyment	of	all	
fundamental	Human	Rights’	(Asian-African	Conference,	1955).		
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The	conference	was	therefore	using	the	contradictions	apparent	in	the	
rhetoric	and	practices	of	the	United	Nations	in	order	to	push	for	
independence	for	those	nations	still	under	colonial	rule.	This	consolidation	
of	anti-colonial	resistance	gained	strength	in	the	years	following	Bandung	
through	the	conflict	between	two	of	the	United	Nations’	major	players:	the	
United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union.		
	
The	Cold	War	provided	an	opportunity,	both	for	the	anti-colonial	
movement	and	for	the	two	superpowers.	The	struggle	against	colonialism	
within	the	United	Nations	had	become	a	major	issue	of	ideology	and	the	
Soviet	Union	quickly	realised	they	could	use	this	to	their	advantage,	
claiming	to	be	the	‘true	defenders’	of	freedom	amongst	those	major	
powers	that	continued	to	defend	colonial	rule	(Mazower,	2012:	249).	The	
anti-colonial	movement	therefore	found	itself	with	a	key	ally	in	the	form	of	
the	Soviet	Union,	who	sought	to	establish	influence	over	the	states	of	Asia-
Africa.	The	United	States	on	the	other	hand,	whilst	also	seeking	to	establish	
influence	and	harvest	support	during	the	Cold	War	era,	were	
disadvantaged	by	their	close	relationship	with	the	colonial	powers.	Despite	
their	known	anti-colonial	stance,	the	United	States	were	reluctant	to	
openly	confront	their	closest	allies	over	the	issue	of	colonialism	(Mazower,	
2012:	249).	As	the	major	powers	were	locked	in	conflict,	with	the	Security	
Council	being	rendered	almost	useless	due	to	the	extraordinary	use	of	veto	
during	decision	making,	much	of	this	played	out	in	the	General	Assembly.	
As	all	member	states	have	a	seat	in	the	General	Assembly,	this	became	the	
central	site	for	anti-colonial	resistance	by	the	newly	formed	Asia-Africa	
alliance,	bolstered	by	the	support	of	the	Soviet	Union.	This	period	
therefore	saw	the	General	Assembly	become	a	key	space	within	which	
newly	independent	states	were	able	to	push	decolonisation	onto	the	
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agenda,	confronting	and	challenging	the	power	of	their	former	colonisers	
(Patil,	2008:	40).	
	
In	addition	to	the	political	consequences	of	Bandung,	in	the	form	of	
addressing	decolonisation	within	the	United	Nations,	it	also	represented	a	
significant	moment	in	terms	of	non-Western	solidarity.	Indeed,	one	of	the	
key	agreements	of	the	conference	was	that	regardless	of	the	ideological	
divide	between	nations	within	the	context	of	the	Cold	War,	conflicting	
political	beliefs	or	ideologies	should	not	be	the	basis	for	excluding	nations	
from	international	forms	of	solidarity	(Acharya	and	Tan,	2008:	5).	Whilst	
nations	had	differing	positions	on	the	ideological	divide	characteristic	of	
the	Cold	War,	this	would	not	prevent	the	development	of	an	anti-colonial	
solidarity.	Bandung	signified	an	understanding	of	international	cooperation	
as	acceptance	of	diversity	and	an	agreement	to	overcome	ideological	
conflicts	in	the	interests	of	pursuing	rights	for	the	colonised	and	formerly	
colonised	(Acharya	and	Tan,	2008:	14).	Regardless	of	the	differing	political	
positions	of	those	in	attendance,	the	core	message	of	Bandung	was	anti-
colonialism.		
	
The	anti-colonial	resistance	to	the	United	Nations	that	had	taken	shape	
during	the	San	Francisco	conference	reached	its	peak	in	the	Bandung	
conference	of	1955.	The	failure	of	the	United	Nations	to	deal	with	
colonialism	and	to	formalise	a	commitment	to	independence	in	1945	
generated	an	intense	resistance	to	the	organisation	and	forged	an	alliance	
between	a	large	number	of	Asian	and	African	states.	The	Bandung	
conference,	alongside	meetings	that	followed,	had	provided	the	space	
within	which	the	Asia-Africa	alliance	could	prepare	the	demands	that	
became	associated	with	the	Third	World	Project,	which	included	a	
redistribution	of	global	resources,	a	fairer	global	labour	market	and	a	
recognition	of	the	contribution	of	Asia	and	Africa	to	developments	in	
 125 
technology	and	culture	(Prashad,	2007:	xvi).	It	was	the	beginning	of	a	
longer-term	project	that	sought	to	address	global	inequality,	beginning	
with	demands	for	full	independence	for	the	remaining	colonies	of	the	
world.	The	Third	World	alliance	was	eventually	given	its	opportunity	to	
push	decolonisation	onto	the	agenda	as	part	of	the	years	of	Cold	War	
conflict	that	threatened	to	render	the	United	Nations	irrelevant	and	
incompetent	as	a	result	of	the	prevention	of	action	by	the	United	States	
and	the	Soviet	Union.	Eventually,	this	anti-colonial	pressure	was	too	huge	
to	ignore	and	the	United	Nations	had	to	address	decolonisation.		
	
	
The	United	Nations	and	Decolonisation	
	
In	December	of	1960,	the	mounting	pressure	for	decolonisation	within	the	
United	Nations	resulted	in	the	Declaration	on	the	Granting	of	
Independence	to	Colonial	Countries	and	Peoples,	which	was	adopted	by	a	
resolution	in	the	General	Assembly.	The	Declaration	stated	that:	
	
‘1.	The	subjection	of	peoples	to	alien	subjugation,	domination	and	
exploitation	constitutes	a	denial	of	fundamental	human	rights,	is	contrary	
to	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	and	is	an	impediment	to	the	
promotion	of	world	peace	and	co-operation.	
2.	All	peoples	have	the	right	to	self-determination;	by	virtue	of	that	right	
they	freely	determine	their	political	status	and	freely	pursue	their	
economic,	social	and	cultural	development.	
3.	Inadequacy	of	political,	economic,	social	or	educational	preparedness	
should	never	serve	as	a	pretext	for	delaying	independence.	
4.	All	armed	action	or	repressive	measures	of	all	kinds	directed	against	
dependent	peoples	shall	cease	in	order	to	enable	them	to	exercise	
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peacefully	and	freely	their	right	to	complete	independence,	and	the	
integrity	of	their	national	territory	shall	be	respected.	
5.	Immediate	steps	shall	be	taken,	in	Trust	and	Non-Self-Governing	
Territories	or	all	other	territories	which	have	not	yet	attained	
independence,	to	transfer	all	powers	to	the	peoples	of	those	territories,	
without	any	conditions	or	reservations,	in	accordance	with	their	freely	
expressed	will	and	desire,	without	any	distinction	as	to	race,	creed	or	
colour,	in	order	to	enable	them	to	enjoy	complete	independence	and	
freedom.	
6.	Any	attempt	aimed	at	the	partial	or	total	disruption	of	the	national	unity	
and	the	territorial	integrity	of	a	country	is	incompatible	with	the	purposes	
and	principles	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.	
7.	All	States	shall	observe	faithfully	and	strictly	the	provisions	of	the	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations,	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	
and	the	present	Declaration	on	the	basis	of	equality,	non-interference	in	
the	internal	affairs	of	all	States,	and	respect	for	the	sovereign	rights	of	all	
peoples	and	their	territorial	integrity’	(United	Nations,	1960).	
	
In	words	not	dissimilar	to	those	used	in	the	Final	Communiqué	of	the	
Bandung	Conference,	this	declaration	signaled	an	acknowledgement	of	the	
contradictory	rhetoric	of	the	Charter.	This	declaration	was	unsurprising	
given	that	1960	had	seen	16	new	states	granted	independence	and	
membership	to	the	United	Nations,	meaning	the	Asia-Africa	bloc	had	46	
out	of	99	votes	in	the	General	Assembly	(Mazower,	2009:	185).	The	anti-
colonial	unity	within	the	General	Assembly	could	therefore	no	longer	be	
ignored.	Undoubtedly,	decolonisation	was	an	achievement	of	the	anti-
colonial	movement	that	had	grown	in	strength	since	the	end	of	the	First	
World	War	and	the	Paris	Peace	Conference.	However,	it	was	also	the	case	
that	the	leading	powers	of	the	United	Nations	began	to	see	that	
decolonisation	would	be	key	for	the	continued	existence	of	an	
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international	institution	that	legitimised	their	considerable	global	
influence.	This	new	majority	in	the	General	Assembly	was	one	that	the	
major	powers	needed	to	keep	on	side	if	they	wanted	the	United	Nations	to	
continue	to	exist	and	so	the	process	of	decolonisation	was	inevitable	
(MacQueen,	2011:	31).			
	
The	anti-colonial	unity	between	African	and	Asian	states	formed	at	
Bandung	has	continued	in	the	years	after	formal	decolonisation	in	the	form	
of	the	Non-Aligned	Movement	(NAM)	and	the	Group	of	77.	Although	the	
original	aim	of	these	assemblages	has	been	met	through	the	formal	
process	of	decolonisation	and	as	such	their	unity	is	not	so	heavily	required	
after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	they	continue	to	exist	in	a	diluted	form	to	
provide	a	space	within	which	Asian,	African	and	Latin	American	leaders	can	
meet	to	discuss	their	joint	interests	and	to	agree	upon	strategies	to	push	
for	these	interests	within	the	United	Nations	(Lee,	2010).	The	Group	of	77	
in	particular	focuses	on	promoting	‘South-South’	strategies	for	
development	and	in	fact	has	now	expanded	from	its	original	77	members	
to	include	134	states	(Group	of	77,	2016).	In	spite	of	the	end	of	formal	
colonialism,	these	states	continue	to	provide	some	form	of	resistance	to	
the	domination	of	colonial	powers	in	new	forms.	Their	existence	outside	of	
the	United	Nations	signifies	a	continued	mistrust	of	the	major	powers	and	
a	resistance	to	the	neocolonial	forms	of	domination	and	exploitation	
facilitated	by	the	United	Nations	and	its	structure.		
	
Conclusion	
	
This	alternative	narrative	presented	here	provides	a	challenge	to	the	
conceptualisation	of	decolonisation	as	a	successful	product	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	international	institution.	It	represents	a	challenge	to	the	
United	Nations’	proud	claim	that	‘in	a	vast	political	reshaping	of	the	world,	
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more	than	80	former	colonies	comprising	some	750	million	people	have	
gained	independence	since	the	creation	of	the	United	Nations’	(United	
Nations,	2016).	Rather,	it	has	argued	that	decolonisation	was	the	result	of	
sustained	anti-colonial	resistance	throughout	the	twentieth	century.	
Where	the	standard	historical	narratives	fail	to	acknowledge	the	existence	
of	anti-colonial	resistance	in	the	founding	stages	of	the	United	Nations,	this	
chapter	has	re-narrated	this	history	in	order	to	establish	the	systematic	
way	in	which	colonialism	has	been	silenced,	both	at	the	time	of	the	
organisation’s	founding	and	throughout	standard	accounts	of	its	history.	
The	use	of	archival	documents	throughout	this	chapter	contributes	to	a	de-
silencing	of	these	anti-colonial	histories,	both	at	San	Francisco	and	at	
Bandung.	The	documents	quoted	reveal	the	extent	to	which	resistance	to	
colonialism	was	silenced	and	not	deemed	significant	for	the	establishment	
of	an	international	organisation,	which	in	turn	reveals	the	extent	to	which	
the	United	Nations	was	never	intended	to	be	a	universal	organisation,	but	
rather	was	a	product	of	empire	and	an	institution	that	sought	to	maintain	
the	power	relations	of	empire	(Mazower,	2009).	In	this	thesis,	the	use	of	
archival	data	represents	an	understanding	of	the	power	of	archives	to	de-
silence	those	groups	that	have	been	‘disenfranchised	by	the	dominant	
regimes	of	truth’	(Burton,	2005:	2).	These	documents	show	that	the	United	
Nations	was	subject	to	anti-colonial	resistance	both	prior	to	its	
establishment	and	in	the	years	that	followed,	but	that	this	anti-colonial	
resistance	was	both	dismissed	and	silenced	at	the	time	and	has	been	
dismissed	and	silenced	in	the	standard	historical	narrative	of	the	
institution.	The	archival	data	paints	a	disturbing	picture	in	terms	of	the	
number	of	anti-colonial	groups	that	have	had	their	voices	silenced.		
	
Starting	with	the	anti-colonial	resistance	aimed	at	the	League	of	Nations	
and	travelling	through	history	up	until	the	present	day	with	the	Group	of	
77	and	the	Non-Aligned	Movement,	this	chapter	has	emphasised	this	
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history	of	resistance	in	order	to	show	the	power	afforded	to	particular	
states	in	the	construction	of	the	United	Nations	through	their	very	ability	
to	silence	it.	It	has	illustrated	the	degree	to	which	the	major	powers	in	the	
United	Nations	are	able	to	ensure	that	the	United	Nations	is	always	an	
organisation	that	seeks	to	promote	their	interests	and	to	defend	their	
position,	in	this	case	in	terms	of	claiming	responsibility	for	the	process	of	
decolonisation	after	a	general	acceptance	that	colonialism	was	no	longer	
an	appropriate	way	of	ordering	relations	between	nations.	This	chapter	has	
endeavoured	to	contend	that	to	continue	to	silence	these	histories	of	
resistance	through	an	inaccurate	narrative	of	the	history	of	the	United	
Nations	is	a	form	of	complicity	in	the	imperial	domination	that	these	
organisations	perpetuate.					
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Chapter	5:	Sovereign	(In)Equality	
	
‘The	contradiction	was	that	even	while	the	West	asserted	that	colonialism	
was	a	thing	of	the	past,	it	nevertheless	relied	precisely	on	those	
relationships	of	power	and	inequality	that	had	been	created	by	that	
colonial	past	to	maintain	its	economic	and	political	superiority	which	it	
then	attempted	to	entrench	through	an	ostensibly	neutral	international	
law'	(Anghie,	2005:	216).	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	previous	four	chapters	have	established	the	theoretical	and	
methodological	framework	within	which	the	rest	of	this	thesis	is	located.	
The	purpose	of	the	next	three	chapters	is	to	explore	this	theoretical	
approach	in	relation	to	particular	aspects	of	the	United	Nations.	This	will	
begin	here	in	Chapter	5	with	an	examination	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty	
and	the	way	in	which	it	features	in	the	grounding	principles	of	the	United	
Nations	and	earlier	international	organisations.	The	argument	of	this	
chapter	in	particular,	following	on	from	the	claims	introduced	in	Chapter	2,	
is	that	sovereignty	features	as	a	grounding	principle	in	international	
institutions	such	as	the	League	of	Nations	and	the	United	Nations	but	that	
sovereignty	is	itself	a	concept	with	a	particular	history	and	with	power	
relations	built	into	it.	Building	upon	the	claims	of	Part	One	of	the	thesis,	
this	chapter	will	argue	that	international	institutions	have	used	the	concept	
of	sovereignty	as	a	means	of	justifying	and	legitimating	unequal	power	
relations	that	were	initially	established	through	the	colonial	encounter	
(Anghie,	2001).	Sovereignty	in	this	sense	is	a	key	concept	in	understanding	
the	ways	in	which	the	United	Nations	is	both	built	upon	and	perpetuates	
colonial	power	relations,	which	is	the	broad	focus	of	the	thesis.	
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The	chapter	will	begin	by	looking	at	how	sovereignty	featured	within	the	
League	of	Nations,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	mandate	system	and	how	
the	League	dealt	with	the	administration	of	colonial	territories,	following	
on	from	the	approach	established	in	earlier	chapters	based	on	Mazower’s	
understanding	of	the	United	Nations	as	‘evolution	not	revolution’	(2009:	
17).	In	order	to	understand	the	use	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty	within	
the	United	Nations,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	its	place	in	the	League	of	
Nations,	particularly	with	regards	to	the	supervision	of	colonial	territories.		
	
However,	as	the	League’s	approach	to	sovereignty	formed	the	basis	of	
significant	criticism	of	the	League	of	Nations,	the	second	section	of	the	
chapter	will	move	on	to	look	at	the	distinction	between	the	two	concepts	
of	‘sovereignty’	and	‘sovereign	equality’	that	was	introduced	in	the	
founding	of	the	United	Nations	and	its	significance	for	the	legitimation	of	
the	continuation	of	colonial	power	relations.	Finally,	the	chapter	will	
explore	the	issue	of	trusteeship	within	the	United	Nations	and	how	this	
was	dealt	with	at	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	International	
Organisation	in	San	Francisco,	in	order	to	claim	that	the	system	of	
trusteeship	established	by	the	United	Nations	sits	in	contradiction	to	its	
claims	to	a	commitment	to	sovereign	equality	and	to	equality	more	
broadly.		
	
The	argument	being	developed	throughout	this	chapter	is	based	on	
Anghie’s	assertion	that	the	concept	of	sovereignty	was	generated	by	the	
colonial	encounter	and	the	need	to	assert	the	dominance	of	one	nation	
over	another,	and	that	as	such,	the	sovereignty	granted	to	former	colonies	
will	always	be	distinctive	in	relation	to	the	sovereignty	of	European	nations	
(2005:	6).	Following	this	line	of	argument,	this	chapter	will	examine	the	
concept	of	‘sovereign	equality’	that	was	considered	a	core	principle	for	the	
establishment	of	the	United	Nations,	arguing	that	this	concept	is	inherently	
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contradictory	and	serves	to	legitimate	a	global	order	that	was	established	
through	the	process	of	colonial	domination.		
	
	
Sovereignty	in	the	League	of	Nations	
	
‘The	high	contracting	parties,	
In	order	to	promote	international	co-operation	and	to	achieve	
international	peace	and	security	
by	the	acceptance	of	obligations	not	to	resort	to	war,	
by	the	prescription	of	open,	just	and	honourable	relations	between	
nations,	
by	the	firm	establishment	of	the	understandings	of	international	law	as	the	
actual	rule	of	conduct	among	Governments,	and	
by	the	maintenance	of	justice	and	a	scrupulous	respect	for	all	treaty	
obligations	in	the	dealings	of	organised	peoples	with	one	another,	
Agree	to	this	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	
	
As	previously	detailed,	the	League	of	Nations	was	established	in	1920	
following	the	meeting	of	the	allied	victors	of	the	First	World	War	at	the	
Paris	Peace	Conference	in	1919.	As	this	introductory	paragraph	to	the	
Covenant	suggests,	the	League	was	set	up	with	the	aim	of	providing	
collective	security	at	the	international	level	in	order	to	prevent	an	outbreak	
of	conflict	on	a	similar	scale	in	the	future	(MacQueen,	2011:	6).	The	44	
states	that	signed	the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations	on	28th	June	1919	
hoped	that	the	creation	of	an	international	institution	would	see	the	
abolition	of	war	and	healthier	methods	of	conflict	resolution	in	the	future.	
Where	previously,	individual	governments	had	made	alliances	between	
themselves,	the	League	of	Nations	was	an	attempt	at	a	much	larger	
international	alliance	which	would	attempt	to	police	the	use	of	force	by	the	
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world’s	greatest	military	powers.	The	outbreak	of	the	First	World	War	had	
demonstrated	that	these	traditional	alliances	could	not	be	relied	upon	to	
keep	the	peace,	and	so	the	League	of	Nations	was	established	as	an	
international	coalition	of	states	(Birn,	1981:	6).		
	
The	concept	of	sovereignty	was	fundamental	to	the	League	of	Nations	as	
an	international	system	of	governance.	Like	the	United	Nations	after	it,	the	
League	of	Nations	signified	a	cooperation	of	independent	states,	which	
ultimately	rested	on	the	belief	of	the	sovereignty	of	each	individual	state	
(Mazower,	2009:	150).	Whilst	the	League	of	Nations	was	a	collective,	it	was	
not	designed	to	diminish	the	right	of	each	individual	state	to	rule	over	its	
own	territories.	Sovereignty	in	this	context	is	therefore	understood	in	
terms	of	what	Moses	terms	‘de	facto	sovereignty’	(2014:	27).	De	facto	
sovereignty	refers	to	an	understanding	of	sovereignty	as	the	right	of	states	
to	make	final	decisions	regarding	their	territories	and	not	to	be	governed	
by	the	rules	of	other	states	within	international	organisations	(Moses,	
2014:	27).	The	League	of	Nations	represented	an	agreement	that	states	
would	co-operate	in	order	to	attempt	to	prevent	another	world	war,	but	
the	definition	of	sovereignty	in	this	context	meant	that	individual	states	
ultimately	retained	the	power	to	make	their	own	decisions,	rather	than	
being	made	accountable	to	the	rules	of	behaviour	that	governed	other	
states.	Rather	than	creating	a	world	government,	the	League	of	Nations	
was	more	of	an	agreement	between	individual	states	to	respect	the	
sovereignty	of	one	another	and	as	such	to	not	act	aggressively	towards	one	
another.		
	
In	line	with	this,	it	was	generally	understood	that	each	national	
government	should	retain	control	over	their	military	forces.	In	spite	of	
Article	8	of	the	Covenant	requesting	that	national	armaments	be	reduced	
to	‘the	lowest	point	consistent	with	national	safety’	and	a	requirement	that	
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members	exchange	‘full	and	frank	information	as	to	the	scale	of	their	
armaments’,	these	military	forces	remained	under	national	control	(League	
of	Nations,	1919).	There	was	no	obligation	for	states	to	surrender	their	
military	forces	for	the	greater	good	and	any	decision	to	participate	in	
collective	military	action	remained	the	decision	of	the	individual	state.	
Sovereignty	in	this	context	then,	was	the	right	of	each	nation	to	maintain	
control,	both	in	terms	of	their	military	forces	and	their	ability	to	make	their	
own	decisions	regarding	responses	to	acts	of	aggression	and	international	
conflict.	However,	sovereignty	was	also	a	key	concern	in	relation	to	
colonial	territories	and	those	territories	liberated	from	the	defeated	
powers	of	the	First	World	War.		
	
As	seen	in	Chapter	1,	the	League	of	Nations	established	the	mandate	
system	in	order	to	manage	those	territories	that	had	belonged	to	the	
defeated	parties	of	the	First	World	War.	The	aim	of	this	system	was	in	
theory	to	provide	some	level	of	accountability	on	the	part	of	the	victorious	
powers	so	that	the	mandated	territories	were	not	simply	subsumed	into	
existing	empires.	In	principle,	mandatory	administration	was	intended	to	
make	imperial	rule	a	project	of	development	in	order	to	prepare	territories	
for	self-government,	however	in	reality,	it	failed	to	do	so	(Pedersen,	2015:	
4).	The	concept	of	sovereignty	was	key	to	the	League’s	approach	to	
mandated	territories	and	caused	a	significant	level	of	dispute	between	its	
members.	The	mandate	system	claimed	to	be	acting	to	prevent	conquering	
powers	from	gaining	full	sovereignty	and	hence	full	control	of	the	
mandated	territory	and	its	military	forces.	However,	it	was	not	made	clear	
to	whom	this	sovereignty	belonged	either	in	the	Covenant	or	in	later	
discussions	(Pedersen,	2015:	204).	The	mandated	territories	were	certainly	
not	considered	sovereign,	but	neither	could	they	be	allowed	to	be	seen	as	
being	transferred	from	the	hands	of	one	imperial	master	to	another.	The	
result	was	that	neither	the	mandated	territory	nor	the	mandatory	power	
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was	considered	to	have	sovereignty	over	the	territory	and	as	such,	
sovereignty	was	simply	absent	from	these	spaces	altogether	(Pedersen,	
2015:	232).		
	
However,	in	the	absence	of	sovereignty	being	granted	to	the	mandatory	
power,	sovereignty	could	not	be	denied	to	these	territories	forever.	What	
the	mandate	system	attempted	to	establish	was	that	these	territories	were	
working	towards	self-government,	with	Article	22	of	the	Covenant	referring	
to	‘peoples	not	yet	able	to	stand	by	themselves’	(League	of	Nations,	1919,	
emphasis	added).	In	theory,	the	mandated	territory	would	be	recognised	
as	sovereign	and	cease	to	be	governed	by	an	imperial	power	directly	and	
the	League	of	Nations	indirectly	once	it	was	considered	‘civilised’.	However	
in	reality,	the	mandatory	power	decided	the	moment	at	which	the	
mandated	territory	had	achieved	a	sufficient	level	of	civilisation	that	
independence	was	appropriate	(Grant,	2007:	89).	Although	the	mandate	
system	claimed	to	be	a	process	of	granting	sovereignty	to	the	territories	
that	had	formerly	belonged	to	the	empires	of	the	defeated	parties	of	the	
First	World	War,	in	actuality,	it	formed	part	of	a	process	of	imperial	
legitimation.	By	granting	imperial	powers	the	responsibility	of	overseeing	
the	development	of	these	territories	into	civilised	sovereign	states,	the	
mandate	system	justified	imperial	rule	as	a	system	of	domination.	It	
allowed	the	sovereignty	of	colonial	territories	to	be	determined	by	imperial	
powers.		
	
The	mandate	system	reinforced	those	ideas	about	development	and	
civilisation	that	justified	the	colonial	project.	By	understanding	colonial	
territories	as	existing	in	an	earlier	stage	of	development	than	imperial	
powers,	it	was	possible	to	justify	both	colonialism	and	the	mandate	system	
as	projects	of	tutelage	and	development.	The	League	of	Nations	embraced	
the	already	established	colonial	discourse	of	civilisation	that	allowed	
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countries	to	be	ranked	in	terms	of	their	adherence	to	European	cultural	
values,	defining	the	mandate	system	as	a	relationship	between	the	civilised	
and	the	uncivilised	(Grant,	2007:	80).	Cultural	difference	within	the	
mandate	system	was	therefore	viewed	as	a	distinction	between	backwards	
and	advanced	nations,	with	those	nations	categorised	as	advanced	bearing	
the	responsibility	to	teach	the	people	of	backwards	territories	how	to	
advanced	(Anghie,	2001:	621).	The	League	of	Nations,	through	the	
mandate	system,	reinforced	those	problematic	ideas	about	difference	and	
civilisation	that	justified	the	colonial	project	from	its	outset.	It	reinforced	
the	notion	of	a	cultural	hierarchy	with	European	culture	at	its	peak,	and	the	
concept	of	sovereignty	was	intricately	bound	up	in	the	maintenance	of	this	
discourse.		
	
As	Anghie	(2001)	argues,	the	significance	of	sovereignty	within	this	
framework	has	two	key	aspects.	Firstly,	that	sovereignty	became	the	
promised	reward	for	territories	that	exhibited	desirable	behaviour	and	the	
mandate	system	encouraged	this	with	the	support	of	the	discourse	of	
civilisation	(Anghie,	2001:	617).	The	mandate	system	was	presented	as	a	
process	of	development	that	would	allow	those	territories	that	were	not	
deemed	ready	for	self-government	to	be	supervised	by	nations	at	the	
height	of	civilisation	in	order	that	the	whole	world	would	be	a	better	place.	
As	such,	sovereignty	was	used	as	the	ultimate	reward	for	territories	that	
showed	their	ability	to	be	a	part	of	a	global	civilised	society	through	
adherence	to	European	cultural	values.	Secondly	however,	Anghie	argues	
that	the	sovereignty	that	would	be	granted	to	non-European	territories	
within	the	League	of	Nations	framework	was	distinctive	by	virtue	of	it	
having	to	be	granted,	rather	than	being	inherent	as	it	was	for	European	
nations;	this	system	established	European	sovereignty	and	non-European	
sovereignty	as	two	distinct	categories	(2001:	520).	The	mandate	system	
therefore	used	the	concept	of	sovereignty	as	an	incentive	for	the	people	of	
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mandated	territories	to	behave	in	particular	ways,	without	acknowledging	
that	the	sovereignty	that	would	be	granted	to	them	would	never	be	
equivalent	to	the	sovereignty	held	by	European	nations.	The	fact	that	the	
imperial	authorities	had	the	power	to	decide	when	mandates	had	reached	
the	point	at	which	sovereignty	could	or	should	be	granted	clearly	shows	
that	the	right	to	govern	associated	with	mandates	and	mandatory	powers	
was	distinct.	The	significance	of	the	idea	of	sovereignty	within	the	League	
of	Nations	therefore	is	that	it	enabled	the	development	of	new	systems	of	
control	that	were	informed	by	imperial	discourse.		
	
It	is	clear	then	that	sovereignty	was	a	key	concept	within	the	League	of	
Nations	as	an	international	institution.	It	formed	the	basis	of	the	
relationship	between	member	states	in	terms	of	their	right	to	make	final	
decisions	and	to	rule	their	territories,	which	Moses	terms	‘de	facto	
sovereignty’	(2014:	27).	Sovereignty	in	this	context	represented	the	idea	
that	despite	the	League	of	Nations	signifying	an	agreement	to	engage	in	
collective	security,	members	retained	ultimate	authority	over	their	level	of	
involvement	and	collective	security	amounted	to	a	commitment	to	respect	
the	sovereignty	of	other	states	by	resisting	acts	of	military	aggression.	This	
desire	to	maintain	national	sovereignty	was	therefore	fundamental	for	
those	states	signing	the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	Nations,	which	was	the	
first	real	attempt	at	an	international	cooperation	of	states	as	opposed	to	
individual	partnerships	between	states	(Schlesinger,	2003:	17).		
	
However,	sovereignty	was	also	a	key	feature	in	the	relationship	between	
member	states	and	non-member	states,	particularly	the	existing	colonies	
that	belonged	to	imperial	member	states	and	the	colonies	that	had	
belonged	to	the	defeated	nations	of	the	First	World	War.	In	this	context,	
the	mandate	system	saw	sovereignty	function	as	a	prospective	reward	for	
territories	deemed	too	uncivilised	to	govern	themselves,	which	allowed	for	
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the	perpetuation	of	imperial	control	under	the	guise	of	development	
(Anghie,	2001:	608).	Whilst	sovereignty	was	automatically	assumed	for	
member	states	of	the	League,	it	had	to	be	granted	to	these	mandated	
territories	and	became	a	justification	for	a	relationship	of	dominance	and	
control.	Sovereignty	was	key	to	the	organisation	of	the	world	that	was	
reinforced	through	the	League.			
	
The	outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War	however	resulted	in	the	League’s	
system	of	international	organisation	being	deemed	a	failure	and	calls	for	a	
new	way	in	which	to	deal	with	an	increasingly	global	world.	The	notion	of	
sovereignty	and	respect	for	the	sovereignty	of	individual	states	that	had	
been	written	into	the	organisation	of	the	League	of	Nations	was	no	longer	
considered	sufficient	in	dealing	with	potential	acts	of	aggression	by	the	
major	military	powers	and	so	a	new	way	of	organising	the	world	was	
required	(MacQueen,	2011:	13)	Keen	to	distance	itself	from	the	negativity	
surrounding	the	imperialism	of	the	League,	the	United	Nations	began	
discussing	international	organisation	not	in	terms	of	sovereignty,	but	in	
terms	of	sovereign	equality.		
	
	
The	United	Nations	and	the	Move	Towards	Sovereign	Equality	
	
The	United	Nations	wished	to	frame	itself	as	a	new	organisation	aiming	to	
address	the	failures	of	the	League	of	Nations,	which	had	been	universally	
proclaimed	a	failure.	As	a	significant	amount	of	criticism	had	been	levelled	
at	the	League	for	being	exclusive	and	for	protecting	the	rights	of	individual	
states	too	much,	the	United	Nations	sought	to	promote	itself	as	a	universal	
institution	with	the	potential	for	global	membership.	In	doing	so,	it	had	to	
appear	to	be	inclusive	and	based	on	a	commitment	to	equality	and	equal	
representation.	Where	the	League	had	been	criticised	for	its	respect	for	
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the	national	sovereignty	of	its	exclusive	members,	the	United	Nations	
began	with	a	commitment	to	equality	in	terms	of	the	sovereignty	of	its	
much	broader	membership	(MacQueen,	2011:	13).	However,	this	rhetoric	
of	sovereign	equality	that	we	see	in	the	formation	of	the	United	Nations	
fails	to	acknowledge	the	colonial	origins	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty.	
Furthermore,	the	privileging	of	the	sovereignty	of	certain	nations	over	and	
above	that	of	other	nations	and	the	United	Nations’	continuation	of	the	
power	structures	established	by	the	League	render	claims	to	‘equality’	
both	problematic	and	misleading.			
	
In	contrast	to	the	League	of	Nations,	the	United	Nations	wished	to	avoid	
the	sense	of	inefficiency	in	decision	making	associated	with	the	protection	
of	national	sovereignty	and	the	control	retained	by	individual	
governments.	Instead,	it	was	promoted	as	allowing	for	the	possibility	of	
effective	collective	action	where	required,	whilst	retaining	the	‘purity’	of	
national	sovereignty	(Schlesinger,	2003:	17).	Governments	would	still	be	
considered	sovereign,	but	there	was	a	greater	sense	of	international	
responsibility	attached	to	the	United	Nations.	The	structure	of	the	United	
Nations	also	contributed	to	this	more	efficient	process	of	decision	making,	
but	we	will	return	to	examine	this	in	Chapter	6.	The	aim	of	the	United	
Nations	was	to	create	an	institution	that	could	deal	with	problems	of	
international	conflict	and	security	through	collective	decision	making,	
rather	than	leaving	decisions	around	intervention	and	military	aggression	
at	the	hands	of	individual	governments	as	had	been	seen	in	the	League.	
Indeed,	there	was	a	strong	awareness	of	the	need	to	avoid	the	faults	of	the	
League	in	the	founding	of	a	new	organisation	if	it	was	to	be	successful	
(Archer,	1992:	24).	In	order	to	address	this,	the	focus	of	the	United	Nations	
became	less	an	issue	of	protecting	national	sovereignty	and	more	an	issue	
of	promoting	and	respecting	sovereign	equality.	However,	as	this	section	
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will	show,	the	sovereignty	afforded	to	member	states	was	not	always	as	
equal	as	it	was	claimed.			
	
The	preamble	to	the	Charter	is	the	first	reference	to	equality	within	the	
United	Nations	as	an	international	body,	affirming	‘…the	equal	rights	of	all	
men	and	women	and	of	nations	large	and	small…’	(United	Nations,	
1945:2).	This	definition	was	much	the	same	within	the	context	of	the	
League	of	Nations,	but	as	the	Charter	progresses,	the	significant	difference	
is	the	focus	not	just	on	sovereignty	but	sovereign	equality.	Article	2	of	the	
United	Nations	Charter	asserts	this	explicitly,	stating	that	‘the	Organization	
is	based	on	the	principle	of	the	sovereign	equality	of	all	its	Members’	and	
also	emphasising	the	obligations	of	the	charter	as	applicable	to	‘all	
members’	(United	Nations,	1945:	3).	The	United	Nations	was	in	much	the	
same	way	as	its	predecessor	a	cooperative	body	of	independently	existing	
sovereign	states,	however	their	fundamental	equality	was	in	this	case	
explicitly	stipulated	in	the	language	of	the	governing	documents,	where	it	
had	been	rather	more	implicit	in	the	League	of	Nations	(Mazower,	2009:	
149).	It	would	seem	then,	that	the	United	Nations	as	an	international	body	
was	trying	in	theory	to	avoid	affording	individual	governments	the	power	
to	dominate	international	relations.	However,	it	becomes	difficult	not	to	be	
sceptical	of	these	claims	once	the	structure	of	the	organisation	is	examined	
in	more	detail.	Indeed	at	this	point,	it	would	seem	that	the	initial	claims	to	
equality	are	present	in	order	to	disguise	the	incredibly	unequal	power	
relations	built	into	the	institution.		
	
Patil	(2008)	argues	that	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	is	ultimately	an	
expression	of	the	sovereignty	of	the	Western	powers,	formalising	their	
rights	as	sovereign	nations	over	the	rights	of	colonies	and	dependent	
territories	who	are	not	included	in	this	claim	to	equality	as	a	result	of	not	
being	considered	sovereign.	The	emphasis	of	the	charter	not	on	equality	
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per	se	but	on	sovereign	equality	works	to	exclude	those	territories	and	
peoples	not	yet	considered	sovereign	by	the	international	community,	i.e.	
existing	colonies	and	territories	held	under	the	League	of	Nations	mandate	
system,	which	would	soon	transform	into	the	trusteeship	system	of	the	
United	Nations.	As	such,	the	claims	to	equality	made	in	the	Charter	are	
somewhat	misleading	as	they	only	apply	to	those	nations	already	
considered	sovereign.	This	creates	a	hierarchy	within	the	international	
community	whereby	the	rights	of	existing	sovereign	(imperial)	states	are	
enshrined	in	the	Charter	as	a	fundamental	principle,	making	the	prospect	
of	decolonisation	problematic	(Patil,	2008:	44).	The	sovereignty	of	the	
initial	member	states	of	the	United	Nations	is	written	into	the	Charter	as	its	
primary	principle,	meaning	that	the	rights	of	colonies	and	other	non-self-
governing	territories	will	always	be	secondary	to	the	right	of	sovereign	
states	to	govern	those	territories.	This	framework	is	clearly	a	problematic	
starting	point	for	the	process	of	decolonisation.		
	
The	United	Nations	claims	that	since	its	establishment	in	1945	‘more	than	
80	former	colonies	have	gained	their	independence’	(United	Nations,	
2016).	The	United	Nations	is	frequently	praised	for	leading	colonies	to	
independence,	with	Baehr	and	Gordenker	stating	that	‘most	of	the	present	
UN	members	are	former	colonies	that	gained	political	independence	
through	direct	or	indirect	involvement	with	the	United	Nations’	(2005:	
114).	Whilst	it	is	undeniable	that	decolonisation	gained	momentum	
following	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations,	to	attribute	this	to	the	
United	Nations	itself	is	deceptive.	Chapter	4	detailed	an	alternative	
narrative	that	emphasised	the	intense	work	of	the	anti-colonial	movement	
in	pushing	for	decolonisation	and	the	recognition	of	this	narrative	
challenges	the	notion	that	the	United	Nations	as	an	organisation	was	
responsible	for	achieving	independence	for	colonies	and	dependent	
territories.	However	for	the	purposes	of	the	discussion	here,	the	more	
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significant	point	is	that	although	a	large	number	of	countries	have	gained	
independence	since	1945,	the	sovereignty	that	is	granted	to	them	is	not	
equal	to	the	sovereignty	of	the	initial	member	states	of	the	United	Nations.	
As	Anghie	argues,	international	law	and	its	associated	institutions	were	
responsible	for	the	creation	of	two	different	forms	of	sovereignty:	
European	and	non-European	(2001:	520).	The	sovereignty	granted	to	
former	colonies	and	dependent	territories	through	United	Nations	
decolonisation	would	never	be	equivalent	to	the	inherent	sovereignty	of	
Western	nations	that	was	enshrined	in	the	principles	of	the	Charter.	The	
very	fact	that	one	form	of	sovereignty	is	natural	and	the	other	must	be	
granted	-	based	on	an	adherence	to	European	ideas	of	civilisation	-	surely	
makes	the	idea	of	sovereign	equality	for	these	nations	impossible.		
	
As	Pahuja	argues,	the	discourse	of	development	that	was	so	central	to	the	
development	of	both	these	international	organisations	does	the	work	of	
reconciling	the	contradictions	between	the	commitment	to	sovereign	
equality	and	the	fact	that	certain	nations	remain	under	imperial	control,	
allowing	the	United	Nations	to	exist	as	an	institution	committed	to	
universality	whilst	also	emphasising	Western	values	as	exemplary	(2011:	
46).	The	standard	narrative	of	development	and	progress	allows	the	idea	of	
sovereign	equality	to	exist	without	meaning	actual	equality	for	all	nations,	
through	the	categorisation	of	colonies	and	dependent	territories	as	
existing	in	an	earlier	stage	of	development	and	by	holding	sovereignty	and	
sovereign	equality	as	the	ultimate	end	goal.	This	is	an	example	of	what	
Bhabha	(1994)	terms	a	‘time-lag’	of	cultural	difference,	whereby	nations	
that	do	not	conform	to	European	cultural	values	are	framed	as	existing	in	
an	earlier	period	of	history,	whilst	always	being	on	the	path	of	progress.	
However,	this	narrative	of	development	fails	to	recognise	that	the	
sovereignty	granted	through	decolonisation	is	in	a	secondary	form,	not	
equivalent.	No	matter	how	long	these	former	colonies	travel	on	the	road	to	
 144 
progress,	they	will	never	reach	the	prize	of	sovereignty	that	is	equivalent	to	
the	sovereignty	inherently	characteristic	of	their	imperial	masters.			
	
To	view	sovereign	equality	within	the	United	Nations	in	the	way	suggested	
here	reiterates	the	colonial	foundations	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty,	
whereby	sovereignty	is	used	to	legitimate	a	global	hierarchy	of	power.	As	
discussed	in	the	previous	section	in	relation	to	sovereignty	within	the	
League	of	Nations,	Anghie	argues	that	the	discourse	of	sovereignty	was	
born	out	of	the	colonial	encounter	as	a	way	of	establishing	the	inferior	
nature	of	non-European	territories	in	order	to	justify	colonial	occupation	
(2014:	130).	The	concept	itself	is	intrinsically	colonial	as	its	initial	function	
was	to	justify	imperial	rule.	To	continue	to	use	the	concept	of	sovereignty	
as	a	way	of	understanding	the	place	of	different	territories	within	the	
international	community	is	therefore	a	form	of	postcolonial	power.	In	spite	
of	formal	decolonisation,	the	idea	of	sovereignty	is	bound	up	in	its	colonial	
history	and	can	never	be	a	neutral	status,	nor	can	it	ever	apply	to	all	
territories	equally.	An	international	system	of	governance	based	on	the	
sovereignty	of	states	will	always	be	a	European	system	of	governance	
(Archer,	1992:	27).	The	fact	that	the	United	Nations	emphasised	
sovereignty	as	the	primary	principle	of	relations	between	states	is	further	
evidence	that	it	was	not	a	revolutionary	institution,	and	as	argued	
throughout	the	first	half	of	this	thesis,	in	spite	of	the	decolonisation	seen	
since	the	beginning	of	the	United	Nations,	it	is	ultimately	a	product	of	
empire	(Mazower,	2009:	17).	This	chapter	argues	that	the	concept	of	
sovereignty	and	the	discourse	of	sovereign	equality	has	been	key	to	both	
maintaining	forms	of	colonial	power	and	to	disguising	them.		
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Sovereign	Inequality	and	United	Nations	Trusteeship	
	
As	has	been	made	clear,	the	United	Nations	presented	itself	as	an	
institution	that	was	attempting	to	deal	with	the	perceived	failures	of	the	
League	of	Nations	in	order	to	create	a	more	effective	system	of	collective	
security	through	the	notion	of	sovereign	equality.	Where	the	League	had	
been	criticised	for	its	exclusivity	and	the	dominance	of	the	colonial	powers	
in	international	security,	the	United	Nations	aimed	to	position	itself	as	a	
universal	organisation	that	recognised	the	sovereignty	and	equality	of	all	
nations.	However,	in	addition	to	the	ways	in	which	the	concept	of	
sovereignty	itself	can	be	criticised	from	the	perspective	of	its	colonial	
origins,	the	United	Nations’	formal	commitment	to	sovereign	equality	is	
undermined	when	we	examine	the	systems	designed	to	deal	with	the	
management	of	colonial	territories	and	how	they	were	developed.	These	
systems	can	be	understood	as	neocolonial	technologies	of	power,	which	
are	strategies	of	control	designed	to	replace	colonial	practices	as	the	key	
instruments	of	imperialism	in	the	face	of	decolonisation	and	independence	
(Nkrumah,	1965:	ix).	As	has	already	been	suggested,	the	trusteeship	
system	of	the	United	Nations	was	little	more	than	a	re-branding	of	the	
League	of	Nations	mandate	system,	and	as	such	saw	the	continuation	of	
associated	forms	of	colonial	power	and	domination.	The	trusteeship	
system	signifies	yet	another	way	in	which	the	United	Nations	was	the	
product	of	evolution	from	the	League,	not	a	revolutionary	approach	to	
international	politics	(Mazower,	2009:	17).	
	
As	detailed	in	Chapter	1,	Article	22	of	the	Covenant	of	the	League	of	
Nations	established	former	colonial	possessions	of	the	defeated	parties	of	
the	First	World	War	as	mandate	territories	to	be	supervised	by	imperial	
powers.	These	territories	were	categorised	based	on	the	degree	to	which	
they	were	deemed	‘able	to	stand	by	themselves’	(League	of	Nations,	1919).	
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As	has	also	been	previously	highlighted,	many	of	the	ideologies	and	
structures	present	in	the	League	of	Nations	were	modified	and	re-branded	
for	their	inclusion	in	the	United	Nations.	The	dissolution	of	the	League	of	
Nations	meant	the	end	of	the	mandate	system	and	thus	an	opening	for	a	
different	approach	to	negotiating	the	colonial	relationship.	However,	even	
in	the	face	of	public	pressure	around	decolonisation,	the	United	Nations	
did	little	to	encourage	independence	for	those	territories	that	had	been	
subject	to	subordination	by	the	mandate	system	(Sherwood,	1996:	90).	
Rather,	they	were	to	be	transferred	to	a	re-branded	Mandate	System	in	
the	form	of	the	United	Nations	trusteeship	system,	with	Article	77	of	the	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations	detailing	the	territories	that	should	be	dealt	
with	under	this	new	system.	Article	77	of	the	Charter	reads	as	follows:	
	
	‘1.	The	trusteeship	system	shall	apply	to	such	territories	in	the	following	
categories	as	may	be	placed	thereunder	by	means	of	trusteeship	
agreements:		
a.	territories	now	held	under	mandate;	
b.	territories	which	may	be	detached	from	enemy	states	as	a	result	of	the	
Second	World	War;	and	
c.	territories	voluntarily	placed	under	the	system	by	states	responsible	for	
their	administration.’	(United	Nations,	1945).	
	
In	spite	of	the	grand	claims	to	equality	outlined	in	the	preamble	of	the	
United	Nations	Charter,	it	failed	to	establish	decolonisation	and	
independence	for	the	colonies	as	reasonable	objectives	for	the	
international	community.	This	new	system	saw	a	continuation	of	the	
colonial	relationships	supported	by	the	Mandate	System	in	the	League	of	
Nations.	Indeed,	Article	79	of	the	Charter	states	that		
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‘The	terms	of	trusteeship	for	each	territory	to	be	placed	under	the	
trusteeship	system,	including	any	alteration	or	amendment,	shall	be	agreed	
upon	by	the	states	directly	concerned,	including	the	mandatory	power	in	
the	case	of	territories	held	under	mandate	by	a	Member	of	the	United	
Nations...’	(United	Nations,	1945).			
	
The	trusteeship	system	established	by	the	United	Nations	did	not	seek	to	
transfer	control	from	imperial	powers	to	an	international	organisation	in	
order	to	begin	the	process	of	decolonisation.	Rather,	it	sought	to	establish	
a	system	that	appeared	to	be	beginning	this	process	whilst	maintaining	the	
rights	of	colonisers	to	rule	their	territories	as	they	saw	fit.	The	system	of	
trusteeship	established	by	the	United	Nations	continued	the	colonial	
ideologies	established	in	the	League	with	a	focus	on	development	and	
progress	with	Western	liberalism	as	the	ultimate	goal	for	all	states	
(Mazower,	2009:	201).	The	trusteeship	system	reinforced	colonial	
ideologies	whereby	Europe	was	equated	with	development.	However,	the	
neo-colonial	relationships	established	through	the	system	of	trusteeship	in	
the	context	of	the	rhetoric	around	equality	in	the	United	Nations	seem	to	
be	somewhat	contradictory.		
	
Although	the	sponsoring	nations	wished	to	frame	the	United	Nations	as	a	
new	organisation	that	would	succeed	where	the	League	of	Nations	had	
failed,	as	we	have	already	seen	in	Chapter	4,	the	issue	of	colonialism	and	
colonial	independence	did	not	appear	to	feature	as	a	high	priority.	
Concerns	around	national	sovereignty	were	in	regards	to	relationships	
between	colonial	powers	as	opposed	to	relationships	between	colonial	
powers	and	colonies	or	dependent	territories.	Indeed,	the	motivational	
forces	that	had	led	to	the	development	of	the	League	after	the	First	World	
War	were	to	a	large	extent	the	same	motivations	that	prompted	the	
development	of	the	United	Nations,	that	is,	a	system	of	international	
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cooperation	to	prevent	wars	between	powerful	states	(Haas,	2009:	3).	The	
relationships	between	these	powerful	states	and	their	colonies	were	not	
seen	to	be	within	the	scope	of	international	organisations	as	to	challenge	
colonialism	was	to	challenge	the	sovereignty	of	imperial	powers.	Although	
the	rhetoric	of	the	United	Nations	suggests	its	establishment	was	a	
response	to	the	events	of	the	Second	World	War,	creating	an	organisation	
capable	of	protecting	individuals	from	the	violence	such	as	the	Second	
World	War	had	seen,	in	reality	it	was	filling	the	space	left	by	the	League	in	
terms	of	a	formal	agreement	between	powerful	states	to	avoid	conflict	on	
a	global	scale.	The	trusteeship	system	was	developed	in	the	process	of	the	
establishment	of	the	United	Nations	in	order	to	manage	the	colonial	
territories	that	had	formerly	belonged	to	the	League	of	Nations	Mandate	
System	and	those	that	had	been	taken	from	the	defeated	parties	of	the	
Second	World	War,	whilst	recognising	that	the	mandate	system	could	not	
be	continued	under	the	same	name.		
	
Although	any	discussion	of	colonial	territories	had	been	notably	absent	
from	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	Conference,	this	was	an	issue	that	was	
scheduled	to	be	dealt	with	at	San	Francisco	(Nicholas,	1975:	10).	As	
previously	discussed	in	Chapter	4	however,	the	conference	at	San	Francisco	
saw	the	exclusion	of	numerous	groups	representing	colonised	peoples	who	
campaigned	for	decolonisation	to	be	put	on	the	agenda	for	the	United	
Nations	(Sherwood,	1996:	82).	A	number	of	anti-colonial	groups	at	San	
Francisco	expressed	a	desire	to	address	the	issues	of	decolonisation	and	
sovereign	equality	for	all	territories	involved	in	the	organisation.	However,	
Western	powers	showed	no	desire	to	discuss	these	issues,	instead	wishing	
to	protect	their	own	sovereignty	and	the	rights	of	their	own	states	above	
all	else	(Patil,	2008:	42).	Even	those	groups	who	had	been	invited	to	be	a	
part	of	national	delegations	such	as	the	National	Association	for	the	
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Advancement	of	Colored	People	were	unable	to	generate	significant	
discussion	around	decolonisation.		
	
The	system	of	trusteeship	outlined	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	
perpetuates	the	notions	of	development	and	civilisation	present	in	the	
mandate	system	of	the	League	of	Nations,	ensuring	that	imperial	powers	
have	control	over	the	development	of	particular	nations	in	order	for	them	
to	be	granted	independence	and	to	be	recognised	as	sovereign	states	
(Rajagopal,	2003:	72).	As	with	the	mandate	system,	the	principle	of	
trusteeship	was	based	upon	a	narrative	that	distinguished	between	
developed,	wise	and	paternalistic	administrating	authorities	(i.e.	imperial	
powers)	and	undeveloped,	irrational	and	childlike	dependent	territories	in	
order	to	justify	a	system	of	control	and	domination	(Patil,	2008:	96).	The	
trusteeship	system	was	legitimated	by	this	narrative	of	development	and	
the	potential	for	eventual	self-government.	Whilst	this	system	appears	on	
the	surface	to	be	addressing	the	increasingly	contentious	issue	of	
decolonisation	on	the	basis	that	dependent	territories	will	be	guided	to	
independence	via	trusteeship,	the	rhetoric	of	sovereign	equality	that	
features	so	heavily	in	the	United	Nations’	founding	documents	disguises	its	
neocolonial	mechanisms	of	control.	The	idea	of	tutelage	reinforces	a	world	
view	with	Europe	as	the	height	of	civilisation	and	other	cultures	as	existing	
in	an	earlier	stage	of	progress.		
	
The	trusteeship	system	that	was	formed	by	the	United	Nations	was	not	
therefore	a	system	that	would	recognise	the	sovereignty	of	all	states	in	line	
with	a	commitment	to	sovereign	equality.	Rather,	the	notion	of	sovereign	
equality	stood	in	contradiction	to	the	trusteeship	system,	which	allowed	
for	the	continuation	of	the	colonial	management	of	colonies	and	
dependent	territories.	The	trusteeship	system	reinforced	problematic	
ideologies	of	development	that	supported	a	hierarchy	in	terms	of	
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civilisation,	recognising	the	inherent	sovereignty	and	equality	of	developed	
Western	states	and	the	need	for	other	parts	of	the	world	to	earn	their	
sovereignty	through	adherence	to	Western	values	(Anghie,	2001:	621).	In	
order	to	fully	understand	how	this	system	was	developed	and	the	
particular	interests	of	states	that	had	influence	on	its	structure,	it	is	
necessary	to	return	to	the	San	Francisco	conference	and	explore	the	ways	
in	which	sovereignty	and	trusteeship	featured	within	these	initial	
discussions	of	the	United	Nations.		
	
	
Sovereignty	and	Trusteeship	at	San	Francisco	
	
The	United	Nations	Conference	on	International	Organisation	(UNCIO)	in	
San	Francisco	in	theory	provided	a	space	for	all	those	invited	as	potential	
members	of	the	United	Nations	to	discuss	the	proposals	made	by	the	
sponsoring	governments	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	and	to	agree	on	the	contents	
of	what	would	become	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.	As	such,	issues	
of	sovereignty	and	trusteeship	inevitably	featured	in	the	discussions.	
However	in	reality,	despite	the	sponsoring	nations	framing	the	San	
Francisco	conference	as	a	space	for	all	nations	to	play	a	part	in	developing	
a	universal	organisation,	discussions	on	working	papers	were	limited	in	the	
same	way	that	discussions	on	decolonisation	were	limited	and	did	not	
allow	for	any	radical	amendments	by	smaller	states	(Twitchett,	1969:	178).	
San	Francisco	was	in	reality	a	space	for	prospective	member	states	to	agree	
to	the	proposals	generated	by	the	sponsoring	nations	at	Dumbarton	Oaks.	
This	final	section	of	this	chapter	will	highlight	the	ways	in	which	discussions	
around	the	trusteeship	at	San	Francisco	were	centred	on	a	problematic	
ideology	of	development	and	failed	to	deal	with	the	contradictory	nature	
of	a	system	of	trusteeship	and	a	commitment	to	sovereign	equality.		
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Organisationally,	the	conference	was	divided	into	four	commissions:	
Commission	I,	General	Provisions;	Commission	II,	General	Assembly;	
Commission	III,	Security	Council;	and	Commission	IV,	International	Court	of	
Justice	(United	Nations,	2016).	Each	commission	was	then	subdivided,	
resulting	in	twelve	committees	in	total,	each	with	a	different	focus	in	terms	
of	establishing	an	agreed	Charter.	Committee	4	of	Commission	II	was	
tasked	with	dealing	with	the	existing	mandate	territories	left	over	from	the	
League’s	days	and	developing	a	system	of	trusteeship	that	would	address	
the	requirements	of	the	relationship	between	dependent	territories	and	
their	sovereign	administrators.	In	spite	of	the	range	of	perspectives	held	by	
committee	members,	the	outcomes	were	largely	in	line	with	the	wishes	of	
the	imperial	powers.	On	the	issue	of	trusteeship,	even	amendments	
suggested	by	some	of	the	major	powers	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	–	namely	the	
Soviet	Union	and	China	-	were	only	tentatively	included	in	final	drafts.	
Existing	imperial	powers	did	not	see	independence	as	a	normal	outcome	of	
colonial	status	and	as	such,	were	unwilling	to	include	independence	as	the	
key	outcome	of	a	system	of	trusteeship	(Gilchrist,	1945:	987).	In	spite	of	
the	existence	of	Committee	4,	sovereignty	for	colonial	territories	was	not	
considered	to	be	a	priority	for	discussion	at	the	San	Francisco	conference.		
Rather,	the	imperial	powers	that	dominated	the	conference	sought	to	
maintain	a	system	of	control	through	transferring	colonial	territories	from	
the	controversial	League	of	Nations	Mandate	System	to	a	seemingly	new,	
although	not	much	different,	United	Nations	Trusteeship	System.	They	
sought	to	minimise	discussion	of	decolonisation	in	spite	of	the	mounting	
public	pressure	detailed	in	Chapter	4.	
	
Concerns	around	the	idea	of	independence	as	an	objective	of	this	
proposed	system	within	the	committee	meetings	came	largely	from	the	
delegation	of	the	United	Kingdom.	Minutes	from	the	fourth	meeting	of	this	
committee	state	that	the	representative	for	the	United	Kingdom	‘…warned	
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the	Committee	against	confusing	independence	with	liberty.	What	the	
dependent	people	wanted	was	an	increasing	measure	of	self-government;	
independence	would	come,	if	at	all,	by	natural	development’	(Summary	of	
Fourth	Meeting	of	Committee	II/4,	May	14th	1945).	The	United	Kingdom	
delegation	was	keen	to	prevent	independence	being	written	into	the	
Charter	as	the	necessary	eventual	outcome	of	trusteeship.	This	quote	
exemplifies	this	British	attitude	to	dependent	territories,	as	well	as	
emphasising	the	strong	belief	in	the	notion	of	progress	as	linear	and	the	
idea	that	particular	nations	exist	in	a	‘time-lag’	(Bhabha,	1994).	Dependent	
territories	are	framed	as	being	in	an	earlier	stage	of	development,	as	being	
earlier	versions	of	European	states,	with	an	understanding	that	they	would	
eventually	progress	naturally	and	eventually	be	qualified	to	be	recognised	
as	independent	sovereigns,	whilst	all	the	time	emphasising	their	
dependence.	Although	this	progression	is	framed	as	natural,	their	
development	had	become	the	responsibility	of	those	sovereign	states	that	
had	achieved	civilisation	and	hence	for	the	delegation	of	the	United	
Kingdom,	the	purpose	of	the	trusteeship	system	was	to	allow	for	the	
continuation	of	colonial	rule	that	may	or	may	not	result	in	independence.		
	
British	representatives	at	San	Francisco	clearly	sought	to	protect	the	
empire	and	minimise	United	Nations	support	for	independence	for	
colonies	and	former	League	of	Nations	Mandate	territories.	Prior	to	San	
Francisco,	British	Prime	Minister	Winston	Churchill	had	been	assured	by	
the	other	sponsoring	nations	at	Yalta	that	no	colony	of	the	British	Empire	
would	be	subject	to	the	United	Nations	system	of	control	without	British	
consent	(Baehr	and	Gordenker,	2005:	16).	Despite	assurances	that	the	
United	Nations	system	would	be	voluntary	for	those	colonies	that	were	not	
either	mandate	territories	or	former	colonies	of	enemy	states	after	the	
Second	World	War,	the	British	delegation	seemed	keen	to	prevent	
independence	becoming	a	compulsory	eventual	target.	However,	the	
 153 
principle	of	independence	for	colonial	territories	was	significant	for	the	
representatives	of	the	Soviet	Union	who	had	also	raised	the	issue	of	
trusteeship	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	(Haas,	2009:	12).	In	the	same	meeting	of	
Committee	4,	minutes	state	that		
	
‘The	Delegate	from	the	Soviet	Union	observed	that	every	member	of	the	
United	Nations	would	be	responsible	for	the	system	to	be	established.	He	
did	not	agree	that	self-government	alone	would	be	an	adequate	objective,	
but	emphasized	the	importance	of	independence,	and	reminded	the	
Committee	that	the	amendments	to	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	draft	proposed	
by	the	four	sponsoring	governments	included	“the	self-determination	of	
peoples”	among	the	aims	of	the	United	Nations;	this	principle	could	hardly	
be	omitted	from	the	trusteeship	chapter’	(Summary	of	Fourth	Meeting	of	
Committee	II/4,	May	14th	1945).		
	
The	delegation	for	the	Soviet	Union	was	clearly	keen	to	challenge	the	
aspects	of	the	United	Nations	that	would	continue	to	legitimate	imperial	
rule	in	any	form.		
	
Indeed,	the	representatives	of	the	Soviet	Union	expressed	increasingly	
anti-colonial	sentiments	throughout	the	course	of	the	conference	as	their	
relationship	with	the	other	sponsoring	nations	became	progressively	tense.	
Relations	particularly	between	the	Soviets	and	the	Americans	began	to	
deteriorate,	resulting	in	a	Soviet	desire	to	increase	their	anti-colonial	
objections	in	order	to	present	themselves	as	the	singular	proponents	of	
true	democracy	(Anderson,	2003:	51).	Their	difficult	relationship	with	the	
existing	colonial	powers	led	to	an	increased	focus	on	supporting	
independence	as	the	ultimate	objective	for	colonial	and	former	mandate	
territories	under	the	new	United	Nations	system.	This	view	was	reinforced	
in	the	Soviet	amendments	to	the	United	States	draft	on	the	Trusteeship	
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system,	which	proposed	that	the	basic	objectives	of	the	trusteeship	system	
should	include	the	promotion	of		
	
‘…the	political,	economic,	and	social	advancement	of	the	trust	territories	
and	their	inhabitants	and	their	progressive	development	towards	self-
government	and	self-determination	with	active	participation	of	peoples	of	
these	territories	having	the	aim	to	expedite	the	achievement	by	them	of	
the	full	national	independence…’	(Amendments	of	the	Soviet	Delegation	to	
the	United	States	Draft	on	Trusteeship	System,	May	11th	1945).	
	
In	contrast	to	the	British	view	that	independence	would	be	an	eventual	
natural	outcome	for	some	(but	not	all)	of	the	territories	under	the	new	
trusteeship	system,	for	the	Soviets	the	trusteeship	system	needed	to	have	
much	clearer	aims	in	terms	of	decolonisation	and	the	full	independence	of	
dependent	territories.	For	them,	it	was	important	that	independence	be	
written	into	the	Charter,	rather	than	being	left	as	a	decision	to	be	made	by	
administering	nations	and	colonial	powers.	The	independence	of	all	
territories	was	a	necessary	condition	for	the	United	Nations	to	fulfil	its	
commitment	to	sovereign	equality.		
	
Despite	the	discussions	at	San	Francisco	and	the	concerns	and	objections	
of	the	Soviet	delegation,	what	we	see	in	the	final	draft	of	the	United	
Nations	Charter	is	a	hesitance	to	interfere	in	colonial	relationships,	with	
Article	76	stating	that	the	basic	objectives	of	the	Trusteeship	System	are:	
	
‘a.	to	further	international	peace	and	security;	
b.	to	promote	the	political,	economic,	social	and	educational	advancement	
of	the	inhabitants	of	the	trust	territories,	and	their	progressive	
development	towards	self-government	or	independence	as	may	be	
appropriate	to	the	particular	circumstances	of	each	territory	and	its	
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peoples	and	the	freely	expressed	wishes	of	the	peoples	concerned,	and	as	
may	be	provided	by	the	terms	of	each	trusteeship	agreement…’	(United	
Nations,	1945).		
	
The	final	draft	is	much	more	reflective	of	the	British	view	that	
independence	may	not	be	appropriate	for	all	territories.	This	idea	harks	
back	to	the	19th	century	ideologies	of	civilisation	that	have	been	challenged	
throughout	this	thesis.	These	discourses,	which	are	seen	again	here	in	
discussions	around	trusteeship,	construct	a	hierarchy	that	sees	European	
civilised	nations	at	its	peak,	followed	by	‘barbarous’	nations	who	could	be	
taught	to	be	civilised	and	‘savages’	who	were	entirely	unable	to	achieve	
the	levels	of	social	complexity	belonging	to	Europeans	(Tarazona,	2012:	
917).	This	desire	to	construct	the	world	in	terms	of	civilised/uncivilised	and	
backwards/advanced	is	as	present	in	the	rhetoric	of	the	United	Nations	as	
it	was	in	the	League	of	Nations,	but	perhaps	more	discretely.		
	
Whilst	the	histories	of	the	United	Nations	emphasise	its	desire	to	distance	
itself	from	the	League	of	Nations	and	stress	its	novelty	as	an	institution,	the	
issue	of	trusteeship	within	the	United	Nations	demonstrates	the	
continuation	of	the	strategies	of	colonial	management	seen	in	the	League	
of	Nations	Mandate	System,	as	well	as	the	continuation	of	problematic	
underlying	discourses	of	development	and	civilisation.	The	understanding	
that	sovereign	equality	in	the	United	Nations	was	a	move	away	from	the	
imperialist	understandings	of	sovereignty	in	the	League	of	Nations	
therefore	seems	incorrect.	Rather,	what	we	find	is	a	contradiction	between	
the	claims	to	equality	made	in	the	Charter	and	the	systems	it	details.	The	
very	fact	that	the	United	Nations	developed	such	a	system	of	management	
of	particular	territories	and	that	independence	was	not	always	to	be	
considered	appropriate	as	a	progressive	development	seems	incongruent	
with	its	claims	to	‘…the	equal	rights	of	men	and	women	and	of	nations	
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large	and	small…’	as	outlined	in	the	preamble	to	the	Charter	(United	
Nations,	1945).	We	must	therefore	look	more	critically	at	the	idea	of	
sovereignty	itself	in	international	law	and	how	it	allows	a	particular	
understanding	of	progress.		
	
As	has	previously	been	discussed,	the	idea	of	sovereignty	in	international	
law	is	guilty	of	neglecting	to	recognise	its	European	origins	and	aiming	to	
downplay	its	relationship	to	colonialism.	International	law	is	considered	
universally	applicable,	based	on	the	interaction	of	sovereign	states.	
However,	the	concept	of	sovereignty	which	features	in	international	law	is	
European	in	origin,	raising	an	ideological	conflict	between	its	proposed	
universality	and	the	denial	of	sovereignty	to	non-Europeans	through	the	
historical	process	of	colonialism	(Anghie,	2001:	516).	Understanding	the	
European	origins	of	sovereignty	as	a	concept	allows	us	to	see	its	role	in	the	
colonial	‘civilising	mission’,	whereby	the	colonial	powers	saw	themselves	as	
‘…redeeming	the	backward,	aberrant,	violent,	oppressed,	undeveloped	
people	of	the	non-European	world	by	incorporating	them	into	the	universal	
civilization	of	Europe’	(Anghie,	2005:	3).	What	this	does	is	create	what	
Anghie	terms	the	‘dynamic	of	difference’,	whereby	a	gap	is	created	
between	two	cultures	with	one	as	‘universal’	(i.e.	civilised)	and	one	as	
‘particular’	(i.e.	uncivilised)	(2005:	4).	This	‘dynamic	of	difference’	allows	
colonialism	to	be	justified	as	a	process	of	civilising	the	uncivilised	and	
incorporating	‘backwards’	nations	into	a	stable	system	of	international	law.		
	
This	ideology	is	apparent	in	the	discussions	around	the	Trusteeship	System	
at	San	Francisco,	particularly	in	remarks	made	by	British	delegate	Lord	
Cranborne.	During	a	speech	in	the	third	meeting	of	Commission	II	(General	
Assembly),	Lord	Cranborne	stressed	the	British	expertise	in	matters	of	
colonialism	and	argued	for	the	necessity	of	non-specific	principles	on	
matters	of	trusteeship	by	saying	that		
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‘It	is	sometimes	imagined	by	those	who	have	not	very	closely	studied	
colonial	policy	that	all	Colonies	are	alike.	That	is	very	far	from	the	truth.	
They	differ	as	much	from	each	other	as	do	metropolitan	territories.	They	
range	from	the	most	primitive	areas	in	the	Pacific	and	Central	Africa	to	
such	highly	civilized	countries	as	Ceylon,	Malta	and	Java.	They	are	
inhabited	by	peoples	of	different	races,	peoples	of	different	religions	and	
peoples	at	different	stages	of	civilisation.	Each	must	be	administered	
differently	to	take	account	of	the	varying	traditions,	culture	and	capacities	
of	the	indigenous	people.’	(Corrigendum	to	Verbatim	Minutes	of	Third	
Meeting	of	Commission	II,	June	20th	1945).			
	
Lord	Cranborne’s	speech	again	emphasises	this	dichotomy	between	
civilised	and	uncivilised,	perpetuating	the	understanding	that	people	in	
particular	parts	of	the	world	are	naturally	endowed	with	an	advanced	level	
of	social	complexity,	whilst	other	nations	are	savage	or	barbarous	
(Tarazona,	2012:	917).	This	ideology	fails	to	account	for	how	it	is	that	some	
countries	come	to	be	‘advanced’	whilst	others	remain	‘backwards’	or	
‘primitive’.	Colonialism	is	seen	as	the	solution	rather	than	the	problem.		
	
Within	the	context	of	international	law,	sovereignty	is	then	born	out	of	this	
encounter.	The	civilised	nations	are	sovereign	and	the	uncivilised	must	be	
instructed	on	how	to	be	civilised	in	order	to	become	sovereign.	However,	
where	European	sovereignty	was	constructed	as	natural	by	international	
law,	former	colonies	had	to	be	granted	sovereignty	based	on	their	
adherence	to	European	notions	of	civilisation	(Anghie,	2001:	621).	Within	
the	context	of	the	United	Nations,	this	sovereignty	would	be	granted	to	
particular	territories,	although	not	necessarily	all	territories,	through	the	
trusteeship	system	which	saw	the	creation	of	new	forms	of	domination	
and	control	administered	by	colonial	powers	via	the	United	Nations	as	an	
international	institution	(Anghie,	2005:	179).	These	new	forms	of	control	
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were	justified	by	presenting	colonialism,	as	Lord	Cranborne	does,	as	a	
process	of	civilisation	and	development.	The	generally	accepted	
understanding	of	international	law	as	universal	however	disguises	the	
colonial	history	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty	and	reproduces	the	‘dynamic	
of	difference’,	legitimising	inequalities	in	the	global	system	(Anghie,	2005:	
241).				
	
This	leads	us	to	a	rather	more	different	understanding	of	sovereignty	than	
the	one	presented	by	the	United	Nations.	If	we	see	sovereignty	not	as	
preceding	colonialism	but	being	created	through	the	process	of	
colonialism,	it	is	not	an	unbiased	way	of	understanding	international	
relations.	Whilst	international	law	is	theoretically	based	on	sovereign	
equality	between	states,	the	influence	of	colonialism	in	its	development	
meant	that	international	law	and	its	subsequent	associated	institutions	
created	two	distinct	models	of	sovereignty:	European	sovereignty	and	non-
European	sovereignty	(Anghie,	2001:	520).	This	is	the	only	way	in	which	it	
is	possible	to	understand	the	co-existence	of	international	law	and	
colonialism.	If	we	understand	this	to	be	true,	it	becomes	clear	that	
sovereignty	is	not	a	uniform	category.	The	norms	by	which	a	state	is	
considered	to	be	sovereign	are	subject	to	change	dependent	on	context	
(Doty,	1996:	149).	The	fact	that	definitions	of	sovereignty	are	historically,	
socially	and	politically	contingent	therefore	suggests	a	challenge	to	the	
ideological	universality	of	international	law,	and	thus,	a	challenge	to	the	
equality	of	institutions	with	sovereignty	as	their	basis,	such	as	the	United	
Nations.		
	
Examining	documents	from	the	discussions	around	trusteeship	at	San	
Francisco	provides	an	insight	into	the	determination	of	the	major	powers	
to	prevent	the	realisation	of	commitments	to	sovereign	equality.	The	
trusteeship	system	was	designed	in	order	to	legitimise	inequality	through	
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the	concept	of	sovereignty,	with	colonies	and	dependent	territories	being	
excluded	from	equality	as	a	result	of	their	inability	to	be	sovereign.	Having	
explored	the	structure	of	the	system	of	trusteeship	within	the	United	
Nations	and	the	discussions	held	around	it	at	San	Francisco,	it	is	possible	to	
take	issue	with	the	United	Nations’	commitment	to	sovereign	equality.	This	
section	has	shown,	through	the	use	of	archival	data,	the	way	in	which	the	
system	of	trusteeship	established	by	the	United	Nations	was	not	
underpinned	by	a	belief	in	the	equality	of	all	nations,	but	rather	that	it	was	
based	upon	a	hierarchical	ordering	of	society	and	problematic	ideologies	of	
development	and	civilisation.	Even	in	the	face	of	opposition	by	the	Soviet	
Union	-	a	key	player	in	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	–	the	
delegation	of	the	United	Kingdom	was	able	to	argue	for	a	system	that	
protected	the	sovereign	right	of	the	British	empire	to	rule	over	its	
territories	over	the	right	of	its	territories	to	be	sovereign	and	equal.		
	
	
Conclusion	
	
As	Anghie	argues,	the	concept	of	sovereignty	was	born	out	of	the	colonial	
encounter,	as	a	way	of	dealing	with	the	relationship	between	the	European	
and	non-European	worlds	(2005:	3).	The	concept	of	sovereignty	was	
created	in	order	to	justify	the	domination	of	non-Europeans	by	Europeans,	
categorising	the	sovereign	European	states	as	more	civilised	and	therefore	
as	having	a	duty	to	educate.	Both	the	mandate	system	of	the	League	of	
Nations	and	the	trusteeship	system	of	the	United	Nations	are	therefore	
heavily	shaped	by	colonialism	due	to	their	reliance	on	the	concept	of	
sovereignty	as	a	way	of	ordering	international	relations.	In	using	
sovereignty	as	the	basis	upon	which	these	systems	function,	both	systems	
reinforce	the	ideologies	of	civilisation	and	development	that	underpin	
sovereignty	as	a	concept.	
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The	first	section	of	this	chapter	focused	on	the	function	of	sovereignty	
within	the	League	and	illustrated	the	way	that	the	structures	of	control	and	
domination	established	by	the	League	of	Nations	Mandate	System	have	
played	a	key	role	in	the	development	of	successive	systems.	Using	the	work	
of	Anghie,	it	has	shown	how	the	specific	political	and	economic	
technologies	which	were	established	to	manage	the	relationship	between	
coloniser	and	colonised	in	1919	continue	to	underpin	the	relationship	
between	the	major	powers	and	the	rest	of	the	world	in	contemporary	
global	relations	(2001:	624).	In	both	the	mandate	system	of	the	League	and	
the	trusteeship	system	of	the	United	Nations,	so-called	‘advanced’	nations	
were	required	to	act	as	educators,	teaching	people	of	the	colonies	how	to	
develop	into	civilised	nations,	emphasising	a	singular	understanding	of	
progress	with	European	modernity	as	its	end	point.	This	is	a	clear	example	
of	Patil’s	‘kinship	politics’,	which	are	characterised	by	a	paternal	
relationship	between	those	nations	considered	civilised	and	those	in	need	
of	civilisation	(2008:	95).	
	
Whilst	this	relationship	and	the	logic	behind	it	was	fairly	explicit	in	the	
League,	the	heavy	criticism	of	the	League	and	the	public	support	of	the	
project	of	decolonisation	meant	this	relationship	had	to	be	more	implicit	
within	the	United	Nations.	However,	even	discourses	of	sovereign	equality	
rely	on	sovereignty	as	a	way	of	organising	global	relations	and	therefore	
have	their	roots	in	colonialism.	The	purpose	of	sovereignty	is	always	to	
empower	some	and	disempower	others	(Anghie,	2014:	134).		
	
This	chapter	argued	that	the	trusteeship	system	established	by	the	Charter	
was	little	more	than	a	re-branding	exercise.	Trusteeship	maintained	the	
ideologies	of	development	and	civilisation	that	were	entrenched	in	the	
mandate	system	and	that	had	acted	as	a	justification	for	colonial	rule.	The	
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trusteeship	system	existed	in	order	to	continue	the	transformation	from	
colonialism	as	a	direct	system	of	control	to	the	discourse	of	development	
that	accompanied	trusteeship	and	acted	as	a	less	explicit	way	of	managing	
the	behaviour	of	colonial	territories	(Rajagopal,	2003:	71).	Within	the	
United	Nations,	rather	than	emphasising	an	ultimate	goal	of	independence	
for	these	territories,	the	Charter	focused	always	on	the	issue	of	global	
security	as	of	paramount	importance	(Haas,	2009:	9).	The	encouragement	
of	specific	behaviour	by	‘advanced’	nations	was	framed	in	terms	of	
preparing	dependent	territories	for	engagement	in	a	global	system	and	
minimising	the	potential	for	international	aggression,	as	opposed	to	
preparing	these	territories	for	independence	as	a	form	of	justice	for	their	
subjection	to	colonial	domination.	In	light	of	this,	how	is	it	possible	to	
suggest	that	the	United	Nations	is	based	on	any	notion	of	equality	when	
the	right	of	particular	states	to	rule	over	other	territories	is	written	into	the	
Charter?	
	
The	archival	data	used	throughout	this	chapter	reveals	this	problematic	
ideological	framing	of	particular	nations	as	‘civilised’	and	other	nations	as	
‘uncivilised’,	particularly	by	British	representatives	such	as	Lord	Cranborne.	
The	data	reveals	the	belief	in	Western	supremacy	born	out	of	colonialism	
that	underpinned	the	structuring	of	the	United	Nations	in	terms	of	
Trusteeship,	whilst	also	further	doing	the	work	of	de-silencing	anti-colonial	
histories	in	terms	of	revealing	the	Soviet	objections	to	this	framework.	The	
archival	data	de-silences	both	the	colonial	history	of	the	United	Nations	in	
terms	of	its	structural	development	and	the	anti-colonial	resistance	to	
these	structures.	Both	of	these	aspects	have	been	absent	from	standard	
histories	of	the	United	Nations	and	are	not	reflected	in	the	organisation’s	
ability	to	frame	itself	as	an	institution	committed	to	equality	and	rights	
(Patil,	2008).		
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This	chapter	has	shown	that	despite	the	United	Nations	Trusteeship	
Council	officially	suspending	operation	in	1994,	the	overwhelming	
influence	of	colonialism	in	the	formative	stages	of	the	United	Nations	and	
the	continued	reliance	on	international	law	and	sovereignty	as	universally	
applicable	frameworks	means	that	the	inequalities	of	colonialism	are	
reproduced	even	in	contemporary	contexts	(Patil,	2008:	44).	For	the	
purposes	of	this	thesis,	these	ideas	around	sovereignty	and	civilisation	
have	a	significant	impact	upon	contemporary	debates	around	
responsibility,	intervention	and	protection.		
	 	 	
It	is	important	to	recognise	and	question	in	this	context	the	way	in	which	
an	ideology	which	began	in	Europe	came	to	be	universally	applicable	to	all	
parts	of	the	world,	including	those	with	significant	differences	in	terms	of	
culture	and	political	organisation.	Despite	stark	cultural,	political	and	
economic	differences	between	Europe,	Africa	and	Asia	for	example,	the	
idea	of	sovereignty	comes	to	be	understood	as	universally	applicable	to	all	
of	these	territories	through	the	institution	of	international	law	(Anghie,	
2001:	516).	However,	once	we	accept	that	sovereignty	is	a	concept	with	a	
historical	and	political	agenda,	it	calls	into	question	the	neutrality	of	the	
institutions	that	have	sovereignty	as	their	fundamental	principle.	As	the	
United	Nations	is	an	institution	reliant	on	international	law	for	its	
legitimacy	and	that	claims	to	be	fundamentally	based	on	the	sovereign	
equality	of	all	its	members,	this	is	called	into	question	if	we	understand	the	
concept	of	sovereignty	to	be	inherently	colonial	due	to	its	European	
history.		
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Chapter	6:	Practical	Politics	and	the	Security	Council	
	
‘When	the	Five	were	united,	there	were	almost	no	limits	to	what	they	
could	do.	But	if	one	of	the	Five	dissented,	it	appeared	that	the	council	
could	be	paralyzed’	(Bosco,	2009:	35).	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	focus	of	this	chapter	is	the	United	Nations	Security	Council,	which,	
under	Article	24	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	has	‘…primary	
responsibility	for	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security...’	
(United	Nations,	1945).	The	Security	Council	is	therefore	the	key	body	in	
decision	making	around	intervention	and	as	such	it	is	necessary	to	
understand	how	it	came	into	existence	and	the	powers	held	by	its	
members	when	thinking	about	issues	of	global	political	power.	The	
institutionalised	privilege	of	the	powerful	is	exceptional	in	the	case	of	the	
United	Nations	when	compared	with	other	international	organisations	
(Krisch,	2008:135).	The	deliberate	decisions	made	around	the	structure	of	
the	Security	Council	from	its	conception	allow	for	the	selective	
enforcement	of	policies	related	to	intervention,	and	rather	than	enforcing	
the	principles	of	sovereign	equality	that	were	outlined	in	the	Charter,	the	
Security	Council	allows	for	decisions	to	be	made	based	on	the	privileged	
political	interests	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	nations.		
	
What	follows	is	an	outline	of	the	development	of	the	Security	Council,	
including	some	archival	material	from	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	
International	Organisation	at	San	Francisco,	as	well	as	documents	that	
were	generated	following	the	earlier	meetings	of	the	major	powers	at	
Dumbarton	Oaks.	The	argument	running	through	this	chapter	is	that	the	
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structure	of	the	Security	Council	as	it	was	established	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	
and	San	Francisco	is	what	underpins	the	United	Nations’	ability	to	continue	
to	implement	policy	selectively	in	contemporary	contexts.	Following	the	
methodological	approach	of	reading	through	history	that	was	detailed	in	
Chapter	3,	this	chapter	will	provide	the	basis	for	understanding	the	
developments	in	United	Nations	policy	that	will	be	detailed	in	Chapter	7.			
	
Ultimately,	this	chapter	will	demonstrate	the	ways	in	which	the	Security	
Council	is	the	key	site	of	postcolonial	privilege	within	the	United	Nations.	
Building	upon	the	theoretical	approaches	of	the	Part	One	of	the	thesis,	this	
chapter	will	argue	that	the	Security	Council	engages	in	neocolonial	
practices	and	will	use	archival	evidence	to	illustrate	how	the	major	powers	
ensured	that	the	United	Nations	would	be	an	organisation	that	preserved	
the	unequal	global	order	established	through	colonialism.		
	
Power	Politics	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	and	San	Francisco	
	
As	outlined	in	Chapter	1,	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	Conference,	more	formally	
known	as	the	Washington	Conversations	on	International	Peace	and	
Security	Organization,	took	place	between	21st	August	and	7th	October	
1944.	The	conference	consisted	of	representatives	from	the	United	
Kingdom,	the	United	States,	the	Soviet	Union	and	China.	Following	on	from	
the	earlier	international	conferences	towards	the	end	of	the	Second	World	
War,	the	aim	of	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	conference	was	to	formally	propose	
an	international	organisation	that	would	prevent	the	outbreak	of	another	
World	War,	learning	from	the	lessons	of	the	League	of	Nations	which	had	
failed	to	do	so	(Hanhimäki,	2008:	12).	The	League	of	Nations	had	been	
deemed	a	failure	publically	and	internationally	as	a	result	of	the	Second	
World	War,	and	so	these	key	players	in	the	international	community	had	
begun	work	on	a	new	organisation	as	a	replacement.	This	section	will	
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outline	some	of	the	power	politics	at	play	in	the	initial	stages	of	the	United	
Nations’	development,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	Security	Council	and	
its	five	permanent	members,	largely	based	on	the	work	of	historian	Robert	
C.	Hilderbrand	who	has	written	extensively	about	this	in	his	1990	book	
Dumbarton	Oaks:	The	Origins	of	the	United	Nations	and	the	Search	for	
Postwar	Security.	
	
The	overwhelming	failure	of	the	League	of	Nations	had	been	attributed	in	
no	small	part	to	the	absence	of	two	of	the	greatest	powers	of	the	world	at	
that	time:	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union.	As	Hilderbrand	argues,	
their	involvement	was	deemed	essential	in	order	to	address	the	failures	of	
the	League	and	for	a	new	organisation	to	succeed	(1990:	92).	Where	the	
League	of	Nations	had	been	selective	in	its	membership,	this	new	
organisation	was	imagined	to	be	much	more	inclusive	and	aimed	to	unite	a	
larger	number	of	the	governments	of	the	world,	but	more	specifically	to	
unite	the	most	powerful.	From	the	perspective	of	the	United	States	itself	
however,	this	involvement	in	a	new	international	organisation	was	also	
part	of	a	broader	political	campaign.	President	Roosevelt	saw	this	as	an	
opportunity	to	justify	United	States	involvement	in	the	Second	World	War,	
framing	it	as	a	longer-term	project	to	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	5).	For	the	United	
States,	a	new	international	organisation	would	justify	to	the	public	their	
contribution	to	the	war	by	framing	it	as	the	beginning	of	a	united	
international	attempt	to	bring	about	world	peace.	Already	it	is	clear	that	
the	involvement	of	particular	states	in	the	creation	of	the	United	Nations	
did	not	simply	stem	from	a	desire	to	create	a	better	world.	Rather,	the	
involvement	of	the	major	powers	of	the	United	Nations	was	also	politically	
motivated.		
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It	is	worth	noting	at	this	point	the	complexities	of	framing	the	Security	
Council	in	terms	of	postcolonial	privilege	and	neocolonial	power.	The	
inclusion	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	China	within	this	understanding	of	the	
United	Nations	–	and	the	Security	Council	more	specifically	–	seems	
somewhat	contradictory.	However,	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	not	to	
account	for	the	full	nature	of	the	Security	Council	in	postcolonial	terms,	but	
to	argue	that	colonialism	was	key	to	the	formation	of	the	United	Nations	as	
an	institution.	Whilst	the	inclusion	of	powers	that	were	encouraging	of	
decolonisation	might	seem	to	suggest	that	the	United	Nations	was	
abandoning	colonialism	as	a	global	structure,	as	will	be	discussed	in	further	
detail,	the	inclusion	of	France	was	a	British	assertion	in	order	to	maintain	
support	for	empire	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	40).	Thus,	whilst	the	Soviet	Union	
and	China	cannot	be	viewed	as	imperial	powers	in	the	same	sense	as	
Britain	or	France,	they	are	nonetheless	a	part	of	an	institution	that	has	its	
roots	in	colonialism.	Understanding	their	role	in	terms	of	the	western-
centricity	of	the	United	Nations	is	an	undoubtedly	complex	that	does	
require	further	consideration,	but	this	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	the	
argument	being	presented	here	and	does	not	distract	from	their	role	in	an	
organisation	born	out	of	colonialism.			
	
Each	of	the	governments	invited	to	take	part	at	the	meetings	at	
Dumbarton	Oaks	brought	with	them	proposals	for	an	international	
organisation	and	these	were	debated	over	the	course	of	the	conference.	
These	discussions	eventually	resulted	in	the	‘Dumbarton	Oaks	Documents	
on	International	Organization’	that	would	be	taken	to	the	San	Francisco	
conference	in	1945	and	would	form	the	basis	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	
Nations.	This	conference	and	the	resulting	documents	show	the	ways	in	
which	the	privilege	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	nations	was	built	into	the	
United	Nations	from	the	outset,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	Security	
Council	and	the	ways	in	which	the	organisation	was	imagined	to	deal	with	
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future	international	conflicts.	For	the	purposes	of	this	section,	the	focus	
will	be	on	the	discussions	around	the	structure	and	the	role	of	the	Security	
Council.	
	
Whilst	preliminary	discussions	on	the	development	of	an	international	
organisation	prior	to	Dumbarton	Oaks	had	largely	been	between	Britain,	
the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union,	the	United	Nations	Security	
Council	eventually	came	to	be	dominated	–	and	still	is	dominated	–	by	five	
permanent	members,	with	the	additions	of	France	and	China.	This	
permanent	membership	within	the	Security	Council	not	only	confirms	the	
status	of	these	nations	as	great	powers,	but	in	the	case	of	France	in	
particular,	the	symbolism	of	permanent	membership	may	have	granted	
great	power	status	(Krisch,	2008:	136).	The	perceived	status	and	privilege	
of	these	nations	was	now	to	be	institutionalised	in	the	form	of	the	Security	
Council.	Their	role	as	permanent	members	simultaneously	cemented	their	
power	and	legitimated	it	through	framing	these	five	states	as	the	key	
players	in	maintaining	international	peace	and	security.	Although	not	
present	at	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	conference,	France	was	given	a	key	role	in	
the	new	organisation	at	the	insistence	of	the	British	government.	
According	to	Hilderbrand,	regardless	of	their	perceived	shortcomings	
during	the	Second	World	War,	Winston	Churchill	insisted	that	France	be	
given	a	permanent	seat	on	the	Security	Council	amidst	fears	that	Britain	
would	otherwise	face	the	power	of	the	Soviet	Union	alone,	or	else	rely	on	
the	support	of	the	United	States	which	was	not	always	guaranteed	(1990:	
40).	Churchill	believed	that	France	would	provide	Britain	with	the	support	
required	to	stand	up	to	two	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	states	to	emerge	
after	the	First	World	War.		
	
The	permanent	membership	of	China	was	also	a	strategic	decision,	
however	in	this	instance	on	the	part	of	the	United	States.	As	Hilderbrand’s	
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account	states,	whilst	China	was	not	at	the	time	considered	to	be	a	global	
power	on	the	same	scale	as	the	United	States,	the	Soviet	Union	or	the	
United	Kingdom,	their	involvement	was	deemed	to	be	essential	by	the	
United	States,	whose	own	involvement	was	essential	for	the	organisation	
to	work	at	all	(1990:	41).	In	the	British	government’s	view,	the	inclusion	of	
China	in	the	plans	for	an	international	organisation	was	a	political	initiative	
on	the	part	of	President	Roosevelt,	with	plans	to	guide	China	to	a	position	
where	it	would	be	strong	enough	to	police	Asia,	but	weak	enough	to	still	
rely	on	the	United	States	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	59).	The	United	States	wished	
to	give	China	the	international	status	that	would	enable	them	to	control	
the	rest	of	the	Asian	continent,	whilst	also	creating	a	strong	relationship	
between	China	and	the	United	States.	Even	the	inclusion	of	particular	
states	as	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council,	and	therefore	as	key	
players	in	the	international	organisation	more	generally,	were	strategic	
decisions	based	on	the	political	interests	of	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	
United	States	with	aims	to	support	decisions	that	may	be	challenged	by	the	
other	permanent	members.		
	
Unlike	France,	representatives	from	China	were	present	at	Dumbarton	
Oaks,	although	not	at	the	same	time	as	the	Soviet	Union.	Although	Chinese	
representatives	took	part	in	discussions	at	Dumbarton	Oaks,	Hilderbrand	
argues	that	the	talks	between	British,	American	and	Chinese	
representatives	that	took	place	in	the	later	days	of	the	conference	were	to	
a	large	degree	ceremonial,	as	the	majority	of	the	significant	decisions	had	
been	made	during	talks	with	the	Soviet	Union	(1990:	229).	Even	initial	
decisions	about	which	countries	should	form	the	leadership	of	this	new	
international	organisation	were	therefore	built	around	political	
relationships	and	ensuring	that	the	interests	of	the	Russians,	the	Americans	
and	the	British	would	be	prioritised	at	all	times.	These	five	nations	would	
become	permanent	members	on	the	Security	Council,	dominating	
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decisions	around	international	intervention	and	holding	primary	
responsibility	for	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security.	It	is	
no	surprise	therefore	that	the	attitude	of	the	sponsoring	governments	was	
very	much	that	the	United	Nations	as	an	organisation	was	theirs	and	that	it	
would	preserve	a	world	order	that	they	would	be	the	main	beneficiaries	of	
(Goodwin,	1971:46).		
	
The	resulting	documents	of	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	conference	formed	the	
basis	for	discussions	at	the	San	Francisco	conference	between	April	and	
June	of	1945	where	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	was	signed,	and	it	is	
worth	emphasising	here	some	of	the	key	opening	statements.	The	
proposals	were	drafted	and	made	public	by	the	United	States	
representatives	in	the	interests	of	enabling	full	discussion	by	the	people	of	
the	United	States	prior	to	the	San	Francisco	conference	(United	States,	
1944:	1).	These	proposals	state	that	the	purpose	of	the	new	international	
organisation	–	from	here	on	referred	to	as	the	United	Nations	–	was	‘To	
maintain	international	peace	and	security;	and	to	that	end	to	take	
collective	measures	for	the	prevention	and	removal	of	threats	to	the	peace	
and	the	suppression	of	acts	of	aggression…’	(United	States,	1944:	8).	The	
proposals	go	on	to	state	that	in	order	to	achieve	this	primary	purpose,	the	
United	Nations	would	be	‘…based	on	the	principle	of	the	sovereign	equality	
of	all	peace-loving	states’	(United	States,	1944:	8).		
	
As	noted	in	previous	and	subsequent	chapters,	the	United	Nations	was	to	
be	framed	as	an	international	body	for	collective	action,	based	on	the	
fundamental	equality	of	all	its	members.	However,	this	principle	of	equality	
already	appears	to	be	in	conflict	both	with	the	structure	of	the	organisation	
and	the	very	fact	that	the	proposals	upon	which	it	was	based	were	
determined	by	a	small	number	of	states	whose	power	and	status	was	
privileged	above	all	others.	Even	when	we	consider	the	larger	conference	
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at	San	Francisco,	fourty-five	nations	in	total	were	invited	to	attend	
including	nineteen	from	the	Americas	and	the	Caribbean,	seven	from	Asia	
and	the	Middle	East	and	ten	from	Europe	and	only	three	from	Africa,	which	
was	largely	still	colonised	(Bosco,	2009:	32).	Despite	claims	to	inclusivity	
and	equality,	this	new	organisation	failed	to	address	the	issue	of	
colonialism,	and	indeed,	those	participating	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	had	
claimed	to	be	‘not	ready’	to	discuss	colonialism	at	this	point	(Gilchrist,	
1945:	983).	Claims	of	inclusivity	and	internationalism	therefore	seemed	
only	to	apply	to	particular	countries	that	fitted	traditional	understandings	
of	sovereignty	and	colonised	nations	were	not	considered	significant	in	
proposals	for	a	global	organisation.	If	the	United	Nations	was	to	be	
dominated	by	those	present	at	the	Dumbarton	Oaks	conference,	how	
could	it	be	based	on	any	notion	of	equality?	This	contradiction	becomes	
even	more	apparent	when	we	look	at	the	decisions	made	around	the	
structure	of	the	Security	Council	and	the	powers	that	would	be	afforded	to	
its	members.		
	
	
United	Nations	Security	Council:	Structure,	Veto	and	Selectivity	
	
As	alluded	to	in	earlier	chapters,	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council	and	
the	privileges	afforded	to	its	five	permanent	members	are	of	particular	
significance	for	the	arguments	being	discussed	throughout	this	thesis,	and	
especially	for	the	arguments	of	the	final	chapter.	The	Security	Council	is	
dominated	by	the	major	powers	as	a	result	of	their	permanent	
membership	and	their	associated	power	of	veto,	which	allows	them	to	act	
selectively	in	responding	to	international	crises	(Roberts	and	Zaum,	2008:	
13).	In	order	to	understand	the	degree	to	which	this	is	possible	and	the	
structures	that	allow	for	the	selective	enforcement	of	policy	within	the	
Security	Council,	it	is	first	necessary	to	detail	this	structure	and	how	it	came	
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into	being.	This	section	will	therefore	examine	the	decisions	that	were	
made	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	in	order	to	institutionalise	the	privilege	of	the	
world’s	most	powerful	nations.		
	
The	Dumbarton	Oaks	proposals	state	that	with	regards	to	its	composition:	
	
‘The	Security	Council	should	consist	of	one	representative	of	each	of	
eleven	members	of	the	organization.	Representatives	of	the	United	States	
of	America,	the	United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland,	the	
Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics,	the	Republic	of	China,	and,	in	due	
course,	France,	should	have	permanent	seats.	The	General	Assembly	
should	elect	six	states	to	fill	the	non-permanent	seats.	These	six	states	
should	be	elected	for	a	term	of	two	years,	three	retiring	each	year’	(United	
States,	1944:	12).		
	
The	Security	Council	was	to	be	made	up	of	a	combination	of	permanent	
and	non-permanent	members,	with	non-permanent	members	rotating	to	
give	more	member	states	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	Security	Council	
decision	making.	This	proposed	structure	was	agreed	in	the	Charter	and	
remained	in	place	until	reforms	in	1965,	which	saw	the	non-permanent	
members	of	the	Security	Council	increase	from	six	to	ten,	although	no	
reforms	were	made	in	terms	of	permanent	membership	(Krisch,	2008:	
136).	Although	the	inclusion	of	four	additional	non-permanent	members	
could	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	increase	representativeness	and	balance,	
this	reform	did	little	to	address	concerns	around	permanent	membership.	
The	Security	Council,	which	has	always	been	viewed	as	the	key	body	of	the	
United	Nations	in	terms	of	addressing	threats	to	peace	and	security,	was	
therefore	dominated	by	powerful	nations	from	the	outset	and	no	reforms	
since	1945	have	effectively	addressed	this	issue.	This	in	itself	suggests	an	
unwillingness	to	adapt	the	United	Nations	to	more	adequately	reflect	the	
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contemporary	world,	instead	maintaining	a	structure	that	legitimises	the	
power	of	those	who	dominated	global	politics	at	the	end	of	the	Second	
World	War.		
	
At	Dumbarton	Oaks	the	privilege	to	be	afforded	to	the	permanent	
members	of	the	Security	Council	was	central,	with	decisions	around	its	
structure	dominating	discussions	and	plans	for	the	organisation	that	would	
become	the	United	Nations.	The	sponsoring	nations	wished	to	create	a	
structure	within	which	they	were	free	and	able	to	respond	to	any	possible	
threats	in	a	manner	of	their	choosing,	without	having	an	obligation	to	
respond	to	threats	of	lesser	importance	to	them	(Luck,	2008:	63).	They	
wanted	to	have	the	ability	to	respond	to	any	type	of	international	conflict	
peacefully	or	militarily	where	necessary,	without	being	dragged	into	
disputes	between	smaller	states	that	they	deemed	unworthy	of	their	
attention.	The	Soviet	Union	in	particular	wanted	to	create	a	structure	
whereby	the	Security	Council,	and	by	extension,	the	five	permanent	
members,	would	dominate	international	peacekeeping	in	order	to	avoid	
the	problems	of	inefficiency	seen	in	the	League	of	Nations	(Hilderbrand,	
1990:	110).		
	
Where	the	League	of	Nations	had	frequently	been	prevented	from	taking	
action	due	to	disagreements	between	states	in	the	assembly,	
peacekeeping	in	the	United	Nations	was	to	be	controlled	by	a	smaller	
number	of	states	in	the	hope	that	agreement	would	be	more	likely.	By	
appointing	themselves	as	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	with	
particular	privileges,	the	sponsoring	nations	designed	a	structure	within	
which	they	could	dominate	decisions	on	intervention	and	military	action	
without	any	real	sense	of	accountability	(Luck,	2008:	63).	Whilst	their	
position	would	enable	them	to	act,	it	would	not	force	them	to	act.	This	
permanent	membership	afforded	to	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	
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States,	the	Soviet	Union,	China	and	France	was	based	on	the	recognition	of	
their	distinct	role	in	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	(Thakur,	2006:	
48).	Although	the	United	Nations	was	framed	as	an	international	
organisation,	based	on	principles	of	equality,	this	permanent	membership	
of	the	Security	Council	cemented	the	status	of	the	major	powers	as	more	
important	in	the	maintenance	of	peace	than	any	other	states.	It	is	vital	that	
we	remember	that	this	leadership	role	was	self-appointed	and	the	purpose	
of	examining	this	here	is	to	emphasise	the	likelihood	that	this	structure	
was	designed	to	preserve	a	particular	global	political	hierarchy.		
	
The	self-appointment	of	permanent	membership	reinforces	the	view	that	
these	particular	nations	were,	and	continue	to	be,	the	most	advanced	
nations	in	the	world	and	encourages	a	eurocentric	ideology	of	civilisation.	
The	role	of	the	major	powers	in	the	Security	Council	simultaneously	
identifies	them	as	the	most	advanced	nations	and	legitimates	their	position	
in	the	global	political	hierarchy.	Their	permanent	position	as	guardians	of	
international	peace	and	security	cements	their	position	as	the	paternalistic	
educators	as	discussed	in	Patil’s	notion	of	kinship	politics	(2008:	95).	The	
role	of	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	Security	Council	as	the	ultimate	
decision	making	body	in	terms	of	intervention	preserves	the	relationship	
between	particular	nations	that	was	established	through	colonialism.	In	
the	face	of	mounting	pressure	to	decolonise	the	world,	these	nations	
ensured	that	this	new	organisation	would	cement	their	position	as	
responsible	educators	with	the	duty	of	maintaining	peace	internationally	
and	intervening	in	conflicts	within	and	between	what	they	deemed	less	
developed	nations.	The	structure	of	the	Security	Council	is	therefore	an	
example	of	what	Patil	terms	‘the	softer	kinship	politics	of	colonial	rule’	
(2008:	96).		
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Claims	to	sovereign	equality	made	throughout	the	governing	documents	of	
the	United	Nations	are	therefore	heavily	undermined	by	the	very	structure	
of	the	Security	Council	and	its	development	as	a	key	body	within	the	
United	Nations	as	an	institution.	Permanent	membership	for	particular	
states	seems	to	be	a	fairly	clear	example	of	this.	Although	the	initial	plans	
for	the	Security	Council	included	six	non-permanent	members	on	rotation,	
and	despite	the	fact	that	this	has	been	increased	to	ten,	the	ultimate	
authority	lies	with	the	globally	powerful	and	their	sovereignty	is	protected	
and	privileged	above	all	else,	on	the	understanding	that	they	are	the	
natural	leaders	of	a	world	organisation	due	to	their	advanced	position	on	
the	linear	path	of	progress	and	development	(Patil,	2008:	42).	It	is	clear	
then,	that	although	the	United	Nations	claims	to	be	an	international	
organisation	based	on	sovereign	equality,	there	is	still	a	sharp	hierarchical	
distinction	in	terms	of	which	nations’	sovereignty	is	most	valid	and	
legitimate.	The	power	differential	seen	in	the	structure	of	the	Security	
Council	is	of	strong	significance	due	to	the	procedural	powers	afforded	to	
this	body	of	the	United	Nations.	The	Security	Council	is	able	to	invoke	
sanctions,	apply	military	action	and	make	recommendations	for	the	next	
Secretary-General	amongst	other	things	(Kuziemko	and	Werker,	2006:	4).	
As	such,	the	permanent	members	do	not	only	dominate	the	Security	
Council,	but	by	extension	the	United	Nations	as	a	whole.		
	
Although	permanent	membership	is	clearly	an	issue	in	terms	of	
maintaining	a	hierarchical	ordering	of	the	world,	what	matters	are	the	
implications	of	this	permanent	membership	and	the	powers	it	affords	to	
particular	states.	The	following	chapter	will	look	at	selectivity	in	terms	of	
intervention	in	order	to	illustrate	the	significance	of	permanent	
membership	within	the	Security	Council.	Here,	it	is	necessary	to	outline	the	
underlying	structures	that	have	been	established	in	order	to	allow	for	
selectivity.	The	key	aspect	with	regards	to	the	dominance	of	the	
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permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	and	the	powers	afforded	to	
them	is	the	principle	of	unanimity	between	the	permanent	members	and	
their	ability	to	veto.	This	issue	was	one	that	threatened	the	very	
establishment	United	Nations	as	an	organisation,	as	Chapter	1	briefly	
touched	upon.		
	
The	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	states	in	Article	27	that	decisions	on	
non-procedural	matters	within	the	Security	Council		
	
‘…shall	be	made	by	an	affirmative	vote	of	nine	members	including	the	
concurring	votes	of	the	permanent	members;	provided	that,	in	decisions	
under	Chapter	VI,	and	under	paragraph	3	of	Article	52,	a	party	to	a	dispute	
shall	abstain	from	voting’	(United	Nations,	1945).	
	
According	to	the	Charter,	decisions	on	issues	of	security	must	have	the	
unanimous	support	of	the	five	permanent	members	in	order	to	pass	and	
these	five	members	have	the	power	to	veto	decisions	and	prevent	a	
resolution	from	being	adopted,	provided	that	they	are	not	directly	involved	
in	the	dispute.	Permanent	members	therefore	have	the	ability	to	prevent	
action	in	international	conflicts	as	part	of	their	privileged	status	as	
international	peacekeepers.	In	order	for	the	United	Nations	as	an	
organisation	to	authorise	the	use	of	force,	it	is	necessary	that	Britain,	
France,	the	United	States,	China	and	Russia	(formerly	the	Soviet	Union)	
agree	that	action	is	both	justified	and	necessary.		
	
The	principle	of	abstention	if	a	member	is	directly	involved	in	a	dispute	is	
what	had	caused	disagreement	between	government	representatives	
present	at	Dumbarton	Oaks.	Indeed,	the	proposals	put	forward	in	October	
1944	state	in	Section	C.	Voting:	‘the	question	of	voting	procedure	in	the	
Security	Council	is	still	under	consideration’	(United	States,	1944:	13).	
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Whilst	the	discussions	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	had	resolved	the	majority	of	
issues	around	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council,	the	rules	around	voting	
procedure	were	unable	to	be	resolved	until	the	conference	at	San	
Francisco.	The	Soviet	Union	did	not	agree	with	British	and	American	
delegations	that	decisions	around	conflicts	involving	the	major	powers	
directly	should	not	be	voted	on,	and	therefore	not	vetoed,	by	those	
involved	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	110).	The	aim	here	was	to	prevent	a	situation	
whereby	the	United	Nations	could	intervene	in	the	affairs	of	the	major	
powers.	The	Soviet	Union	wanted	to	be	able	to	prevent	Security	Council	
intervention	when	their	own	interests	were	directly	at	stake.	This	dispute	
over	the	power	of	veto,	which	threatened	to	ruin	any	chance	of	building	a	
new	international	organisation,	reflected	a	growing	level	of	suspicion	
between	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	loose	alliance	between	the	United	
Kingdom	and	the	United	States,	which	would	eventually	escalate	into	the	
Cold	War	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	212).		
	
It	was	not	only	the	major	powers	that	were	concerned	about	the	use	of	
veto	within	the	Security	Council.	Throughout	the	conference	at	San	
Francisco,	the	Australian	delegation	raised	concerns	around	the	proposed	
power	of	veto	within	the	Security	Council.	Dr	Evatt,	Australia’s	Minister	of	
External	Affairs	at	the	time,	proved	to	be	a	firm	and	vocal	opponent	of	the	
great	power	privilege	that	was	being	written	into	the	structure	of	the	
United	Nations	(Fox,	1946:	122).	At	the	ninth	meeting	of	committee	three,	
which	was	tasked	with	determining	the	structure	and	procedure	of	the	
Security	Council,	Dr	Evatt	remarked		
	
‘It	seems	to	me	to	be	clear	that	although	all	the	parties	want	the	Security	
Council	to	act,	to	make	recommendations,	and	ten	out	of	eleven	members	
of	the	Council	wish	the	Council	to	act,	yet	one	power	can	say,	“No,	we	are	
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not	going	to	do	it.”	Such	a	situation	is	preposterous.	No	one	could	suggest	
any	reason	under	such	circumstances	why	the	Security	Council	in	such	a		
case	should	be	prevented	from	acting	by	the	vote	of	one	power’	(Remarks	
of	Delegate	of	Australia	at	Ninth	Meeting	of	Committee	III/1,	May	17th	
1945).		
	
Australian	representatives	at	San	Francisco	argued	that	the	principle	of	
veto	and	the	ability	of	any	one	of	the	major	powers	to	prevent	action	even	
where	all	other	members	were	in	agreement,	showed	that	the	Security	
Council	and	the	United	Nations	more	broadly,	had	been	designed	in	the	
exclusive	interests	of	those	permanent	five	members	of	the	Council	(Bosco,	
2009:	36).	The	New	Zealand	delegation	also	commented	upon	the	
‘inadequate	position’	of	smaller	powers	within	the	proposed	plans	for	the	
Security	Council	and	argued	that	collective	security	would	not	be	possible	if	
the	permanent	five	members	had	the	power	to	veto	decisions	(Summary	
Report	of	Fourth	Meeting	of	Committee	III/3,	May	10th	1945).		
	
If	the	question	of	decision	making	and	the	power	of	veto	had	been	
contentious	at	Dumbarton	Oaks,	it	was	even	more	so	at	San	Francisco,	with	
various	delegations	representing	smaller	powers	suggesting	amendments	
to	the	proposals	from	Dumbarton	Oaks	and	Yalta.	Representatives	from	
Columbia	argued	that	the	voting	procedure	proposed	by	the	sponsoring	
governments	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	‘…would	put	the	question	of	peace	or	
war	in	the	hands	of	any	one	of	the	five	powers’	(Summary	Report	of	19th	
Meeting	of	Committee	III/1,	June	12th	1945).	The	Columbian	delegation	
had	already	stated	however	that	they	were	willing	to	support	the	power	of	
veto	on	the	provision	that	the	autonomy	of	regional	arrangements	such	as	
those	applying	to	Latin	America	would	be	increased	(Address	by	Minister	of	
Foreign	Affairs	of	Columbia	at	the	Fifth	Plenary	Session,	April	30th	1945).	
Indeed,	despite	the	twenty	Latin	American	states	represented	at	San	
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Francisco	not	agreeing	on	all	issues	during	the	conference,	they	maintained	
a	united	front	when	discussing	regional	defence	arrangements	and	were	
supported	in	this	by	the	League	of	Arab	States	(Fox,	1946:	122).		
	
Although	this	structure	that	privileged	the	interests	of	the	permanent	
members	of	the	Security	Council	did	not	go	unchallenged	by	less	powerful	
states	at	the	San	Francisco	conference,	particularly	by	those	middle	powers	
mentioned,	the	ability	to	veto	decision	making	was	put	forward	as	a	
necessary	feature	of	the	Security	Council	for	the	permanent	members,	and	
thus	a	necessary	feature	for	the	United	Nations	as	a	whole	to	exist.	In	spite	
of	concerns	raised	by	smaller	states	about	the	dominance	of	a	minority,	
the	cooperation	of	these	powerful	states	was	essential	for	the	functioning	
of	an	international	organisation.	The	sponsoring	governments	attempted	
to	suppress	these	concerns	with	reference	to	notions	of	‘responsibility’	
rather	than	power.	For	example,	at	the	sixth	meeting	of	Committee	Three,	
a	representative	for	the	Chinese	delegation	was	reported	to	have	made	the	
following	comments:	
	
‘On	the	question	of	the	requirement	for	unanimity	of	the	permanent	
members	to	make	a	vote	in	the	Security	Council	effective	on	enforcement	
action,	he	explained	it	meant	that	there	was	a	greater	responsibility	placed	
on	their	shoulders	in	the	arrest	of	aggression	and	in	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security.	It	was	an	important	provision.	He	again	
recalled	the	failures	of	the	League	wherein	the	permanent	member	states	
had	no	greater	responsibility	than	other	states	in	this	vital	aspect,	and	
pleaded	for	giving	the	new	world	Organization	a	chance’	(Corrigendum	to	
Summary	Report	of	Sixth	Meeting	of	Committee	III/3,	May	14th	1945).		
	
As	seen	in	the	remarks	made	by	the	Chinese	delegate	here,	the	major	
powers	frequently	argued	that	their	permanent	membership	was	not	a	
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privilege	but	rather	a	burden.	It	was	their	responsibility	or	duty	to	ensure	
the	success	of	this	new	organisation	following	the	breakdown	of	the	
League	of	Nations	and	to	ultimately	ensure	that	the	world	was	a	safer	
place.		
	
This	framing	of	the	permanent	five’s	power	as	responsibility	was	reiterated	
throughout	the	conference,	largely	in	response	to	concerns	made	by	
representatives	of	middle	powers	such	as	Australia.	Senator	Connally	of	
the	United	States	delegation	made	a	statement	that	also	expressed	a	
similar	sentiment:		
	
‘…the	responsibility	of	the	Five	Permanent	Members	of	the	Security	
Council	is	momentous;	it	is	tremendous.	It	may	have	the	effect	of	shaking	
the	very	foundations	of	the	earth,	and	I	cannot	conceive	of	anyone	of	the	
Great	Powers	that	shall	be	a	member	of	the	Security	Council	considering	
lightly	of	that	responsibility.	It	is	our	theory	that	they	will	be	sensible	in	
that	sense	of	responsibility	and	that	they	will	discharge	the	duties	of	their	
office	not	as	representatives	of	their	governments,	not	as	representatives	
of	their	own	ambitions	or	their	own	interests,	but	as	representatives	of	the	
whole	Organization	in	behalf	of	world	peace	and	in	behalf	of	world	
security’	(Remarks	by	Senator	Connally,	Delegate	of	the	United	States,	at	
the	Meeting	of	Commission	III,	June	20th	1945).	
	
Again,	the	power	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	is	
framed	as	a	responsibility	that	they	are	undertaking	on	behalf	of	the	rest	of	
the	world.		
	
This	framing	of	great	power	privilege	as	responsibility	rather	than	
dominance	is	significant	for	the	debates	that	will	be	explored	in	Chapter	7	
around	the	Responsibility	to	Protect.	It	is	also	however	strongly	connected	
 180 
to	ideas	around	sovereignty	that	have	been	significant	in	the	previous	
discussions	of	this	thesis,	whereby	the	concept	of	sovereignty	within	
international	law	reinforces	a	particular	understanding	of	what	it	means	to	
be	modern	and	civilised,	creating	a	linear	understanding	of	progress.	To	
frame	the	relationship	between	great	powers	and	small	powers	within	the	
United	Nations	as	one	of	responsibility	reproduces	what	Anghie	terms	the	
‘dynamic	of	difference’,	which	allows	one	culture	to	be	framed	as	universal	
and	civilised	and	one	as	particular	and	uncivilized,	with	international	law	
providing	and	legitimating	mechanisms	that	will	enable	the	teaching	of	
civilisation	to	the	uncivilised	(Anghie,	2005:	4).	Difference	becomes	
understood	through	the	concept	of	development,	with	those	nations	who	
are	deemed	more	advanced	adopting	the	role	or	responsibility	of	teaching	
other	nations	how	to	progress.		
	
Within	the	context	of	the	Security	Council,	these	ideas	of	difference	as	part	
of	a	continuum	of	development	from	uncivilised	to	civilised	encourage	an	
understanding	of	the	permanent	members	as	educators	and	responsible	
paternal	figures,	reinforcing	their	privilege	and	legitimating	their	
dominance.	The	framing	of	the	permanent	members	as	having	a	distinct	
responsibility	for	all	other	members	of	the	organisation	allows	for	their	
decision	making	to	be	legitimated	as	in	the	interests	of	international	peace	
and	security,	when	they	may	in	fact	be	acting	less	nobly	in	their	own	
national	interest.	The	fact	that	this	notion	of	responsibility,	and	hence	
difference,	is	built	into	the	structure	of	the	United	Nations	via	the	Security	
Council	highlights	one	of	the	ways	in	which	the	inequalities	of	formal	
colonialism	are	reproduced	within	international	institutions	(Anghie,	2005:	
199).	This	institutionalisation	of	the	privilege	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	
and	former	imperial	masters	within	the	Security	Council	allows	for	the	
continuation	of	the	domination	characteristic	of	formal	colonialism.	The	
Security	Council	is	the	foremost	site	of	postcolonial	privilege	within	the	
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United	Nations,	where	colonial	dominance	is	institutionalised	to	the	extent	
that	even	after	decolonisation,	former	colonisers	are	able	to	maintain	their	
dominance	in	global	affairs	(Krisch,	2008:	135).		
	
The	power	of	veto	within	Security	Council	decision	making	is	also	the	most	
influential	structure	in	allowing	for	the	issue	of	selectivity	that	is	key	for	the	
arguments	of	this	thesis	and	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	following	
chapter.	The	great	power	unanimity	required	for	the	Security	Council	to	
pass	and	adopt	a	resolution	means	that	powerful	states	are	able	to	prevent	
action	in	situations	where	their	interests	are	not	being	met,	and	hence	the	
great	powers	have	the	ability	to	be	selective	about	which	conflicts	require	
an	international	solution	(Roberts	and	Zaum,	2008:	12).	Their	ability	to	
frame	their	power	within	the	Security	Council	not	as	power	but	as	
responsibility	legitimates	their	decision	making	as	acting	in	the	interests	of	
humanity,	where	in	reality,	the	major	powers	have	the	capacity	to	act	in	
their	own	interests	and	prevent	action	that	would	have	negative	
consequences	for	their	individual	political	relationships	(Murray,	2012:	73).		
	
The	Cold	War	period	is	a	prime	example	of	this	selectivity	in	action,	
highlighting	the	extent	to	which	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	
Security	Council	dominate	international	peacekeeping	and	make	decisions	
that	prioritise	their	own	interests.	Throughout	the	Cold	War	period,	the	
Security	Council	was	prevented	from	adopting	resolutions	on	212	
occasions,	largely	as	a	result	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	use	of	the	veto	(Weiss,	
2012:	42).	The	East-West	conflict	saw	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	United	
States	use	the	Security	Council	as	a	tool	of	conflict,	preventing	effective	
action	in	cases	of	international	conflict	in	line	with	their	own	political	
interests.	This	power	of	veto	therefore	inherently	provides	the	major	
powers	with	the	ability	and	the	right	to	act	selectively	in	terms	of	threats	to	
international	peace	and	security	(Roberts	and	Zaum,	2008:	12).	Those	
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states	that	did	not	make	up	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	
Council,	such	as	Australia	and	the	Latin	American	states,	recognised	that	
the	proposals	from	Dumbarton	Oaks	would	allow	the	major	powers	to	act	
selectively	and	in	any	manner	they	saw	appropriate.	However,	this	right	of	
selectivity	was	deliberately	written	into	the	Charter	and	proposals	made	at	
San	Francisco	to	include	detailed	definitions	of	situations	that	would	
constitute	threats	to	international	peace	and	security,	largely	as	an	
attempt	to	restrict	the	powers	of	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	
Council,	were	unsuccessful	(Roberts	and	Zaum,	2008:	13).		
	
The	selectivity	of	the	Security	Council	with	regards	to	the	application	of	
policy,	particularly	around	intervention	in	situations	of	international	
conflict,	highlights	the	fact	that	fundamentally,	the	Security	Council	is	not	
an	impartial	judicial	body,	but	an	intensely	political	one	(Roberts	and	Zaum,	
2008:	20).	The	ability	of	the	major	powers	to	act	selectively	therefore	
undermines	the	principles	of	sovereign	equality	outlined	in	the	Dumbarton	
Oaks	proposals	and	in	the	Charter	itself.	Despite	claims	that	the	United	
Nations	is	based	upon	the	sovereign	equality	of	all	its	members,	the	
institutionalisation	of	great	power	privilege	is	such	that	the	United	States,	
the	United	Kingdom,	France,	Russia	and	China	have	the	ability	to	prevent	
action	to	address	threats	to	international	peace	and	security	should	they	so	
wish,	a	capability	that	has	been	utilised	at	numerous	points	in	the	United	
Nations’	history.		
	
This	section	has	outlined	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council	and	how	this	
structure	came	to	be,	following	intense	debate	at	the	San	Francisco	
conference.	The	quotes	taken	from	archival	documents	from	the	San	
Francisco	conference	are	again	doing	the	work	of	de-silencing	the	anti-
colonial	resistance	present	at	the	conference,	challenging	the	standard	
narratives	of	the	development	of	the	United	Nations	and	revealing	the	
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extent	to	which	the	United	Nations	was	from	its	very	beginnings	designed	
to	be	dominated	by	the	major	powers	and	to	institutionalise	their	privilege	
(Krisch,	2008:	135).	The	archival	data	shows	that	the	conference	at	San	
Francisco	was	a	site	of	struggle	not	of	cooperation,	particularly	with	
regards	to	the	Security	Council	and	its	structure,	which	was	viewed	by	anti-
colonial	states	to	have	been	designed	exclusively	in	the	interests	of	the	
major	powers	(Bosco,	2009:	36).	Beginning	to	unpick	the	issue	of	
responsibility	as	a	key	concept	within	the	structural	organisation	of	the	
United	Nations,	it	has	been	argued	here	that	the	Security	Council	is	a	key	
space	within	which	the	postcolonial	privilege	of	the	major	powers	has	been	
institutionalised	and	left	largely	unchanged	since	1945.	This	continuous	
framing	of	power	as	responsibility	reinforces	the	problematic	ideology	of	
civilisation	that	has	been	a	key	focus	of	this	thesis.	It	reinforces	the	
relationship	between	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	Security	Council	
and	the	rest	of	the	world	in	terms	of	Patil’s	(2008)	‘kinship	politics,’	
whereby	former	colonisers	are	able	to	maintain	their	dominance	through	a	
discourse	of	development	that	sees	them	as	educators	of	progress.	The	
fact	that	this	position	of	power	is	accompanied	by	the	ability	to	prevent	
action	in	international	conflicts	provides	these	states	with	the	ability	to	act	
in	accordance	with	their	own	political	interests	and	is	therefore	a	
significant	form	of	postcolonial	power	in	a	formally	decolonised	world.		
	
	
Sovereignty	and	the	Security	Council	
	
The	notion	of	sovereignty	as	discussed	in	detail	in	the	previous	chapter	is	
of	prime	importance	within	the	context	of	the	Security	Council,	particularly	
with	regards	to	intervention.	The	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	states	in	
Article	1:	‘Nothing	contained	within	the	present	Charter	shall	authorize	the	
United	Nations	to	intervene	in	matters	which	are	essentially	within	the	
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domestic	jurisdiction	of	any	state…’	(United	Nations,	1945:	3).	However,	
the	process	of	Security	Council	intervention	appears	to	be	in	contradiction	
with	this,	especially	when	we	consider	the	role	of	the	five	permanent	
members	of	the	Security	Council	in	this	decision	making	process.	When	
members	of	the	Security	Council	seek	to	intervene	in	the	affairs	of	another	
country,	breaching	traditional	understandings	of	sovereignty,	hierarchical	
orders	of	power,	interest	and	ideology	affect	the	decision	making	process	
(Jones,	2013:	1153).	The	struggle	in	terms	of	sovereign	equality	in	these	
contexts	becomes	one	between	smaller	states	and	the	world’s	most	
powerful	states,	which	is	a	struggle	that	it	is	impossible	for	smaller	states	
to	win.	This	section	will	look	specifically	at	the	role	that	the	concept	of	
sovereignty	plays	within	the	context	of	the	Security	Council,	arguing	that	
the	Security	Council’s	respect	for	sovereignty	is	selective	and	based	on	
hierarchical	understandings	of	civilisation	that	prioritise	the	sovereignty	of	
particular	states	over	others.	As	Anghie	(2005)	argues,	this	is	a	result	of	the	
relationship	between	the	concept	of	sovereignty	and	the	process	of	
colonialism.			
	
Within	the	broader	structure	of	the	United	Nations,	all	member	states	have	
the	opportunity	to	participate	in	discussions	as	independent	sovereigns.	
The	General	Assembly	provides	the	space	within	which	these	discussions	
are	able	to	happen	(United	Nations,	1945).	However,	what	the	structure	of	
the	Security	Council	requires	is	that	smaller	states	relinquish	their	rights	as	
sovereigns	and	allow	decisions	to	be	made	on	their	behalf	with	regards	to	
acts	of	aggression	and	subsequent	interventions	(military	or	otherwise).	
For	the	Security	Council,	the	aim	has	never	been	equality	in	terms	of	
representation,	but	rather	unity	and	control	in	making	decisions	(Luck,	
2008:	63).	This	surrender	of	sovereignty	did	not	go	unrecognised	by	those	
present	at	the	birth	of	the	organisation	and	concerns	were	raised	around	
the	role	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	and	the	level	of	
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power	afforded	to	them	by	the	structure	of	the	organisation,	as	seen	in	the	
remarks	made	by	the	delegates	of	Australia	and	New	Zealand	in	the	
previous	section.		
	
Concerns	around	this	sacrifice	were	raised	both	at	the	conference	in	San	
Francisco	as	already	discussed	but	this	also	continued	throughout	the	early	
years	of	the	organisation.	After	the	ratification	of	the	Charter	at	San	
Francisco	in	1945,	Dr	Zuleta	Angel	of	Colombia	chaired	the	first	plenary	
meeting	of	the	General	Assembly	in	1946	and	highlighted	the	issues	
around	sovereignty	in	his	opening	statement:	
	
‘The	five	great	Powers	which,	by	virtue	of	Articles	24	and	27	of	the	Charter,	
and	by	the	very	nature	of	things,	will	shoulder	the	chief	responsibility	for	
the	maintenance	of	peace	and	security,	will	bring	not	only	the	immense	
power	of	their	military,	financial	and	industrial	resources,	but	something	
more	important,	without	which	their	very	power	would	be	nothing	but	the	
prelude	to	an	unthinkable	cataclysm;	I	mean	good	will,	divested	of	every	
shred	of	intrigue	or	trickery,	and	that	spirit	of	co-operation	which	is	vital	in	
order	to	maintain	among	them	of	good	understanding	upon	which	our	
whole	Organization	rests.	In	signing	the	Charter,	the	other	Powers	have	
already	deposited	as	their	first	contribution	to	this	great	undertaking,	a	
large	part	of	that	which	they	hold	most	dear	and	most	precious,	a	large	
part,	that	is,	of	their	sovereignty.	They	made	this	sacrifice	with	deep	
emotion,	but	without	hesitation,	in	the	belief	that	here	was	the	beginning	
of	a	new	era	in	which	their	security	would	be	collectively	guaranteed	by	
adequate	and	effective	means,	and	any	aggression	or	attempt	at	
aggression	directed	against	them	would	be	severely	repressed’	(United	
Nations	General	Assembly,	1946:	38).		
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There	was	recognition	then,	that	smaller	member	states	of	the	United	
Nations	were	sacrificing	their	own	sovereignty	in	order	to	support	the	
structure	of	the	organisation	and	the	role	of	the	Security	Council	as	the	
sponsors	envisaged	it.	As	noted	previously,	without	the	Security	Council	on	
the	terms	outlined	by	the	representatives	at	Dumbarton	Oaks,	there	would	
be	no	United	Nations	at	all	(Bosco,	2009:	26).	However,	this	recognition	
highlights	once	again,	the	way	in	which	claims	to	sovereign	equality	made	
in	the	Charter	were	in	contradiction	with	the	very	structure	of	the	United	
Nations	from	the	outset.	For	the	organisation	to	exist,	it	was	necessary	for	
the	sovereignty	of	some	states	to	be	privileged	and	the	sovereignty	of	
other	states	to	be	sacrificed.		
	
The	way	in	which	this	sacrifice	of	sovereignty	is	framed	is	also	significant	in	
that	it	is	based	on	an	understanding	that	the	major	powers	are	‘by	the	very	
nature	of	things’	the	most	advanced	nations	and	therefore	the	most	
qualified	to	shoulder	the	responsibility	of	maintaining	international	peace	
and	security.	Rather	than	understanding	the	structure	of	the	Security	
Council	as	a	reinforcement	of	hierarchical	global	positioning	and	the	power	
of	the	permanent	members	as	a	new	form	of	colonial	management,	even	
those	smaller	states	that	had	highlighted	concerns	around	the	dominance	
of	the	major	powers	were	part	of	the	maintenance	of	a	discourse	of	
development	and	progress.	The	status,	position	and	‘responsibility’	of	the	
major	powers	is	naturalised	and	their	role	in	the	organisation	is	legitimated	
through	an	understanding	of	the	world	that	equates	cultural	difference	
with	the	notion	of	development	and	civilisation.	They	are	part	of	the	
maintenance	of	what	Anghie	terms	the	‘dynamic	of	difference’	(2005:	4).		
	
Arguably	in	an	attempt	to	distract	attention	away	from	this	issue	of	
sovereign	equality	within	the	structures	of	the	Security	Council,	the	
representatives	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	had	also	included	proposals	for	a	
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General	Assembly,	which	would	provide	a	space	for	all	member	states	to	
discuss	issues	of	international	cooperation.	The	General	Assembly	was	to	
be	made	up	of	representatives	from	every	member	state,	and	should		
	
‘…have	the	right	to	consider	the	general	principles	of	cooperation	in	the	
maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security,	including	the	principles	
governing	disarmament	and	the	regulation	of	armaments;	to	discuss	any	
questions	relating	to	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security	
brought	before	it	by	any	member	or	members	of	the	Organization	or	by	
the	Security	Council;	and	to	make	recommendations	with	regard	to	any	
such	principles	or	questions’	(United	States,	1944:	10).			
	
The	General	Assembly	would	be	a	space	for	each	member	state,	large	or	
small,	to	have	their	voice	heard	on	general	issues	to	be	considered	by	the	
United	Nations.	Crucially	however,	the	proposals	specified	that	the	General	
Assembly	did	not	have	the	right	to	make	recommendations	on	its	own	
initiative	‘…on	any	matter	relating	to	the	maintenance	of	international	
peace	and	security	which	is	being	dealt	with	by	the	Security	Council’	
(United	States,	1944:	10).	Whilst	the	General	Assembly	would	form	a	space	
within	which	theoretically	all	member	states	could	have	their	say	on	
matters	of	international	peace	and	security,	once	a	conflict	was	being	dealt	
with	by	the	Security	Council,	the	General	Assembly	was	not	permitted	to	
make	recommendations,	and	control	over	appropriate	action	was	to	
remain	in	the	hands	of	the	major	powers	and	their	ability	to	veto.	The	
General	Assembly	in	this	sense	was	designed	to	placate	smaller	nations,	
giving	them	a	space	within	which	to	vent	their	opinions	and	to	attempt	to	
address	the	principle	of	sovereign	equality	(Hilderbrand,	1990:	108).		
	
These	initial	contradictions	in	terms	of	sovereignty	and	sovereign	equality,	
particularly	in	relation	to	the	structures	of	the	organisation	and	the	
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Security	Council,	allowed	for	the	development	of	an	organisation	that	
rearticulated	the	power	of	the	most	powerful	and	set	up	structures	that	
would	later	allow	for	a	redefinition	of	ideas	of	sovereignty	that	legitimates	
this	power	further,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	chapter.	In	more	recent	
years,	and	particularly	since	the	1990s,	the	United	Nations	has	arguably	
attempted	to	address	issues	of	selectivity	within	the	Security	Council	and	
details	of	these	changes	in	policy	over	time	will	be	outlined	in	the	following	
chapter.	In	spite	of	this,	the	issues	of	power	politics	and	the	dominance	of	
the	permanent	five	members	of	the	Security	Council	continue	to	result	in	
the	selective	application	of	United	Nations	policy.		
	
To	return	to	the	example	that	has	been	used	throughout	this	thesis,	in	the	
recent	context	of	the	Middle	East,	very	similar	revolutionary	uprisings	in	
Libya	and	Syria	have	seen	markedly	different	responses	from	the	Security	
Council	and	both	were	met	with	concerns	around	major	power	interest	in	
the	implementation	of	policy.	The	intervention	in	Libya	was	not	vetoed	by	
any	of	the	major	powers	but	saw	abstentions	from	Brazil,	China,	Germany,	
India	and	Russia,	highlighting	a	growing	concern	from	the	global	
community	about	the	implementation	of	interventionist	policy	(Mahdavi,	
2012:	265).	Although	not	wishing	to	directly	prevent	action	in	a	situation	of	
conflict,	a	significant	number	of	members	of	the	Security	Council	abstained	
from	voting	in	favour	of	action,	suggesting	a	discomfort	with	the	approach	
the	Security	Council	was	taking	in	this	particular	scenario.	In	the	Libyan	
context,	questions	were	raised	over	the	relationship	between	United	
Nations	intervention	based	on	notions	of	protection	and	the	political	goals	
of	powerful	states,	namely	regime	change	(Bellamy	and	Williams,	2011:	
846).	As	Libya	was	still	under	the	rule	of	a	functioning	government	at	the	
time	of	intervention,	the	international	response	was	heavily	criticised	as	
being	more	concerned	with	the	removal	of	the	Gaddafi	regime	than	with	
humanitarian	aims	of	protection.		
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In	contrast,	despite	a	similar	uprising	in	Syria,	the	interventionist	response	
of	the	Security	Council	was	not	replicated.	Despite	attempts	to	address	
selectivity	through	the	development	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	
principle,	the	Security	Council	was	unable	to	adopt	a	resolution	for	action	
in	Syria,	replicating	the	inconsistency	of	the	1990s	seen	in	cases	such	as	
Rwanda	and	Kosovo	(Mohamed,	2012:	225).	On	the	surface,	this	suggests	
that	within	Security	Council	decision	making,	some	crises	are	deemed	
worthy	of	intervention	whilst	others	are	not,	and	that	this	judgement	is	left	
in	the	hands	of	the	major	powers	to	decide.	If	we	delve	a	little	deeper	than	
this	however,	these	judgements	appear	to	be	based	on	the	political	
interests	and	relationships	between	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	
Security	Council.		
	
Action	in	Syria	has	been	consistently	prevented	by	the	Russian	government	
through	the	use	of	their	power	of	veto,	specifically	citing	the	‘Western	
betrayal’	over	Libya	as	their	justification	(Rotmann	et	al,	2014:	368).		The	
crisis	in	Syria	has	seen	hundreds	of	thousands	of	people	killed	and	millions	
displaced	both	inside	and	outside	of	Syria,	but	the	Russian	and	Chinese	
governments	have	paralysed	the	Security	Council	through	vetoes	to	
resolutions	(Weiss,	2014:	13).	Clearly	then,	within	the	Security	Council,	
humanitarian	motives	and	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	
security	are	not	always	underlying	decisions	around	intervention	and	
protection.	The	ICISS	report	on	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	in	2001	even	
attempted	to	address	this	by	stating	that:	
	
‘The	Permanent	Five	members	of	the	Security	Council	should	
agree	not	to	apply	their	veto	power,	in	matters	where	their	
vital	state	interests	are	not	involved,	to	obstruct	the	passage	
of	resolutions	authorizing	military	intervention	for	human	
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protection	purposes	for	which	there	is	otherwise	majority	
support’	(ICISS,	2001:	xiii).		
		
In	spite	of	this	clear	warning	that	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	
Council	should	not	exploit	their	right	of	veto,	what	we	see	in	the	case	of	
Syria	is	the	abuse	of	the	privilege	afforded	to	the	five	permanent	members	
that	was	raised	as	a	concern	as	far	back	as	San	Francisco.		
	
However,	whilst	the	combined	desire	of	Russia	and	China	to	prevent	action	
in	Syria	is	undoubtedly	influenced	by	their	own	political	interests,	it	also	
reflects	the	political	power	conflicts	between	the	world’s	most	powerful	
nations.	The	use	of	veto	by	the	Russian	government	in	particular	reflects	a	
long-standing	concern	around	Western-led	military	interventions	(Allison,	
2013:	795).	Whilst	the	Security	Council	claims	to	be	fundamentally	
supporting	the	aim	of	the	United	Nations,	namely	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security,	the	fact	is	that	the	major	powers	act	
exclusively	in	their	own	interests	when	making	decisions.	The	example	
used	here	is	by	no	means	the	only	occasion	where	selectivity	has	been	an	
issue	within	the	Security	Council	over	the	past	seven	decades;	the	major	
powers	have	been	framing	their	own	interests	as	global	interests	since	the	
United	Nations	began.	The	fact	that	they	are	able	to	do	so	is	a	result	of	the	
deliberate	and	conscious	structuring	of	the	Security	Council	from	the	
beginnings	of	the	organisation	at	Dumbarton	Oaks.	As	Luck	argues,	the	
Security	Council	remains	today	as	it	was	from	its	beginnings	
‘undependable,	unaccountable,	and	unrepresentative’	(2008:	85).		
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Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	questioned	the	role	of	the	Security	Council	in	relation	to	
the	United	Nations’	commitment	to	equality,	particularly	focusing	on	the	
fact	that	the	Security	Council	is	a	key	site	where	decisions	are	made	and	
yet	it	is	entirely	dominated	by	a	small	number	of	states.	The	chapter	has	
argued	that	this	structuring	of	the	Security	Council	allows	for	the	selective	
enforcement	of	policy	based	on	the	privileged	power	of	particular	states	
and	their	ability	to	prevent	action	that	does	not	conform	to	their	political	
interests	(Luck,	2008:	63).		
	
This	chapter	has	argued	that	the	Security	Council	legitimates	the	power	
structures	established	through	colonialism	by	institutionalising	the	power	
of	the	powerful	and	arguing	that	this	is	based	on	their	‘special	role	and	
responsibility	in	underwriting	world	order	and	collective	security’	(Thakur,	
2006:	48).	Their	status	is	naturalised	and	their	privilege	is	framed	as	a	
burden	of	responsibility.		
	
The	Security	Council’s	respect	for	sovereignty	is	selective	in	that	
intervention	in	the	contemporary	global	context	frequently	represents	a	
breach	of	the	traditional	understandings	of	sovereignty	such	as	those	
established	by	the	Charter	whereby	the	United	Nations	does	not	have	the	
right	to	intervene	in	domestic	conflicts	(United	Nations,	1945).	The	next	
chapter	will	look	in	more	detail	at	how	this	move	towards	interventionist	
policy	has	developed	over	time,	but	in	this	chapter	the	purpose	has	been	
to	highlight	the	fact	that	permanent	membership	in	the	Security	Council	
represents	a	prioritisation	of	the	sovereignty	of	particular	nations	over	
others.	This	structure	requires	smaller	states	to	relinquish	their	rights	as	
sovereigns	in	allowing	the	permanent	members,	whose	sovereignty	is	
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always	protected,	to	act	on	their	behalf	(United	Nations	General	Assembly,	
1946:	38).		
	
This	chapter	has	therefore	ascertained	that	the	Security	Council	is	the	key	
site	of	postcolonial	privilege	within	the	United	Nations.	The	power	of	the	
United	Kingdom,	the	United	States,	France,	Russia	and	China	has	been	
institutionalised	and	this	structure	allows	for	the	selective	enforcement	of	
policy	that	amounts	to	the	ability	of	these	powers	to	intervene	only	in	
situations	where	their	own	political	interests	will	be	met.	The	
conversations	at	Dumbarton	Oaks	and	San	Francisco	ensured	that	the	
United	Nations	would	be	an	organisation	that	preserved	the	global	order	
established	by	colonialism	through	institutionalising	their	privilege	via	the	
Security	Council.	As	Mazower	argues,	
	
‘It	was	to	be	a	device	for	cushioning	the	British	Empire,	cementing	its	ties	
with	the	United	States,	and	coming	to	terms	with	the	unfortunate	but	
tolerable	fact	that	the	Soviet	Union	had	become	a	world	power.	By	keeping	
the	peace,	it	would	preserve	the	global	hegemony	of	Europe	and	its	
successor	states’	(2009:	104).		
	
The	effects	of	this	institutionalisation	of	power	continue	to	be	felt	in	
contemporary	conflicts,	through	the	implementation	of	neocolonial	
policies	on	intervention,	as	will	be	seen	in	the	following	chapter.		
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Chapter	7:	From	Non-Intervention	to	R2P	
	
‘It	is	this	sum	total	of	these	modern	attempts	to	perpetuate	colonialism	
while	at	the	same	time	talking	about	“freedom”,	which	has	come	to	be	
known	as	neo-colonialism’	(Nkrumah,	1965:	239).	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	purpose	of	this	final	chapter	is	to	make	the	connection	between	
contemporary	debates	surrounding	the	United	Nations	and	its	history	that	
has	been	the	focus	of	this	thesis	thus	far.	Focusing	on	the	Responsibility	to	
Protect	policy	of	the	United	Nations	that	governs	the	organisation’s	
behaviour	in	terms	of	intervention,	this	chapter	will	trace	the	historical	
development	of	this	policy,	starting	with	the	United	Nations’	initial	
commitment	to	non-intervention.	Ultimately,	this	chapter	will	provide	an	
example	of	the	significance	of	an	accurate	understanding	of	history	in	
dealing	with	contemporary	issues.	It	will	show	that	the	United	Nations’	
selective	enforcement	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	principle	is	
underpinned	by	its	colonial	history	and	the	institutionalisation	of	great	
power	privilege	from	its	very	beginnings.	In	order	to	bring	together	the	
theoretical	approach	that	was	established	in	the	first	half	of	the	thesis	with	
a	concrete	example	of	how	this	theory	applies	to	the	real,	day-to-day	
practices	of	the	United	Nations,	intervention	will	be	the	focus.	
	
The	chapter	will	begin	with	an	examination	of	the	United	Nations’	initial	
commitment	to	non-intervention	in	the	affairs	of	other	countries,	whereby	
member	states	were	recognised	as	independent	sovereigns	within	an	
international	community	(Roberts,	1993:	434.	This	commitment	to	non-
intervention	will	be	discussed	here	in	terms	of	its	particular	significance	to	
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those	member	states	that	were	formerly	colonised	and	to	those	states	that	
remained	under	the	trusteeship	system	of	the	United	Nations	and	had	
independence	as	their	end	goal	(Roberts,	1993:	434).	The	chapter	will	then	
move	on	to	detail	the	continued	development	in	United	Nations	policy	
with	regards	to	intervention	that	has	seen	a	move	from	the	right	of	states	
to	non-intervention	to	a	responsibility	of	states	to	intervene	and	protect	
since	the	signing	of	the	Charter	in	1945.		
	
The	sixty	years	between	the	signing	of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations	
and	the	agreement	on	the	principle	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	at	the	
World	Summit	of	2005	have	seen	distinct	periods	of	development	in	terms	
of	approaches	to	intervention,	which	will	be	examined	in	some	detail	here.	
Beginning	with	the	significance	of	non-intervention	post	World	War	2,	then	
moving	on	to	look	at	how	the	United	Nations	was	affected	by	disputes	
between	the	superpowers	during	the	Cold	War,	followed	by	an	
examination	of	the	rise	of	humanitarian	intervention	particularly	during	the	
1990s	and	the	ICISS	report	on	Responsibility	to	Protect	that	followed	in	
2001,	this	chapter	will	investigate	the	development	of	the	idea	of	
responsibility	within	United	Nations	policy,	bearing	in	mind	the	previous	
chapters	that	have	discussed	issues	of	power	and	inequality	from	the	
institution’s	establishment.		
	
Whilst	this	development	of	United	Nations	policy	is	often	framed	in	terms	
of	a	humanitarian	response	to	atrocities,	here	it	will	be	argued	that	policies	
within	the	United	Nations	and	their	application	to	real	life	scenarios	are	
always	heavily	influenced	by	issues	of	global	political	power,	and	that	in	
this	particular	instance,	the	notion	of	‘responsibility’	is	used	in	order	to	
mask	particular	political	interests	and	strategies.	This	chapter	brings	
together	the	argument	running	throughout	the	thesis	that	the	process	of	
decolonisation	and	the	eventual	disbanding	of	the	trusteeship	system	in	
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1994	resulted	in	the	need	for	new	forms	of	control	and	domination,	and	
that	this	was	done	under	the	guise	of	the	notion	of	responsibility	that	
sprung	from	discourses	of	development	and	civilisation	that	were	
established	through	colonialism.	Rather	than	existing	as	a	genuine	concern	
for	the	suffering	of	individuals,	it	will	be	argued	that	the	concept	of	
responsibility	within	this	context	functions	as	a	neocolonial	technology	of	
power	to	ensure	the	continuation	of	ideas	around	civilisation	and	
development	that	maintain	the	existing	–	unequal	–	global	order.		
	
	
Non-Intervention	After	the	Second	World	War	
	
To	reiterate	what	has	been	previously	outlined,	the	preamble	of	the	
Charter	of	the	United	Nations	states	that	in	signing	the	Charter,	member	
states	agreed		
	
‘to	unite	our	strength	to	maintain	international	peace	and	security,	and	to	
ensure,	by	the	acceptance	of	principles	and	the	institution	of	methods,	that	
armed	force	shall	not	be	used,	save	in	the	common	interest…’	(United	
Nations,	1945:	2).		
	
The	Charter,	signed	following	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War,	was	
therefore	designed	to	deal	with	wars	between	states	rather	than	wars	
within	states;	it	was	designed	to	deal	with	international	rather	than	
domestic	conflicts	(Doyle	and	Sambanis,	2006:	11).	With	the	sovereignty	of	
states	as	a	fundamental	principle,	the	United	Nations	was	designed	to	
mediate	relationships	between	individual	states	to	maintain	international	
peace	and	security,	not	to	deal	with	internal	conflicts	within	a	sovereign	
state.	Following	on	from	its	predecessor	the	League	of	Nations,	the	
wording	of	the	preamble	strongly	infers	that	the	United	Nations	was	
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designed	as	a	grouping	of	independent	states	in	agreement	to	reduce	the	
use	of	military	force	in	order	to	prevent	conflict	on	the	scale	of	the	First	
and	Second	World	Wars.	Indeed,	as	quoted	in	the	previous	chapter,	Article	
2	of	the	Charter	deals	with	the	use	of	force	by	member	states	and	dictates	
that,	with	regard	to	intervention:	
	
‘Nothing	contained	in	the	present	Charter	shall	authorize	the	United	
Nations	to	intervene	in	matters	which	are	essentially	within	the	domestic	
jurisdiction	of	any	state	or	shall	require	the	Members	to	submit	such	
matters	to	settlement	under	the	present	Charter…’	(United	Nations,	1945).	
	
The	Charter	sets	out	the	aims	of	the	United	Nations	not	as	a	world	
government,	but	as	an	organisation	designed	to	encourage	international	
cooperation	without	interference	in	domestic	matters.		
	
The	United	Nations	in	this	sense	was	designed	as	a	Westphalian	system	of	
peacekeeping,	whereby	independent	sovereign	states	were	obliged	to	
obey	a	particular	set	of	rules	of	behaviour	with	regards	to	international	
relations	and	as	such,	conflict	would	in	theory	only	arise	when	states	
disobeyed	the	rules	and	acted	aggressively	towards	each	other	
(MacQueen,	2011:	14).	Conflicts	within	states	were	therefore	not	initially	
imagined	to	be	within	the	realms	of	United	Nations	peacekeeping	and	the	
right	of	those	states	recognised	as	sovereigns	to	manage	their	own	
domestic	affairs	was	of	the	utmost	importance.	Although	the	United	
Nations’	claims	to	universality	and	equality	have	already	been	questioned	
in	terms	of	the	very	structure	of	the	organisation,	it	aimed	to	present	itself	
as	universalist	where	the	League	of	Nations	had	been	criticised	for	being	
imperialist	and	the	principle	of	non-intervention	was	fundamental	in	doing	
so.	The	principle	of	non-intervention	in	this	context	was	not	based	on	
justice	or	moral	grounds,	but	on	maintaining	order,	providing	clear	rules	
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for	limiting	the	use	of	force	and	reducing	the	risk	of	military	conflict	
(Roberts,	1993:	434).	In	order	for	this	new	international	organisation	to	
function	efficiently,	it	was	considered	necessary	to	provide	clear	guidelines	
on	respecting	the	sovereignty	of	individual	states	and	non-intervention	was	
the	way	to	do	so.			
	
The	United	Nations	Security	Council	has	historically	been	respectful	of	this	
foundational	principle	of	non-intervention,	and	has	privileged	this	over	the	
right	of	individuals	not	to	be	killed	(Bellamy,	2011:3).	Although	this	has	
been	questioned	in	the	earlier	chapters	of	this	thesis,	the	United	Nations	
was	in	theory	essentially	based	on	the	sovereign	equality	of	all	its	
members,	and	as	such,	non-intervention	was	the	logical	resulting	principle	
for	governing	relations	between	states,	or	‘the	other	side	of	the	
Westphalian	coin’	(Weiss,	2012:	21).	If	the	United	Nations	was	based	on	
the	equal	right	of	all	member	states	to	maintain	sovereign	authority	over	
their	territory,	this	right	had	to	be	supported	by	the	inability	of	any	state	to	
intervene	in	the	affairs	of	another.	This	principle	of	non-intervention	was	
of	particular	significance	for	those	countries	joining	the	United	Nations	that	
were	still	or	had	previously	been	colonies	of	empire.	In	a	time	where	the	
anti-colonial	movement	was	gaining	momentum	and	public	attitudes	had	
shifted	in	support	of	decolonisation,	it	was	important	to	ensure	that	this	
new	organisation	would	not	support	previous	structures	of	domination.	
Indeed,	the	commitment	to	non-intervention	and	non-interference	as	
outlined	by	the	United	Nations	both	at	San	Francisco	and	in	the	Charter	
was	the	reason	for	so	many	states	agreeing	to	join	in	the	first	instance	
(Roberts,	1993:	434).	An	organisation	that	committed	to	the	independence	
and	sovereignty	of	each	of	its	members	seemed	an	attractive	prospect	to	
those	countries	that	had	suffered	decades	of	exploitation	and	domination	
at	the	hands	of	their	imperial	masters.		
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For	smaller,	developing	states,	their	commitment	to	membership	of	the	
United	Nations	was	dependent	upon	a	commitment	by	the	world’s	most	
powerful	states	to	respect	their	sovereignty	and	their	right	to	rule	within	
their	own	national	borders	(Mazower,	2009:	189).	As	previously	noted,	the	
sacrifice	of	sovereignty	made	by	those	smaller	powers	in	the	signing	of	the	
Charter	and	agreeing	to	the	dominance	of	the	five	permanent	members	of	
the	Security	Council	was	frequently	articulated,	with	representatives	of	
those	smaller	powers	stating	that	this	was	done	on	the	understanding	that	
the	Security	Council	would	guarantee	collective	security	and	the	repression	
of	acts	of	aggression	(United	Nations	General	Assembly,	1946:	38).	Those	
states	that	had	fought	for	independence	were	wary	from	the	start	however	
that	whilst	the	promise	of	sovereign	equality	and	formal	independence	was	
appealing,	the	United	Nations	had	the	capacity	to	become	an	arena	for	
justifying	postcolonial	rule.		
	
In	later	years,	the	principle	of	non-intervention	continued	to	have	a	strong	
significance	in	debates	around	changing	policies	on	intervention	and	how	
to	deal	with	humanitarian	emergencies.	A	number	of	largely	ex-colonial	
states	argued	against	developing	norms	of	interventionist	policy	and	
maintained	a	fundamental	commitment	to	non-intervention	in	the	
domestic	affairs	of	other	states	as	a	governing	approach	(Mayall,	1991:	
421).	For	formerly	colonised	states,	the	United	Nations	in	theory	provided	
the	opportunity	to	be	treated	as	equal	sovereigns	with	colonisers	and	this	
principle	of	non-intervention	formed	the	foundation	for	this	relationship.	
Whilst	still	colonised	these	countries	used	the	United	Nations	to	fight	
against	their	imperial	masters	and	to	push	for	decolonisation,	but	once	
independent,	these	countries	fought	to	keep	the	United	Nations	out	of	
affairs	which	they	understood	to	fall	under	their	own	domestic	jurisdiction	
due	to	an	increasing	concern	around	the	inequality	of	power	between	
particular	states	in	the	global	system	(Mazower,	2009:	189).	However,	as	
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many	of	the	governments	of	the	ex-colonial	states	fighting	for	non-
intervention	were	dictatorships,	their	public	commitment	to	liberalism	as	
the	basis	for	non-intervention	failed	to	convince	the	international	
community	and	as	a	result,	the	increasingly	interventionist	approach	of	the	
major	powers	were	not	inhibited	(Mayall,	1991:	422).	Whilst	the	Charter	of	
the	United	Nations	on	the	surface	proclaimed	non-intervention	as	an	
essential	part	of	the	organisation,	the	reality	has	increasingly	distanced	
itself	from	this	rhetoric.			
	
	
Power	Politics	in	the	Cold	War	Period	
	
The	Cold	War	period	from	the	late	1940s	to	the	late	1980s	saw	a	move	
away	from	this	initial	commitment	to	non-intervention,	although	without	
moving	as	strongly	towards	the	humanitarianism	seen	in	the	1990s.	
International	intervention	by	the	United	Nations	during	the	Cold	War	
period	was	based	on	a	triumvirate	of	consent,	neutrality	and	the	use	of	
force	only	in	self-defence	(MacQueen,	2011:	24).	Intervention	was	to	be	
authorised	by	state	in	question,	based	on	restoring	peace	rather	than	
supporting	a	particular	party	in	the	case	of	a	civil	conflict	and	intervening	
parties	were	not	to	use	military	action	except	where	it	was	absolutely	
necessary	in	order	to	protect	troops.	This	approach	signified	a	move	away	
from	traditional	forms	of	international	peacekeeping	and	the	principle	of	
non-interference	in	domestic	affairs	as	outlined	in	the	Charter,	but	
intervention	remained	heavily	restricted	and	dependent	upon	the	consent	
of	states	seen	to	be	in	need.	The	Carter	administration	in	the	United	States	
(from	1977	–	1981)	was	particularly	keen	to	avoid	military	interference,	
highlighting	the	responsibility	of	the	United	States	to	act	in	accordance	
with	international	law	(Cohen,	2012:	10).	The	United	Nations,	although	
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perhaps	only	on	the	surface,	remained	reluctant	to	respond	militarily	to	
domestic	disputes	without	the	approval	the	state	concerned.		
	
However,	later	during	this	period,	concerns	began	to	be	raised	about	the	
role	of	the	major	powers	in	implementing	United	Nations	policies	on	
intervention,	with	the	structure	of	the	Security	Council	coming	into	
question.	The	East-West	conflict	was	hugely	influential	on	decision	making	
within	the	United	Nations,	and	particularly	within	the	Security	Council	at	
this	time.	At	a	time	when	a	number	of	bodies	within	the	United	Nations	
were	subject	to	reform,	the	Security	Council	was	paralysed	in	terms	of	
efficiency	due	to	the	conflict	between	East	and	West	(Bertrand,	1995:	350).	
The	exclusivity	of	the	Security	Council	and	the	crucial	power	of	veto	held	by	
the	five	permanent	members	as	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter,	meant	
that	it	was	impossible	to	secure	agreement	on	matters	of	international	
security	during	this	period.	In	addition,	outside	of	the	Security	Council,	the	
General	Assembly	also	lost	the	sense	of	democracy	and	neutrality	
envisaged	by	member	states	to	be	present	from	its	beginnings.	Instead,	it	
became	a	showground	for	conflict	between	the	superpowers	who	upon	
finding	the	Security	Council	an	ineffective	route	to	action,	fought	to	
generate	allegiance	from	smaller	states	on	matters	of	conflict	(Sayward,	
2013:	3).	The	General	Assembly	became	the	only	space	within	which	the	
superpowers	were	able	to	propose	action	and	gain	support	from	those	
smaller	member	states	that	were	not	involved	in	the	politics	of	the	Security	
Council.	The	global	political	relationships	between	states	had	a	heavy	
impact	upon	voting	patterns	and	consequently	upon	the	extent	to	which	
the	United	Nations	could	take	action	as	a	neutral	international	institution.		
	
Inside	the	General	Assembly,	the	key	focus	of	the	United	Nations’	work	
during	this	period	was	the	promotion	of	the	idea	of	development	for	newly	
independent	countries.	The	superpowers	used	this	promotion	of	
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development	for	smaller	states	as	an	opportunity	both	to	gain	support	and	
to	further	their	own	policy	agendas	(Sayward,	2013:	5).	Both	Soviet	and	
American	forces	emphasised	their	desire	to	work	on	projects	that	would	
promote	and	stimulate	development	in	those	smaller	states	that	had	
recently	gained	independence.	However,	the	United	States	were	evidently	
more	convincing	in	their	approach	as	they	acquired	huge	levels	of	support	
from	former	colonies	within	the	General	Assembly.	Indeed,	the	
overwhelming	support	for	the	United	States	during	the	Cold	War	period	as	
a	result	of	their	promotion	of	ideas	of	development,	particularly	during	the	
earlier	years	of	the	Cold	War,	was	adequate	enough	to	ensure	almost	all	
decisions	made	within	the	General	Assembly	privileged	United	States	
interests	(Rowe,	1971:	76).	In	exchange	for	their	commitment	to	promoting	
development	in	less	powerful	states,	the	United	States	received	
significantly	increased	support	in	relation	to	other	issues	presented	in	the	
General	Assembly.	This	was	particularly	important	in	light	of	the	Security	
Council’s	inability	to	act	as	a	result	of	the	constant	invocation	of	the	veto.	
This	period	in	time	therefore	saw	the	possibility	of	the	manipulation	of	the	
United	Nations	as	an	institution	in	line	with	the	political	agendas	of	the	
most	powerful	nations,	with	decision	making	reliant	on	the	political	
relationships	between	states.		 	
	
This	idea	of	development	as	promoted	by	the	United	Nations	is	one	that	
has	been	critiqued	throughout	the	course	of	this	thesis	and	which	has	
formed	the	basis	of	international	relationships	since	the	colonial	era.	This	
discourse	of	development	for	former	colonial	territories	that	was	crucial	
for	the	major	powers	throughout	the	Cold	War	period	encourages	a	
Western	notion	of	progress	and	encourages	an	hierarchical	relationship	of	
dependence,	with	‘advanced’	Western	nations	acting	as	teachers,	guiding	
the	uncivilised	along	a	linear	path	to	civilisation	(Patil,	2008:	95).	Rather	
than	encouraging	independence	and	a	respect	for	difference,	the	notion	of	
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development	within	this	context	assumes	a	singular	goal	for	all	states:	
Western	liberalism.	The	independence	of	former	colonies	then	becomes	
bound	up	in	these	problematic	ideologies	of	development	and	civilisation	
that	further	legitimate	the	institutionalisation	of	great	power	privilege	
within	the	United	Nations.	This	discourse	justifies	the	position	of	the	major	
powers	and	naturalises	a	hierarchy	that	was	established	by	the	unnatural	
colonial	relationship.	During	the	Cold	War	period,	the	United	States	used	
this	problematic	framing	of	global	relationships	to	its	benefit	in	order	to	
gain	support	in	its	battle	against	communism.		
	
The	Security	Council	was	not	as	easily	manipulated	in	the	support	of	United	
States’	interests	as	the	General	Assembly	however.	Whilst	the	Soviet	Union	
clearly	used	their	power	of	veto	as	a	political	tool	within	the	Security	
Council	throughout	the	Cold	War,	they	had	also	become	particularly	
sceptical	about	the	idea	of	United	Nations	military	intervention,	viewing	it	
as	an	instrument	of	Western	domination	and	interest	(MacQueen,	2011:	
28).	Although	the	Security	Council	had	historically	respected	the	principle	
of	non-interference,	moves	towards	more	interventionist	policy	raised	
concerns	around	the	political	agendas	of	the	globally	powerful.	During	the	
East-West	conflict,	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	was	prevented	from	
taking	action	in	the	form	of	intervention	on	212	occasions,	largely	at	the	
hands	of	the	Soviet	Union	(Weiss,	2012:	42).	Whilst	this	was	undoubtedly	
largely	a	political	strategy,	used	as	part	of	a	bigger	battle	between	East	and	
West,	it	was	also	representative	of	an	increasing	distrust	of	Western	
ideology	and	signified	a	protest	against	the	continuing	dominance	of	British	
and	American	forces	in	international	politics.		
	
The	Cold	War	period	therefore	began	to	show	the	intricate	networks	of	
political	power	within	the	United	Nations	and	how	action	and	effectiveness	
could	be	manipulated	at	the	hands	of	those	governments	at	the	top,	as	a	
 203 
result	of	the	strategic	construction	of	the	institution	from	its	beginnings.	
Whilst	moves	towards	interventionist	policy	and	the	departure	from	non-
intervention	as	a	guiding	principle	were	still	in	their	infancy,	what	this	
period	in	the	Security	Council’s	history	illustrates	is	that	its	permanent	five	
members	were	able	to	use	their	position	in	order	to	ensure	their	political	
interests	were	being	pursued,	or	at	least	to	prevent	action	that	was	not	in	
their	interests.	At	San	Francisco,	these	major	powers	had	encouraged	
support	for	their	permanent	membership	on	the	basis	that	they	would	be	
faced	with	the	ultimate	responsibility	to	act	in	the	global	interests,	
however	the	Cold	War	period	showed	the	extent	to	which	their	own	
political	interests	would	always	be	prioritised	first	and	foremost.	The	
increased	emphasis	on	the	discourse	of	development	during	this	period	is	
also	significant	for	the	changes	in	policy	that	followed	and	for	
understanding	the	ways	in	which	power	relationships	established	through	
colonialism	were	justified	on	the	basis	of	natural	progression.	
	
	
Humanitarianism	in	the	1990s	
	
The	1990s	and	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	saw	a	further	transformation	in	
intervention	strategies	by	the	United	Nations.	Encouraged	by	the	relatively	
peaceful	end	to	the	conflict,	the	United	Nations	rearticulated	a	
commitment	to	the	foundational	values	of	equality,	freedom	and	liberalism	
(Barnett,	2002:	25).	The	dissolution	of	the	Soviet	Union	had	prompted	
within	the	United	Nations	a	greater	level	of	cooperation	on	security	
matters,	with	China	remaining	uncomfortable	on	the	issue	of	intervention	
but	not	enough	to	invoke	to	power	of	veto	(Higgins,	1995:	449).	Where	the	
Cold	War	had	created	political	conflicts	between	East	and	West	within	the	
United	Nations,	the	1990s	saw	a	much	greater	level	of	agreement	on	issues	
of	international	security	and	a	joint	commitment	to	dealing	with	human	
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rights	abuses	from	an	international	perspective.	There	was	however	a	
sense	in	which	existing	policies	and	the	focus	on	non-interference	were	not	
seen	to	be	effective	in	dealing	with	the	rising	number	of	humanitarian	
crises	in	this	period.		
	
As	a	result,	the	early	1990s	saw	an	increasingly	invasive	interpretation	of	
Chapter	VII	of	the	UN	Charter	(Doyle	and	Sambanis,	2006:	1).	This	section	
of	the	Charter	deals	with	‘Action	with	respect	to	threats	to	the	peace,	
breaches	of	the	peace,	and	acts	of	aggression’	and	details	provisions	for	
the	Security	Council	to	authorise	the	use	of	armed	force	in	order	to	
‘…maintain	or	restore	international	peace	and	security’	(United	Nations,	
1945:	9).	Whereas	previously,	the	United	Nations	had	prioritised	the	right	
of	sovereign	states	to	rule	without	interference	from	the	international	
community	unless	conflicts	between	states	arose,	a	new	form	of	
intervention	developed	during	this	period,	prioritising	the	rights	of	
individuals	to	be	treated	in	accordance	with	the	United	Nations	Declaration	
of	Human	Rights	(1948)	over	the	right	of	states	to	non-intervention.		
Humanitarian	concerns	were	not	seen	to	be	a	legitimate	basis	for	military	
intervention	during	the	Cold	War	period,	but	the	1990s	saw	a	change	in	
attitudes	and	the	overwhelming	acceptance	of	the	idea	that	intervention	
authorised	by	the	United	Nations	was	a	legitimate	response	to	
humanitarian	issues	(Wheeler,	2002:	8).	Humanitarianism	became	the	
norm	for	governing	relations	between	states,	and	indeed	between	1990	
and	1999	the	United	Nations	was	responsible	for	leading	35	peacekeeping	
operations,	in	comparison	to	only	18	operations	between	1948	and	1989	
(United	Nations,	2016).	This	period	in	history	therefore	saw	much	greater	
emphasis	being	placed	on	the	view	that	the	international	community	has	a	
duty	to	intervene,	to	prevent	and	to	respond	to	instances	of	human	rights	
abuse	(Kaldor,	2003:	128).	Where	previously	the	United	Nations	had	been	
framed	as	an	organisation	with	the	purpose	of	preventing	international	
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conflict,	this	period	saw	the	United	Nations	take	on	a	more	active	role	in	
responding	to	the	suffering	of	individuals	within	domestic	contexts.		
	
In	order	to	understand	the	implications	of	this,	it	is	necessary	here	to	look	
at	the	beliefs	that	underpin	a	humanitarian	approach	to	world	politics.		
This	humanitarianism	of	the	1990s	saw	a	greater	level	of	importance	
accorded	to	the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(1948)	as	a	
standard	for	the	treatment	of	citizens	by	governments	and	emphasis	on	an	
obligation	for	the	international	community	to	ensure	that	all	individuals	
were	treated	in	accordance	with	this.	Human	rights	as	they	are	
conceptualised	by	the	United	Nations	are	based	on	a	belief	in	a	common	
humanity	and	the	idea	that	there	is	in	all	human	beings	the	same	basic	
moral	conviction	and	as	such,	a	sense	of	solidarity.	This	conception	of	a	
common	humanity	is	articulated	in	the	idea	within	international	relations	
that	where	we	are	capable	to	do	so	we	should,	and	crucially	that	we	have	a	
responsibility	to,	assist	any	person	who	is	in	need	through	the	simple	fact	
that	they	are	our	fellow	human	beings	(Van	Hooft,	2011:	291).	The	idea	of	
humanity	is	therefore	based	on	an	understanding	of	all	individuals	
regardless	of	geographical	location	are	equal	human	beings	with	equal	
rights.		
	
From	this	‘Principle	of	Humanity’	stems	the	‘Principle	of	Justice’	which	
amounts	to	a	duty	to	act	to	remedy	issues	of	inequality	(Van	Hooft,	2011:	
292).	The	notion	of	justice	therefore	accepts	that	whilst	all	individuals	have	
the	right	to	be	treated	by	the	same	universal	standards,	as	outlined	in	the	
United	Nations	Declaration,	this	does	not	always	happen	and	that	through	
historical	circumstance,	inequalities	exist	between	individuals	and	groups	
of	individuals.	Where	inequality	does	exist,	the	notion	of	humanity	compels	
those	who	have	the	capacity	to	do	so	to	address	and	attempt	to	deal	with	
inequality,	acting	upon	the	notion	of	justice.	The	commonality	underlying	
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this	idea	of	humanity	and	the	commitment	to	justice	is	that	of	a	shared	
vulnerability,	which	in	turn	underpins	human	rights	as	a	concept	(Turner,	
2006:	1).	The	humanitarianism	of	the	1990s	is	based	in	this	understanding	
of	a	universal	commitment	to	equality,	justice,	and	to	the	equal	treatment	
of	all	as	we	are	all	equally	vulnerable	to	abuse	in	our	existence	as	human	
beings.		
	
Human	rights	as	an	ideology	are	built	upon	this	foundation	of	a	common	
humanity	which	is	not	geographically	located	or	temporally	specific,	and	
which	is	held	in	the	idea	that	we	are	all	vulnerable	to	abuse	of	these	rights	
at	any	given	time.	This	sense	of	shared	vulnerability	and	common	humanity	
allows	human	rights	to	be	viewed	as	universally	applicable	and	available	to	
all	through	their	status	as	human	beings	(Turner,	2006:	6).	Thus,	the	moral	
foundation	of	human	rights	as	a	concept	is	discursively	powerful,	allowing	
human	rights	to	be	viewed	as	grounded	in	a	basic	human	instinct	to	act	in	
solidarity	with	others.	This	moral	character	provides	human	rights	as	a	set	
of	beliefs	with	a	tone	of	rationality,	constructing	them	as	natural,	neutral	
and	outside	of	the	realm	of	politics	(Douzinas,	2007:	11).	This	is	
problematic	within	the	context	of	the	United	Nations	as	it	has	frequently	
allowed	the	major	powers	to	justify	intervention	on	the	basis	of	these	
individual	rights	that	are	conceived	of	as	natural	and	rational.	However,	
this	moral	tone	that	frequently	underpins	discourses	of	human	rights	and	
underlies	appeals	to	the	use	of	intervention	to	protect	human	rights	fails	to	
acknowledge	the	historical	construction	of	human	rights	as	a	concept.	
When	we	delve	further	into	the	history	of	human	rights	as	an	ideology,	it	
becomes	clear	that	they	form	part	of	the	broader	understanding	of	
Western	liberalism	as	the	height	of	civilisation	and	the	end	point	for	
human	development.		
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The	universalism	of	human	rights	and	their	basis	in	a	sense	of	a	common	
humanity	becomes	questionable	when	we	consider	their	historical	
foundation.	The	1789	Rights	of	Man	and	Citizen	are	often	cited	as	the	
predecessor	of	the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	as	the	
first	attempt	to	formalise	the	rights	of	individuals.	The	Rights	of	Man	
however,	were	never	intended	as	universal	rights	for	all	individuals	on	the	
basis	of	their	existence	of	human	beings	and	were	in	fact	a	particular	set	of	
rights	that	were	not	applicable	to	certain	groups,	including	women,	slaves	
and	criminals	(Waters,	1996:	595).	It	is	problematic	therefore	to	view	
human	rights	as	objectively	universal	when	their	historical	origins	are	a	set	
of	rights	that	were	exclusionary.	The	inclusion	of	excluded	groups	fails	to	
address	how	it	is	that	the	rights	of	a	few	became	the	rights	of	all	and	fails	
to	address	the	historical	processes	that	allowed	for	these	initial	silences	
(Bhambra	and	Shilliam,	2009:	2).	To	elaborate,	the	relationship	between	
the	United	Nations	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	and	the	exclusionary	
Rights	of	Man	highlights	the	problematic	historical	basis	of	contemporary	
ideologies	of	human	rights.	Therefore,	the	use	of	the	United	Nations	
Declaration	of	Human	Rights	as	a	justification	for	interventions	is	also	
problematic	in	terms	of	the	historic	silencing	of	particular	groups	of	
individuals	and	particular	cultures.	Whilst	interventions	based	on	the	
protection	of	human	rights	make	claims	to	universality,	the	historical	
foundations	of	human	rights	as	a	concept	are	built	upon	the	privilege	and	
so	their	use	reinforces	this	privilege.			
	
Nonetheless,	human	rights	continue	to	be	understood	as	a	universal	
standard	for	the	treatment	of	individuals	and	they	formed	the	basis	of	the	
ideology	of	humanitarianism	and	subsequently	the	practice	of	
humanitarian	military	intervention.	The	move	towards	humanitarianism	
after	the	Cold	War	and	the	development	of	humanitarian	military	
intervention	as	a	legitimate	action	by	the	international	community	appeals	
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to	a	sense	of	a	common	humanity	and	a	globalised	duty	to	protect	the	
rights	of	individuals	or	to	seek	justice	where	rights	are	being	abused.	
Humanitarian	military	intervention	in	this	sense	is	presented	as	a	principle	
in	line	with	the	standard	set	at	the	Nuremburg	trials	after	the	Second	
World	War,	with	the	suggestion	that	if	crimes	against	humanity	can	be	
used	as	a	legal	basis	to	legally	prosecute	individuals	after	events	have	
taken	place,	then	it	can	also	be	used	as	a	basis	for	intervening	to	prevent	
humanitarian	emergencies	before	they	occur	(Fine,	2007:	82).	However	the	
concepts	of	common	humanity	and	human	rights	have	become	
synonymous	with	European/Western	understandings	of	civilisation	as	a	
result	of	their	historical	development.	This	sense	of	a	common	humanity	
underpinning	this	drive	towards	humanitarianism	neglects	the	historical	
construction	of	human	rights	and	contributes	to	the	‘...mystifying	amnesia	
of	the	colonial	aftermath’	(Gandhi,	1998:	4).		
	
To	return	to	dealing	with	policy	as	is	the	focus	of	this	chapter,	the	
development	of	humanitarian	military	intervention	as	a	legitimate	practice	
within	the	international	community	and	the	United	Nations	more	
specifically	was	not	promoted	simply	as	a	case	of	powerful	nations	
intervening	where	they	saw	fit,	but	as	a	practice	that	would	increase	the	
protection	of	individuals	through	an	understanding	of	basic	rights	that	are	
inherent	in	a	civilised	society	and	that	are	applicable	to	all	human	beings.	
Indeed	it	was	the	capacity	for	powerful	nations	to	intervene	where	they	
saw	fit	that	prompted	scepticism	and	eventually	led	to	a	feeling	of	
disillusionment	with	humanitarianism	as	a	guiding	principle	for	
international	relations	(Blackburn,	2010:	11).		
	
In	an	attempt	to	address	these	concerns,	cosmopolitan	writers	developed,	
and	continue	to	support,	a	set	of	criteria	that	an	international	crisis	must	
satisfy	in	order	for	humanitarian	military	intervention	to	be	deemed	
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legitimate.	Wheeler	(2002)	argues	that	humanitarian	intervention	is	only	
legitimate	in	cases	where:	
	
1. The	situation	can	be	deemed	a	‘supreme	humanitarian	
emergency’	
2. Force	is	used	as	a	last	resort	
3. A	proportionality	threshold	is	met	(i.e.	the	number	of	lives	
saved	must	outweigh	the	number	of	lives	lost)	
4. There	is	a	high	probability	that	the	use	of	force	will	result	in	a	
positive	humanitarian	outcome.		
	
All	four	of	these	requirements	must	be	met	in	order	for	the	intervention	to	
be	deemed	legitimate	(Wheeler,	2002:	34).	These	criteria	were	developed	
in	order	to	prevent	situations	whereby	powerful	nations	manipulated	the	
language	of	humanitarianism	to	justify	interventions	with	ulterior	motives.	
Although	the	conflict	of	the	Cold	War	was	no	longer	directly	affecting	
decision	making	within	the	United	Nations,	the	concerns	raised	around	the	
power	politics	of	the	institution	remained	at	the	forefront	of	approaches	to	
intervention.	Humanitarianism	was	heralded	as	a	universal	principle	that	
would	ensure	that	the	United	Nations	was	working	on	the	basis	of	
improving	the	lives	of	individuals	without	being	led	by	the	political	
motivations	of	individual	states.	
	
However,	even	if	the	criteria	for	legitimate	intervention	have	been	met,	
the	conceptual	danger	of	humanitarian	military	intervention	lies	in	the	
construction	of	a	victim/saviour	dialectic,	whereby	developing	nations	play	
the	role	of	sufferer	and	powerful	nations	play	the	role	of	rescuer	
(Douzinas,	2007:	68).	The	relationship	between	states	within	the	
framework	of	humanitarianism	becomes	a	paternalistic	relationship	based	
on	a	responsibility	to	help	those	less	fortunate,	and	although	it	is	
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undeniable	that	the	international	community	has	some	sort	of	duty	to	
assist	in	cases	of	abuse,	to	allow	international	relationships	to	develop	in	
this	way	is	problematic	as	rescue	comes	to	be	based	on	a	feeling	of	
superiority	(Douzinas,	2007:	73).	The	policy	of	intervention	based	on	
humanitarianism	all	too	easily	becomes	a	legitimate	form	of	cultural	and	
political	dominance	through	the	language	of	development	and	
responsibility,	in	much	the	same	way	as	both	the	mandate	system	in	the	
League	of	Nations	and	the	trusteeship	system	in	the	early	years	of	the	
United	Nations.	Powerful	nations	are	able	to	justify	their	involvement	in	
the	political	governance	of	developing	nations	under	the	guise	of	
humanitarianism	(Barnett,	2011).	This	paternalism	that	developed	in	
United	Nations	policy	during	the	1990s	has	a	deep	significance	for	the	later	
policy	of	Responsibility	to	Protect.		
	
In	spite	of	vast	levels	of	support	and	cooperation	within	the	United	Nations	
during	this	period,	the	rise	of	humanitarianism	within	the	United	Nations	
after	the	Cold	War	was	largely	unsuccessful.	Despite	the	agreement	that	
the	rights	of	individuals	should	be	prioritised	over	the	right	of	states	to	
non-intervention,	the	enforcement	of	United	Nations	policy	continued	to	
be	inconsistent,	selective	and	dependent	upon	complicated	networks	of	
political	power	(Weiss,	2012:	8).	These	concerns	around	the	effectiveness	
of	humanitarian	military	intervention	as	an	approach	were	exacerbated	by	
the	response	of	the	international	community	to	a	number	of	humanitarian	
crises	in	the	1990s.	As	seen	historically,	the	rhetoric	of	United	Nations	
policy	did	not	match	its	application	in	reality,	supporting	the	idea	that	the	
difference	between	what	the	United	Nations	claims	to	do	and	what	it	is	
actually	capable	of	doing	is	heavily	influenced	by	the	political	agenda	of	
particular	nations,	namely	the	five	permanent	members	of	the	Security	
Council.		
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The	disillusionment	with	humanitarianism	as	a	governing	principle	
intensified	following	a	number	of	events	that	were	particularly	visible	in	
the	international	media.	The	genocide	in	Rwanda	in	1994	saw	a	number	of	
governments	render	effective	international	intervention	impossible	
through	not	wishing	to	face	the	costs	and	risks	associated	with	intervention	
despite	the	situation	satisfying	the	conditions	for	legitimate	humanitarian	
intervention	(Seybolt,	2008:	77).	When	tensions	between	Tutsi	and	Hutu	
populations	escalated	in	early	1994,	the	United	Nations	peacekeeping	
operation	present	in	Rwanda	was	severely	understaffed	and	ill	equipped	to	
deal	with	the	situation	(Stein,	2012:	175).	As	a	result,	despite	an	increased	
focus	on	the	rights	of	individuals	and	increased	support	for	intervention	on	
the	basis	of	humanitarian	concerns,	United	Nations	involvement	in	Rwanda	
was	unsuccessful	in	preventing	the	tragic	mass	murder	of	huge	numbers	of	
people.	Indeed,	in	April	1994,	Security	Council	Resolution	912	actually	
reduced	the	numbers	of	the	United	Nations	Assistance	Mission	for	Rwanda	
(UNAMIR)	from	2548	to	270,	making	effective	action	impossible	(Stein,	
2012:	177).	Despite	numbers	being	marginally	increased	later	on	in	the	
conflict,	this	particular	case	was	heavily	criticised,	with	many	arguing	that	
the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	could	have	acted	sooner	
and	prevented	genocide	(Kuperman,	2001:	78).		
	
Later,	the	situation	in	Kosovo	in	1999	also	raised	concerns	around	the	
effectiveness	of	United	Nations	policies	with	regards	to	intervention.	The	
North	Atlantic	Treaty	Organisation	(NATO)	intervened	in	Kosovo	in	spite	of	
the	United	Nations’	inability	to	come	to	an	agreement	on	whether	or	not	
military	intervention	was	appropriate.	NATO’s	intervention	in	Kosovo	was	
largely	viewed	as	legitimate,	despite	not	having	the	approval	of	the	
Security	Council,	existing	as	a	case	in	which	ethical	and	moral	concerns	
were	considered	more	significant	than	the	approval	of	international	law.	As	
Stromseth	et	al	argue,	the	situation	in	Kosovo		
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‘…pitted	fundamental	human	rights	principles	affirmed	by	the	UN	Charter	
against	the	Charter’s	rules	limiting	the	resort	to	force	–	confronting	NATO	
with	the	dilemma	of	either	acting	without	Council	authorization	or	
tolerating	severe	human	rights	abuses	in	a	desperate	and	escalating	
humanitarian	crisis	in	Europe’	(2006:	35).		
	
The	intervention	in	Kosovo	was	unauthorised	by	the	Security	Council	due	
to	the	use	of	veto	power	by	Russia	and	China,	preventing	the	authorisation	
of	the	use	of	force,	yet	was	seen	by	many	as	justified	despite	its	illegality.	
These	humanitarian	failures,	amongst	others	in	the	1990s,	highlight	again,	
the	ways	in	which	United	Nations	policy	differs	in	terms	of	ideology	and	
reality.	The	rhetoric	of	equality,	human	rights	and	protection	seen	in	
United	Nations	policy	was	not	put	into	practise	as	a	result	of	the	
institutionalised	privilege	of	a	small	number	of	states.			
	
These	failures	of	humanitarianism	were	well	publicised	by	news	outlets	
around	the	world	and	prompted	calls	for	a	new	approach	to	intervention	
by	the	international	community,	with	existing	approaches	to	international	
security	being	viewed	as	insufficient	for	dealing	with	such	crises.	In	the	
case	of	Kosovo,	the	ineffectiveness	of	existing	United	Nations	strategies	
was	most	clearly	articulated	by	the	international	community	taking	action	
without	Security	Council	authorisation.	NATO’s	unauthorised	bombing	of	
Kosovo	had	set	a	precedent	for	bypassing	United	Nations	policies	and	
procedures	in	the	name	of	humanitarianism,	stressing	the	need	for	a	new	
approach	capable	of	dealing	with	developments	in	the	international	
community	if	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution	was	to	continue	to	be	
relevant	(Mazower,	2009:	2).	The	United	Nations	had	to	come	up	with	a	
new	approach	to	dealing	with	conflict	if	it	was	to	retain	its	hold	on	
international	law	and	international	relations.		
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This	call	for	a	new	approach	was	stated	publicly	by	Kofi	Annan,	the	UN	
Secretary-General	at	the	time,	who	argued	that	following	the	number	of	
humanitarian	emergencies	in	the	1990s,	there	was	a	need	to	‘...adapt	our	
international	system	better	to	a	world	with	new	actors,	new	
responsibilities,	and	new	possibilities	for	peace	and	progress’	(Annan,	
1999).	Annan	argued	for	the	need	to	develop	a	system	that	made	the	issue	
of	selectivity	in	interventions	less	likely	through	an	understanding	of	
intervention	as	defined	through	and	dependent	upon	legitimate	and	
universal	principles	(Annan,	1999).	
	
	
ICISS	and	the	Focus	on	Responsibility	
	
Following	Annan’s	call	for	a	new	method	of	conducting	international	
intervention,	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	
Sovereignty	(ICISS)	was	set	up	in	2001	in	order	to	develop	a	report	based	
on	the	idea	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	and	to	formulate	a	new	way	for	
the	United	Nations	to	deal	with	humanitarian	situations.	Members	of	the	
commission	were	made	up	of	representatives	from	a	variety	of	
nationalities:	Gareth	Evans	(Australia),	Mohamed	Sahnoun	(Algeria),	Gisèle	
Côté-Harper	(Canada),	Lee	Hamilton	(United	States),	Michael	Ignatieff	
(Canada),	Vladimir	Lukin	(Russia),	Klaus	Naumann	(Germany),	Cyril	
Ramaphosa	(South	Africa),	Fidel	V.	Ramos	(Philippines),	Cornelio	
Sommaruga	(Switzerland),	Eduardo	Stein	Barillas	(Guatemala)	and	Ramesh	
Thakur	(India).	The	report	generated	by	the	ICISS	was	voted	upon	and	
unanimously	accepted	at	the	2005	United	Nations	World	Summit	and	
remains	the	leading	principle	for	United	Nations	approaches	to	
intervention.	The	2005	World	Summit	Outcome	document	reiterates	the	
commitment	of	the	United	Nations	to	a	responsibility	to	protect,	a	
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responsibility	initially	held	by	individual	states,	but	held	more	widely	by	the	
international	community	should	particular	states	fail	in	their	duty	(United	
Nations,	2005:	30).	Having	examined	the	historical	development	of	United	
Nations	policy	on	intervention	since	1945,	it	is	possible	to	see	within	
Responsibility	to	Protect	the	continued	sense	of	paternalism	that	
underpinned	the	humanitarianism	of	the	1990s	but	rebranded	as	a	
responsibility,	playing	on	the	moral	connotations	associated	with	this	
concept.	As	Rutazibwa	argues,	policies	established	by	international	
organisations	in	more	recent	years	have	used	this	agenda	of	development	
in	order	to	encourage	a	sense	of	moral	responsibility	and	ethical	concern	
within	international	relations	(2010:	21).		
	
The	report	of	the	International	Commission	on	Intervention	and	State	
Sovereignty	proposed	the	idea	of	understanding	sovereignty	as	
responsibility,	rather	than	the	automatic	right	of	a	state,	as	well	as	
advancing	the	notion	that	responsibility	for	the	protection	of	populations	
ultimately	lay	with	the	state	itself,	but	fell	to	the	international	community	
should	a	particular	state	fail	in	its	duties	(ICISS,	2001:	XI).	Where	previously,	
the	notion	of	sovereignty	had	been	understood	as	the	right	of	states	to	
self-determination	and	the	right	to	non-interference	by	the	international	
community,	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	discourse	argued	that	sovereignty	
did	not	represent	authority,	but	a	responsibility	for	states	to	protect	their	
own	populations	from	the	four	key	crimes	identified	in	the	report:	
genocide,	war	crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	and	crimes	against	humanity	
(Thakur,	2006:	251).	This	reconceptualisation	of	the	notion	of	sovereignty	
implied	some	level	of	accountability	on	the	behalf	of	states,	both	to	their	
own	people	and	to	the	wider	international	community,	with	regards	to	
adherence	to	international	human	rights	standards	(Cohen,	2012:	14).	The	
sovereignty	of	states	was	not	to	be	automatically	granted	and	respected,	
but	became	dependent	upon	the	observance	of	international	law	and	
 215 
human	rights	principles.	In	this	way,	the	principle	of	Responsibility	to	
Protect	made	the	rights	of	states	to	sovereignty	contingent	upon	the	
respect	of	the	human	rights	of	the	individuals	for	whom	that	state	is	
responsible	(Bellamy,	2011:	198).	It	represented	an	extension	of	previous	
ideas	of	humanitarianism	and	the	focus	on	human	rights	as	the	foundation	
of	international	relations,	whilst	retaining	criteria	for	legitimate	
intervention	and	emphasising	the	idea	that	intervention	is	only	justifiable	
in	cases	of	extreme	abuse.		
	
Although	Responsibility	to	Protect	as	developed	by	the	ICISS	elaborated	on	
situations	whereby	international	intervention	would	be	appropriate,	
intervention	was	presented	as	the	second	of	three	pillars,	and	there	was	
also	a	strong	focus	on	the	idea	of	prevention.	The	ICISS	report	states	that	
‘prevention	is	the	single	most	important	dimension	of	the	responsibility	to	
protect...’	and	that	the	responsibility	to	prevent	involved	an	examination	of	
‘...both	the	root	causes	and	direct	causes	of	internal	conflict	and	other	
man-made	crises	putting	populations	at	risk’	(ICISS,	2001:	XI).	This	focus	on	
prevention	represents	an	admission	of	the	inadequacies	of	using	
intervention	to	deal	with	humanitarian	emergencies,	and	an	understanding	
that	both	the	state	in	question	itself	and	the	international	community	have	
a	responsibility	to	intervene	in	a	non-military	manner	as	soon	as	situations	
of	conflict	become	apparent.	This	was	encouraged	both	on	a	moral	level	
and	on	a	political	or	economic	level,	as	prevention	would	address	the	
tension	between	the	respect	of	sovereignty	and	military	intervention,	as	
well	as	being	significantly	less	costly	for	intervening	parties	(Woocher,	
2012:	22).	In	this	sense,	the	ICISS	encouraged	a	stronger	feeling	of	
international	community,	encouraging	assistance	to	failing	states	before	
situations	reached	the	level	of	genocide,	war	crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	or	
crimes	against	humanity.		
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The	third	pillar	of	the	responsibility	to	protect	as	defined	by	the	ICISS	
report	was	the	responsibility	to	rebuild.	Should	prevention	fail	and	
intervention	by	the	international	community	become	absolutely	necessary	
in	order	to	prevent	large-scale	harm,	the	international	community,	
according	to	the	ICISS,	has	a	responsibility	‘...to	provide,	particularly	after	a	
military	intervention,	full	assistance	with	recovery,	reconstruction	and	
reconciliation,	addressing	the	causes	of	the	harm	the	intervention	was	
designed	to	halt	or	avert’	(ICISS,	2001:	XI).	The	responsibility	of	the	
international	community	as	suggested	by	the	ICISS	was	therefore	an	
extension	of	previous	understandings	on	the	necessity	of	intervention.	Not	
only	did	states	have	a	responsibility	to	intervene	in	traditional	ways	-	
militarily	or	otherwise	-	should	a	state	be	seen	to	be	failing	in	its	
responsibilities	towards	its	citizens,	there	was	also	an	earlier	responsibility	
to	attempt	to	prevent	situations	from	escalating	to	the	point	of	
intervention,	and	a	later	responsibility	to	assist	in	rebuilding	communities	
following	intervention.	These	three	pillars	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	
can	be	clearly	seen	in	Articles	138	and	139	of	the	2005	World	Summit	
Outcome	document	and	became	the	new	lens	through	which	humanitarian	
assistance	was	viewed	by	the	United	Nations	(United	Nations,	2005).		
	
What	lies	at	the	heart	of	this	sense	of	responsibility	is	the	notion	of	action.	
All	three	pillars	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	promote	the	idea	of	action	by	
the	international	community.	In	terms	of	responding	under	Responsibility	
to	Protect,	there	are	four	categories	that	constitute	legitimate	points	for	
intervention:	genocide,	war	crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	and	crimes	against	
humanity	(Murray,	2012:	65).	This	categorical	definition	of	legitimate	
causes	for	intervention	attempts	to	clarify	those	situations	whereby	
military	action	is	appropriate	and	avoid	intervention	under	the	general	
guise	of	humanitarianism,	seeming	to	address	the	concerns	over	selective	
enforcement	and	the	abuse	of	power	within	the	Security	Council.	However,	
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the	importance	of	action	under	Responsibility	to	Protect	is	somewhat	
undermined	by	the	lack	of	consequence	for	inaction.	The	duty	to	prevent,	
respond	and	rebuild	is	clearly	articulated	but	in	the	absence	of	an	overall	
enforcing	authority,	there	is	no	corresponding	punishment	for	a	failure	to	
act	(Welsh,	2012:	106).	Whilst	individual	states	run	the	risk	of	intervention	
by	the	international	community	should	they	fail	to	live	up	to	their	
responsibility	to	protect	their	citizens,	once	this	responsibility	falls	to	the	
international	community,	there	is	no	tangible	consequence	for	their	failure	
to	live	up	to	it.	In	this	sense,	Responsibility	to	Protect	does	not	go	very	far	
in	dealing	with	the	issues	associated	with	humanitarian	military	
intervention,	namely	selective	enforcement	and	dominance	by	the	
powerful.		
	
The	issue	of	selective	enforcement	was	the	initial	prompt	for	a	
reconceptualisation	of	responsibility,	as	outlined	by	Kofi	Annan	following	
the	situation	in	Rwanda.	The	United	Nations	military	force	was	ill-equipped	
to	respond	in	Rwanda	due	to	those	member	states	who	were	capable	of	
providing	support	not	wishing	to	face	the	costs	and	risks	that	military	
action	would	require	(Seybolt,	2008:	77).	In	the	absence	of	an	authority	
which	has	the	power	to	punish	inaction	by	those	with	the	capacity	to	do	so,	
selective	enforcement	of	United	Nations	policies	in	this	manner	will	
continue	to	occur.	Rather	than	acting	on	the	moral	obligation	that	is	
envisaged	by	the	ICISS,	states	without	a	political	interest	in	the	outcome	of	
conflicts	make	rational	cost/benefit	decisions	based	on	the	likelihood	of	
success,	which	raises	questions	around	legitimacy	(Murray,	2012:	69).	
There	may	be	a	situation	that	satisfies	the	definitions	of	a	legitimate	
emergency	as	proposed	by	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	principle,	but	
there	is	no	compelling	force	to	action	other	than	the	sense	of	moral	
obligation	seen	to	underpin	international	relations.	As	a	result,	despite	the	
ICISS	aiming	to	provide	a	structure	of	responsibility	that	would	be	
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universally	applicable,	we	continue	to	see	inconsistent	application	of	the	
Responsibility	to	Protect	doctrine	(Bellamy,	2011:	27).	Furthermore,	in	the	
event	that	a	situation	is	deemed	a	legitimate	cause	for	action,	practical	
issues	with	regard	to	operationalising	Responsibility	to	Protect	arise.	There	
is	no	clear	process	for	the	application	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	in	
logistical	terms,	and	as	such,	the	task	falls	to	the	Security	Council,	which	
has	proved	both	incapable	and	unwilling	to	implement	this	policy	through	
military	intervention	(Murray,	2012:	72).	Despite	its	aims	to	provide	a	clear	
and	consistent	framework	for	intervention,	the	implementation	of	
Responsibility	to	Protect	is	obstructed	by	issues	of	cost	and	the	logistics	of	
military	deployment,	such	as	chains	of	command	(Murray,	2012:	71).			
	
The	principle	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	suffered	a	number	of	blows	to	its	
reputation	following	these	issues	of	global	power	relations,	particularly	at	
the	hands	of	the	British	government	under	Tony	Blair	and	the	United	States	
government	under	George	W.	Bush.	Following	its	formation	by	the	ICISS	in	
2001,	the	language	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	was	heavily	used	by	the	
United	States	and	British	governments	to	retroactively	(and	inaccurately)	
justify	their	involvement	in	the	invasion	of	Iraq	(Chalk	et	al,	2012:	39).	The	
use	of	this	framework	to	legitimate	the	Iraq	invasion	subsequently	
damaged	the	reputation	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	following	the	intensely	
negative	public	response	to	Iraq.	The	use	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	as	an	
inaccurate	justification	for	the	war	in	Iraq	emphasises	the	way	in	which	
constructions	of	responsibility	with	regards	to	human	rights	are	heavily	
influenced	by	power	and	the	capacity	for	particular	actors	to	appropriate	a	
discourse	to	justify	their	actions.		
	
The	aftermath	of	the	Iraq	invasion,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	atrocities	
of	Abu	Ghraib,	meant	that	the	United	States	government	was	no	longer	
viewed	as	a	guarantor	of	international	rights	(Habermas,	2003:	703).	
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Following	this,	Responsibility	to	Protect	was	viewed	with	cynicism	by	a	
number	of	actors	in	the	international	community,	who	saw	it	as	another	
potential	framework	for	neocolonial	dominance	by	the	world’s	most	
powerful.	The	lack	of	power	experienced	by	the	United	Nations	despite	its	
authority	meant	that	the	global	hegemonic	powers	remained	immune	to	
punishment	(Mahdavi,	2012:	263).	These	concerns	were	emphasised	
particularly	by	Arab	and	Asian	states	following	the	2005	World	Summit,	
who	came	to	view	Responsibility	to	Protect	as	a	reconceptualisation	of	
humanitarian	intervention,	providing	the	opportunity	for	coercive	
interference	in	the	domestic	affairs	of	states	(Bellamy,	2011:	31).		
	
These	concerns	around	the	relationship	between	Responsibility	to	Protect	
as	a	means	of	human	protection	and	other	political	goals,	such	as	regime	
change	have	retained	significance	in	recent	years,	particularly	in	relation	to	
the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	(Bellamy	and	Williams,	2011:	846).	The	
end	of	2010	saw	the	beginnings	of	revolutionary	protests	across	the	Middle	
East	and	North	Africa,	with	the	case	of	Libya	being	the	most	significant	for	
the	discussion	here.	Following	an	escalating	conflict	between	the	Gaddafi	
government	and	rebel	forces,	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	adopted	
Resolution	1973	on	March	17th	of	2011,	authorising	international	forces	to	
use	‘all	necessary	measures’	to	protect	Libyan	civilians	(Crook,	2011:	571).	
This	was	not	the	first	time	that	Responsibility	to	Protect	had	been	used	in	
order	to	authorise	intervention,	but	its	significance	stood	in	the	fact	that	
United	Nations	involvement	was	not	welcomed	by	the	Gaddafi	regime.	
Resolution	1973	was	the	first	instance	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	being	
used	to	justify	intervention	and	the	use	of	force	against	the	wishes	of	a	
functioning	state	(Bellamy	and	Williams,	2011:	825).	The	Libyan	case	was	
also	the	first	example	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	being	used	in	the	Middle	
East	and	Northern	Africa	(Mahdavi,	2012:	257).	The	United	Nations	
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response	to	the	conflict	in	Libya	saw	a	different	use	of	policy	around	
intervention	and	the	idea	of	responsibility	than	had	been	seen	before.		
	
The	intervention	in	Libya	saw	concerns	raised	specifically	around	the	
relationship	between	Responsibility	to	Protect	and	the	political	goal	of	
regime	change	within	the	international	community,	with	critics	arguing	
that	whilst	intervention	with	the	aim	of	protecting	human	life	is	legitimate,	
intervention	with	the	basic	political	aim	of	regime	change	is	not	(Bellamy	
and	Williams,	2011:	846).	This	particular	case,	which	has	been	utilised	
throughout	the	course	of	this	thesis,	draws	attention	to	the	way	in	which	
those	nations	with	the	most	political	power,	namely	the	five	permanent	
members	of	the	Security	Council,	are	able	to	appropriate	United	Nations	
policy	in	order	to	justify	and	legitimate	intervention	with	potentially	
political	rather	than	humanitarian	aims	and	objectives.	This	was	of	
particular	significance	in	the	case	of	Libya,	as	the	larger	narrative	of	the	
Arab	Spring	protests	was	the	claim	that	these	countries	wished	to	
transcend	the	West	rather	than	replicate	it,	rejecting	colonial	and	
postcolonial	oppression	(Dabashi,	2012:	xviii).	The	very	purpose	of	the	
revolutions	across	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	was	independence	and	
freedom	for	civilians,	both	from	a	dictatorial	regime	and	from	their	
continued	economic	exploitation	by	the	West.	What	they	received	instead	
was	further	oppression	through	a	military	intervention	that	sought	to	
ensure	the	perpetuation	of	postcolonial	structures	of	power	throughout	
the	international	community.			
	
The	Security	Council	discussions	around	intervention	received	significant	
media	coverage	at	the	time,	and	indeed	continue	to	do	so,	highlighting	the	
tensions	between	East	and	West	that	have	soared	in	the	months	of	2016	in	
relation	to	Syria,	seeming	to	have	revived	the	Cold	War	frictions	between	
the	United	States	and	Russia	in	particular.	However,	this	tension	appeared	
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to	be	brewing	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	Libyan	intervention.	The	
revolutionary	protests	in	Libya	spread	to	Syria	in	the	later	months	of	2011	
and	despite	similarities	between	the	two	contexts,	a	draft	proposal	for	
intervention	in	Syria	put	forward	by	the	UK,	France,	Germany	and	Portugal	
was	not	accepted	by	the	Security	Council.	Both	Russia	and	China	vetoed	
the	proposals,	with	Russia	explicitly	citing	the	Western	‘betrayal’	over	Libya	
as	their	reason	for	doing	so	(Rotmann	et	al,	2014:	368).	Whilst	
Responsibility	to	Protect	was	implemented	in	response	to	the	conflict	in	
Libya	in	terms	of	protecting	the	lives	of	civilians	where	their	government	
had	failed	to	do	so,	the	Russian	government	deemed	the	response	of	the	
international	community	as	something	that	amounted	to	more	than	simple	
protection.	The	Russian	government	argued	that	the	air	strikes	that	formed	
a	part	of	the	military	intervention	in	Libya	were	not	consistent	with	the	
protection	of	civilians,	but	rather	represented	support	for	anti-government	
forces	in	order	to	topple	the	Gaddafi	regime	that	had	fallen	out	of	favour	
with	British	and	American	governments	(Averre	and	Davies,	2015:	818).	As	
such,	the	Russian	government	has	remained	absolute	in	its	stance	and	
consistently	prevented	action	by	the	United	Nations	in	Syria.	Whilst	this	is	
undoubtedly	in	part	due	to	the	political	relationship	between	the	Russian	
and	Syrian	governments,	the	defiance	of	the	Russian	government	is	also	
representative	of	a	Cold	War	attitude	towards	the	West,	a	statement	that	
Russia	will	not	be	overruled	by	British	and	American	political	desires	and	a	
clear	objection	to	the	disregard	of	the	principle	of	non-intervention	as	
respect	for	the	right	of	states	to	sovereign	authority	(Averre	and	Davies,	
2015:	829).	It	would	seem	that,	due	to	historical	ideological	disagreement,	
Russia	has	an	understanding	of	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	that	is	at	odds	
with	the	wider	international	community,	questioning	the	legitimacy	of	
intervention	as	a	humanitarian	practice	(Orchard,	2016).	
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This	inconsistent	application	and	selective	enforcement	of	Responsibility	to	
Protect	in	recent	years	emphasises	the	extent	to	which	issues	of	global	
political	power	infiltrate	international	relations.	There	is	a	distinction	in	this	
context	between	power	and	authority.	Whereas	authority	represents	the	
capacity	to	create	norms	and	provide	them	with	legitimacy	as	the	result	of	
a	political	process,	as	with	the	United	Nations,	power	relates	to	the	
capacity	to	enforce	these	norms	(Thakur,	2006:	6).	It	follows	that	although	
the	United	Nations	has	the	authority	to	create	norms	such	as	Responsibility	
to	Protect	and	provide	them	with	legitimacy	through	an	international	
political	process,	the	lack	of	a	binding	contract	to	action	means	that	they	
are	dependent	on	the	world’s	strongest	military	powers	to	enforce	these	
norms.	In	other	words,	as	has	been	seen	in	the	very	recent	contexts	of	
Libya	and	Syria,	the	United	Nations	is	unable	to	enforce	its	authority	with	
regard	to	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	without	the	support	of	the	five	
permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council.		
	
Although	Responsibility	to	Protect	makes	appeals	to	a	moral	obligation	and	
a	sense	of	common	humanity,	the	reality	is	that	action	remains	constrained	
by	the	unequal	power	relations	in	global	politics	(Mahdavi,	2012:	267).	It	is	
naive	to	think	that	these	powerful	states	will	act	purely	in	the	utopian	
interests	of	a	common	humanity.	Their	decisions	are	always	influenced	by	
rational	understandings	of	the	costs	and	benefits,	both	financial	and	
political,	involved	in	intervening	based	on	the	Responsibility	to	Protect.	
Powerful	states	have	strategic	not	moral	priorities	(Thakur,	2006:	241).	As	
with	previous	approaches	to	international	relations	and	humanitarian	
interventions,	Responsibility	to	Protect	becomes	a	question	of	power.	
Powerful	states	may,	through	the	United	Nations,	intervene	in	the	name	of	
protecting	the	rights	of	minorities	suffering	from	human	rights	abuses,	but	
there	is	no	protection	for	the	weak	against	the	dominant	international	
moral	majority	(Thakur,	2006:	211).	Responsibility	to	Protect	in	this	sense	
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runs	the	risk	of	legitimating	a	particular	understanding	of	progress	and	the	
enforcement	of	a	singular	conception	of	moral	values.	Selective	
enforcement	will	continue	to	be	an	issue	for	as	long	as	the	United	Nations	
as	a	world	organisation	is	reliant	upon	of	the	cooperation	of	the	world’s	
major	powers	(Habermas,	2006:	20).			
	
The	main	issue	that	arises	out	of	this	conception	of	responsibility	is	that	of	
collective	action.	Responsibility	to	Protect	is	based	on	an	understanding	of	
a	unified	international	community	which	has	a	collective	responsibility	to	
protect,	both	at	the	individual	level	of	states	to	their	own	people,	and	at	
the	global	level.	In	reality,	this	international	community	is	a	complex	
network	of	power	relations	(Mahdavi,	2012:	267).	The	capacity	for	action	is	
dependent	upon	the	cooperation	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	states,	
without	whom,	the	international	community	in	the	sense	of	capacity	for	
collective	action	ceases	to	exist.	The	United	Nations	Security	Council	
cannot	be	viewed	as	the	agent	of	enforcement	with	regards	to	moral	
responsibility	as	its	success	or	failure	to	live	up	to	this	responsibility	is	
dependent	upon	the	action	of	member	states	(Welsh,	2012:	111).	The	
emphasis	of	Responsibility	to	Protect	on	a	collective	moral	responsibility	
fails	to	recognise	these	fundamental	issues	of	power,	instead	choosing	to	
believe	that	states	will	act	in	the	interests	of	a	common	humanity	as	
members	of	an	international	community.	With	regards	to	implementing	
the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	‘to	assign	this	task	to	the	“international	
community”	is	to	assign	the	task	to	everyone	and	no	one’	(Knight,	2012:	
283).	The	current	global	order	and	organisation	of	state	boundaries	does	
not	allow	for	collective	action	in	this	way.	Assigning	the	task	of	protection	
to	the	international	community	provides	a	number	of	potential	rescuers,	
and	as	a	result,	less	chance	of	actual	rescue	(Welsh,	2012:	106).	Thus,	
despite	initial	optimism	with	regards	to	Responsibility	to	Protect	and	its	
potential	to	provide	a	more	transparent	and	concrete	framework	for	
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dealing	with	acts	of	genocide,	war	crimes,	ethnic	cleansing	and	crimes	
against	humanity,	a	number	of	questions	and	concerns	remain	about	the	
use	of	moral	claims	to	responsibility	in	order	to	legitimate	dominance	and	
perpetuate	the	existing	global	order.	Selective	enforcement	and	the	lack	of	
consequence	for	inaction	continue	to	thwart	consistent	application	of	the	
principle	in	dealing	with	humanitarian	emergencies.	The	conflicts	arising	in	
the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	in	recent	years	have	highlighted	the	
extent	to	which	national	interests	always	trump	humanitarian	need	(Hehir,	
2016).	
	
This	section	concludes	this	brief	history	of	the	development	of	policies	on	
intervention	within	the	context	of	the	United	Nations,	showing	the	stark	
contrast	between	initial	commitments	by	the	United	Nations	to	non-
intervention	and	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	which	amounts	to	a	moral	
right	to	intervene	in	the	affairs	of	other	countries.	The	argument	that	has	
been	developed	here	is	that	the	Responsibility	to	Protect	signifies	the	
latest	stage	in	the	historical	domination	of	particular	parts	of	the	world	by	
others,	a	neocolonial	technology	of	power	that	legitimates	the	dominance	
of	the	major	powers	through	a	continued	reliance	on	the	hierarchical	
understanding	of	global	society	that	has	been	institutionalised	in	the	
United	Nations.	Sovereignty	under	Responsibility	to	Protect	is	no	longer	
the	right	to	self-determination,	but	is	a	capacity	that	states	have	
dependent	upon	their	adherence	to	Western	cultural	norms	(Rutazibwa,	
2014:	295).	As	we	have	seen	continuously	throughout	history,	cultural	
difference	is	unable	to	be	understood	purely	as	difference.	Instead,	all	non-
Western	states	are	dealt	with	through	the	ideologies	of	development	and	
progress,	whereby	their	difference	will	be	eradicated	and	their	culture	
assimilated,	usually	by	force	(Rutazibwa,	2014:	295).	This	is	emphasised	
through	the	continued	process,	which	we	have	seen	throughout	the	history	
of	sovereignty	as	a	concept,	of	making	sovereignty	contingent	upon	terms	
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decided	by	the	West.	As	argued	throughout	Chapter	5,	sovereignty	for	non-
European	states	has	always	been	dependent	upon	an	adherence	to	
Western	values,	and	we	continue	to	see	this	within	the	context	of	
Responsibility	to	Protect	and	the	reconceptualisation	of	sovereignty	as	
responsibility.		
Following	the	formal	decolonisation	of	the	majority	of	the	world,	
Responsibility	to	Protect	is	a	neocolonial	policy,	providing	major	powers	
with	the	right	to	intervene	–	or	not	intervene	-	when	and	where	they	deem	
it	appropriate	whilst	simultaneously	removing	the	rights	of	former	colonies	
to	non-intervention	as	outlined	in	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.	The	
purpose	of	the	argument	developed	throughout	this	chapter	is	not	to	
suggest	that	the	sovereignty	of	violent	dictatorial	governments	should	be	
prioritised	over	the	lives	of	civilians,	but	rather	to	disturb	dominant	
understandings	of	the	United	Nations	and	particularly	the	Security	Council	
as	acting	in	the	interests	of	international	peace	and	security.	This	issue	
provides	a	clear	example	of	the	way	in	which	neocolonialism	functions	
within	the	contemporary	practices	of	the	United	Nations,	and	as	Nkrumah	
argues;	‘neo-colonialism	is	the	worst	form	of	imperialism.	For	those	who	
practice	it,	it	means	power	without	responsibility	and	for	those	who	suffer	
from	it,	it	means	exploitation	without	redress’	(1965:	xi).	Through	the	
Responsibility	to	Protect,	the	United	Nations	seeks	to	perpetuate	colonial	
power	relations	whilst	claiming	to	be	acting	in	the	interests	of	freedom.			
	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	ability	of	the	major	powers	to	continue	to	manipulate	policy	in	their	
interests	in	spite	of	more	recent	attempts	to	restrain	this	control	highlights	
the	magnitude	of	their	privilege	within	the	United	Nations.	In	this	chapter,	
intervention	has	been	used	as	an	example	of	how	postcolonial	power	
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manifests	in	reality	through	neocolonial	mechanisms,	as	well	as	being	an	
illustration	of	the	importance	of	understanding	the	historical	context	of	
contemporary	debates.		
	
As	the	Cold	War	period	had	also	witnessed	the	Declaration	on	the	Granting	
of	Independence	to	Colonial	Countries	and	Peoples	(1960),	the	major	
powers	had	to	establish	new	technologies	for	retaining	control	over	former	
colonies	and	this	was	done	through	an	increased	focus	on	the	idea	of	
development.	In	light	of	formal	decolonisation,	this	would	allow	the	major	
powers	to	continue	to	relationships	of	control	and	the	kinship	politics	
reminiscent	of	formal	colonialism	(Patil,	2008).		
	
	
This	chapter	argued	that	the	reconceptualisation	of	sovereignty	as	
responsibility	serves	to	legitimate	the	existing	global	order	and	justify	
intervention	that	is	often	politically	motivated.	Furthermore,	the	language	
of	responsibility	that	is	used	in	framing	the	policy	seeks	to	legitimise	the	
United	Nations	as	an	organisation	committed	to	peace,	but	the	structure	of	
the	organisation	and	the	lack	of	consequence	for	a	failure	to	implement	
the	policy	allows	Western	powers	to	distance	themselves	from	any	real	
sense	of	responsibility	(Chandler,	2010).	Ultimately,	even	when	policy	
makes	clear	the	circumstances	under	which	intervention	is	appropriate	and	
necessary,	it	is	still	the	power	of	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	
Security	Council	to	enforce	this	policy	and	there	is	no	consequence	for	
their	failure	to	do	so	(Welsh,	2012:	106).	As	such,	this	policy	functions	to	
justify	the	interventions	the	major	powers	do	decide	to	undertake	as	the	
actions	of	world	leaders	who	are	responsible	for	the	protection	of	civilians	
suffering	abuse	at	the	hands	of	their	own	governments,	whilst	failing	to	
compel	these	world	leaders	to	act	in	all	cases	that	meet	the	criteria	for	
intervention.		
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Indeed,	the	contemporary	examples	that	have	been	returned	to	
throughout	this	thesis	of	the	uprisings	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	
emphasise	the	degree	to	which	this	policy	has	failed	to	address	selectivity	
and	the	power	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	to	
continue	to	manipulate	the	organisation	in	line	with	their	own	political	
interests	(Thakur,	2013:	71).	It	is	the	argument	of	this	Chapter	that	the	
United	Nations	will	continue	to	act	selectively	in	cases	of	civil	war	and	
humanitarian	emergency	whilst	the	structure	of	the	organisation	remains	
unchanged.	As	long	as	its	permanent	members	and	their	ability	to	veto	
dominate	the	Security	Council,	selectivity	will	be	inevitable.		
	
To	conclude,	this	chapter	has	provided	a	historical	narrative	of	the	
development	from	non-intervention	to	a	responsibility	to	intervene	that	
argues	that	the	issue	of	intervention	illustrates	the	various	techniques	
within	the	United	Nations	for	managing	particular	parts	of	the	world.	It	has	
shown	how,	at	different	periods	in	time,	the	United	Nations	has	been	able	
to	maintain	systems	of	colonial	and	neocolonial	domination	and	to	
perpetuate	global	hierarchies	of	power	that	were	established	by	
colonialism.	Each	of	these	approaches	to	intervention	following	formal	
decolonisation	has	allowed	for	the	continuation	of	selective	enforcement	
of	interventionist	policy	in	line	with	major	power	interests,	which	has	been	
justified	through	the	language	of	responsibility	and	ideologies	of	
development	and	civilisation.		
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Discussion	and	Conclusion	
	
‘...the	European	peoples	must	first	decide	to	wake	up	and	shake	
themselves,	use	their	brains,	and	stop	playing	the	stupid	game	of	the	
Sleeping	Beauty’	(Fanon,	1967:	84).	
	
	
Introduction	
	
The	United	Nations	has	been	framed	as	an	organisation	with	the	primary	
aims	of	maintaining	international	peace	and	security	and	achieving	
international	cooperation	since	its	establishment	in	1945.	This	thesis	forms	
a	postcolonial	critique	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution,	particularly	
in	relation	to	its	claims	to	equality,	with	a	focus	on	the	ways	in	which	both	
the	structures	of	the	organisation	and	the	discourses	surrounding	it	allow	
for	selectivity	when	dealing	with	conflict	at	an	international	level.	It	has	
further	been	argued	that	these	problematic	discourses	are	a	result	of	the	
suppression	of	colonialism	in	the	historical	narratives	of	the	United	Nations	
and	closely	related	to	this,	in	the	narrative	of	the	development	of	
international	law	and	the	concept	of	sovereignty.	The	historical	
construction	of	the	United	Nations	in	this	manner,	it	has	been	argued	here,	
has	served	to	maintain	the	existing	global	order	and	develop	new	forms	of	
neocolonial	control	following	decolonisation	and	independence,	privileging	
western	culture	and	equating	difference	with	underdevelopment.	Here,	
the	attempt	has	been	to	uncover	some	of	the	silences	in	the	history	of	the	
United	Nations	and	to	disturb	the	dominant	discourses	of	equality	that	
surround	the	United	Nations	as	an	international	organisation.		
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Part	One	of	the	thesis	exists	as	a	challenge	to	history,	both	to	the	standard	
histories	of	the	United	Nations	that	have	been	shown	to	be	inadequate	and	
to	history	more	broadly	as	a	process	of	silencing.	It	sought	to	challenge	the	
dominance	of	particular	narratives	in	our	understandings	of	the	world	and	
more	specifically	in	the	dominant	discourses	of	equality	that	surround	the	
United	Nations	as	an	institution.	Chapter	1	began	by	outlining	these	
dominant	discourses,	detailing	the	standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations	
and	illuminating	the	absences	apparent	in	their	narratives	despite	their	
view	of	the	United	Nations	not	always	being	positive.	It	argued	that	in	
order	to	address	these	absences,	it	was	necessary	to	view	the	United	
Nations	as	an	extension	of	the	imperial	alliances	that	constituted	the	
League	of	Nations,	taking	into	account	the	relationship	between	the	
League	and	the	process	of	colonialism	(Mazower,	2009:	17).		
	
The	postcolonial	framework	within	which	this	challenge	is	conceived	was	
outlined	in	Chapter	2,	which	introduced	the	main	critiques	of	the	United	
Nations	as	an	organisation	and	of	international	law	and	its	reliance	on	the	
concept	of	sovereignty	more	broadly.	This	theoretical	framework	was	
accompanied	by	a	methodological	framework	in	Chapter	3	that	argued	
strongly	for	the	importance	of	history	and	for	the	potential	of	the	archive	
as	a	source	of	counter-knowledge	with	which	to	challenge	dominant	
discourses.		
	
This	counter-narrative	was	detailed	in	Chapter	4	in	order	to	contest	those	
dominant	narratives	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	that	underplay	
the	significance	of	colonialism	in	the	founding	of	the	organisation	and	that	
enable	an	understanding	of	history	where	colonial	powers	are	the	saviours	
of	those	they	ruled	over.	This	chapter	argued	for	a	re-narration	of	history	
in	order	to	account	for	these	traditions	of	resistance.	
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Part	Two	has	focused	on	applying	these	theoretical	approaches	to	the	
structures	of	the	United	Nations	that	have	maintained	colonial	power	
relations	through	neocolonial	technologies.	Part	two	began	with	an	
examination	of	the	United	Nations’	claims	to	sovereign	equality	in	Chapter	
5	and	argued	that	such	claims	are	incompatible	with	the	history	of	
sovereignty	as	a	concept	and	the	structures	of	the	organisation	itself.	This	
formed	the	basis	for	a	discussion	of	the	role	of	the	Security	Council	in	
Chapter	6,	which	argued	that	the	United	Nations	was	fundamentally	based	
on	the	concentration	of	power	in	the	Security	Council	where	the	
sponsoring	nations	had	and	continue	to	have	an	overwhelming	dominance.		
	
Chapter	7	concludes	this	second	part,	concentrating	on	the	issue	of	
intervention	and	arguing	that	in	the	historical	development	from	non-
intervention	to	the	Responsibility	to	Protect,	the	United	Nations	has	
undergone	a	series	of	policy	changes	in	order	to	ensure	the	continuation	of	
global	hierarchies	and	systems	of	control	that	have	their	roots	in	the	
colonial	encounter	and	colonial	power	relations.	This	concluding	chapter	
will	bring	together	the	debates	from	these	previous	seven	chapters	in	
order	to	emphasise	the	significance	of	historical	understanding	in	the	
discussion	of	contemporary	debates.		
	
It	will	begin	with	an	examination	of	the	issues	that	provided	the	impetus	
for	this	project:	intervention,	selectivity	and	the	privilege	of	the	major	
powers.	These	issues,	which	are	of	significant	contemporary	relevance,	
were	the	starting	point	for	the	thesis	and	they	bring	together	and	
exemplify	the	broader	arguments	of	the	thesis	in	terms	of	the	importance	
of	re-narrating	history	in	order	to	account	for	the	silencing	of	colonialism.	I	
will	then	move	on	to	discuss	the	theoretical	approach	that	has	formed	the	
framework	for	the	arguments	made	throughout	the	previous	seven	
chapters,	focusing	on	the	absence	of	colonialism	from	historical	narratives	
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of	the	United	Nations	and	the	constant	reinforcement	of	discourses	of	
development	that	have	been	challenged	throughout.	The	next	section	will	
reiterate	the	methodological	approach	that	informed	the	project,	arguing	
for	the	importance	of	history	in	our	understandings	of	the	contemporary	
world	and	for	the	need	to	address	the	silencing	of	particular	histories.	The	
entire	project	is	committed	to	addressing	inequality	through	the	re-
narration	of	history	in	order	to	give	voice	to	silences.	This	chapter	will	
conclude	with	a	summary	of	the	core	claims	of	the	thesis	and	some	ideas	
for	potential	directions	of	future	research.			
	
	
Intervention,	Selectivity	and	Great	Power	Privilege	
	 	
Chapter	7	discussed	the	development	from	non-intervention	as	a	leading	
principle	in	the	earliest	years	of	the	United	Nations	to	the	current	guiding	
principle	of	Responsibility	to	Protect,	which	was	in	fact	the	starting	point	
for	this	thesis.	If	there	is	a	responsibility	to	protect	those	in	danger	of	
human	rights	abuses,	living	in	civil	wars	and	suffering	at	the	hands	of	their	
own	governments,	how	is	it	that	some	conflicts	result	in	an	international	
military	intervention	authorised	by	the	United	Nations	and	others	do	not?	
What	are	the	underlying	historical	structures	that	allow	for	this	selectivity	
to	occur?		
	
Here,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	institutionalisation	of	great	power	
privilege,	particularly	within	the	context	of	the	Security	Council,	since	the	
very	beginnings	of	the	United	Nations	has	made	selectivity	possible	and	in	
some	ways	inevitable	(Roberts	and	Zaum,	2008:	12).	Whilst	the	Charter	
makes	non-intervention	a	key	principle	of	the	United	Nations	and	the	way	
it	deals	with	conflict,	the	structure	of	the	organisation	means	that	these	
decisions	are	ultimately	made	by	the	major	military	powers	and	has	
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allowed	for	the	development	of	a	policy	that	legitimates	intervention	by	
framing	it	as	responsibility	as	opposed	to	political	interest.		The	
contradiction	inherent	in	this	responsibility	is	that	there	is	no	consequence	
for	inaction.	Whilst	the	Security	Council	can	justify	military	intervention	on	
the	basis	of	a	responsibility	to	protect	the	populations	of	countries	in	
conflict	where	their	own	governments	are	failing	to	do	so,	there	is	no	
actual	obligation	for	states	to	act	(Welsh,	2012:	106).	A	conflict	may	satisfy	
the	conditions	to	make	military	intervention	a	legitimate	response,	but	in	
reality,	the	absence	of	a	United	Nations	military	force	leaves	this	
responsibility	at	the	hands	of	individual	governments	and	there	is	no	
ultimate	authority	that	can	force	states	to	use	their	own	military	forces.	
The	concept	of	responsibility	in	this	context	therefore	seems	to	be	serving	
some	other	purpose	than	dealing	with	conflict	and	threats	to	international	
peace	and	security.		
	
Throughout	the	course	of	this	thesis,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	notion	of	
responsibility	is	in	fact	a	product	of	the	discourses	of	development	that	
surround	the	United	Nations.	The	concept	of	responsibility	serves	to	
legitimate	the	unprecedented	institutionalisation	of	great	power	privilege,	
particularly	within	the	Security	Council	(Krisch,	2008:	135).	The	veto	power	
afforded	to	the	permanent	five	members	of	the	Security	Council	essentially	
provides	them	with	the	ability	to	make	the	ultimate	decision	with	regards	
to	military	intervention.	This	power	is	afforded	to	them	in	recognition	of	
their	distinct	role	in	the	maintenance	of	international	security	(Thakur,	
2006:	48).	This	role	is	theirs	however	as	a	result	of	an	understanding	of	the	
world	that	was	established	through	colonialism.	Imperial	powers	believed	
themselves	to	have	an	advanced	level	of	social	complexity	in	comparison	
to	the	colonies	they	controlled	and	the	notion	of	development	was	
established	on	the	basis	that	the	‘uncivilised’	people	of	the	colonies	could	
attain	this	social	complexity	if	they	conformed	to	certain	values	(Tarazona,	
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2012:	917).	Through	the	colonial	encounter,	imperial	powers	could	teach	
uncivilised	nations	to	conform	to	European	values,	following	a	path	of	
progress	and	development	that	had	European	culture	as	its	ultimate	
endpoint.	This	idea	of	viewing	cultural	difference	in	terms	of	development	
has	ultimately	fed	into	the	notion	of	responsibility	that	has	increased	in	
significance	over	the	seventy	years	of	the	United	Nations’	existence.	
Colonialism	established	the	framework	whereby	European	nations	could	
be	viewed	as	educators	who	were	responsible	for	the	development	of	
uncivilised	nations	into	civilised	nations	and	this	responsibility	provided	
them	with	a	distinct	status	in	regards	to	maintaining	international	security,	
most	notably	in	the	Security	Council	(Patil,	2008:	96).		
	
The	practice	of	intervention	illustrates	the	degree	to	which	the	power	of	
the	powerful	has	been	cemented	in	the	very	structure	of	the	United	
Nations.	The	ability	of	the	Security	Council	to	intervene	in	domestic	
conflicts	and	to	act	selectively	in	deciding	where	to	intervene	highlights	the	
need	for	change	in	the	structure	of	the	United	Nations	if	we	wish	to	move	
towards	a	more	equal	global	society.	Whilst	the	Security	Council	continues	
to	be	the	body	where	decisions	around	intervention	are	made	and	whilst	it	
continues	to	be	dominated	by	its	permanent	members,	the	United	Nations	
will	continue	to	be	an	institution	that	legitimates	a	global	hierarchy	and	
allows	for	postcolonial	structures	of	power,	domination	and	exploitation.			
	
	
Discourses	of	Development	and	the	Absence	of	Colonialism	
	
The	dominance	of	the	major	powers	within	the	United	Nations	and	their	
position	in	a	global	hierarchy	is	underpinned	by	a	discourse	of	
development	that	supports	eurocentric	understandings	of	what	it	means	to	
be	civilised.	This	discourse	of	development	that	was	established	in	the	
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colonial	encounter	has	been	consistently	reproduced	throughout	the	
history	of	the	United	Nations	and	within	the	League	of	Nations	before	it.	It	
has	been	most	significant	in	the	management	of	colonial	territories	
through	the	mandate	system	in	the	League	of	Nations	and	the	system	of	
trusteeship	in	the	United	Nations	(Anghie,	2005).	Both	of	these	systems	
have	framed	the	major	powers	as	acting	as	paternalistic	educators	of	the	
uncivilised	and	have	enabled	neocolonial	technologies	of	management	
through	an	understanding	of	development	that	is	problematic	(Rajagopal,	
2003:	72).		
	
The	relationships	between	colonies	and	their	colonisers	that	were	
entrenched	in	the	mandate	system	were	replicated	in	the	trusteeship	
system,	albeit	accompanied	by	a	much	more	explicit	focus	on	the	idea	of	
development	(Rajagopal,	2003:	72).	What	had	previously	been	understood	
as	a	relationship	between	colonies	and	empires	was	framed	by	the	United	
Nations	as	a	relationship	between	administering	authorities	and	
dependent	territories.	In	response	to	mounting	anti-colonial	public	
pressure,	the	United	Nations	established	a	system	that	reinforced	existing	
discourses	of	development	in	order	to	legitimate	problematic	hierarchies	
that	were	built	into	its	structure	from	the	start.	These	relationships	were	
characterised	by	what	Patil	calls	‘kinship	politics’,	framing	these	dependent	
territories	as	irrational	and	childlike,	in	need	of	tutelage	and	guidance	from	
the	rational	and	paternal	advanced	states	(2008:	95).	In	the	face	of	an	
increasing	anti-colonial	sentiment,	it	was	important	for	imperial	states	to	
establish	new	forms	of	control	that	could	be	justified	as	something	more	
than	domination	and	control,	so	that	even	when	former	colonies	were	
granted	independence	it	was	the	result	of	a	satisfactory	adherence	to	the	
path	of	development	established	by	their	colonial	masters	(Rajagopal,	
2003:	72).		
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In	order	for	these	new	systems	to	work,	it	was	vital	for	the	sponsoring	
governments	to	minimise	discussion	of	the	colonial	question	and	
decolonisation	in	the	founding	stages	of	the	United	Nations.	As	highlighted	
in	Chapter	1,	this	silencing	of	colonialism	did	not	only	occur	at	the	San	
Francisco	conference	in	1945,	it	is	a	silence	that	has	been	replicated	and	
reproduced	throughout	the	standard	histories	of	the	United	Nations.	
Standard	accounts	of	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	as	an	
international	organisation	fail	to	acknowledge	the	significance	of	
colonialism	for	its	founding	and	as	a	result,	reproduce	the	problematic	
discourses	of	equality	that	surround	it	(Sherwood,	1996).	Chapter	4	
highlighted	some	of	the	unsuccessful	attempts	by	various	groups	such	as	
the	African	Academy	of	Arts	and	Research	and	the	West	Indies	National	
Council	to	get	decolonisation	and	independence	for	the	colonies	onto	the	
agenda	for	discussion	at	San	Francisco,	attempts	that	have	been	written	
out	of	the	vast	number	of	accounts	of	the	history	of	the	United	Nations	
(Sherwood,	1996:	71).	The	fact	that	these	attempts	were	made,	were	
unsuccessful	and	have	not	been	included	in	the	standard	narrative	tells	us	
something	significant	about	the	United	Nations	as	an	institution.	Rather	
than	dealing	with	the	issue	of	colonialism	and	making	commitments	on	the	
subject	of	independence,	the	major	powers	sought	to	minimise	discussions	
of	this	sort	in	order	to	enable	new	forms	of	management	to	be	established	
that	were	not	explicitly	colonial	but	maintained	colonial	relationships	(Patil,	
2008:	42).				
	
Colonialism	is	also	notably	absent	from	histories	of	international	law	and	
most	importantly	for	the	arguments	developed	here,	in	accounts	of	the	
history	of	the	concept	of	sovereignty.	The	United	Nations	frames	
sovereignty	as	an	objective	status	for	those	states	that	have	successfully	
followed	European	paths	to	development	to	the	extent	that	they	are	able	
to	participate	in	the	global	system.	The	aim	of	the	trusteeship	system	in	
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this	sense	is	to	guide	dependent	territories	to	a	level	of	progress	where	
they	can	be	granted	sovereignty	and	participate	in	international	relations	
as	individual	states	(United	Nations,	1945).	However,	this	narrative	
neglects	the	significance	of	colonialism	for	the	concept	of	sovereignty	and	
for	the	development	of	international	law	more	generally.	This	thesis	has	
made	frequent	use	of	Anghie’s	argument	that	sovereignty	as	a	way	of	
governing	relationships	between	states	emerged	during	the	colonial	
encounter	as	a	way	of	understanding	the	relationship	between	European	
colonisers	and	their	non-European	colonies	(2005:	3).	In	order	to	justify	
colonial	domination,	imperial	states	were	deemed	sovereign	and	colonies	
were	not,	making	international	law	key	to	the	civilising	mission	of	
colonialism,	with	colonialism	acting	as	the	process	by	which	uncivilised	
nations	could	become	civilised	and	be	granted	sovereignty.	As	the	United	
Nations	claims	to	be	based	on	the	sovereign	equality	of	member	states,	it	
is	significant	to	understand	here	the	colonial	history	of	the	concept	of	
sovereignty	in	itself.		
	
The	perceived	objectivity	and	universality	of	international	law	was	justified	
through	the	idea	that	the	status	of	sovereignty	was	attainable	for	all	
nations	and	these	ideas	were	used	to	legitimate	the	exploitation	of	colonial	
domination	as	a	civilising	mission	(Koskenniemi,	2005:	117).	For	this	
colonial	history	to	be	absent	from	narratives	of	international	law	is	
therefore	problematic	as	it	fails	to	recognise	the	fact	that	whilst	European	
states	were	inherently	sovereign,	non-European	states	had	to	earn	their	
sovereignty	through	adherence	to	European	cultural	values.	In	this	sense,	
their	sovereignty	can	never	be	equal.			
	
The	challenge	to	discourses	of	development	that	has	been	present	
throughout	this	thesis	is	based	on	the	belief	that	to	understand	the	world	
in	terms	of	development	and	progress	is	to	prioritise	particular	cultures	
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and	traditions	over	others.	To	challenge	this	is	to	emphasise	that	these	
discourses	have	enabled	and	justified	the	violence	inherent	in	colonialism	
and	to	challenge	the	continuation	of	this	violence	through	neocolonial	
forms	of	control.	Understanding	the	world	in	terms	of	development	
towards	a	singular	end	point	will	always	prioritise	the	values	of	a	particular	
culture	and	it	is	this	that	I	take	issue	with	throughout	the	course	of	this	
thesis.		
	
	
Silences	and	the	Importance	of	History	
	
In	addition	to	making	specific	arguments	about	the	United	Nations	and	its	
relationship	to	colonialism,	it	has	been	the	aim	of	this	thesis	to	emphasise	
the	significance	of	an	accurate	understanding	of	history	for	a	more	valid	or	
legitimate	analysis	of	contemporary	debates.	In	the	case	of	this	project,	
this	has	been	exemplified	by	the	analysis	of	the	selective	enforcement	of	
United	Nations’	policies	on	military	intervention,	arguing	that	in	order	to	
understand	the	implementation	and	selective	enforcement	of	the	
Responsibility	to	Protect	principle	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	since	
the	pro-democracy	revolutionary	uprisings	that	began	in	late	2010,	it	is	
necessary	to	understand	the	underlying	structures	that	have	enabled	this	
selective	enforcement	to	occur.	To	discuss	selective	enforcement	without	
reference	to	the	ways	in	which	great	power	privilege	has	been	
institutionalised	in	the	United	Nations	and	in	turn,	how	this	power	has	
been	legitimated	by	postcolonial	discourses	of	development	that	pre-date	
the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	is	to	neglect	significant	aspects	of	
history	that	have	influenced	contemporary	international	relations.	Within	
the	contemporary	context	of	political	struggles	between	the	world’s	major	
powers,	civil	war	across	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa,	a	refugee	crisis	
on	an	unprecedented	scale	and	the	recent	turn	towards	a	romanticised	
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British	desire	to	return	to	empire,	it	seems	more	important	than	ever	to	re-
narrate	our	histories	in	order	to	take	into	account	the	effects	of	colonialism	
on	the	contemporary	structure	of	the	world.	The	failure	to	acknowledge	
the	histories	of	colonialism	that	have	shaped	the	contemporary	world	has	a	
significant	impact	upon	the	ways	in	which	it	is	possible	to	understand	and	
frame	contemporary	political	debates	(Bhambra,	2014:	153).	In	order	to	
fully	understand	contemporary	global	politics,	it	is	necessary	to	include	
these	histories	of	colonialism	that	have	been	consciously	forgotten	in	order	
to	maintain	existing	hierarchical	orders	of	power.	The	historical	analysis	
that	has	been	presented	here	works	on	this	understanding	that	an	
inaccurate	understanding	of	the	past,	where	significant	events	and	
processes	have	been	silenced	or	excluded,	can	only	lead	to	an	inadequate	
understanding	of	the	present	(Bhambra,	2007:	2).		
	
In	dealing	with	silences,	it	has	also	been	a	desire	of	the	project	to	give	
voice	to	those	aspects	of	history	that	are	usually	overlooked.	Chapter	4	re-
narrated	the	relationship	between	international	institutions	and	
colonialism	by	emphasising	the	histories	of	resistance	that	have	
accompanied	the	establishment	of	these	institutions.	This	is	not	simply	
about	filling	in	the	gaps	in	historical	knowledge,	but	it	is	also	an	
acknowledgement	of	the	attempts	made	by	various	groups	to	resist	
colonial	domination.	To	do	this	emphasises	the	overwhelming	violence	of	
colonialism,	postcolonialism	and	neocolonialism	in	that	these	structures	of	
power	have	succeeded	in	spite	of	significant	resistance,	but	it	also	aims	to	
give	credit	to	this	anti-colonial	resistance	in	achieving	the	formal	
decolonisation	that	is	usually	attributed	to	the	United	Nations.	In	this	
sense,	the	reinterpretation	of	history	is	not	simply	about	providing	a	
different	interpretation	of	the	same	facts,	but	about	establishing	new	facts	
and	the	exposure	of	facts	that	have	been	hidden	by	the	overwhelming	
power	of	some	to	make	history	(Bhambra,	2007:	155).	However,	this	
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project	also	acknowledges	the	limits	of	this	kind	of	work	and	does	not	
claim	to	speak	for	those	who	have	suffered	at	the	hands	of	imperial	
violence	and	who	continue	to	suffer	as	a	result	of	the	political	interests	of	
Western	governments	engaging	in	neocolonial	practices	of	domination.	
There	is	always	a	limit	to	the	extent	to	which	a	researcher	can	address	the	
silences	of	non-Western	contexts	when	writing	from	a	Western	
positionality	(Rutazibwa,	2014:	299).	I	am	aware	that	my	own	position	
within	a	global	context	is	a	privileged	one	and	I	am	conscious	of	the	
complications	of	addressing	the	silencing	of	particular	histories	from	my	
global	and	historical	positioning.	The	hope	is	that	this	work	can	contribute	
to	a	wider	project	of	addressing	historical	silences	that	includes	the	work	of	
non-Western	scholars	in	narrating	their	own	histories.				
	
There	is	also	a	hope	that	the	disciplinary	context	of	this	project	makes	an	
original	contribution	to	the	topic	of	study.	Critiques	of	the	United	Nations	
and	discussions	of	the	issues	presented	throughout	these	chapters	are	
usually	the	realm	of	legal	studies	or	of	theorists	of	international	relations	in	
politics	departments.	By	approaching	this	topic	from	a	sociological	
perspective,	it	has	been	possible	to	look	much	more	closely	at	the	
discourses	that	underpin	relationships	between	states	within	the	United	
Nations,	as	sociology	is	primarily	concerned	with	issues	of	power,	ideology	
and	identity	within	particular	contexts,	exploring	the	relationship	between	
societies	and	institutions	that	are	involved	in	the	establishment	of	power	
(Taylor,	2010:	15).	Rather	than	simply	providing	an	alternative	narrative	to	
the	standard	accounts	of	the	United	Nations,	a	sociological	approach	has	
allowed	for	a	calling	into	question	of	that	which	we	take	for	granted,	
arguing	against	narratives	that	construct	our	experiences	as	necessary	and	
natural	(Dean,	2003:	pp.	180-181).	The	overarching	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	
to	disturb	the	dominant	discourses	of	equality	and	development	that	
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underpin	the	United	Nations,	which	are	all	too	often	naturalised	through	
notions	of	responsibility	and	progress.		
	
Conclusions	and	Future	Research	
	
What	has	been	established	here	is	a	critique	of	the	understanding	that	the	
United	Nations	is	an	institution	entirely	dedicated	to	the	maintenance	of	
international	peace	and	security	and	fundamentally	based	on	the	principle	
of	equality.	The	exploration	of	the	selective	enforcement	of	policy	on	
intervention	has	highlighted	the	way	in	which	the	structure	of	the	Security	
Council	and	the	United	Nations	more	broadly	has	been	designed	to	enable	
the	privileging	of	the	political	interests	of	the	world’s	most	powerful	
nations.	Their	privileged	role	and	status	within	the	organisation	has	been	
legitimated	throughout	history	by	underlying	discourses	of	development	
that	perpetuate	an	understanding	of	progress	as	adherence	to	European	
culture	and	Western	liberalism,	allowing	the	major	powers	to	be	viewed	as	
responsible	for	global	development	due	to	their	sophisticated	culture	
(Tarazona,	2012:	917).	This	relationship	was	established	through	the	
colonial	encounter	alongside	the	concept	of	civilisation	and	an	
understanding	of	cultural	difference	as	civilised	versus	uncivilised.	The	
silencing	of	colonialism	within	the	historical	narratives	of	the	United	
Nations	and	within	narratives	of	the	development	of	international	law	
more	broadly	is	therefore	significant.	To	fail	to	acknowledge	how	it	is	that	
particular	states	and	not	others	came	to	be	the	permanent	members	of	the	
Security	Council	is	to	inaccurately	represent	the	history	of	international	
relations	and	allows	for	problematic	understandings	of	the	world	order	as	
natural	and	justified.	The	silencing	of	colonialism	within	this	context	serves	
to	maintain	the	existing	global	order	by	legitimating	power	differentials	
through	a	relationship	of	responsibility	and	to	equate	the	idea	of	cultural	
difference	with	underdevelopment	and	privilege	Western	culture.	The	
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silencing	of	colonialism	has	allowed	for	the	continuation	of	postcolonial	
power	structures	and	neocolonial	technologies	of	power	that	ensure	the	
continued	dominance	of	the	world’s	major	powers.	The	aim	throughout	
this	thesis	has	been	to	uncover	some	of	the	silences	in	the	United	Nations’	
history	of	itself	and	the	histories	told	by	academics,	disturbing	dominant	
discourses	of	equality	and	highlighting	the	significance	of	colonialism	for	
these	histories	in	order	to	provide	an	alternative	analysis	of	contemporary	
issues	of	selectivity.	Furthermore,	the	aim	has	been	to	emphasise	the	
significance	of	an	accurate	understanding	of	history	for	understanding	
contemporary	debates.	
	
The	implications	of	this	research	relate	to	the	ability	to	take	seriously	the	
histories	of	colonialism	and	anti-colonial	resistance	that	are	presented	here	
as	fundamental	to	the	construction	of	the	United	Nations.	Should	these	
histories	be	taken	seriously,	there	are	significant	implications	for	the	
disciplines	of	International	Relations,	Law	and	Politics,	in	terms	of	
understanding	their	critiques	in	terms	of	traditions	of	resistance	in	a	non-
Western	context.	Whilst	the	critical	scholars	of	these	disciplines	have	
worked	towards	a	deconstruction	of	their	core	concepts,	this	needs	to	be	
done	in	terms	of	the	histories	of	resistance	that	have	been	presented	here,	
not	just	in	critical	terms.	The	thesis	also	has	implications	for	international	
institutions	and	international	policy	in	terms	of	re-structuring	the	Security	
Council	within	the	United	Nations	and	problematising	ideas	of	
development	and	civilisation	in	terms	of	their	historical	use.	The	argument	
here	has	been	that	such	discourses	have	enabled	the	perpetuation	of	
colonial	power	structures	through	international	institutions.		
	
Finally,	there	are	implications	for	contemporary	forms	of	resistance	to	such	
power	structures	in	terms	of	learning	from	anti-colonial	movements	that	
saw	unity	across	political,	economic	and	cultural	divides.	This	argument	is	
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articulated	in	Pham	and	Shilliam’s	(2017)	edited	collection	Meanings	of	
Bandung:	Postcolonial	Orders	and	Decolonial	Visions,	which	argues	the	
politics	of	Bandung	reverberates	in	today’s	continued	battles	against	
neocolonialism.	The	de-silencing	of	colonial	histories	and	anti-colonial	
resistance	can	therefore	provide	a	framework	for	resisting	neocolonial	
practices	and	postcolonial	power	if	we	take	these	histories	seriously	and	
use	them	to	challenge	existing	global	power	structures.	The	hope	of	this	
thesis	is	to	contribute	to	this	process	of	de-silencing	in	order	to	further	
resistance.	
	
In	terms	of	future	research,	this	project	has	opened	a	number	of	
possibilities	in	terms	of	exploring	the	role	of	anti-colonial	resistance	
movements	throughout	history	in	challenging	eurocentric	dominance.	I	am	
keen	to	do	more	research	into	the	structures	of	these	anti-colonial	
organisations	and	to	use	archival	material	in	order	to	give	voice	to	these	
narratives	that	have	been	continually	silenced	throughout	history,	
particularly	in	terms	of	understanding	how	these	anti-colonial	movements	
frame	and	re-frame	the	core	concepts	that	are	central	to	our	
understanding	of	the	modern	world.	My	work	will	remain	committed	to	a	
desire	to	challenge	the	naturalisation	of	colonialism	as	process	of	
domination	and	violence,	as	well	as	a	desire	to	challenge	the	discourses	of	
development	that	continue	to	govern	relationships	between	different	parts	
of	the	world.		
	
The	recent	conflicts	in	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	that	have	provided	
both	the	impetus	for	this	study	and	examples	of	the	reality	of	selective	
intervention	by	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	also	provide	an	
opportunity	for	further	research.	The	constantly	changing	political	context	
in	relation	to	these	conflicts	has	proved	to	be	a	challenge	during	the	4	
years	that	this	project	has	taken	to	complete,	but	I	am	keen	to	continue	my	
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research	in	relation	to	this	particular	geographical	context,	especially	given	
the	most	recent	political	conflict	between	Russia	and	the	United	States	
that	is	reminiscent	of	the	Cold	War	(see	Borger,	2016).	The	motivations	of	
the	revolutionary	protests	in	this	region	provide	a	significant	challenge	to	
the	existing	global	order	and	in	the	most	recent	months,	the	actions	of	the	
Security	Council	in	relation	to	Syria	in	particular	have	begun	to	publicly	
uncover	the	extent	to	which	the	United	Nations	is	limited	by	the	political	
interests	of	the	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council.		
	
Whilst	the	focus	of	this	thesis	is	by	the	nature	of	doctoral	research	very	
particular,	it	has	been	undertaken	in	the	hope	of	providing	an	original	
contribution	to	a	bigger	global	project	initiated	by	postcolonial	theorists	to	
challenge	the	existing	global	order.	It	is	underpinned	by	the	belief	that	the	
world	that	we	live	in	is	not	the	result	of	natural	processes,	of	differential	
development	across	geographical	spaces.	It	is	not	natural	that	wealth	is	
concentrated	in	particular	parts	of	the	globe	whilst	other	parts	of	the	world	
suffer	extreme	levels	of	poverty.	As	such,	this	project	is	underlined	by	the	
same	concerns	that	faced	the	world	in	the	immediate	years	following	
decolonisation,	that	we	cannot	rely	on	the	benevolence	of	the	major	
powers	of	the	world	to	deal	with	the	unjust	consequences	of	colonialism	
and	that	justice	will	only	have	a	chance	if	we	continue	to	struggle	against	
those	powers	that	have	an	interest	in	maintaining	inequality	(Nkrumah,	
1965:	xix).		
	
This	thesis	has	aimed	to	provide	a	challenge	to	this	inequality	by	focusing	
on	a	very	specific	part	of	the	problem.	However,	this	is	done	on	the	basis	
that	in	order	for	international	institutions	such	as	the	United	Nations	to	
truly	act	in	the	interests	of	the	global	population,	it	is	necessary	first	to	deal	
with	the	structures	of	inequality	within	them.	It	is	necessary	to	look	at	their	
historical	development	and	to	acknowledge	their	relationship	to	the	
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broader	global	structures	of	inequality	that	were	established	through	
colonialism.	The	aim	here	has	not	been	to	argue	that	all	international	
institutions	are	inherently	problematic,	but	rather	to	argue	that	
organisations	that	institutionalise	the	privilege	of	a	small	number	of	states	
will	never	be	capable	of	acting	in	the	interests	of	the	global	population.			
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
‘The	danger	to	world	peace	springs	not	from	the	action	of	those	who	seek	
to	end	neo-colonialism	but	from	the	inaction	of	those	who	allow	it	to	
continue’	(Nkrumah,	1965:	258).	
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